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Abstract 
This thesis starts with the proposition that EU (learning) mobility makes the 
realisation of European Union (EU) citizenship most likely. More specifically, it 
conceptualises EU citizenship as a dynamic bond between the EU and its 
citizens, with an important role in community building processes, including 
processes of differentiation (between EU citizens) and exclusion (of non-
citizens). EU citizenship is then observed as a multidimensional construct, 
made up of EU identity, EU rights and EU participation. These propositions 
are tested using original focus group evidence of young and educated EU 
citizens in Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
 
The findings of the thesis provide a more nuanced understanding of EU 
citizenship: it is activated by citizens’ mobility rather than by political 
participation, as is the case with national citizenship. However, its 
dependence on mobility makes EU citizenship irrelevant for stayers (the 
majority of the EU’s population) and results in a brief and temporary 
experience for EU mobiles. 
 
Overall, the thesis emphasises the benefits of attending to the dimensions of 
EU citizenship concurrently and acknowledging the mobile/stayer distinctions. 
It provides original insight into the genuine significance of EU citizenship for 
mobiles and stayers, and sheds new light on the role of EU citizenship in the 
quest for further political integration. 
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Introduction 
It is generally accepted that globalisation is transforming the relationship 
between nation states and their citizens (Isin and Turner, 2002; 2007). In this 
context, the European Union (EU) has been seen as an exemplar of 
cosmopolitanism and an ideal context to illustrate these transformations 
(Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Beck 2006; Beck and Grande, 2007). 
Accordingly, the introduction of EU citizenship in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty 
(Treaty on European Union, TEU) (Article 8) can be interpreted as a direct 
challenge to national models of citizenship (Meehan, 1993; Joppke, 1998; 
Tambini, 2001; Olsen 2008b) and the first genuine attempt at establishing 
democracy beyond nation states (Laffan, 1996; Bruter, 2005; Gillespie and 
Laffan, 2006; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009). However, rather than the 
emergence of an EU-wide (political) community, as the European Commission 
(‘the Commission’) (1997: 3) and some scholars would have us believe 
(Habermas, 1996; Preuss, 1996; Kostakopoulou, 2001; 2005; Bruter, 2005; 
Risse, 2010), the 20 years following the treaty were characterised by the 
development of new processes of differentiation and exclusion within and 
beyond the EU’s borders (Favell and Hansen, 2002; Schierup, Hansen and 
Castles, 2006; Favell, 2008; Fligstein, 2008; Shore, 2012; Ross, 2014).  
 
In fact, the introduction of EU citizenship coincided with a popular veto of an 
EU treaty in Denmark – the first of its kind, which contested the original 
provisions on EU citizenship (Adler-Nissen, 2008). Similarly, recent analyses 
draw our attention to the increasing level of popular discontent (Hooghe and 
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Marks, 2005; 2009) and widespread ambivalence towards European 
integration (White, 2011; Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014). These 
attitudes are, perhaps, most pronounced in the United Kingdom (UK), where 
many citizens are in favour of the country’s exit from the EU, a so-called 
‘Brexit’ (Geddes, 2014; Wellings and Baxendale, 2015). Similar issues are 
also noticeable in other member states however, especially in the growing 
popularity and electoral success of right wing and anti-EU populist parties 
(Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz, 2012; Mudde, 2014). At first it may 
appear as if, in its response to these developments, the Commission has 
moderated its narrative on European integration (Juncker, 2014a). Yet, a 
closer inspection of its discourse suggests that, with EU citizenship acting as 
“the crown jewel” of political integration, the Commission’s supranational 
aspirations “remain on the horizon” (European Commission, 2013b: 2; 2014f; 
Reding, 2013a). Hence, there appears to be a growing disparity between the 
attitudes of (EU) citizens, national political actors and the Commission. So it is 
more important than ever to address the issue of citizenship – the dynamic 
bond that ties a sovereign political community and the individuals together – 
within the EU and, in particular, the significance of EU citizenship in the 
context of European integration. 
 
Against this backdrop, the thesis examines how EU citizenship is realised in 
practice. More specifically, it investigates the scope for the realisation of EU 
citizenship as envisaged by the Commission and it tests the proposition that 
EU mobility in combination with education makes its fulfilment most likely. The 
thesis establishes that a subgroup of mobile, highly-educated and young 
11 
 
citizens are expected to achieve a sense of EU identity and utilise the rights 
and opportunities for participation associated with EU citizenship. It then 
inspects this premise using a multi-method approach to research. First, it 
analyses the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship using critical 
discourse analysis (CDA). Second, it builds on original focus group evidence 
of young and educated citizens in their role as EU mobiles and stayers in 
Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). The combination of these two 
qualitative methods provides for a more comprehensive examination of EU 
citizenship, thereby enhancing the empirical and conceptual contributions of 
this thesis. 
 
The thesis seeks to advance our knowledge and understanding of EU 
citizenship in two respects. The principal empirical contribution of the thesis 
stems from its interrogation of the relationship between EU citizenship and EU 
mobility. To this end, it reports the findings from CDA of the Commission’s 
post-1993 discourse on EU citizenship and focus group research conducted in 
Sweden and the UK. The CDA is illustrative of the Commission’s approach to 
EU citizenship and the focus groups of how (young and educated) EU mobiles 
and stayers are likely to realise the dimensions of EU citizenship – EU 
identity, rights and participation – and take part in new processes of 
differentiation and exclusion.  
 
The chief conceptual contribution of the thesis is two-fold. First, due to the role 
of mobility in activating EU citizenship, the thesis proposes that we reconsider 
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the dichotomy of active/passive (EU) citizens – traditionally observed through 
citizens’ political engagement – along the mobiles/stayers distinctions. 
Second, it suggests that the dimensions of EU citizenship are more heavily 
interlinked than is generally recognised in the existing literature and should 
thus be considered concurrently, just as the dimensions of national citizenship 
tend to be explored concurrently. Adopting a more inclusive approach to EU 
citizenship provides new insights into how national and EU policy-makers can 
pursue further political integration, if they so wish, through the medium of EU 
citizenship. 
 
Taken together, the empirical and conceptual contributions of the thesis 
provide a more nuanced understanding of EU citizenship: it is activated by 
citizens’ mobility – rather than political participation as is the case with 
national citizenship. However, its dependence on mobility makes EU 
citizenship irrelevant for the majority of the EU’s population (the stayers) and 
results in a brief rather than long-lasting experience for the rest (the EU 
mobiles). Moreover, mobility seems to have uneven effects on the dimensions 
of EU citizenship and does not turn EU mobiles into ‘ideal’ EU citizens. For 
example, mobility may enhance the sense of shared EU identity among 
mobiles, but it is unlikely to be fruitful for their approaches to EU participation. 
Overall, the thesis makes a compelling case for adopting a more inclusive 
approach to EU citizenship and for considering the dichotomy of 
active/passive (EU) citizens along the mobiles/stayers distinctions. The 
original qualitative analysis enables the thesis to deliver an in-depth 
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interrogation of EU citizenship and sheds new light on the role of EU 
citizenship in furthering political integration in Europe. 
 
I.1. EU citizenship in context  
Proponents of a more closely integrated EU, were, from the outset, explicit 
about the role of EU citizenship in attaining their supranational and political 
aspirations. For example, in its very first citizenship report, written one month 
after the TEU came into force, the Commission (1993: 2, emphasis in original) 
declared that the (mere) introduction of EU citizenship in the Treaty “created a 
direct political link” between the EU and member state citizens “with the aim 
of fostering a sense of [EU] identity”. Similar ideas can be seen in some of the 
Commission’s (see for example 2008a; 2010a; 2013a) more recent reports. 
They too place citizens “at the heart of European integration” and identify EU 
citizenship as the “fundamental status of nationals of the member states” 
(European Commission, 2013a: 2, 3, emphasis in original). More often than 
not, however, the transformative potential of EU citizenship has been an 
aspiration rather than a demonstrated fact.  
 
All too often the Commission has said what it would like to see happen rather 
than what has actually happened (see for example Hansen and Hager, 2010). 
For example, despite its increasing efforts to promote EU mobility among 
citizens (more recently within the framework of the ‘European Year of 
Citizens, 2013-14’), only a very small segment of the EU’s population have 
actually exercised their mobility rights. Even the ‘direct political link’ EU 
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citizenship supposedly represents can be questioned considering its 
“complementary” status to member state citizenship (Hansen, 2009). The 
situation has only been worsened by the fact that member state governments 
have recently curtailed some of these mobility rights (Shore, 2012). Official 
figures indicate that about 20 per cent of the EU’s population is actively mobile 
in the EU (TNS Opinion and Social, 2011), though only around 2.7 per cent or 
13.6 million people actually reside in an EU member state other than their 
country of origin on a semi-permanent basis (Eurostat, 2014a).1 Although 
there is much variation between these figures, there is a highly charged 
political debate in some member states over the effects of EU mobility on the 
host country. In the UK for example, Prime Minister David Cameron (2013) 
recently announced that national governments must ‘crackdown on EU 
immigration’ by capping EU citizens’ access to the welfare systems of host 
countries.  
 
Partly for these reasons, both the EU and its citizenship policies are more 
often condemned than applauded. National leaders, who possess the political 
support of EU citizens, have recently begun a process of inter-state dialogue 
that aims to propose arbitrary policies restricting EU citizenship rights, most 
notably EU mobiles’ access to welfare provisions (Mikl-Leitner et al., 2013; 
Mills and Grimston, 2014; Wagstyl, 2014). In this context, critical scholars 
depict EU citizenship as “pie in the sky” (D’Oliveria, 1995). These approaches 
do not, however, recognise that EU citizenship is, in some sense, already a 
reality: member state citizens exercise their EU rights when they vote for the 
                                            
1 In comparison, third-country non-EU immigrants make up around 4.1% of the EU’s 
population (20.7 million people) (Eurostat, 2014a). 
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European Parliament (EP) or move between the EU’s member states. 
Additionally, the EU’s unrelenting push for political integration (arguably at the 
cost of national sovereignty) and the current debate between EU and national 
leaders about freedom of movement make EU citizenship a highly topical 
issue within contemporary European studies.  
 
Against this background, the thesis seeks to shed light on the extent to which 
member state citizens, or in this case ‘EU citizens’, realise the ideals of EU 
citizenship. In so doing, it embeds the study of EU citizenship in the broader 
field of citizenship studies. According to scholars in this field, citizenship can 
be broadly defined as the dynamic bond between a sovereign political 
community and the individual (Heater, 2004a; Magnette, 2005). It shapes 
community-building processes, including both, processes of differentiation, 
distinguishing between different categories of citizens (Turner, 1997: 15) and 
exclusion, separating citizens from non-citizens (Castano et al., 2002: 319). 
The latter aspect usually stems from the traditional Aristotelian definition of 
citizenship, observing the active/passive dichotomy of citizenship from a 
political engagement perspective (Bellamy, 2008a: 97-123). It is also generally 
accepted that citizenship entails three interlinked and collective dimensions, 
namely identity, rights and participation (Heater, 2004a; Magnette, 2005; 
Bellamy, 2008a; Bosniak, 2008). These dimensions have been common to 
citizenship models across diverse historical and political contexts and can 
shed light on the range of existing theories and practices.  
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The establishment of EU citizenship has instigated the development of a more 
specialised research agenda on EU citizenship (Meehan, 1993; Wiener, 1998; 
Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001). The resulting literature is, however, separated 
almost entirely from the broader field of citizenship studies (Chapter 1.1.). The 
bulk of this research probes whether the different dimensions of (national) 
citizenships are present at the EU level. However, the (alleged) sui generis 
character of EU citizenship usually leads most scholars to question its 
practical aspects (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009), including the vigour of 
citizens’ sense of collective EU identity (Duchesne et al., 2013), their 
awareness of EU rights (White, 2011) and interest and actual participation in 
EU elections (Hobolt, 2012). Therefore, these scholars highlight the limits of 
contemporary EU citizenship and political integration. This thesis argues that 
by considering the dimensions of EU citizenship separately and within its 
normative, institutional or empirical frameworks, these scholars present a very 
partial understanding of what EU citizenship actually signifies. 
 
Many scholars recognise the multidimensional character of national 
citizenships in Europe (Heater, 2004a; Magnette, 2005; Bellamy, 2008a). Yet, 
most studies on EU citizenship have failed to adopt a similarly inclusive 
approach. Some fail to recognise the existence of all three dimensions of EU 
citizenship and test one dimension alone – usually EU identity (Bruter, 2005; 
Shaw, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2010; Ross, 2014). Others recognise that 
EU citizenship is multidimensional but do not test these dimensions 
empirically (Bellamy 2008b; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Karolweski, 
2010; Risse, 2010; Olsen, 2012). Again others test two dimensions together at 
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any one time (Recchi and Favell, 2009; White, 2011; Duchesne et al., 2013; 
Van Ingelgom, 2014). These approaches do not seem to notice the interlinked 
character of the dimensions of EU citizenship and do not consider their 
concurrent effects. 
 
In contrast to these studies, this thesis argues that the three dimensions of EU 
citizenship are equally important (Chapter 1.2.). They are interlinked and 
constantly reinforce and stimulate one another. By the same token, if one or 
more of these dimensions are absent, they undermine the intensity of the 
other dimension(s) and can lead to ambiguity in the broader citizenship 
framework as well. Consequently, examining one dimension over the others 
may lead to false conclusions about EU citizenship’s actual significance. The 
necessity to adopt a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship is apparent if 
we consider how individuals can turn their mere subjecthood into citizenship. 
EU rights define the legal parameters within which individuals (in this case 
member state citizens) can realise their EU citizenship. The exercising of 
these rights has the potential to enhance individuals’ sense of EU identity, 
which in turn can influence their approaches to EU level political participation 
(Sanders et al., 2012).2 Moreover, EU rights underscore who has the right to 
participate in EU politics. In turn, EU participation defines the boundaries of 
the EU community and the parameters of EU identity. Should it be realised, 
the latter dimension could render EU citizenship a political model of 
                                            
2 There is not a simple linear relationship between the dimensions of EU citizenship – as 
demonstrated by Sanders et al. (2012). Instead, EU identity can lead to political participation 
and, in turn, EU participation may enhance citizens’ sense of EU identity. The complementary 
character of EU citizenship to national citizenships also complicates this process. The 
multiplicity in how these dimensions may reinforce one another (Figure 1.1.) makes adopting 
a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship all the more appropriate and necessary. 
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citizenship (Bellamy, 2008b). The political potential of EU citizenship has been 
addressed by empirical studies and policy-makers to a considerable extent 
(mainly in their attempt to address the EU’s so-called democratic deficit) 
(especially in Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2010).3 Yet, there is very little scholarly 
work that considers the interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship (these are 
Favell, 2008; 2010; Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 
2012). 
 
Consequently, this thesis adopts a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship 
and defines and examines its frameworks and dimensions concurrently. The 
empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 5 – 7) will shed light on how the 
interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship are likely to manifest themselves. 
Although young and educated citizens may find it challenging to make sense 
of their (EU) citizenship – after all, it is an unlikely topic of discussion in their 
everyday lives – the deliberation within and between the focus groups is likely 
to provide us with an indication of how these dimensions interact with one 
another in the EU context (possibly at both the national and EU levels). A 
central argument of this thesis is that if academics and EU officials really want 
to address the issue of EU citizenship (in relation to EU political integration) 
they should attend to its dimensions concurrently.  
 
While participation in political-decision making has been at the centre of 
nation state citizenship in Europe (Marshall, 1950; Bellamy, 2008a; 2010), a 
                                            
3 The establishment of EU citizenship thus supports a political (Hix, 2008; Hix and Høyland, 
2011) rather than a regulatory approach to the EU (Majone, 1998). 
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closer inspection of the institutional framework of EU citizenship reveals that 
only EU mobility makes it relevant to the lives of its citizens (Chapter 2.). 
Every EU treaty places citizens’ EU mobility rights at the heart of EU 
citizenship (European Commission, 2013a) and prior to their EU level political 
engagement (see for example Article 20 of the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on the 
Functioning of the Union, TFEU)). Until recently these texts only discussed the 
rights of EU mobiles and even now they do not specify the rights of stayers.4 
Even more, EU mobility facilitates citizens’ claims for most of their EU rights, 
including non-discrimination on the basis of nationality and it activates some 
political rights, including the right to vote in the EU and municipal elections at 
the country of their residence (Guild, Rotaeche and Kostakopoulou, 2013). 
Therefore, the institutional framework of EU citizenship implies that member 
state citizens’ EU mobility, including economic, labour and learning mobility, 
activates their EU status.  
 
Actually, from the different types of EU mobility that citizens can exercise, the 
Commission (2008c; 2010c; 2010d) has been particularly outspoken about 
the positive effects EU learning mobility has on young citizens’ sense of EU 
citizenship (Chapter 2.2.). Consequently, and despite the fact that member 
states continue to set educational policies in the EU, the Commission has 
dominated the relevant policy discourse (Keeling, 2006; Curaj et al., 2012). 
For example, in the current Erasmus+ programme, the learning mobility of 
over four million individuals, including two million higher education students is 
                                            
4 The Citizens’ Initiative (CI) was introduced in Article 24 of TFEU in 2009. However, its 
impact has been marginal. The Commission turned down the very first initiative that gathered 
the required support from citizens (Right 2 Water) (Appendix 3). 
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positioned as the first of three action points to be realised by 2020 (European 
Commission, 2014a). There is some empirical evidence to support the 
Commission’s approach (King and Ruiz, 2003; Van Mol, 2014; Mitchell, 2012; 
2014). However, a number of studies also suggest that participating in 
educational exchanges does not have a considerable impact on students’ 
sense of EU identity (Sigalas, 2009; 2010a; 2010b; Wilson, 2011) or that it 
only enhances the EU identity of less-well educated students (Kuhn, 2012a).  
 
Most of these studies explore the effects of EU (learning) mobility through the 
transactionalist approach to European integration (Deutsch et al., 1968). 
Whilst building on their findings, this thesis also explores the interaction that 
occurs between EU mobiles and stayers in the context of heightened EU 
mobility. Due to the central role EU mobility has in activating EU citizenship, 
processes of differentiation and exclusion – an integral aspect of how 
citizenship shapes community building processes – are expected to manifest 
differently than what has been observed in national contexts. Accordingly, EU 
mobility is expected to lead to processes of differentiation between (and 
among) EU mobiles and stayers, and is likely to heighten processes of 
exclusion (of non-EU citizens). The thesis proposes that we re-consider the 
dichotomy of active/passive (EU) citizens along the mobiles/stayers 
distinctions. In order to elucidate how the research was carried out to address 
the issue of EU citizenship and its relationship with EU mobility, the next 
section discusses the questions, methods and case studies adopted. 
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I.2. Key questions, research methods and case studies  
This thesis examines how EU citizenship is realised in practice. More 
specifically, it probes whether and how young and educated citizens realise 
their EU citizenship (Research Question 1). In so doing, it aims to explore the 
extent to which the ideals of EU citizenship, as envisaged by the Commission, 
are fulfilled by these citizens or are ever likely to be fulfilled (Research 
Question 2). The previous section drew attention to the interlinked character 
of the dimensions of EU citizenship. This issue raises another question, 
namely how EU identity, rights and participation are likely to transform one 
another and shape the broader structure of EU citizenship (Research 
Question 3). EU citizenship departs from national models because it is 
activated through EU mobility (rather than political participation). Against this 
backdrop, the thesis includes a qualitative interrogation of new processes of 
differentiation and exclusion in the EU (Research Question 4). Finally, by 
reflecting on the (alleged) link between EU citizenship and political integration 
in Europe (Research Question 5), the thesis makes an attempt to contribute to 
the debate about democratic legitimacy. 
 
In order to provide a better understanding of EU citizenship (its different 
frameworks and dimensions), this thesis adopts a multi-method approach to 
research (Bryman, 2012: 383) and complements the findings of CDA with 
original focus group evidence. First, the thesis undertakes CDA of the 
Commission’s ideals on EU citizenship. Analysing the Commission’s 
discourse, it sheds light on the normative and institutional frameworks of EU 
citizenship, and the actual scope these frameworks grant to citizens for 
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realising their EU status. Discourse is understood in this thesis as a “form of 
social practice” that is “socially shaped and socially constitutive” (Fairclough, 
2013: 92). It is expected to “sustain and reproduce the social status quo, 
…[because] it contributes to transforming it” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 
258). More specifically, the thesis is interested in the Commission’s “practical 
argumentation” (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 1) about EU citizenship. To 
this end, it studies how the analytical components of CDA – power relations 
between political actors, their pre-determined objectives and the ideological 
implications of their actions (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 78-116) – are 
likely to shape the Commission’s discourse.  
 
The CDA includes qualitative, in-depth and thorough analysis of EU treaty 
texts, legislative proposals, formal evaluations and reports, as well as media 
statements that were first and foremost written by the Commission or by 
Commission representatives. The selection of documents was made on 
whether the argument they present is credible, typical and comprehensible 
(Scott, 1990: 6).5 Due to the ever-changing institutional setting of the EU – in 
which the Commission also re-invents itself every five years – documents with 
an explicit focus on ‘EU’ (or ‘Union’) citizenship were considered in more 
detail. By evaluating these documents, the thesis draws attention to a 
disparity in official EU thinking: the economic rationales of EU citizenship 
dominate the everyday workings of the Commission as well as the legal 
structure of EU citizenship. However, this fits uncomfortably with the oft-cited 
political aspirations of the Commission, which grants a somewhat elitist 
                                            
5 See Appendix 1 for CDA research sample. 
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character to EU citizenship and establishes different categories of EU citizens. 
From these categories of citizens, EU-15 mobiles and, especially, the young 
and highly educated EU mobiles are expected to realise their EU citizenship 
to the fullest. 
 
The Commission was selected as the case study for the CDA due to its 
executive role in the EU (Hix and Høyland, 2011), pro-integrationist and 
supranational outlook (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000), sole responsibility for 
communicating EU policies to citizens (European Commission, 2013q) and 
interest in developing an EU level citizenship regime since the 1950s (Olsen, 
2012). Its interest in citizenship has a political community-building function – 
similarly to the role national citizenships have had in nation states (Wiener, 
1998). However, the Commission’s executive power has shrunk considerably 
in the recent years (Kassim and Menon, 2010) due to the increased power of 
legislative institutions (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 27) – the European Parliament 
(EP) and the Council of the European Union (EU Council) –, the 
institutionalisation of the European Council (Puetter, 2012) and the recent 
crisis (Hodson, 2013). Therefore, we cannot be sure to what extent its 
discourse on EU citizenship is likely to also echo the changing dynamics of 
the broader, institutional structure of the EU.  
 
Second, the findings of the CDA aid the analysis of primary focus group 
evidence, which explores how EU citizenship is actually perceived and 
realised by a sub-group of citizens – the young and educated EU mobiles and 
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stayers. There are two main reasons for selecting focus groups as the main 
research method for this thesis. On the one hand, focus groups are 
particularly suitable for carrying out exploratory research in a sensitive field of 
study (Morgan, 1998: 11). Considering that citizenship, identity and political 
participation are unlikely topics for everyday discussions, making sense of the 
perceptions of participants would have been difficult using survey or interview 
data. Focus groups are seen as a more appropriate research method. They 
allow for the expression of diverse views and facilitate interaction and 
‘collective sense-making’ among participants (Bryman, 2012: 503-4). On the 
other hand, the interaction, reasoning and forms of reflection present in the 
focus groups are expected to provide more in-depth data. Participants can go 
beyond a set of interview questions and probe one another for holding certain 
perspectives. The resulting interaction among them is expected to highlight 
the issues they consider important and produce insights that would be harder 
to access using a different research method (Morgan, 1998: 12).  
 
The focus groups referred to in this thesis covered three main topics. First, it 
explored how participants defined their national and EU citizenships, and 
whether EU mobiles were more likely to identify themselves as EU citizens 
than stayers. Second, it investigated participants’ approaches to the three 
dimensions of EU citizenship; their sense of identity (EU, country of origin or 
host country), perceptions of dis/advantages as EU mobiles/stayers, and 
engagement in political participation at the EU, national and local levels. Third, 
the focus groups probed participants’ views about their experiences of EU 
(learning) mobility and its impact on their sense of (EU) citizenship. In some 
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cases, the focus groups questioned participants about the most appropriate 
and effective methods for promoting the idea of EU citizenship across 
member states.6 
 
Ten focus groups were carried out with EU mobiles and stayers in Sweden 
and the UK between May 2012 and March 2013. Participants were recruited 
through snowballing technique, using social-media resources, posters, flyers 
and public announcements. They were aged between 18 and 30 years old 
and required to have arrived in Sweden or the UK as a result of their 
exercising of EU mobility rights. The interviews lasted for approximately 1.5 
hours and the language of discussions was English.7 Four groups of EU 
mobiles and one of stayers were conducted in each country. The stayer 
groups were included for controlling purposes. The likely effects of mobility on 
participants’ perceptions could only be explored if rival explanations for 
changes in their perceptions, including the effects of national and educational 
contexts were also considered. In total, these groups included 66 EU mobiles 
and stayers, 29 in Sweden (including 22 EU mobiles and 7 stayers) and 37 in 
the UK (including 24 EU mobiles and 13 stayers). Participants came to these 
countries from a variety of member states, including EU-15 and Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) states. They had spent different lengths of time in 
Sweden and the UK before the research was conducted, ranging from one 
week to over four years. On average, participants in Sweden were aged 23.5 
                                            
6 See Appendix 2 for focus group related information, including questionnaire and 
demographic information on participants. Access to the focus group data is available from the 
researcher upon request. 
7 The majority of EU mobiles in Sweden did not speak Swedish. 
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years and arrived 14 months before the research was carried out. For the UK, 
the figures were 21.5 and 2.5 years, respectively.  
 
Sweden and the UK were selected as case studies due to their willingness to 
allow free movement from CEE states immediately upon their accession. 
Their subsequent contradictory approaches towards EU residents are 
indicative of the ever-changing state of affairs in a crisis-stricken EU (Chapter 
3.2.2). It is well known that EU rights were limited following the EU’s Eastern 
enlargement in 2004.8 Although initially three EU-15 states opened their 
borders to CEE mobiles, namely Ireland, Sweden and the UK, by 2007 only 
Sweden had left its borders open.9 Therefore, there is only one EU-15 
member state where all EU citizens can and have been able to exercise their 
EU rights, namely Sweden. As a result, Sweden recorded around 276,000 EU 
mobiles in 2011 (Eurostat, 2014a) and has seen a gradual growth in overall 
numbers: 16,500 in 2004 and 25,100 by 2011 (Eurostat, 2014a). Interestingly 
for this thesis, almost half of all EU mobiles who arrived to Sweden in 2011 
went there for educational purposes (making up approximately 10,500 visiting 
EU students) (SHEA, 2013). Even though EU mobiles continue to arrive to 
Sweden, Swedes still have the most welcoming attitude towards them across 
the EU (GMF, 2013). While the majority of Swedes (61 per cent) express a 
growing concern about the extent to which immigrants integrate into the 
                                            
8 The EU rights of students are not restricted by transitional measures. However, students can 
only really enjoy the same rights as stayers once any restriction on their residence is also 
lifted (e.g. access to employment and healthcare). 
9 EU-15 member states are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. CEE 
member states are part of the EU since 2004. They include EU8 countries: Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland. Cyprus and Malta also 
joined the EU on the 1st of May 2004. The so-called EU2 states joined on the 1st of January 
2007: Bulgaria and Romania. Finally, Croatia joined the EU on the 1st of July 2013. 
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Swedish society (GMF, 2013), non-integration makes it more likely that EU 
mobiles interact with one another and develop a ‘community of Europeans’.10 
Therefore, Sweden seems to be an ideal context for young and educated EU 
mobiles to realise their EU citizenship, which makes it a particularly 
appropriate case study for this thesis.  
 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that EU mobiles are still the exception rather 
than the rule in Sweden (Doyle, Hughes and Wadensjö, 2006). Their small 
number is even more striking when it is compared with numbers in the UK, the 
second case study of this thesis. The UK had received around 2.3 million EU 
mobiles by 2011, representing about 3.7 per cent of its total population 
(Eurostat, 2014a).11 Even more, the number of EU mobiles arriving to the UK 
is still on the rise: net migration doubled from 65,000 to 131,000 in the year 
ending September 2013, corresponding to approximately half of the UK’s 
foreign net migration (Migration Watch, 2014). From the estimated 209,000 
EU mobiles who arrived during this year, 47,500 were EU mobiles with long-
term study plans (Migration Watch, 2014). Actually, the UK has had, for a 
number of years, the largest inflow of foreign students. For example, in 2012 
just under a third of all EU mobiles studied in the UK – almost twice as many 
as in the second most popular study destination, namely Germany (these 
three figures were 728,600 for the EU, 205,600 for the UK and 121,000 for 
                                            
10 GMF (2013) report refers to general public attitudes towards immigration and does not 
make a distinctions between TCNs and EU mobiles. Some of the hostility is, nonetheless, 
expected to be towards TCNs rather than EU mobiles as apparent from the policy strategies 
of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and Sweden Democrats (SD), both of which gained 
considerably public support recently (Berg and Spehar, 2013; Geddes, 2014). 
11 For a more detailed evaluation of member states’ immigration rules and their likely impact 
on mobile EU citizens’ perceptions, see Chapter 3. 
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Germany) (Eurostat, 2014b). The British public’s reaction to the inflow of EU 
mobiles has been characterised by mild hostility: 64 per cent consider 
migration to be “more problem than opportunity”, 55 per cent believe that “too 
many” migrants are in the country (GMF, 2013) and, in a referendum on 
Britain’s EU membership sizable minority, 39 per cent would vote in favour of 
leaving the EU (YouGov, 2014). Hence EU mobiles are likely to be less 
welcome in the UK than in Sweden. The UK is expected to demonstrate the 
negative impact a host country context can have on young citizens’ ability to 
realise their EU citizenship. In addition to its adverse approach towards EU 
mobiles, practical considerations also underpin the selection of the UK as a 
case study for this thesis. The researcher was based at a British university, 
which eased both the recruitment process and organisation of focus groups. 
Other considerations included language requirements, access to funding and 
the time constraints of completing this thesis.  
 
Since this thesis relies on exploratory qualitative evidence, it has a somewhat 
limited scope to make generalisations about the link between EU citizenship 
and EU (learning) mobility. Considering that the conclusions of existing 
quantitative studies on one or the other dimensions of EU citizenship are 
inconsistent (see for example Recchi and Favell, 2009; Sanders et al., 2012), 
adopting a quantitative approach would have only added another layer to the 
existing diversity in the field.12 While the exploratory evidence is not 
representative of the general population, it is expected to shed light on the 
                                            
12 Furthermore, no data set is currently available which includes measures of the dimensions 
of (EU) citizenship and could also account for the effects of EU mobility. The best alternative 
is the mass survey data from IntUne; an EU-wide dataset with indicators linked to EU 
citizenship, identity and participation – apart from EU mobility. 
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likely impact mobility has on those citizens who are most susceptible to 
changes in their perceptions of citizenship. The evidence also allows for 
contradictory evidence to emerge – EU mobiles at Swedish and UK 
universities may exhibit a range of non-EU citizenship perceptions and 
experiences. This should become apparent through their focus group 
debates. Moreover, it is only through qualitative exploratory evidence that 
contemporary processes of differentiation and exclusion can be interrogated. 
To the knowledge of the researcher, it is the first time this issue is addressed 
by academic work on EU citizenship. Although existing qualitative research on 
(young) citizens’ sense of EU citizenship recognises the importance of EU 
mobility, they only investigate how the perceptions of EU mobiles or stayers 
are likely to change following intra-EU mobility (Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008; 
Skey, 2011a; Ross, 2014). The focus group evidence used in this thesis also 
draws attention to the way in which EU mobiles and stayers approach one 
another. It can thus make clear empirical and conceptual contributions to the 
debates these studies have begun to generate.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis cannot reach any conclusions about whether and to 
what extent those citizens who were originally targeted by the EU – EU labour 
mobiles (Maas, 2005; Olsen, 2012) – actually realise EU citizenship or how 
they perceive its different dimensions. This would be a novel and highly 
topical research project that would likely to generate interest amongst 
academics and policy-makers. However, due to the time constraints and 
limited resources of the researcher, as well as the well-documented difficulty 
associated with securing access to these groups of EU mobiles (European 
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Commission, 2013a), this thesis probes the perceptions and behaviours of EU 
students in their roles as EU mobiles and stayers). It can thus only really draw 
conclusions about the likely impacts (institutionalised) EU learning mobility 
has for EU mobiles and stayers. Nonetheless, research on EU learning 
mobility is also important considering that the Commission identifies 
participating students as the ideal EU citizens and also because these 
students determine the type of EU citizenship that is likely to persist into the 
future. 
 
I.3. Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised around eight substantive chapters. 
Chapter 1 sets the scene for addressing the issue of EU citizenship in this 
thesis. A short overview of the existing literature on EU citizenship suggests 
that there is a tendency among scholars to observe EU citizenship as sui 
generis and attend to its frameworks and dimensions separately. In an 
attempt to re-embed the study of EU citizenship within the broader field of 
citizenship studies, the chapter draws attention to debates, which played out 
across diverse historical and political models, and the extent to which these 
debates accord with the case of EU citizenship. Subsequently, the chapter 
considers how the dimensions of (EU) citizenship – (EU) identity, rights and 
participation – can be operationalised in empirical terms.  
 
Chapter 2 explores the European Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship 
and demonstrates that the young, educated and mobile citizens are 
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recognised as the ideal EU citizens. The main finding is that largely due to the 
broader institutional structure of the EU, EU citizenship’s economic rationale 
rather than political aspirations dictates the Commission’s everyday discourse. 
Actually, the Commission seems to work towards expanding the scope EU 
mobiles have for realising their EU citizenship. Due to its principal focus on 
EU mobiles, the Commission grants an elitist character to EU citizenship and 
adopts selective policies towards different categories of EU citizens, including 
stayers, CEE and EU-15 mobiles. As a result, it institutionalises processes of 
differentiation and exclusion within the EU. 
 
Chapter 3 considers the main hypothesis of this thesis. In particular, it 
proposes EU mobility (together with education) is required to enhance 
citizens’ ability to realise their EU citizenship. In order to shed light on the 
likely relationship between these two issues, the chapter revisits the 
transactionalist approach to European integration, the development of mobility 
rights and educational policies in the EU, and the findings of empirical studies, 
most of which have applied the contact hypothesis to understand citizens’ 
experiences. The chapter then investigates how EU mobility is likely to impact 
the relationship between different categories of EU citizens by revisiting the 
main findings of qualitative studies on EU identity and citizenship. It then 
proposes that we reconsider the dichotomy of active/passive (EU) citizens 
along the mobiles/stayers distinctions. 
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In order to illustrate the likely effects of EU mobility on citizens’ sense of EU 
citizenship, Chapters 4 to 7 use original focus group evidence of EU mobiles 
and stayers in Sweden and the UK. After a short overview of the processes 
associated with conducting focus group research, Chapter 4 emphasises that 
mobility can transform the perceptions of young citizens about EU and 
national citizenships. The majority of EU mobiles who participated in the focus 
groups assumed there is a (direct) bond between the EU and its mobiles, 
while for stayers EU citizenship was secondary to their national citizenships. 
However, most participants believed EU citizenship does not really exist 
(more specifically, not to the same extent as national citizenships do). 
Depending on their country of residence, this deduction led to increasing 
differences between participants’ perceptions of the shape and future of EU 
citizenship. Accordingly, participants in Sweden were more likely to observe 
EU citizenship as “something for the future” than those in the UK.  
 
Chapter 5 explores EU mobiles’ sense of EU identity across three elements: 
sense of belonging, shared identity and recognition of the “other”. The key 
findings indicate that EU mobiles were more likely “to feel European” than 
stayers, especially considering their sense of belonging to the EU. There also 
appeared to be significant differences between the approaches of EU mobiles 
and stayers to the other two elements of EU identity. However, novel 
processes of differentiation and exclusion might overshadow the initially 
fruitful effects of EU mobility. Most importantly, the evidence suggests that 
participants’ sense of EU identity was particularly exclusive in character and 
likely to have a civic aspect. For example, EU mobiles had a difficulty in 
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bridging the differences between CEE and EU-15 mobiles. Nonetheless, they 
were even less likely to socialise with stayers. Similar concerns emerged from 
the debates among (EU-15) stayers; they too appeared to find it difficult to 
socialise with EU mobiles, especially CEE mobiles. Against this backdrop, the 
cosmopolitan outlook of some participants – mainly male mobiles – might be 
characterised as ambiguous at best. 
 
Chapter 6 sheds light on the likely similarities and distinctions between the 
perceptions of EU mobiles about their EU rights, considering their awareness 
and presumed advantages of their rights, and whether and, if so, to what 
extent these rights were expected to guarantee equality among EU citizens 
and access to member state and (possibly) EU communities. The chapter 
highlights that young and educated EU citizens increasingly referred to EU 
mobility as the basis on which a model of EU citizenship might materialise. 
Nonetheless, participants also suggested that a clear divide is emerging 
between EU-15 and CEE mobiles, probing the extent to which EU citizenship 
is relevant for other categories of EU citizens, including the stayers, the 
uneducated and those with limited economic resources. Thus the chapter 
provides a strong indication of how processes of differentiation (and 
exclusion) are emerging in the EU context. 
 
Chapter 7 turns to the last dimension of EU citizenship, EU participation, and 
explores which of the young and educated citizens were likely to participate, 
what were the main reasons for and the most likely forms of their participation 
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– whether they participated in traditional or alternative forms of engagement. 
The evidence suggests that mobility matters for how these citizens 
approached participating in politics. Accordingly, EU mobiles focused on the 
nuanced characteristics of the EU – which could be used to justify their 
abstention from traditional forms of engagement –, while stayers transferred 
their knowledge of national politics to the EU level in order to make sense of 
the latter. Although tackled somewhat differently, the majority of both groups 
of citizens appeared to be critical of the EU and its political-system, observing 
it to be largely undemocratic. None of the groups considered EU participation 
as an aspect of EU citizenship and, instead, the ensuing debates portrayed 
EU participation as yet another source of processes of differentiation. These 
findings indicate that EU mobility together with EU participation may 
undermine rather than enhance the EU’s quest for political integration. 
 
Chapter 8 provides an overall assessment of EU citizenship. It summarises 
the key findings of the thesis and pays particular attention to the likely impact 
EU mobility has on how citizens realise their EU citizenship. The chapter then 
considers the implications of these findings in the context of the EU’s political 
integration and the Commission’s ideals and, finally, identifies potential 
research agendas and questions for future studies.  
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Chapter 1. Addressing the issue of EU citizenship 
The majority of literature on EU citizenship tends to demarcate EU citizenship 
from the other models of citizenship. Regardless of the specific arguments 
made by scholars, the result of their endeavour is to suggest that EU 
citizenship is sui generis (Pollack, 2005; Kostakopoulou, 2007; Bellamy, 
2008b; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009) or not even worthy of the name (Aron, 
1974; Smith, 1992; Shore, 2000) – to the extent that it is entirely divorced from 
the broader field of citizenship studies. Also within EU citizenship studies, 
scholars have tended to focus on one dimension of citizenship – identity, 
rights or participation – to the exclusion of the others, and consider EU 
citizenship’s institutional, normative and empirical frameworks separately (see 
for example Kostakopoulou, 2001; Maas, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2010; 
Olsen, 2012). This practice has led to a very partial understanding of what EU 
citizenship actually signifies.  
 
This chapter attempts to respond to these two problematic features of the 
existing literature on EU citizenship. First, it seeks to firmly re-embed the 
study of EU citizenship in the field of citizenship studies. To do so, it provides 
a general definition of citizenship and considers how its dimensions accord 
with different models, including historical, national and EU citizenships. 
Although the contested character of citizenship – the differences between 
models in practice and theory – serves as the point of departure for the 
majority of the existing literature in this field (Marshall, 1950; Kymlicka and 
Norman, 1994; Isin and Turner, 2002; Bellamy, 2008a), there is a tendency 
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citizenship – identity, rights and participation. Second, as a consequence of 
embedding the study of EU citizenship in the field of citizenship studies, the 
chapter establishes the desirability of adopting a more inclusive approach to 
(EU) citizenship. This means that we attend to all three dimensions of EU 
citizenship concurrently and (preferably) across its institutional, normative and 
empirical frameworks.   
 
This chapter lays down the conceptual foundations of citizenship and sheds 
light on why citizenship has been difficult to apply to the case of the EU. The 
proposed approach – attending to the dimensions of EU citizenship 
concurrently – is used for structuring and analysing the empirical evidence in 
the subsequent chapters of this thesis (Chapters 3 – 7). This chapter is 
divided in to three main parts. The first part offers an overview of the literature 
on EU citizenship. The second part provides a general definition of citizenship 
and draws upon the dimensions of citizenship across historical and political 
contexts. The third part considers how the dimensions of (EU) citizenship – 
(EU) identity, rights and participation – can be operationalised in empirical 
terms. 
 
1.1. An overview of the literature on EU citizenship 
The (formal) establishment of EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty has 
been perceived as a new turning point in the history and development of 
citizenship (Habermas, 1996: 505; Gerstenberg, 2001: 299; Heater, 2004a: 
276). Due to the distinctively political role of citizenship (Magnette, 2005: 15; 
Bellamy, 2008a: 2), it has also been interpreted as the EU’s attempt at 
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community-building and political integration (Laffan, 1996; Kostakopoulou, 
2001; Karolewski, 2009). However, contradictory conclusions about the actual 
significance of EU citizenship have emerged (see for example Smith, 1992; 
Habermas, 2003). This section provides a short overview of the existing 
literature on EU citizenship and, in particular, on what has been revealed 
about its normative, institutional and empirical frameworks.13 
 
1.1.1. The normative, institutional and empirical frameworks of EU 
citizenship 
Scholars tend to make overly optimistic or overly cynical assumptions about 
the normative framework of EU citizenship.14 Some emphasise the 
transformative potential of EU citizenship as the first supra- or post-national 
model (Habermas, 1996; 1998; 2003; Preuss, 1996; 1998b; Kostakopoulou, 
2001; 2005; Nicolaïdis, 2004; 2015; Aradau, Huysmans and Squire, 2010), 
and the constituent of a cosmopolitan model (Soysal, 1994; Cesarani and 
Fullbrook, 1996; Linklater, 1998; Gerstenberg, 2001; Beck, 2006; Delanty, 
2006; Benhabib, 2007; Schlenker, 2012). Their analyses point to the 
‘hollowing-out’ of national citizenship in favour of more inclusive models of 
                                            
13 The literature on EU citizenship has expanded considerably over the years, especially after 
the Maastricht Treaty (for overviews see Warleigh, 1998; Olsen, 2014). Since this thesis 
explores the normative, institutional and empirical frameworks of EU citizenship, the focus in 
this section is on the seminal contributions that have been made in relation to these 
frameworks. As a result, legal approaches to EU citizenship are omitted from this section. 
Their omission is due to the fact that they are not part of the practices through which citizens 
realise their citizenship. Nonetheless, it is not the intention of the chapter to suggest that legal 
approaches do not make an important contribution to the existing literature on EU citizenship 
(for example Closa 1992; Oliveira 1995; O’Leary 1996; Carrera 2005; Kostakopoulou, 2007; 
2013; Craig and de Bùrca, 2008; Kochenov, 2012; 2014). In fact, their arguments are used in 
the analysis of EU rights (Appendix 3) and the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship 
(Chapter 2). 
14 There are only a handful of scholars who have explored EU citizenship’s normative 
framework and considered what it actually signifies rather than what it should do so (Weiler, 
1999; Bauböck, 2007). These scholars accept that EU citizenship has its potentials and 
limitations, but also maintain its significance on its own right. Their argument is thus more 
empirically embedded than the normative debates discussed in this section. 
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citizenship (Tambini, 2001: 199). Those in the supra- or post-national strand 
stress that more and more EU citizens are united across national borders, and 
(previous) distinctions between national citizens and non-citizens are 
increasingly blurred (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 160-4; 2005; see also Eder and 
Giesen, 2001: 2). The cosmopolitan strand goes one step further by making a 
case for granting (EU) citizenship status on the basis of personhood rather 
than nationality (Soysal, 1994; Gerstenberg, 2001: 299; Habermas, 2003). 
Even when these scholars accept that empirical evidence points to an 
enduring multiplicity in citizens’ sense of identity (Duchesne and Frognier, 
2008), they infer positive assumptions about the future of EU citizenship. For 
example, they argue that by participating in EU-wide projects, citizens have 
the opportunity to develop an EU level 'demoi-cracy' (Nicolaïdis, 2004; 2015). 
These scholars thus observe EU citizenship as a key aspect of the EU’s 
burgeoning political union and usually adopt an argument that corresponds 
with the expectant tone of neofunctionalist (Haas, 1968) and transactionalist 
approaches to European integration (Deutsch et al., 1968).  
 
Other scholars draw attention to the limitations of EU citizenship, especially 
compared to national models in Europe (Smith, 1992; Miller, 1995; Shore, 
2000; Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001; Bellamy, Castiglione and Santoro, 2004; 
Bellamy, 2008b). The main question these scholars attempt to answer is “how 
can one be a citizen of a non-state?” (Shore, 2004: 32, emphasis in original). 
Starting from the 'no-demos' thesis, they suggest that introducing citizenship 
at the EU level (and, for that matter, any attempt at introducing citizenship 
beyond the nation state) is far-fetched. To support their argument, these 
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scholars identify certain aspects as prerequisites for contemporary 
(democratic) citizenships to thrive, including a shared language, history and 
political culture (Miller, 1995: 162; 2000; see also Smith, 1992; Grimm, 1995). 
Due to the effects of globalisation and citizens’ growing distrust of politics (Isin 
and Turner, 2007), this list has been extended to include public interest in EU 
and national politics, as well as a receptive political elite and a dynamic civil 
society (Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001; Bellamy, Castiglione and Santoro, 2004; 
Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw, 2006).  
 
By comparing EU citizenship to national models however, these scholars are 
predisposed to underplay its potentials and some have done so even before 
the formal establishment of EU citizenship took place (Aron, 1974: 653). 
Actually, by equating citizenship with national models, these scholars cannot 
observe EU citizenship as an example of citizenship at all (Smith, 1992; 
Shore, 2000; Bellamy, 2008a). Instead, they see it as an(other) illustration of 
the importance of national models (Bellamy, 2008b). Accordingly, the bi-level 
structure of EU citizenship underscores its ‘misnomer’ quality (Bellamy and 
Warleigh, 2001: 8), making it an ‘indirect’ and ‘second-order’ link that is highly 
dependent on member state citizenships (Neunreither, 1995; Delanty, 1997). 
As a result, citizenship is perceived as a matter of nation state policy (see for 
example Bellamy, Castiglione and Santoro, 2004). 
 
The contradictory conclusions and partial explanations of these two normative 
strands in the literature provided the necessary ground for further investigation 
of EU citizenship. Consequently, a number of studies have begun to explore 
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the institutional framework of EU citizenship and shed new light on how its 
meaning and significance have changed over time (Meehan, 1993; Wiener, 
1998; Kostakopoulou, 2001; Maas, 2007; Shaw, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 
2010; Olsen, 2012). Most of these studies focus on the evolution and 
expansion of EU rights and draw attention to its origins in the early days of 
economic integration in Europe (see for example Everson, 1995; Maas, 2007: 
5-8). Against the backdrop of an emerging ‘political union’ it is perhaps not 
surprising that initial research in the 1990s and early 2000s was inclined to 
observe EU citizenship as “a new kind of citizenship” (Meehan, 1993: 1; see 
also Shaw, 1998; Wiener, 1998; Kostakopoulou, 2005; Maas, 2007). At this 
point the EU was usually observed as an ideal setting in which the first post- 
and supra-national demos could surface (Kostakopoulou, 2001).  
 
However, more and more scholars became mindful not to exaggerate the 
evolutionary appeal of EU rights (Vink, 2005; Shaw, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 
2010; Olsen, 2012; Shore, 2012; Maas, 2014). As a result, there is an 
inclination to observe EU citizenship as a ‘transnational model’, which heavily 
relies on citizens’ cross-border mobility and national citizenships (Vink, 2005; 
Olsen, 2012; Maas, 2014). These scholars emphasise that heightened 
processes of exclusion (of non-citizens) and differentiation (between different 
categories of EU citizens – mobiles and stayers) are apparent in the EU 
(Favell and Hansen, 2002; Schierup, Hansen and Castles, 2006; Shaw; 2007; 
Hansen and Hager, 2009; Shore, 2012; Andreouli and Howarth, 2013). They 
also maintain that the early and late 2000s, including the public veto of EU 
treaties (Hansen and Hager, 2010) and, especially, the recent crisis (Shore, 
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2012) created a suitable context for such processes to be embedded in the 
institutional framework of EU citizenship. These scholars provide us with 
insight into the actual scope citizens have to realise EU citizenship.  
 
At first it may seem that research on the empirical framework of EU citizenship 
– studies which investigate citizens’ sense of citizenship – complement the 
literature on its normative and institutional frameworks (Bruter, 2005; Favell, 
2008, 2010; Recchi and Favell, 2009; Gaxie, Hubé and Rowell, 2011; White, 
2011; Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012; Duchesne 
et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014). A closer inspection of empirical research 
reveals however that most attended to one or the other dimensions of EU 
citizenship, while overlooking the others.15 Actually, they seem to have been 
interested in investigating citizens’ perception of the EU/Europe and the 
presence and strength of their EU/European identity. In an attempt to illustrate 
these issues however, research is usually carried out in isolation from other 
theories and from the framework of EU citizenship, not to mention the broader 
field of citizenship studies (the exceptions so far are Favell (2008; 2010) and 
Sanders and his colleagues, Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, Magalhães and 
Tóka, 2012). It is then difficult to reconcile the implications of their findings for 
contemporary (EU) citizenship. Thus most empirical research appears to have 
                                            
15 There are obvious practical benefits for adopting a more focused research design. First, it 
can provide us with a more in-depth and rigorous investigation of each dimension of EU 
citizenship. Second, the scope of the research project becomes more manageable if we 
investigate one dimension rather than three dimensions and EU citizenship together. 
However, such a ‘selective’ approach is bound to further the existing diversity in the 
specialised literature on EU citizenship. It thus allows for reaching further contradictory 
assumptions about what EU citizenship signifies, which is the very reason why most scholars 
carry out empirical research in the first place. 
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proliferated the existing diversity in the specialised literature on EU 
citizenship.  
 
The inconsistency in the findings of empirical research is likely to amplify this 
issue further. Earlier studies and those with a quantitative approach often 
conclude, “the glass of EU citizenship is perhaps best regarded as half full 
rather than half empty” (Sanders et al., 2012: 222, see also Bruter, 2005; 
Recchi and Favell, 2009; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012). In one of the 
few pieces of empirical research carried out on EU citizenship specifically, 
Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka (2012) demonstrate that even though rational 
cost-benefit calculations direct citizens’ sense of EU citizenship, it could be 
enhanced through citizens’ heightened political participation at the EU level. 
Nonetheless, these scholars resolve that “a sense of EU citizenship among 
European mass publics is [already] extensive” and fairs well “against 
comparable standards of ‘national citizenship’” (Sanders, Magalhães and 
Tóka, 2012: 231). In contrast, most qualitative studies conclude, ‘the glass of 
EU citizenship’ is half empty. For example, White (2011: 221, emphasis 
added) stresses that the civic lives of taxi drivers in Czech, German and UK 
cities are framed by nation states and “rarely corresponded to the contours of 
any recognisable European polity.” In their investigation of citizens’ reaction to 
different aspects of European integration in Paris, Oxford and Brussels, 
Duchesne et al. (2013) illustrate that, depending on their professional 
background (workers compared to employers and activists) and city of 
residence (especially Oxford compared to the other two cities), quite a few 
citizens are likely to find it difficult to form any opinion about the EU. In fact, 
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most citizens who participated in their focus groups “barely ha[d] 
consciousness of Europe at all” (Duchesne et al., 2013: 197).  
 
In an attempt to bridge the inconsistency between these findings, Van 
Ingelgom (2014) adopts a mixed method research design and studies citizens’ 
reactions towards the European integration process. She highlights that a 
substantial portion of citizens – ‘the median European’ – is not integrated into 
the EU and do not have Europhile or Eurosceptic attitudes. Instead, they 
exhibit ambivalent dispositions towards the integration project.16 This finding 
compels Van Ingelgom (2014: 3) to call for a re-conceptualisation of citizens’ 
attitudes towards the EU, which also includes “the notion of indifference”. 
From these examples it is apparent that even if they vary in their approaches 
to and assumptions of the (developing) bond between the citizens and the 
EU, empirical studies complement also the literature on the normative and 
institutional frameworks of EU citizenship. In particular, they illustrate well the 
diversity of processes through which citizens activate one or the other 
dimensions of EU citizenship today.  
 
                                            
16 Isin and his colleagues are omitted from this list (Isin and Nielsen, 2008; Isin, 2009; Isin and 
Saward, 2013). They consider how the “other” (non-citizens) attempt to achieve citizenship 
recognition, though some consideration have also been given to how marginal groups do the 
same, including the Roma (Aradau et al., 2013) or prostitutes in the EU (Aradau, Huysmans 
and Squire, 2010). Although these scholars make an important and timely contribution to the 
literature on (EU) citizenship, their focus on the ‘acts of (EU) citizenship’ – the processes 
through which any individual may make claims for the status, identity and rights of EU 
citizenship – means that, from the outset, their study challenges both the normative and 
institutional frameworks of (EU) citizenship. Since we are still lacking a more nuanced 
understanding of what EU citizenship actually signifies, this thesis takes these two 
frameworks as the starting point of its analysis. 
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1.1.2. Adopting a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship 
The previous section attempted to demonstrate that by attending to the 
various frameworks and dimensions of EU citizenship separately, scholars 
reached contradictory conclusions about its significance. In so doing however, 
there is a risk that they entirely divorced their study from the broader field of 
citizenship studies. In fact, the chasing of an ideal (within normative studies) 
and the investigation of a single dimension of EU citizenship (EU rights within 
institutional and EU identity within empirical studies) seems to have led 
scholars to neglect the oft-cited character of citizenship as being contested 
and in ‘flux’ (Isin, 2009). In contrast, the broader field of citizenship studies is 
dedicated to exposing the contested character of citizenship. Since an 
“elaborate theory” (Turner, 1993: viii) or approach to citizenship does not 
exist, scholars in this field have been concerned with “producing analytical 
and theoretical tools” which aid the comparability of different models (Isin and 
Turner, 2002: 4; Tilly, 2003: 611; Bellamy, 2004: 3; 2010: xvi- xvii; Heater, 
2004a: 288; Joppke, 2007: 46-7).17 In doing so, they draw attention to certain 
debates – general inquires about the definition of citizenship and the 
applicability of its dimensions –, which played out across diverse historical and 
political contexts (see for example Isin and Turner, 2002; 2007).  
 
Consequently, some parallels can be drawn between the main theoretical 
traditions of citizenship. The republican, liberal and communitarian traditions 
                                            
17 As a result, scholars within the field of citizenship studies usually explore the dimensions of 
citizenship, which are linked to “the three fundamental axes, extent (rules and norms of 
inclusion and exclusion), content (rights and responsibilities) and depth (thickness or 
thinness) of citizenship” (Isin and Turner, 2002: 2-4, emphasis in original; see also Isin and 
Turner, 2007). Thus, in order to provide a more nuanced understanding of EU citizenship, we 
should adopt a more inclusive approach to (EU) citizenship and attend to its three dimensions 
concurrently (Heater, 2004a: 287; Bellamy, 2004: 3). 
45 
 
idealise the political, legal and social dimensions of Greek, Roman and 
national citizenships respectively (Heater, 1999; Bellamy, 2008a; Bosniak, 
2008). More recently, the cosmopolitan, multiculturalist and feminist traditions 
seek to highlight the universality of citizenship rights. The cosmopolitan 
tradition advocates a world citizenship model in which human rights and 
citizenship rights are one and the same (Falk, 1994; Linklater, 1998; Heater, 
2004b; Delanty, 2009),18 while the multiculturalist and feminist traditions 
promote the introduction of group-differentiated rights based on ethnicity or 
gender (Kymlicka, 1995; Lister, 2007; Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010).19 
Even though these traditions have a clear preference for addressing the issue 
of citizenship through a certain dimension, they do not dismiss the 
significance of the other dimensions all together. For example, the republican 
tradition expects to see citizen participation in politics to translate into a sense 
of political identity.  Nonetheless, by idealising one dimension and a specific 
historical model, they too tend to afford a somewhat stagnant character to 
citizenship.  
 
Moreover, while it is true that a definition of citizenship must “take on both 
broader and deeper meaning” (Heater, 2004a: 293) in order to reflect reality, it 
should not be stretched too far. The tendency to broaden the definition of 
citizenship can and, to some extent, has already led to observing any new 
phenomenon as a novel model of citizenship (Magnette, 2005: 8). Purely on 
this basis for instance, EU citizenship has been interpreted as sui generis 
                                            
18 The cosmopolitan tradition traces its origins to Socrates’s approach to world citizenship and 
the stoic concept of cosmopolis (Heater, 2004b: 8-15; 26-36). 
19 Similarities have also been recognised between the multicultural and feminist traditions and 
Greek and Roman citizenships respectively (Lister, 1997; Turner, 2006). 
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(Pollack, 2005). Yet, there are important similarities between EU and national 
citizenships. For instance, a comparison between their normative frameworks 
reveals that both models have a similar purpose, namely to shape community-
building processes at the national and EU levels.20 Similarly, until scholars 
and policy-makers can agree on “what the nature of the beast is” (Risse-
Kappen, 1995), whether the EU is a political, economic or a regulatory 
community (Majone, 1998; Hix and Høyland, 2011), it is difficult to accept that 
its citizenship policies outline an innovative model. Therefore, recognising that 
each political community creates its own model (Aristotle, 1946) should not 
challenge the “heuristic advantage” of citizenship nor lead to further diversity 
in this research field (Magnette, 2005: 2). Even more, it should not diverge us 
from the distinctively political role of citizenship (Bellamy, 2008a: 2). Instead, 
more attention should be paid to how different models emerge, transform and 
become consolidated over time; how these models can be described and 
compared to one another; and what these processes tell us about the actual 
significance of each model.  
 
Against this backdrop, it is worth noting that while many scholars recognise 
the multidimensional character of national citizenships in Europe, most fail to 
adopt a similar approach to EU citizenship. There is thus a risk that much of 
the existing literature provides a less nuanced understanding of what EU 
citizenship actually signifies. This problem was already identified in the 
previous section but it is particularly striking when we take into account the 
contribution of Richard Bellamy and his colleagues to the literature on EU 
                                            
20 See Tilly (1975) for a discussion on nation states’ attempt to shape community-building 
processes through citizenship. In a similar fashion, Reading (2013a) also emphasised that the 
main purpose of EU citizenship is to uphold further political integration 
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citizenship (Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001; Bellamy, Castiglione and Santoro, 
2004; Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw, 2006; Bellamy, 2008b). After all 
Bellamy (2004: 8; 2006: 4; 2008b: 601; 2010: xiii) has, time and again, 
advocated the benefits of addressing the issue of citizenship through its three 
dimensions. Yet, he has only ever explored all three dimensions in the 
national contexts, making comparisons within and across member states 
(Bellamy, Castiglione and Santoro, 2004). In contrast, he has only really been 
interested in the lack of active (participatory) citizenship at the EU level 
(Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001; Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw, 2006). 
Interestingly, both studies led him to the same conclusion; citizenship is “only 
[possible within] a political community with properties similar to those we now 
associate with a state” (Bellamy, 2008a: 6). This led Bellamy (2008b; 2011) to 
welcome the complementary character of EU citizenship. Hence, the very 
scholar who originally advocated adopting ‘a more inclusive approach’ to 
citizenship seems to have failed to follow his own instructions in the case of 
the EU. Considered in this light, it is not surprising that many of the other 
scholars have not adopted ‘a more inclusive approach’ to EU citizenship 
either.  
 
Therefore, and in an attempt to complement and fill an important gap in the 
existing literature, this thesis adopts a ‘more inclusive approach’ to EU 
citizenship. Specifically, it seeks to attend to the dimensions of EU citizenship 
concurrently and across its normative, institutional and empirical frameworks. 
In doing so, it is anticipated that the thesis can provide us with a more 
nuanced understanding of what EU citizenship actually signifies. It will also aid 
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the comparability of EU citizenship with other models – a requirement for any 
research “to be recognizable as accounts of citizenship” (Bellamy, 2004: 3) 
within the broader field of citizenship studies. Comparability is also important 
in the case of the EU, due to the interdependency between national and EU 
citizenships (see for example Kochenov, 2014). The focus group evidence 
used in this thesis is likely to be useful in this additional way. In particular, it 
will shed light on how a select group of young citizens makes sense of and 
compares their two citizenships in the EU (Chapter 4.1.). 
 
1.2. Re-embedding EU citizenship in the field of citizenship 
studies  
By exploring the various definitions of citizenship across diverse historical and 
political contexts, this section will attempt to re-embed the study of EU 
citizenship within the broader field of citizenship studies. 
 
1.2.1. A general definition of citizenship 
Broadly speaking, citizenship can be defined as a dynamic bond between a 
sovereign political community and the individuals within it (Aristotle, 1946; Isin 
and Turner, 2002; Heater, 2004a; Magnette, 2005). For instance, in its initial 
form (c. 700 BC), citizenship referred to the bond between the Greek polis 
(city-state) and the citizens, and the emphasis was on citizens’ participation in 
the city-state’s public affairs (Pocock, 1998: 32-4). In comparison, Civis 
Romanus [Roman citizenship] signalled a more complex and, at the same 
time, dynamic bond (Clarke, 1994: 49) between the Roman Empire and its 
male residents. The dynamism of this model is particularly apparent in the 
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distinct ways in which Roman citizenship was acquired by some male 
residents (Salmond, 1901: 274). During the Middle Ages, citizenship was 
within a city state and denoted an economic “class concept” where 
“membership in specific class groups [the guilds] made the person a citizen” 
(Weber, 1998: 44).21 The Renaissance brought little change to this feudal 
relationship, though there was some movement towards the idea of 
citizenship as an exclusive relationship between a sovereign and the 
individuals (Heater, 2004a: 24-6). Only following the French Revolution did a 
constitutional contract between equal individuals and the state emerge 
(Salmond, 1901). Since then, citizenship has indicated “a relation between 
individuals and [the nation-] states” (Bauböck, 1994: 23).  
 
However, even contemporary national citizenship varies from one state to the 
next and even within state boundaries (Bellamy, 2008a). For example, British 
citizenship has had an “extraordinarily confused history” (Dummett, 2006: 
554). At the outset it signalled a liberal bond between residents, the Empire 
and the Crown (Heater, 2004a: 298). More recently however, we can see a 
slow but gradual shift towards a territorially defined status (Dummett, 2006: 
560-1). Thus a clear definition of what British citizenship really entails is still 
lacking (Anderson, 2012: 2). Although Sweden is similar in this respect – the 
Citizenship Act does not define medborgarskap [citizenship] only deals with 
the acquisition and loss of citizenship – yet here a shift occurred from less 
towards a more liberal model of citizenship (Howard, 2009: 77). This is 
apparent in the continuous ease of acquisition process, the (supposed) 
                                            
21 Weber (1998: 43-4) argues that the economic class concept of citizenship in the Middle 
Ages paved the way for (contemporary) national citizenships, which are inherently political 
and Western at the same time. 
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openness of the Swedish labour market (MIPEX, 2012c), the lack of an official 
citizenship test and language requirement, and the (relatively) low cost of 
citizenship acquisition – 1,500SEK (approximately £135) as of early 2015. 
Thus Swedish citizenship is fairly accessible to residents (Goodman, 2010; 
Wiesbrock, 2011). This is reflected in the number of citizenship acquisitions 
(which are considerable in light of the population). This shift corresponds with 
the needs of the Swedish labour market (Berg and Sephar, 2013: 144-5) and, 
as a result, Sweden now has one of the highest numbers of citizenship 
acquisitions in the world (OECD, 2011: 19).  
 
Even though (national) citizenships have different meanings in European 
states, it is only EU citizenship that is observed as distinctive and sui generis 
– simply because it indicates the first dynamic bond between a transnational 
political community (the EU) and the individuals (Habermas, 1996: 505; 
Weiler, 1997: 497; Gerstenberg, 2001: 299; Heater, 2004a: 352; 
Kostakopoulou, 2007; Bellamy, 2008b; Maas, 2013). Since citizenship has 
referred to a different (type of) bond, political community and group of 
individuals (as citizens) across diverse historical and political contexts, EU 
citizenship is more likely to be another example in a long list of models. There 
is thus a requirement to support the observation of EU citizenship as distinct 
or sui generis with further theoretical underpinnings and/or empirical evidence. 
 
Debates about the general definition of citizenship are usually accompanied 
by reference to its role in shaping community-building processes, reflecting on 
how citizens approach one another as members of the community and how 
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they recognise the non-citizens. This aspect has been mainly emphasised by 
scholars in their consideration of nation state citizenships (see for example 
Marshall, 1950; Tilly, 1975; Brubaker, 1992; Turner, 1997). However, it is 
particularly well-suited to highlighting the inherent association of the idea of 
citizenship with processes of differentiation, distinguishing between categories 
of citizens, and processes of exclusion, dividing citizens from non-citizens (the 
“other”) (Bosniak, 2008: 19-25). The rest of this section considers how such 
processes of differentiation and exclusion in the EU context accord with 
diverse models of citizenship. 
 
The political engagement perspective – focusing on citizens’ participation in 
traditional forms of engagement (propensity to vote and run for office) – 
dominates the bulk of the literature on active/passive citizenship (Magnette, 
2003; Martiniello, 2005; Welge, 2015), including those addressing the issues 
of British and Swedish citizenship respectively (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 
2004; Amnå, 2006; Sloam, 2007; Bevelander, and Pendakur, 2012). The 
origins of this approach can be traced to Greek citizenship, where the 
dichotomy of active/passive citizens was established on the basis of their 
participation in the policy-making process (Bellamy, 2008a: 97-123). However, 
the political engagement perspective may not be as relevant to addressing 
contemporary models (Turner, 1997: 15). For example, there is growing 
evidence to suggest that due to citizens’ unequal access to influencing politics 
(Sloam, 2013: 10-11), more and more citizens now participate in alternative 
forms of engagement (like volunteering and protesting) not only at the national 
(Putnam, 2000; Whiteley, 2012; Smets and van Ham, 2013) but also at the 
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EU level (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). Applying the active/passive dichotomy from 
the political engagement perspective may thus tell us little about the actual 
categories of citizens (Zani and Barrett, 2012).  
 
Nonetheless, as long as it is applied in view of the broader context, the 
active/passive dichotomy can still to be an effective analytical tool in 
addressing the issue of citizenship. This is precisely what a closer inspection 
of historical models of citizenship indicates to us. In the case of Roman 
citizenship for example, different categories of citizens had access to a 
distinctive set of rights (Clarke, 1994: 49). These categories were drawn up 
according to certain criteria, including descent, manumission, privilege or 
legislative grant (Salmond, 1901: 274-6). Accordingly, the male members of 
the Empire were recognised as full Roman citizens and could enjoy some 
well-defined public and private rights. In comparison, women were partial 
citizens – they possessed the rights enjoyed by their parents apart from that of 
voting in the assembly. With the expansion of the Empire, dual (Latin and 
Roman), half and partial citizenships were granted to allies and the male 
members of conquered regions (Heater, 2004a: 17-8). Slaves were the only 
resident group with no access to citizenship rights (Clarke, 1994). In light of 
these categories, applying the political engagement perspective would provide 
us with a rather simplistic portrait of Roman citizenship. Similarly, political 
participation was not the key factor during the Middle Ages or the 
Renaissance. In these cases, economic and military service, and civic 
consciousness distinguished between categories of citizens (Weber, 1998: 45; 
Heater, 2004a: 23-4).  
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Considered in this light, it is perhaps less astonishing that the institutional 
framework of EU citizenship has set out categories of citizens on the basis of 
their intra-EU mobility status (Olsen, 2012; European Commission, 2013a.). 
Even more, the current EU treaties require citizens to move in order to 
activate their EU level status (Guild, 2004; Maas, 2007). Against this 
backdrop, the dichotomy of active/passive EU citizenship from the traditional 
political engagement perspective seems irrelevant. This thesis proposes that 
we should instead investigate the differences between the perceptions and 
behaviour of stayers as passive and mobiles as active EU citizens. A latter 
chapter of this thesis will shed further light on the resulting processes of 
differentiation against the backdrop of heightened mobility in the EU context 
(Chapter 3.3.). 
 
Similarly to processes of differentiation, processes of exclusion have been an 
integral aspect of citizenship across diverse historical and political contexts 
(Bosniak, 2008: 2-3; Bellamy, 2010: xvi; Karolewski, 2010: 26). They were 
apparent in the Greek polis, where citizenship defined a community of ideal 
citizens – “all who share in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn” 
(Aristotle, 1946: 95; see also Pocock, 1998: 77). In sharp contrast, an 
increasingly hollow sense of citizenship accentuated the decay of the Roman 
community. As Roman citizenship was extended to every man in the Empire 
(that is other than slaves), a sense of honour and public duty declined among 
citizens (Heater, 2004a: 19). During the Middle Ages, property-ownership was 
observed as a proof of citizens’ commitment towards the city-state and the 
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guild (Weber, 1998: 44, 48). In an attempt to enhance the loyalty of citizens to 
the city-state, citizenship during the Renaissance was perceived as the 
“commonwealth” among citizens” (Heater, 2004a: 25). In the context of nation 
states, nationalism, national unity and citizenship became interchangeable, 
often at the cost of individual freedoms (Bauböck, 1994: 23). These 
developments intensified the process of exclusion and created considerable 
divisions between (national) citizens (the ethnic majority) and the “other” 
(often the ethnic minority groups) (Hage, 1998).  
 
Although the UK and Sweden have an increasingly heterogeneous 
population, they adopted contradictory approaches to citizenship, immigration 
and integration policies and these differences are also apparent in British and 
Swedish public attitudes. Due to the gradual securitisation of British identity 
politics following 9/11 and 7/7 (Blunkett, 2002; Gilroy, 2005), we can see a 
slow move away from inclusive and multiculturalist principles towards a more 
exclusivist notion of citizenship (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). By and 
large, Sweden still attempts to fulfil its self-portrayal as a modern EU state 
(Brochman and Hagelund, 2012: 26). It has thus made small institutional 
distinctions between the rights of Swedish residents and citizens, and 
supports the integration of migrants into the Swedish society. Arguably, 
“Sweden is setting an example, which hopefully others in Europe will follow” 
(Billstörm, 2008).  
 
Both approaches are apparent at the EU level. Although EU citizenship still 
‘only’ unites member state citizens (of course these are already the “other” 
55 
 
from a national citizenship viewpoint), the distinctions between EU citizens 
and non-citizens, especially third country nationals (TCNs), have lessened 
over time. This is mainly due to the ambiguous boundaries of EU citizenship, 
which do not actually provide a coherent classification of who citizens and 
non-citizens are (Eder and Giesen, 2001: 2; Eder, 2005: 197). Even more, 
certain rights are available to non-citizens – mainly TCNs and EEA residents –
, including political rights such as voting in the local elections of the host 
country (Shaw, 2007). Although the Commission has attempted to revise the 
institutional framework of EU citizenship to require residency status rather 
than nationality (Hansen and Hager, 2010: 53-5), member states continue to 
define the boundaries of national and EU political communities. Due to recent 
security and cultural concerns however, processes of exclusion are becoming 
more acute at the EU level, especially when it comes to anti-Semitism and 
Islamophobia (Bunzl, 2005). We already know that anti-immigration 
sentiments shape the institutional framework of EU citizenship (Hansen and 
Hager, 2010: 7-8). These examples illustrate the similarity between the 
debates surrounding the broad definition of citizenship and related processes 
of community building across diverse historical and political contexts.  
 
1.2.2. The dimensions of citizenship: identity, rights and participation 
across diverse historical and political contexts 
Existing historical overviews underscore that, from the outset, citizenship 
“contained a cluster of meanings [dimensions] related to a defined legal or 
social status, a means of political identity, a focus of loyalty, a requirement of 
duties [and] an expectation of rights” (Heater, 2004a: 166). The institutional 
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framework of and citizens’ approaches to these dimensions (Balibar, 1988: 
724) – identity, rights and participation – establish the vigour of each model 
(Kratochwil, 1994).22 This section sheds light on the relevance of these 
dimensions across historical, national – British and Swedish – and the EU 
models of citizenship, and, subsequently, on the broader implications of the 
interlinked character of these dimensions. The objective of this section is to 
illustrate that EU citizenship is another example of the debates that have 
played out across diverse historical and political contexts.23 
 
The identity dimension of citizenship has been considered as particularly 
relevant to national models. It is often observed that nation states 
reconfigured citizens’ sense of belonging by adding geographically and 
culturally distinct layers to their pre-existing (social) identities (Miller, 1995; 
Brubaker, 1998; Schnapper, 2002; Beiner, 2003; Bellamy, 2008a). The 
resulting identity of citizens has become infused with exclusionary, ethnic and 
culturist ideals (Smith, 1995; Balibar, 2009), and continues to nourish group 
struggles for recognition (Kymlicka 1995; 2011). However, EU citizenship 
does not seem to have a comparable impact on citizens’ sense of identity. For 
example, instead of creating a sense of collective EU identity, EU citizenship, 
together with the European integration process, often lead to a sense of dual 
                                            
22 As a result, some scholars identify citizenship as a “process” or “practice” (Nisbet, 1974; 
Wiener, 1998; 2005; Olsen, 2012). 
23 To some extent at least, the approach of Duchesne (2008: 402) and her colleagues 
(Duchesne et al., 2013: 11) support a similar point in relation to researching EU identity. They 
advocate placing EU identity (preferably, EU identification) within the framework of EU 
citizenship. This chapter goes a step further and calls for placing the dimensions of EU 
citizenship within the framework of EU citizenship and then the study of EU citizenship within 
the broader field of citizenship studies. Since the aim of this section is to illustrate the 
similarities between various models of citizenship, it will not provide an in-depth investigation 
of every model. For further discussion of the historical and political models of citizenship 
referred to in this section see Heater (2004a), Magnette (2005), Bellamy (2008a) or Bosniak 
(2008).
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identity – national and EU identities together – or enhances the exclusive 
aspect of citizens’ national identity (Risse, 2010: 39-46). Existing research 
shows that the development of EU identity seems to be highly contingent on 
certain factors, including the political context – at the national and EU levels –, 
whether citizens’ (existing) national identity is nested, portrayals of the 
country’s EU membership by the political elite, media and the public 
(Medrano, 2003; Hooghe and Marks, 2005: 433-6; Duchesne and Frognier, 
2008; Bruter, 2009). Accordingly, it is perhaps less surprising that some 
scholars have dismissed the significance of EU citizenship all together (Smith, 
1992; Shore, 2000; Bellamy, 2008b). Observed from the broader field of 
citizenship however, the focus shifts from replicating national identities at the 
EU level to recognising that citizenship as identity manifests differently across 
diverse historical and political contexts.  
 
In the Greek polis, for example, a political ethos stems from citizens’ mutual 
understanding of “one another’s characters” (Aristotle, 1946: 292), which 
defined one of the first examples of an imagined community (Ludwig, 2002). 
Questions of belonging were at the forefront in the case of Roman citizenship, 
where the expansion of the Empire made it particularly challenging to exclude 
non-citizens (Magnette, 2005: 19). The Middle Ages and Renaissance 
highlighted the impact social groups, in particular professional (Weber, 1998: 
44) and religious groups (Riesenberg, 1992: 88) can have on citizens’ shared 
identity. While it is true that in the context of nation states feelings of 
patriotism became closely associated with citizenship, there are also 
important variations between citizens’ sense of ethnic (exclusive, cultural) and 
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civic (inclusive, political) identities across and within state borders (Smith, 
1992; Brubaker, 1998). This is exemplified by the variation between 
contemporary British, Swedish and EU identities.  
 
Both civic and ethnic components are part of British national identity today 
(Smith, 1992; Parekh, 2000; Heath and Roberts, 2008). The civic component 
stems from a shared “belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal 
treatment for all, respect for th[e] country and its shared heritage‟ (Blair, 2006; 
see also Wellings, 2002; Curtice, 2006).24 Established during the ‘glorious’ 
days of the British Empire, it legitimised the rule of the ethnic majority – the 
English – but rejected the ethno-nationalist approach to community-building 
processes (especially one that could be comparable to the nationalist 
movements of the European continent) (Kumar, 2003: 145).25 Nonetheless, a 
slow transition from the original emphasis on civic towards the ethnic 
component of British identity has taken place recently (Skey, 2012a). This is 
due to internal processes (especially regional devolution) and external 
pressures (decolonisation, immigration, multiculturalism and EU membership) 
(Gilroy, 2005; Hewitt, 2005; Skey, 2011a). Actually, the ethnic component is 
particularly salient nowadays and has become an integral part of the 
institutional framework of British citizenship – as apparent through the 
introduction and constant revision of the 2005 British Citizenship Test (Gray 
and Griffin, 2014: 299).  
                                            
24 However, this approach may be an attempt to correct historical deficits of an exclusivist 
British nationalism (Meer and Modood, 2008: 475). 
25 In reality however, assimilationist, hierarchical and racist ideologies were at the heart of the 
Empire (Rich, 1990: 12-27). As a result, its dismantling turned British national identity  (and, 
by association, ‘Englishness’) into “an empty signifier” and the “mark of an outsider” (Asari, 
Halikiopoulou and Mock, 2008: 12, see also Nairn, 1977; Condor, Gibson and Abell, 2006). 
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In comparison, the civic component still defines Swedish (national) identity 
(Roth, 2004). Without a clear demarcation of who Swedish citizens are 
(Bernitz, 2012: 17), the emphasis is on the promotion of communitarian 
principles (Stråth, 2004; Agius, 2006). These principles are embedded in the 
relative success of Folkhem [welfare state] (Daun, 1996; Roth and Hertzberg, 
2010, Swedish ‘neutrality’ (Stråth, 2004; Agius, 2006) and a social model of 
Swedish citizenship (Borevi, 2012: 25-7). They promote a collective sense of 
safety, national coherence, solidarity, equality and localism among citizens 
(Ginsburg, 1992). Moreover, due to the institutional importance placed on 
facilitating access to citizenship, aspects of a multicultural model of citizenship 
are also apparent in Sweden (Roth, 2004; Berg and Sephar, 2013). 
Anticipated to counteract xenophobic tendencies among the population and 
decouple the bond between the nation state and its citizens, Sweden is slowly 
implementing a post-national model of citizenship (Gustafson, 2002; Roth, 
2004).  
 
EU citizenship is somewhat different from these two examples since its 
institutionalisation did not translate into a genuine sense of EU identity among 
citizens (Painter 1998; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Sanders, Magalhães 
and Tóka, 2012.). In order to ratify this issue, more and more effort went into 
applying identity technologies – prevalent within nation states (see for 
example Billig, 1995) – through top-down and bottom-up processes (for an 
overview see Karolewski, 2009: 62-8). Top-down processes rely on EU 
symbols (European day, flag, hymn and the Euro) (Risse, 2003: 487-505, 
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Bruter, 2004a: 21-39; 2005: 123-33; Hymans, 2004: 5-31), values (democracy 
and peace) (Della Sala, 2010) and the EU’s normative, cosmopolitan and 
civilian images (Lavenex, 2001: 851-74; Habermas, 2003: 86-100; Eriksen, 
2006: 252-69). Bottom-up processes require citizens’ actual involvement, 
such as exercising EU mobility and political rights, using the Euro and 
shopping across state borders (Bruter, 2005; Recchi and Favell, 2009; Risse, 
2010).  
 
Although these processes have had varying results (Bruter, 2004; 2009; 
Fligstein, 2008; Favell, 2008; 2010), there is an important distinction between 
their long-term effects. While top-down processes tend to enhance the 
cognitive level of citizens’ EU identity (Meinhof, 2004; Kaina and Karolewski, 
2013: 33-5; Bellucci, Sanders and Serricchio, 2012), bottom-up processes 
appear to have a more enduring influence (Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, 
Magalhães and Tóka, 2012). The latter may thus be particularly constructive 
towards the behavioural level of citizens’ EU identity. The latter finding is 
relevant for addressing the issue of EU citizenship and considering its 
association with citizens’ EU identity (Føllesdal, 2001; Besson and Utzinger 
2008; Karolweski, 2010; Koopmans 2012; Schmidtke 2012).  
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Table 1.1. Frequencies of EU27, Sweden and the UK responses to 
Eurobarometer question on European Identity (% Attachment to the EU) 
(2007 - 12) (Source: European Commission 2012j;2013r) 
 
A glimpse of EU identity (2007-12) is included in Table 1.1.. Firstly, the table 
illustrates that citizens in both Sweden and the UK have generally low feelings 
of EU attachment, especially when compared to the EU as a whole (see also 
Henjak, Tòka and Sanders, 2012). Secondly, the table shows that, generally 
speaking, citizens’ sense of EU identity is not particularly stable (as apparent 
in % change columns). Nonetheless, EU identity seems more stable in 
Sweden than in the EU27 and, especially, the UK. It is thus more likely for 
citizens to develop a more stable sense of EU identity in Sweden than in other 
parts of the EU or in the UK. Actually, changes in EU identity in the UK appear 
to be particularly erratic (-10.5% and +12.2%) compared to the smaller 
numbers in Sweden (-0.8% and +1.4%). The UK numbers are striking even 
when compared to the EU27 average (-5.1% and +6.1%). Not surprisingly 
perhaps, the UK may be an especially challenging context for citizens to 
develop a lasting sense of EU identity (also supported by existing empirical 
research on EU identity, see for example Favell, 2008; Duchesne et al., 
Year
State EU27 Sweden UK EU27 % Change Sweden % Change UK % Change
Very / 
Fairly 
attached to 
the EU
49.8 38.5 36.5 44.7 -5.1 37.7 -0.8 26 -10.5
Not very / 
Not at all 
attached to 
the EU
47.4 59.2 59.9 53.5 6.1 60.6 1.4 72.1 12.2
Don't 
Know 2.8 2.3 3.7 1.9 -0.9 1.8 -0.5 1.9 -1.8
May 2007 (EB 67.2) May 2012 (EB 77.3)
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2013). Finally, the table demonstrates the destructive effects of the recent 
crisis on citizens’ sense of EU identity. Thus we can observe a general 
decreasing trend in the frequency of citizens reporting a strong and fair sense 
of attachment to the EU, and a general increasing trend in citizens’ reporting a 
weaker sense of attachment or non-attachment to the EU.  
 
From the different studies on citizenship as rights, the most well-known and, 
perhaps, oft-cited study is by Thomas H. Marshall (1950). Marshall traces how 
conceptions of British citizenship developed over time and across three 
strands of rights, namely civil, social and political rights. He concludes that 
citizenship guarantees full membership and equal treatment in the community 
(Marshall, 1950: 102). Although there are some obvious limitations to 
Marshall’s analysis, including its exclusive focus on citizenship as rights 
(Turner, 1997), he makes an important contribution to citizenship studies by 
drawing attention to the dynamic nature of citizenship and the way in which 
rights can shed a different light on this dynamism. The same point is apparent 
if we consider the relevance of rights across historical and political models of 
citizenship.  
 
Citizens’ individual characteristics such as gender or class restricted access to 
historical models of citizenship. In the Greek polis, the male members of the 
founding families and, later, the male members of one of the geographically 
allocated political units (demes) had access to citizenship (Parton, 2004: 77-
9). Access to Roman citizenship was originally based on gender and nobility, 
however these categories were widened through the gradual expansion of the 
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Empire (Heater, 2004a: 17-8). During the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, 
contributions to the guild’s output and membership in religious groups served 
as the first point of access to citizenship (Riesenberg, 1992: 88; Isin, 2002: 
112). In comparison, the “ontological priority of the individual” is apparent in 
contemporary models of citizenship (Karolewski, 2010: 11). These models 
guarantee the equal status of every citizen within state boundaries (Poggi, 
2003: 42), making the territorial principles of nation states and access to 
citizenship synonymous (Brubaker, 1992: 21). These principles guide the legal 
frameworks of British, Swedish and EU citizenship (Bernitz and Bernitz, 2006; 
Dummett, 2006; Kostakopoulou, 2014). However, neither of these models 
seems to have found it easy to implement the territorial principle.  
 
From a historical perspective, citizens could move freely within the British 
Empire. However, these mobility rights were curtailed with the introduction of 
the British Nationality Act (1981), leaving a substantial segment of UK 
residents caught up in transitional procedures (Sawyer and Wray, 2014: 9). 
The lack of a definition of citizenship created an interesting political context in 
Sweden, where a good number of citizens believe that they have access to 
Swedish welfare state provisions even if they reside abroad (Bernitz, 2012: 
17). The constantly changing borders of the EU make it rather difficult to draw 
clear boundaries for EU citizenship (Kostakopoulou, 2014). These issues are 
further complicated by the interdependent relationship between national and 
EU citizenships. EU free movement provisions clearly challenge the territorial 
principles of British and Swedish citizenships – and, for that matter, of all 
national citizenships across the EU (Kochenov, 2009). In turn, EU citizenship 
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is under considerable constraints internally. Member states can pose 
limitations on citizens’ access to their EU level status, through, for example 
transitional measures or residency requirements (Carrera, 2005; Guild, Peers 
and Tomkin, 2014). The variability between these models illustrate well that 
rights should be integral to considerations of the institutional and empirical 
frameworks of citizenship – the latter of which can shed light on the scope 
citizens have to realising citizenship. Nonetheless, it does not make rights the 
only dimension of (EU) citizenship, despite of what some scholars would like 
us to believe (Marshall, 1950; Meehan, 1993). 
  
In fact, citizenship has been observed as “meaningless” if it does not also 
include “some kind of participation in public affairs” on behalf of the citizens 
(Heater, 2004a: 216; see also Dalton and Klingemann, 2007: 1-3). 
Considered as a sign of the ‘highest and harmonious capabilities’ (Mill, 2002 
[1861]), citizens’ participation has important implications for the legal structure 
of citizenship and it is a central feature of (democratic) political communities 
(Heater, 2004a: 216-7; Bellamy, 2008a: 97).26 There is some disagreement 
about whether participation is an end goal (as with the republican tradition of 
citizenship, see for example Dagger, 2002: 146-52; Bellamy, 2006) or an 
important aspect and consequence of the community’s political culture (as 
with the civic tradition of citizenship, see for example Almond and Verba, 
1963; Inglehart, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).27 These 
                                            
26 Democratic political communities expected to guarantee public autonomy through certain 
constitutional arrangements, which sustain political debate among citizens and the political 
elite (Bellamy, 2005: 157, see also Habermas 1996; Rawls 1993). 
27 Nonetheless, there has been an almost exclusive focus in the field of citizenship studies on 
participation as the key to distinguishing between different categories of citizens (addressed 
in the previous section). 
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disagreements are also apparent across historical and political models of 
citizenship. 
 
In the Greek polis, the political prerequisites of the city-state and the 
community were fulfilled by the participation of the “citizen proper” (Aristotle 
1992: 169, emphasis in original). Participation was an end goal in the Roman 
Empire in political and legal terms, though Roman citizens could not really 
make an impact on political decisions or shape laws (Heater, 2004a: 19). The 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance saw citizens’ participation likened to tax 
bargaining (Magnette, 2005: 54). In the context of nation states, the focus 
shifted to public autonomy and the duty of citizens to participate in politics 
(Poggi, 2003: 42; Bellamy, 2008a: 109-114). However, we are witnessing a 
general decline in citizens’ participation, which may signal that national 
citizenships are in crisis (Barber, 2007: 291-339; Bellamy, 2008a: 114-23). 
The problem with this argument is that it does not take into account the fact 
that an increasing number of citizens participate in individualised and 
alternative forms of engagement, including public demonstrations, 
volunteering, acts of civil disobedience (such as riots), consumerism and on-
line petitions (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Kaase, 2007; Dalton, 2009). 
The changes in citizens’ participation underscore the requirement for us to 
reconsider our approaches to participation within the broader field of 
citizenship studies (see for example Almond and Verba, 1963; Hirschman, 
1982; Franklin, 2004; Dalton and Klingemann, 2007; Putnam and Helliwell, 
2007). These issues are also apparent when we compare citizens’ 
participation across the UK, Swedish and EU contexts. 
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Political participation in the recent local and general elections has been one of 
the lowest in the UK compared to other EU countries (Steinbrecher and 
Rattinger, 2012: 93). Nonetheless, there is growing empirical evidence to 
indicate that half of Brits who do not vote in elections participate in alternative 
forms of engagement (Desmoyers-Davis, 2003; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 
2004; Akram, 2009). From the different groups of citizens, the younger 
generation, especially those aged 30 and under, have been found to be the 
least likely to vote, run for office or be members of political parties (Pattie, 
Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Pattie and Johnston, 2009; Sloam, 2013 Phelps, 
2014). In fact, young Brits are the least likely to vote even when their turnout 
level is considered in the generational context across the EU (Fieldhouse et 
al., 2007). Whilst we should be concerned about this trend, it may be too early 
to interpret it as a crisis for (the future of) British citizenship (Stoker, 2006). It 
is, in fact the younger generations of Brits who are the most likely to 
participate in alternative forms of engagement (Marsh, O’Toole and Jones, 
2007; Norris, 2011; Sloam, 2014a; 2014b) – at twice as likely as the rest of 
the population (Sloam, 2013: 12). Thus the low participation levels in 
traditional forms of engagement in the UK may be interpreted in the broader 
trend of declining voter turnout (Franklin, 2004). It can also be observed as 
one aspect in the recent transformation of British citizenship this section has 
already touched upon. 
 
In comparison, participation in Sweden remains comparatively high across 
both traditional (Steinbrecher and Rattinger, 2012: 94) and alternative forms of 
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engagement (Norris, 2011). The Swedish educational system has been 
recognised as particularly stimulating for (young) citizens’ political participation 
(especially when observed through a comparative perspective) (Gallego 2009; 
Persson, 2012). In fact, it has already been found to lead to particularly high 
levels of cognitive mobilisation – a process through which the political 
resources and skills of citizens are enhanced – among Swedes (Welzel and 
Inglehart, 2010: 55). Against this backdrop, perhaps the most striking gap in 
levels of participation can be observed when we compare the participation of 
residents and citizens (Bevel, Ander and Pendakur, 2006). Although both 
groups can vote in the local and regional elections, members of the former 
group rarely do so (Seidle, 2015), that is until they acquire Swedish citizenship 
– which seems to increase their propensity to participate significantly 
(Endeghal, 2011). 
 
Similar issues are relevant to our consideration of citizens’ participation at the 
EU level, including generational change (Bhatti and Hansen, 2012), migration 
– EU mobiles abstention from voting in the host county (Muxell, 2009; Favell, 
2010) – and the increased use of alternative forms of engagement – 
especially in the context of the crisis (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). Accordingly, 
the declining trend in the electoral turnout of European Parliament (EP) 
elections could and perhaps should be observed in the broader context of 
declining citizen participation (Franklin, 2004), rather than a crisis of EU 
citizenship (Bellamy, 2008b). A snapshot of EP electoral turnout is included in 
Table 1.2. below. Specifically, the table reports the turnout levels across the 
EU (EU average) and in Sweden and the UK for the 1999-2014 period. 
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Table 1.2. EP electoral turnout in the EU, Sweden and the UK (% of total 
population) (1999 – 2014) (Source: European Parliament, 2014) 
 
Table 1.2. demonstrates the continuous decline in the EU average over the 
last 15 years – despite the Commission’s (2012b) recent efforts to turn this 
trend around. Actually, a 7% fall in the EU average over this time period led to 
the lowest ever turnout in 2014 at 42.61%. Some of this variation can be 
explained by Eastern enlargements to countries with lesser democratic 
structures and traditionally low level of voter turnouts (Hix and Marsh, 2007; 
Steinbrecher and Rattinger, 2012; Tilley and Hobolt, 2014). Furthermore, 
citizens’ perception of their country’s EU membership, the state of national 
politics and trust in national institutions are likely to dominate their attitudes 
towards and actual political behaviour at the EU level (Hix and Marsh, 2007; 
Schmitt and Van der Eijk, 2007; Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011; Söderlund, 
Wass and Blais, 2011; Armingeon and Ceka, 2014). Thus a direct ‘electoral 
connection’ between the EP and EU citizens has not materialised (Hix and 
Hageman, 2009). These trends support the second-order thesis of EP 
elections (Seif and Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, 2005; Hix and Høyland, 2011). 
 
Nonetheless, even if EP electoral turnout continues to decline, the literature 
on EU electoral politics underlines that more and more EU citizens consider 
EU average 49.51 45.47 -4.04 43 -2.47 42.61 -0.39
Sweden 38.84 37.85 -0.99 45.53 7.68 48.8 3.27
United Kingdom 24 38.52 14.52 34.7 -3.82 34.19 -0.51
Year/           
State
% Change1999 2004 % Change 2009 % Change 2014
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EU politics as relevant for their daily lives (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). In other 
words, EU politics maybe an important factor in citizens’ decision (not) to vote 
(Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley 2009). Actually, a number of other factors have 
been found to influence citizens’ decision to (not) vote, including the level of 
EU politicisation, citizens’ affective EU identity and the (perceived) 
significance of the EP (Sanders et al., 2012; Torcal, Bonet and Lobo, 2012; 
Hobolt, 2012; 2014; Corbett, 2014). Accordingly, low turnout levels are likely 
to be an indication of  (dis)satisfaction with the EU project (Hix and Marsh, 
2011; Stockemer 2012).  
 
In this light it is perhaps even more interesting to note that EP electoral 
turnout has been fairly low in both Sweden and the UK (as demonstrated in 
Table 1.2.), with showings well below the EU average until 2009 – a year that 
marked a turnaround in the Swedish case. In fact, during the 2004 elections, 
the turnout in the UK surpassed that in Sweden – at 38.52% and 37.85%, 
respectively. The Eastern enlargement and the holding of postal ballots in the 
northernmost regions of England have been used to explain the 2004 peak in 
the UK (Hawkins and Miller, 2014: 14). Overall, the variation between the 
turnout patterns in each country is likely to reflect broader trends, while 
Sweden exhibits more stable voter turnout; the UK shows more variable 
results (Steinbrecher and Rattinger, 2012: 95). Interestingly, the UK is also 
only one of few countries where the gap between turnout at the national and 
EP elections has not increased over time (Hawkins and Miller, 2014). This gap 
could be the result of the UK using different electoral systems for its general 
(first past the post) and EP elections (party list proportional representation) 
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(Hawkins and Miller, 2014). In contrast, the same electoral system is used for 
both elections in Sweden (party list proportional representation) and here the 
gap between turnout levels has increased over time (European Parliament, 
2014). 
 
Before we move onto operationalising the dimensions of EU citizenship – 
specifically, before we break them down into elements that will then be used 
as empirical indicators for the analysis of EU citizenship in the empirical 
chapters of the thesis – we must also recognise that the aforementioned 
dimensions of citizenship are expected to have an interlinked and collective 
character (Tilly, 2003; Bellamy, 2008a; 2010). They constantly reinforce and 
stimulate one another and, at the same time, if one or more of these 
dimensions are not present, they are likely to undermine the depth of the 
other dimension(s) and obscure the model (Tilly, 2003: 611; Bellamy, 2008a: 
12, 2010: xvi).  
 
In light of these issues, studies, which only focus on one dimension of 
citizenship, can only provide a partial understanding of what citizenship really 
signifies. For example, Marshall’s tri-partite model of civic, political and social 
rights is at the heart of the majority of recent studies on national (Barbalet, 
1998; Isin and Turner, 2002) and EU citizenships (Meehan, 1993; Hansen and 
Hager, 2010). Although these studies raise some valid points about the 
significance of rights, it should be quite apparent that these studies can only 
contribute to our knowledge about national and EU citizenships to a certain 
degree. In other words, failing to contemplate rights in the context of identity 
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and participation grant these studies a limited analytical scope. Therefore, if 
we are to address the issues of citizenship fully, we should look at its various 
dimensions concurrently and (preferably) across normative, institutional and 
empirical frameworks.  
 
Even (some) policy-makers have recognised that the dimensions of 
citizenship are interlinked, and as a result, they revised the institutional 
framework of citizenship. For instance, public pay was introduced in the mid-
fifth century to guarantee the political participation of citizens in the Greek 
polis (Burke, 1992). Similarly, and despite the European Commission’s (1993, 
2001) increasingly inconsistent approach to promoting the various dimensions 
of EU citizenship (Chapter 2.2.), it used to be quite outspoken about how EU 
citizenship enhances citizens’ sense of EU identity, awareness of rights and 
EU level participation, (most notably in the early Union citizenship reports). 
Due to the interlinked character of the dimensions of citizenship, we are more 
likely to gain a ‘more nuanced’ understanding of a model of citizenship if we 
attend to its dimensions concurrently. This issue can, once again, be 
illustrated if we consider models of citizenship across diverse historical and 
political contexts. 
 
The expansion of Roman citizenship was coupled with a decline in the 
strength of citizens’ sense of identity (Magnette, 2005: 19). In comparison, 
experiencing a heightened sense of belonging to the nation states was 
supposed to have made it more likely for citizens to participate in national 
politics (Bellamy, 2008a: 12-7). While participatory rights were anticipated to 
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enhance a collective sense of identity among citizens – also emphasised in 
the Greek polis (Thucydides, 1954: 119) –, economic and religious rights were 
useful for enhancing citizens’ individual identities during the Middle Ages 
(Riesenberg 1992: 88; Weber, 1998: 44-5). The different impact of these 
rights may explain why attempts were made to enhance citizens’ public 
autonomy during the Renaissance (Heater, 2004a: 24-7). In the UK, there is 
much concern about the weakening bond between the state and its citizens 
due to the tension between the civic and ethnic components of British national 
identity and, subsequently, citizens’ low levels of participation (Hay, 2007; 
Pattie and Johsnton, 2009; Whiteley, 2012). The Swedish case is almost the 
opposite in this respect. The promotion of ‘Swedish exceptionalism’ has been 
effective in both promoting a sense of Swedish civic identity and mobilising 
citizens’ participation in politics (Billstörm, 2008; Brochman and Hagelund, 
2012: 26; Borevi, 2012: 70-3). EU citizenship may be lagging behind both of 
these models, due to the aforementioned limitations in citizens’ sense of EU 
identity and EU level participation (especially evident in Favell’s (2008; 2010) 
analyses). There is, nonetheless, some empirical evidence to suggest that 
these two dimensions of EU citizenship are likely to be enhanced in the near 
future (Bruter, 2005; Sanders et al., 2012; Ross, 2014).  
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Figure 1.1. The interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship 
 
Figure 1.1. illustrates the likely shape of the interrelated character of the 
various dimensions of EU citizenship. It suggests that the exercising of EU 
rights is expected to be constructive towards citizens’ sense of EU identity and 
enhance citizens’ propensity for EU participation. However, if and when one 
dimension of EU citizenship is weaker than the others, it is likely to have an 
impact on the depth of the other dimensions as well, and, ultimately, it will 
have an important impact on the significance of EU citizenship on the whole. 
Thus for example, if citizens do not participate in EU politics, their EU identity 
is likely to have a weaker civic aspect. It is rather self-explanatory that by not 
participating in EU politics, EU citizens also make less use of the EU rights 
available to them.  
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1.3. Operationalising the dimensions of (EU) citizenship  
The previous part of this chapter underscored that once we have a general 
definition of citizenship, the dimensions of citizenship determine how the 
different models have been realised in practice (Heater, 2004a; Magnette, 
2005; Bellamy, 2008a). Since the thesis is mainly interested in exploring how 
young and educated citizens realise EU citizenship, these dimensions are 
placed at the centre of the succeeding chapters. In order to provide an 
operational definition of each of these dimensions, they are broken down in to 
their constituent elements and these elements will be used as empirical 
indicators for the analysis of focus group evidence. Table 1.3. below provides 
a summary of these elements.  
 
  
Table 1.3. Analytical framework to approaching EU citizenship 
 
The dimensions 
of EU citizenship
EU Identity
A sense of 
belonging to the EU
Shared identity 
among EU citizens (a 
sense of "we")
Recognition of the 
"other" (non-EU 
citizens)
EU Rights Awareness of EU 
rights 
Access to civil, social 
and political rights 
across the EU
Membership in the EU 
(and host countries)
Empirical indicators 
EU Participation
Which EU citizens 
participate (Citizens’ 
socio-economic 
background) 
Reasons for EU 
citizens’ participation 
(Models of 
participation)
Forms of EU citizens’ 
engagement 
(Traditional and 
alternative forms)
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Following an interrogation of young and educated citizens’ general definition 
of (EU) citizenship (Chapter 4), the summary provided in Table 1.3. will 
structure the evidence on participants’ sense of identity, approaches to EU 
rights and participation in politics. Thus, EU identity will be explored across 
participants’ sense of belonging to the EU, shared EU identity with fellow 
citizens, and recognition of the “other”, the non-EU citizens (Chapter 6). Their 
EU rights will be analysed in light of participants’ awareness of EU rights and 
perceptions of the various advantages their EU rights hold, including the 
access they expected to provide to national and (possibly) EU level 
communities (Chapter 6). The final empirical chapter of the thesis will explore 
which segment of the young and educated EU citizens from the focus groups 
were the most likely to participate in EU politics (and local politics in the case 
of EU mobiles), the reasons for their EU participation (or abstention) and their 
preferred forms of engagement (Chapter 7). In order to define each of these 
elements in more detail, the rest  of this chapter is divided into three sections 
with each section defining one dimension of citizenship – identity, rights and 
participation. 
 
1.3.1. Citizenship as identity 
Although most scholars acknowledge the significance of identity for 
considerations of citizenship (for example Tilly, 1996: 1-18; Delanty, 2002: 
159-174; Heater, 2004a: 187-97; Bellamy, 2008a: 52-77; Karolewski, 2010: 
20-2), there is a disagreement about the genuine meaning of and the most 
appropriate methods for addressing this issue (for an excellent overview see 
Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 2–14). They disagree about, for example, the 
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importance of individual and collective identities for citizenship (Smith, 1992; 
Bellamy, 2000: 10-15; Duchesne and Frognier, 2008). Others find multi-
disciplinary approaches to identity unfortunate, since these are likely to grant 
a sense of ambiguity to the concept (Kanter, 2006: 502; Kaina, 2013). 
Consequently, identity may seem somewhat meaningless for the purposes of 
social research (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 2). 
 
In response to these critics, more and more scholars have begun to 
disaggregate the concept of identity into its constituent elements, including a 
sense of belonging to a sovereign political community, shared identity with 
fellow citizens (a “we” feeling) and recognition of the non-citizens (the “other”) 
(see for example Kanter, 2006; Duchesne, 2008; Bellamy, 2008a: 52–77; 
Risse, 2010: 22-8; Karolewski, 2011: 37-57). First, a sense of belonging to the 
community is expected to legitimise the workings of the community, including 
the regulation of citizens’ lives (Bellamy, 2010: xvii). It places an emphasis on 
how citizens identify with the community and whether the community accepts 
them as one of its members (Smith, 1992: 59f; Bruter, 2005: 8). Furthermore, 
the collective self-image of citizens assists in recognising the community as a 
group from within and from the outside (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez, 2001: 
754). Even if citizens only hold a single status of citizenship, they can often 
feel a sense of belonging to a number of (political) communities – in the case 
of the EU this could be the national and EU communities. However, these 
feelings are not (necessarily) placed in order or likely to clash (Risse, 2004: 
249). For example, existing research shows that most EU citizens feel a 
sense of belonging to continental Europe, the EU and their nation states 
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simultaneously (Schild, 2001). Hence, citizens’ sense of belonging is not 
(necessarily) exclusive in practice. In this context, top-down processes can be 
particularly fruitful in enhancing citizens’ sense of belonging to a community 
(see for example Risse’s (2003) assessment about the constructive effects of 
the Euro).  
 
Top down processes include the establishment of definite geographical 
boundaries, common symbols (e.g. a hymn, a flag or a common currency) and 
shared values (e.g. democracy and peace), and the community’s promotion of 
a positive self-image (e.g. democracy promotion beyond borders) (Billig, 1995; 
Karolewski, 2009: 60). Bottom-up processes, emphasise what citizens do, 
including the exercising of rights, use of gestures and language, and how 
these practices could then be constructive towards consolidating the effects of 
top-down processes (Risse, 2010: 30-3). If we are interested in exploring how 
citizens realise their citizenship, the focus becomes, clearly, on bottom-up 
approach to identity formation, especially how citizens’ exercise of rights – 
usually political participation – enhances their citizenship as identity (Bellamy, 
2010: xvii).  
 
Second, a shared identity among citizens affects their ability to realise 
citizenship (Aristotle, 1946: 292) and live their lives on an equal basis as 
‘legitimate members’ of a political community (Kofman, 1995: 130; Bellamy, 
2008a: 12-3). In particular, it requires that citizens collectively recognise one 
another as full members of the community. Even though the importance of a 
shared identity is disputed by some scholars (Bellamy, 2010: xvii), a “fellow-
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feeling” (Mill, 2002 [1861], 391f) is expected to produce a sense of social trust 
and obligations among citizens, both of which are necessary preconditions for 
democratic decision-making processes (Miller, 1995). A shared identity can 
arise from a common purpose, history, language and culture (Gellner, 1983:7; 
Kanter, 2006: 507-508; Risse, 2010: 25-26).28 It can then be enhanced by 
citizens’ interactions with one another, which may lead to mutual recognitions 
of a common fate and purpose (Smith, 1992: 58; Delanty, 1999: 269; Fuss 
and Grosser, 2006: 212-3; Citrin and Sears, 151-2). However, citizens’ shared 
identity is expected to be “both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 
1983: 6) because not every citizen of a community knows each other. As a 
result, it is built on a collective understanding among citizens that their fellows 
have the same identity. Therefore, their shared identity defines an ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson, 1983; Risse, 2010) – a sense of “we” compared to the 
non-citizens, the “other”. 
 
Third, and stemming from the last point, for citizenship as identity to emerge, 
a clear definition the “other” is required (Castano et al., 2002: 319).29 Similarly 
to a sense of shared identity, the “other” is only meaningful if it is recognised 
collectively by citizens. ‘Codes of distinctions’ (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995: 
74) may facilitate citizens’ ability to recognise the “other”. In particular, 
definitive geographical, political, economic and cultural self-images have been 
proposed as useful for this purpose (Herrmann and Brewer, 2004: 6). These 
codes reinforce the actual boundaries of the political community, making an 
                                            
28 These issues refer to “the contents of identity” and are constantly shaped by citizens as 
well as the political elite (Abdelal et al., 2009: 27). 
29 The “other” is one of the basic assumptions raised by social identity theorists as well (see 
for example Tajfel, 1982). 
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initially ‘imagined community’ real in the minds of citizens (Castano et al., 
2003: 450-2, also Risse, 2010: 23). This issue then points to identity and, by 
association, citizenship as a form of ‘categorisation’ (Karolewski, 2010: 26). 
While recognition of the “other” is often regarded as one of the most 
significant components of identity (Citrin and Sears, 2009: 146; Risse, 2010: 
26; Karolewski, 2012), it also underscores the increasingly controversial and 
exclusive character of contemporary citizenships (Bellamy, 2008a: 52-4). 
Thus for example, resulting processes of exclusion have enhanced negative 
attitudes (and often negative feelings) towards the “other” (Brewer, 2001: 
119). This is because when citizenship as identity becomes increasingly 
conventional and accepted by citizens, their rejection of the “other” is also 
heightened (Neumann, 1996: 150-4). 
 
Furthermore, citizens’ sense of identity is anticipated to be multiple and multi-
layered in practice (Citrin and Sides, 2004). As mentioned earlier, citizens can 
belong to a number of political communities and social groups simultaneously. 
In fact, citizens’ socio-individual relationships in each of these communities 
and groups may result in separate, nested, cross-cutting or multi-layered 
identities (Herrmann and Brewer, 2004: 8-10).30 Their identity is also likely to 
                                            
30 According to Herrmann and Brewer (2004: 8-10), multiple identities have a number of 
opportunities to fit together. Separate multiple identities indicate no overlap between different 
identities. Nested multiple identities suggest a hierarchy between different identities, as 
citizens of smaller social groups are also members of and can feel a sense of belonging to 
larger groups (see also Herb and Kaplan, 1999; Diez Medrano and Gutierrez, 2001). This is 
often used in surveys researching and measuring some form of collective identity (e.g. in 
Eurobarometer surveys). Crosscutting multiple identities reflect the fact that some citizens are 
members of a number of social groups and identify with these groups, while others (from the 
same groups) are not. These identities can also clash (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2006). 
Similarly, multi-layered (or marble cake) multiple identities recognise that citizens have 
multiple memberships and identities but suggest that these identities are blended together – 
due to intersecting social factors – which make it difficult to separate identities. As a result, 
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be influenced by a number of intersecting social factors, including gender, 
race, class and social standing (Yuval- Davis, 2007: 562-3). However, even if 
multiple in number, citizens’ identities do not (necessarily) clash since some 
layers are prone to comprise others (Taylor, 1989: 25). This holds particularly 
true for citizenship as identity. Indeed, it is quite normal for citizens to 
negotiate between the contrasting sense of their identities on a daily basis 
(related to gender and religion, for example) and according to the egalitarian 
principles of citizenship, the latter of which emphasise the virtue in conciliating 
clashing identities and taming disruptive behaviours (Hobsbawm, 1996: 39). 
Thus, citizens tend to negotiate between the different layers of their identities 
and often use them according to the specific context (Kofman, 1995: 130). 
These contexts can then promote the endorsement of different social 
identities and sustain certain elements of citizenship as identity, while 
neglecting others.  
 
Thus this thesis follows in the footsteps of scholars who aggregated the 
concept of identity. The subsequent empirical chapter of the thesis (Chapter 
5) will explore young and educated citizens’ sense of EU identity across its 
constituent elements, including citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU, their 
shared EU identity and recognition of non-EU citizens, the EU’s “other” (as 
illustrated in Table 1.3.). The depth of citizens’ EU identity will also be 
considered according to whether it seems to be positioned at the cognitive 
(awareness of citizenship), affective (evaluation of and feelings about 
citizenship) or behavioural levels (collective motivations) (Abdelal et al., 2009: 
                                                                                                                             
citizens’ identities are expected to be context-specific (Maier and Risse, 2003: 18; Risse, 
2010: 25). 
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27-31). While the cognitive level is likely to denote a weak identification, the 
behavioural level is going to be indicative of a strong sense of EU identity 
(Kaina and Karolewski, 2009: 18).   
 
1.3.2. Citizenship as rights  
Rights are “resources provided by social institutions which protects and 
legitimises the existence, the needs and interests, or the actions of the bearer 
of the right” (Bauböck 1994: 209, emphasis added). Due to the legitimising 
role of rights, scholars tend to regard it as the principal dimension of 
citizenship (see for example Marshall, 1950; Balibar, 1988: 723; Isin and 
Turner, 2002: 1; Bellamy, 2010: xvii; Karolewski, 2009: 10). They define the 
legal structure of citizenship and provide an indication of the attitude of a 
particular community towards its citizens (Bauböck, 1994: 211).31 Rights can 
thus shed light on what the community expects citizenship to be in practice. 
However, there is an inherent tension in the idea of rights because citizenship 
is expected to have a collective character but rights are individually orientated 
(Karolewski, 2010: 11).32 Moreover, rights are the only institutionalised 
dimensions of citizenship (Bellamy, 2005: 163-70). In other words, this 
dimension is not defined by citizens’ practices on an everyday basis – as is 
the case with the other two dimensions of citizenship – but by the political 
community. Since citizens do not (directly) define these rights, we must first 
try and shed light on the extent to which they are aware of their rights and can 
                                            
31 Some citizens, most notably in the UK, have been barred from accessing their political 
rights, based on gender and ethnic backgrounds, migration status, criminal convictions and so 
on (Liebich, 2009; Sievers, 2009). Therefore, not every citizen can enjoy their citizenship 
rights fully. 
32 Bellamy (2005: 174-6) makes a similar point when he underscores that due to the 
individuality of rights they are insufficient as the basis of a ‘common moral framework’ – 
citizenship – in a sovereign political community. 
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recognise the junctures in which they tend to exercise these rights. We can 
then move on to exploring two elements of citizenship as rights – membership 
in a sovereign political community and access to political rights, and civil, 
social and economic entitlements (Vink and Bauböck, 2013: 5-9).  
 
The first element, membership, refers to the formal rules individuals must fulfil 
in order to gain access to the political community (and, subsequently, 
citizenship). This element “makes citizens part of a select group, who enjoy 
privileges denied to non-members” (Bellamy, 2008a: 52) and reinforces the 
idea that citizenship is exclusive (Bauböck 1994: 23). Contemporary models 
of citizenship use territorial principles to separate citizens from non-citizens 
(most notably state borders) (Brubaker, 1992: 21) and also offer access to 
citizenship for non-citizens, once they fulfil certain criteria related to visa, 
residential and, often, language requirements (Bauböck Perchinig and 
Sievers, 2009).33 Although these criteria are wide-ranging, there is some 
convergence in the EU context, mainly due to the degree of European 
integration (Hansen and Weil, 2001; Joppke, 2007). This issue may, at first 
suggest that national citizenships have become less exclusive over time, 
paving the way for citizens to access regional, cosmopolitan and world 
communities (Meehan, 1993: 17; Soysal, 1994: 195-206; Heater, 1999: 134-
48, 2004b).34 Nonetheless, the actual, formal rules of access to these 
                                            
33 This is an important aspect of how states deal with temporary immigrants and long-term 
residents, raising questions about the possibility of dual and partial citizenship or even 
‘denzienship’ (for a more theoretically embedded discussion on the variety of ways in which 
citizenship can be acquired see Bauböck, (1999; 2011) and for a more empirically-embedded 
evaluation see for example Vink and Bauböck (2013)). 
34 However, not every scholar agrees with the positive tone granted to ‘world citizenship’ (see 
for example Arendt, 1968: 82; and for an evaluation of world citizenship Heater, 1999: 149-
54). This is because while world citizenship is based on the universality of human rights 
(Delanty, 1997) –moral requirements, which should be upheld by all communities and are 
83 
 
communities remain to be defined by national governments. This issue is 
apparent in the EU, where EU citizenship is derogative of national citizenships 
(Hansen, 2009). Ultimately, membership in a community should provide us 
with “a conceptually clear [and] legally consequential … distinction between 
citizens and foreigners” (Brubaker, 1992: 21). 
 
The second element of rights refers to the ability of citizens to access political 
rights, and civil, social and economic entitlements on an equal basis 
(Marshall, 1950; Wiener, 1998; Bellamy, 2008a: 54-69).35 Citizens’ access to 
political rights is, perhaps, the most important for their citizenship because it 
allows them to reinterpret the legal structure of their citizenship (and the 
outlook of the community) (Bellamy, 2005: 177-83; Karolewski, 2010: 3). 
Furthermore, “individuals become citizens through possessing the right to 
decide what rights they should have and being able to influence the character 
of the community to which they belong” (Bellamy, 2006: 7). Hence citizens’ 
equal access to their political rights opens up the opportunity for them to 
realise a democratic form of citizenship. In comparison, citizens’ equal access 
to civil, social and economic entitlements is perhaps best described as a virtue 
of their citizenship status (Bellamy, 2005: 163-70). It cannot shape the legal 
structure of their citizenship in the same way as their political rights do. This 
issue may explain why, broadly speaking, long-term residents tend to gain 
                                                                                                                             
usually defined in abstract terms – citizenship rights are insitutionalised and set out by a 
specific political community (Bellamy, 2005: 163-70). This distinction renders human rights 
insufficient to serve as the basis of citizenship. Even more, not everyone agrees on what 
moral requirements should human rights uphold (most notable are East/West distinctions) 
(Heater, 2004b). 
35 Civil, political and social rights are the three strands of rights defined by Marshall (1950). 
Nonetheless, the actual “list of citizenship rights is open ended and varies with particular 
political traditions, social structures and cultural understandings” (Bauböck, 1994: 211). The 
rights included in such list can thus give us an indication of how the political community 
approaches its citizens. For an evaluation of EU rights see Annex I. 
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access to civil and social entitlements but not to political rights. It could also 
explain why EU mobiles have not yet secured access to national level voting 
rights in the host country. Therefore, the differences in the access of residents 
and citizens to political rights and socio-economic entitlements are likely to 
reinforce the inclusive/exclusive character of citizenship (Brubaker, 1992: 21; 
Karolewski, 2010: 3).  
 
Thus, the relevant empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 6) will explore the 
extent to which young and educated citizens were aware of their EU rights. It 
will then shed light on citizens’ perceptions of whether EU rights provide 
access to member state and (more broadly) to EU communities. Finally, the 
chapter will consider the potential of EU rights to guarantee political rights and 
civil, social and economic entitlements to citizens across the EU’s territory (as 
illustrated in Table 1.3.). 
 
1.3.3. Citizenship as participation  
This chapter has already established the fundamental role participation has 
been observed to play in activating various models of citizenship (see for 
example Bosniak, 2008). It can be broken down into three elements, including 
who (socio-economic background), why (models of participation) and how 
(forms of participation) participates in politics. First, there is much evidence to 
suggest that there is an age gap in the participation of younger and older 
citizens (Smets, 2012). The reasons for this are threefold and include 
generational, life-cycle and period effects (Norris, 2003). Furthermore, young 
people are more likely to participate when political issues have a clear 
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personal relevance (Sloam, 2014b). In addition to age, studies demonstrated 
the positive effects education and gender have on citizens’ propensity to 
participate (Torney-Purta et al., 2008). Thus for example, women are more 
likely to participate than men (Torney-Purta and Amadeo, 2011).  
 
A number of theoretical models of participation have been put forward to 
elucidate the reasons for citizens’ decision to participate in politics. The 
continuous application of these models suggests that more than one model 
may be relevant to explaining the situation (for an overview see Smets and 
van Ham, 2013). The rational choice model suggests that a cost-benefit 
analysis (Downs, 1957) and, also, citizens’ sense of civic duty (Blais, 2000) 
are important determinants of participation. The resource model suggests that 
the most important factor is related to individual resources (i.e. money, time, 
and civic skills) (Verba and Nie, 1972). Thus the economically well-off, highly 
educated and politically knowledgeable citizens are expected to participate 
more than others. The mobilisation model argues that we “must move beyond 
the worlds of individuals to include [the effects of] family, friends, neighbours, 
and co-workers, plus politicians, parties, activists, and interest groups” in 
order to really understand why citizens participate (Rosenstone and Hansen, 
1993: 23). Psychological models focus on the role of attitudes and 
psychological predispositions such as political interest (Mattila, 2003), while 
sociological models explore the effects of (parental) socialisation, education 
and habit-formation (Plutzer, 2002) on decisions about participation. Finally, 
the political and institutional contexts are the focus of the political institutional 
model (Jackman, 1987).  
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Finally, this chapter has already suggested (and even illustrated) that citizens’ 
participation in traditional forms of engagement (voting, standing for public 
office, party membership and so on) is declining (Franklin, 2004; Bellamy, 
2008a: 114-23). Instead of traditional forms of engagement, a growing 
number of citizens participate in individualised and alternative forms of 
engagement, including public demonstrations, volunteering, acts of civil 
disobedience (such as riots), consumerism and on-line petitions (Pattie, Seyd 
and Whiteley, 2004; Kaase, 2007; Dalton, 2009). Therefore, if really want to 
explore how citizens realise their citizenship today, we must take a broader 
approach to participation and allow citizens to tell us about their preferred 
form of engagement and the reasons for this change (see for example Sloam, 
2014a). 
 
Based on the extant literature on citizens’ participation, the relevant empirical 
chapter of the thesis (Chapter 7) will explore the issue of EU participation by 
considering which segment of the EU mobiles and stayers were the most 
likely to participate in politics at the EU, national and local levels, the reasons 
for their (EU) participation – or, alternatively their abstention – and their 
preferred forms of engagement, including traditional forms of engagement, 
like voting in the EP elections and alternative forms of engagement, such as 
volunteering or participating in protests. 
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1.4. Summary 
This chapter laid down the conceptual foundations of citizenship and shed 
light on why it has been difficult to apply citizenship to the case of the EU. The 
first part of the chapter demonstrated that the study of EU citizenship has 
become separated from the broader field of citizenship studies. This issue 
was evident in two problematic features of the specialised literature on EU 
citizenship. First, the chapter identified a tendency in the literature to explore 
the extent to which EU citizenship is distinct from other models. Second, the 
chapter suggested that existing studies usually attend to a particular 
framework  (institutional, normative or empirical) and dimension (EU identity, 
rights or participation) of EU citizenship and disregard the others. As a result, 
most of the literature is expected to provide a partial understanding of what 
EU citizenship signifies.  
 
In order to provide a more nuanced understanding of EU citizenship, the 
chapter made an attempt to bring its dimensions together. To do so, the 
second part of the chapter explored the debates about citizenship, which 
played out across diverse historical and political contexts. These debates 
usually define citizenship as a dynamic bond between a sovereign political 
community and the individuals, and in relation to this, expect citizenship to 
play an important role in shaping community-building processes (processes of 
exclusion and differentiation). Moreover, citizenship is normally observed as 
multidimensional and composed of three collective and interlinked dimensions 
– identity, rights and participation. By applying the multidimensional definition 
to diverse historical and political models of citizenship, including Swedish, UK 
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and EU citizenship, EU citizenship was observed as yet another example in 
the long line of models. In this context, the dimensions of citizenship were 
observed as imperative to elucidating the affects of diverse historical and 
political contexts. These dimensions were expected to underline the actual 
significance of any model within the broader field of citizenship studies. If we 
are to re-embed the study of EU citizenship within this broader framework, we 
must attend to its dimensions concurrently. In order for us to be able to do this 
however, we had to operationalise the dimensions of citizenship.  
 
The third part the chapter operationalised the dimensions of citizenship. More 
specifically, this part broke the dimensions of citizenship down into its 
constituent elements. These elements were then identified as potential 
empirical indicators for analysing the original focus group evidence about EU 
citizenship (as summarised in Table 1.3.). Although the third part of the 
chapter grants a sequential order to the dimensions of EU citizenship – which 
will also be replicated in the organisation of the later chapters of this thesis – it 
was anticipated that these dimensions transform one another due to their 
interlinked character. Since the dimensions of citizenship have been 
combined differently across diverse historical and political contexts (Tilly, 
2003: 611; Joppke, 2007: 46-7; Bellamy, 2010: xvi-vii), the relationship 
between the dimensions of EU citizenship may be configured specifically to fit 
the EU context. The empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 2, 4– 7) will 
attempt to shed more light on how the relationship between the dimensions of 
EU citizenship is configured. For now, the existing literature on citizenship 
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provided us with an indication of how each dimension is likely to transform 
one another (as illustrated in Figure 1.1.). 
 
Even if the interlinked character of the dimensions of citizenship is likely to be 
configured differently from one context to the next, we know that in every 
context it is policy-makers who set the scope for individuals to activate their 
citizenship. More to the point, it is the institutional framework of citizenship 
that sets out how individuals can exercise their rights. So exploring the 
institutional framework of citizenship is a useful starting point for addressing 
the issue of any model of citizenship. In the case of the EU, it is the European 
Commission, which proposes legislation and defines the institutional 
framework of EU citizenship. The next chapter of this thesis will, as a result, 
investigate the Commission’s discourse on and ideals of EU citizenship, and 
highlight the symbiotic relationship between intra-EU mobility and EU 
citizenship.  
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Chapter 2. The European Union and EU citizenship  
Chapter 1 shed light on the difficulty associated with applying citizenship to 
the case of the EU. This issue was, perhaps, most apparent in the 
contradictory conclusions reached by the specific literature on EU citizenship 
(see for example Shore, 2000; Habermas, 2003). Nonetheless, we cannot be 
too critical about the inconclusiveness of this literature since EU citizenship 
policies seem equally inconsistent (Hansen and Hager, 2010; Pukallus, 2012). 
Interpreting the intentions of the European Commission – the EU’s executive 
that has an inherently pro-integrationist and supranational disposition (Nugent, 
1995: 605-13) – we would expect to see the dominance of supranational 
political aspirations (and some have already done so) (Meehan, 1993; 
Kostakopoulou, 2001; 2008).  
 
However, by being (mostly) ambiguous about the relationship between the 
member state and EU citizenships for example, the Commission (2001: 7; 
2010a: 3) has nourished the bi-level structure and derivative character of EU 
citizenship (Hansen, 2009). This structure grants a ‘second order’ quality to 
EU citizenship (Delanty, 1997) and has, as a result, been invoked by scholars 
to underline its limitations compared to member states models (Neunreither 
1995; O’Leary, 1996). Research on the institutional framework of EU 
citizenship also draws attention to the importance the Commission continues 
to attribute to citizens’ intra-EU mobility (Maas, 2007; Shaw, 2007; Hansen 
and Hager, 2010; Olsen, 2012). This issue raises questions about the 
democratic credentials EU citizenship affords to the political integration 
process in Europe (Maas, 2014). Despite these limitations however, legal 
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scholars accentuate the ever-expanding supra- and post-national scope of 
citizens’ EU rights (Kostakopoulou, 2001; 2007, 2014; Kochenov, 2011, 
2014). Accordingly, a supranational model of EU citizenship is in the making 
and follows the liberal traditions of citizenship (Meehan, 1993; Jenson, 2007). 
 
Against this backdrop, the chapter investigates the Commission’s ideals on 
EU citizenship. It assesses the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship as 
present in treaty texts, legislative proposals, formal evaluations, reports and 
media statements after 1993.36 These documents are assessed on the basis 
of whether or not the argument they present is credible, typical and 
comprehensible (Scott, 1990: 6). The chapter also considers how power 
relations between political actors, their pre-determined objectives and the 
ideological implications of their actions (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 78-
116) are likely to shape the Commission’s discourse. In so doing, it sheds light 
on the institutional framework of EU citizenship, and the actual scope this 
framework grants to citizens for realising their EU status. By studying the 
Commission’s ideals, the chapter attempts make a small contribution to 
previous research on the institutional framework of EU citizenship (Wiener, 
1998; Kostakopoulou, 2001; 2005; Maas, 2007; Shaw, 2007; Olsen, 2008a; 
2012; Hansen and Hager, 2010; Pukallus, 2012). The findings of this chapter 
suggest that the Commission is mainly concerned with expanding the scope 
EU mobiles have for realising their EU citizenship. Due to its principal focus 
on EU mobiles, the Commission grants an elitist character to EU citizenship 
and classifies stayers as primarily member state citizens.  
                                            
36 For historically grounded evaluations of EU citizenship see Wiener, 1998; Maas, 2007; 
Hansen and Hager, 2010; Pukallus, 2012; Olsen, 2012. 
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Moreover, the Commission differentiates between categories of EU mobiles, 
depending on the type of mobility they undertake, and, more recently, their 
ethnic backgrounds. These categories are added to the initial distinctions 
between EU citizens on the basis of their country of origin – since some EU 
member states are more important than others (Moravcsik, 1998). 
Accordingly, EU-15 mobiles and, in particular, the young and highly educated 
EU mobiles are identified by the Commission (2010d: 2; 2014a) as the most 
likely to realise their EU citizenship. In comparison, the political objectives of 
EU citizenship only seem to come to the forefront during the (lead up to) EP 
elections and EU treaty revisions. By exploring the Commission’s relevant 
discourse, this chapter serves as a contextual backdrop for exploring the role 
of mobility in activating EU citizenship (Chapter 3) and interpreting citizens’ 
perceptions of EU citizenship in the subsequent empirical chapters (Chapters 
4 – 7). 
 
This chapter has two main parts. The first part introduces the EU’s broader 
institutional structure and highlights that the changing dynamics between 
these institutions appears to be echoed in the bi-level structure, economic 
rationale and political objectives of EU citizenship. The second part sheds 
light on just how the Commission expects citizens to realise the different 
dimensions of EU citizenship, specifically EU identity, EU rights EU and 
participation.  
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2.1. The structure and rationale of EU citizenship 
Before we consider the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship, it is 
important to shed light on some aspects of the EU’s institutional dynamism, 
which shape both the Commission’s workings and its policy discourse. First, 
the Commission (2013a) is the EU’s executive and holds monopoly over 
initiating and implementing legislation. Its executive role allows the 
Commission to develop a coherent agenda across member state borders and 
define the depth and breadth of EU policies (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 27). This 
is true for EU citizenship policies as well, the development of which the 
Commission monitors and reports to the EU Council and the EP (every three 
years under Art. 25, TFEU). Second, the Commission has a pro-integrationist 
and supranational outlook (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). This is mainly due to 
its historical function as the “motor of European integration” (Lodge, 1989: 37) 
and signals the continuation of neofunctionalist and bureaucratic approaches 
to European integration (Haas, 1958: 16; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997; 
Nugent, 2000).37 The Commission’s supranational outlook is reflected well in 
the requirement for Commissioners to pledge alliance to the EU (Georgakakis 
and Weisbein, 2010). Third, the Commission has sole responsibility for 
communicating EU policies to citizens. For instance, one of the main 
objectives of the Directorate General (DG) for Communication (DG COMM) 
has been to “[d]evelop a sense of ownership of European integration and of 
European identity” among EU citizens (European Commission, 2013q). 
Similarly, the main DG responsible for EU citizenship – currently DG Justice 
                                            
37 Intergovernmental approaches to European integration would argue that its the influence is 
the result of the willingness of nation states to delegate some powers to the supranational 
level in order to guarantee that member states comply with inter-state agreements 
(Moravcsik, 1998). This makes the Commission an agency of member states. 
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(DG JUS) – has similar tasks and objectives (see for example European 
Commission, 2001). We could thus expect to find cooperation and 
coordination between different DGs in their attempt to support EU citizenship. 
Fourth, the Commission has expressed an interest in developing EU level 
citizenship policies since the early 1950s (Maas, 2007; Olsen, 2012). Its basic 
approach has highlighted the EU’s supranational political aspirations – 
recognising that citizenship shapes community-building processes – in an 
emerging ‘community of Europeans’ (European Commission, 1993: 3).  
 
Due to the institutional setting and recent developments in the EU, including 
the increased power of the EU’s legislatures (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000), the 
institutionalisation of the European Council (Puetter, 2012) and the economic 
crisis (Hodson, 2013), the Commission must make sure it does not tread on 
the interests of member states. Actually, these developments put further 
constraints on the Commission’s (formal) executive role (Kassim and Menon, 
2010; Peterson 2012). For example, the EP and EU Council can now request 
legislative proposals (Art. 225 and 241, TFEU), which the Commission is likely 
to find difficult to ignore (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 27). Even when the 
Commission initiates the legislative process, it tends to propose legislation 
that is likely to be accepted by the EP and the EU Council (Bache, George 
and Bulmer, 2012: 232). This is because, in the very few cases where these 
two institutions do not agree with the Commission’s original proposal, they can 
reject it all together or, possibly, revise it in the Conciliation Committee (Hix 
and Høyland, 2013: 172). Thus, the revised legislative process grants 
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conditional agenda-setting powers to the EU’s legislatures (Tsebelis and 
Garrett, 2000).  
 
Since 2009 the Commission (2015a) can ‘only’ set the EU’s mid-term agenda, 
which must also correspond to the long-term goals set out by the European 
Council. Compared to its increased powers during the 1970s and ‘80s (Dinan, 
2010), the Commission’s role is considerably weaker today (Puetter, 2012: 
172). These limitations seem legitimate and echo the intergovernmentalist 
demands put forward by an increasingly Eurosceptic public in the wake of the 
economic crisis (Fabbrini, 2013). Finally, there might be little continuity in the 
actual workings of Commissioners. Member state governments nominate 
Commissioners every five years and can change the nominee after a term 
should they adopt on an overly supranational approach. Similarly, the portfolio 
of Commissioners often changes between terms and, sometimes during their 
five-year term as well (Egeberg, 2013). Therefore, the Commission’s 
discourse (on EU citizenship) is anticipated to echo the complex dynamics 
embedded in the EU’s evolving institutional structure (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 
46) and the restrictive effects of the recent crisis.  
 
2.1.1. EU citizenship – an indirect bond between the EU and its citizens  
The continued importance and, possibly, the fortification of member states’ 
significance are mostly evident in the bi-level structure of EU citizenship, 
which turns EU citizenship into an indirect bond between the EU and its 
citizens. This contradicts the broad definition of citizenship as a direct bond 
between a political community and citizens across diverse historical and 
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political models (Chapter 1.2.). Nonetheless, the Commission has (1993: 1, 
emphasis in original), rather optimistically, claimed that by introducing EU 
citizenship the TEU “created a direct political link between the citizens of the 
Member States and the European Union”.38 However, academics and 
politicians dispute the Commission’s claim (Neunreither 1995; O’Leary, 1996; 
Preuss, 1995; Vink 2005; see also Chapter 1.3.3.). Although EU citizenship 
has a cross-border application and supersedes national borders, member 
states resolve who EU citizens and non-citizens are. Since every state has its 
own citizenship acquisition procedure (Council of Europe, 1997), 28 national 
laws ‘frame’ access to EU citizenship (EUDO, 2015).39 As a result, EU 
citizenship is highly dependent on member state citizenship.  
 
Ironically, the structure of EU citizenship was not discussed in the 
Commission’s initial discourse.40 For example, Article 8 of the TEU stated, 
matter-of-factly, that the treaty introduces EU citizenship and that member 
state citizens are considered EU citizens. “Citizenship of the Union is hereby 
established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a 
citizen of the Union” (TEU, Art. 8(1)). The early EU citizenship reports had a 
similar, ambiguous terminology: “every national of a Member State is 
                                            
38 The Commission made references to ‘Union citizenship’ until the TFEU entered into force at 
the end of 2009, renaming the European Community to the EU. Notwithstanding the political 
implications for European integration (Church and Phinnemore, 2013), for the purpose of 
clarity and consistency this chapter refers to EU citizenship in its discussion of both Union and 
EU citizenship (and related documents). 
39 Moreover, the Commission (2010f; 2013a, b, c) has expressed an interest in standardising 
some national laws – especially those related to the integration of TCNs and citizens’ 
electoral rights. As a result, member states have already had to make some changes to 
national laws (for academic evaluation of these policy areas see Shaw, 2007; Hansen and 
Hager, 2010). 
40 Declaration 2, which was annexed to the TEU hinted at the complementary structure of EU 
citizenship; “the question whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State 
shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned” 
(emphasis added). 
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automatically a citizen of the Union” and “[c]itizenship of the Union is 
conferred on nationals of all member states by the Maastricht Treaty” 
(European Commission, 1993: 2; 1997: 6). The ambiguity in the Commission’s 
initial approach goes hand in hand with the first time citizens expressed an 
attitude of ‘constraining dissensus’ towards European integration (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2005; 2008). Although the EU’s executives (the Commission and the 
European Council) retained their objective of turning the European Economic 
Community (EEC) into a political union, they were aware of a growing popular 
discontent with the intensified level of European integration (see for example 
European Council, 1992). This was perhaps most apparent in the Danish 
referendum on the EU, which led to a symbolic opt-out from the treaty’s 
provisions on EU citizenship – the very provisions which introduced EU 
citizenship in the first place (Adler-Nissen, 2008). 
 
Despite of these early setbacks, the Commission (1997: 17) sustained its aim 
to expand the scope of EU citizenship. For example, it has made an attempt 
to grant EU status to all residents irrespective of their nationality. Due to 
further pressure from member state governments however, the subsequent 
treaties curtailed rather than expanded the scope of EU citizenship (Ferrera 
2005: 142). For instance, the revised Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty 
strengthened the relationship between EU citizenship and nationality. It added 
a new sentence to the previous article, clarifying that “[c]itizenship of the 
Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship”. The treaty thus 
granted a constitutionally recognised bi-level structure to EU citizenship that, 
due to the very slight changes made in subsequent treaties, is still applicable 
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today. However, the bi-level structure of EU citizenship clearly contradicts the 
emerging supranational direction of the EEC prior to the 1990s. It also sheds 
a dubious light on the expectant tone of transactionalist and neofunctionalist 
approaches to European integration (Haas, 1958; Deutsch et al., 1968, see 
also Chapter 3.1.). Although the introduction of EU citizenship appeared to 
have challenged “the exclusive sovereignty of national citizenship”, its 
enduring dependency on member states has been observed to turn it into “a 
second-order citizenship” (Delanty, 1997: 296).41 This is why, as Chapter 1 
highlighted, many academics have treated EU citizenship as derived from 
national citizenships (O’Leary, 1996: 66; Hansen 2009: 6). 
 
Yet, the expectant tone of the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship 
seems to defy these cynical conclusions. This holds true despite the 
Commission’s own admission of the fact that “[n]ationality of a Member State 
is the only way to acquire citizenship of the Union” (European Commission, 
2008: 3, emphasis added) and “citizenship of the Union complements and 
does not replace national citizenship”. Actually, the Commission (2001: 7) 
begun to deduce the impact of EU citizenship’s bi-level structure, interpreting 
it as a contribution towards realising a “new type of multiple citizenship on 
different levels” in Europe. Disguised as a ‘new type of citizenship’, its post-
2000 statements and publications turned EU citizenship’s bi-level structure 
into a possible avenue for advancing integration from the bottom-up. For 
instance, it has argued that since EU citizenship is “a means of facilitating 
                                            
41 Some academics with a legal background have disputed such claims, asserting that EU 
citizenship’s dependency on member states is merely a determinant of access to the status 
and does not have an implication for actual EU rights (Maduro, 2000: 325; Kostakopoulou, 
2012). 
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integration of immigrants… the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the 
Member State … would automatically mean gaining citizenship of the Union 
as well” (European Commission, 2004: 5).  
 
Some progress towards a supranational model of citizenship was made as 
well, especially on the back of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) post-1998 rulings (Carrera, 2005: 710; Kostakopoulou, 2005: 233; for 
an overview see Craig and De Bùrca, 2008: 819-53). For example, the CJEU 
established that EU citizens have an inherent right of free movement and 
residence, regardless of their economic role (Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Kari 
Uecker and Vera Jacquet v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1997; Carlos Garcia 
Avello v Belgian State, 2003). It also clarified that mobiles accrue the same 
social rights as host nationals due to the EU’s non-discriminatory principle 
(Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, 1998).42 Most importantly for EU 
citizenship, the CJEU declared that it “is destined to be the fundamental status 
of nationals of the Member States” (Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre citizens d'aide 
sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, 2001). This judgement came around the 
same time when the Nice European Council debated the legal scope and 
content of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR). The ECFR was to 
expand the rights of EU citizens considerably. Although the Irish no-vote on 
the Nice Treaty – a protest vote against the ECFR, Eastern enlargement and 
the EU (Garry, Marsh and Sinnott, 2005) – ensured that the ECFR did not 
enter into force, the CJEU interpreted the political context suitable for 
                                            
42 However, the CJEU also underlined the cross-border requirement of citizens’ EU status 
(Shaw, 1997; Oliveira 2002; Shuibhne 2002; Mather 2005). 
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clarifying the relationship between EU and member state citizenships (Maas, 
2007: 70-2).  
 
Its subsequent rulings reinforced the fundamental status of EU citizenship. For 
instance, the CJEU established that the loss of member state citizenship 
should always be considered according to EU law, rather than national 
traditions (Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2010). More recently, it 
declared that any national provision, which may restrain citizens’ EU level 
rights, should be applied in accordance with EU law” (Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano 
v. Office national de l’emploi, 2011). Both of these ruling clearly confine the 
ability of member states to deprive individuals of their EU level rights and point 
to a slow wearing-down of member state citizenships (Kochenov, 2011: 101-
4). They have even led to a spectacle of ‘reverse discrimination’ in which 
member states can withhold certain rights from their own citizens but must 
provide these to EU mobiles (Shuibhne, 2010: 1614). In this light, the 
reformist approach of the CJEU could be observed as “a glimpse into the 
future” (Joppke, 2010: 22) of EU citizenship. This is the case especially so if 
we recognise that the necessary legal basis for invoking the supremacy of EU 
law and, as a result, EU citizenship is available to the CJEU (Flaminio Costa v 
ENEL, 1964).  
 
The Commission has followed the example set by the CJEU. To ensure 
precision and the coherent implementation of EU citizens’ rights, it integrated 
the different directives, rules and regulations under the ‘Citizenship Directive’ 
(2004/38/EC) (European Commission, 2004). This was followed by closer 
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scrutiny on how member states implement the rights of EU citizens (European 
Commission, 2008, 2009b), which then led to some changes in the broader 
structure of EU citizenship as present in the EU treaties. For instance, by 
making EU citizenship “additional” rather than “complementary” to member 
state citizenships (Art. 20(1), TFEU),43 the TFEU underscores that EU 
citizenship grants novel rights to member state citizens (see also Kochenov, 
2009: 206). Even if these changes did not go as far as decoupling EU 
citizenship from member state citizenship – a consequence of being able to 
introduce a directive rather than a regulation on EU citizenship – they gave it a 
more independent status (Kostakopoulou, 2011; Kochenov, 2014).  
 
Chapter 1 already mentioned that some academics have long argued that due 
to its transnational scope, the EU rights of citizens could not be granted by 
member states alone (see for example Preuss, 1996: 548-9). By comparison, 
given the necessary administrative resources, the Commission could grant 
national level rights to EU citizens (Kochenov, 2012). This is a rather unlikely 
scenario however and would require substantial concessions of member state 
sovereignty. Actually, it would require an almost complete reversal of the EU’s 
recent institutional reforms (Fabbrini, 2013; Bache et al., 2014). In so doing, 
the Commission could also damage the EP’s recent gains of legitimacy (Hix 
and Høyland, 2013).  
 
                                            
43 The relevant articles in the (new) TFEU (especially Art. 25) not only introduce EU 
citizenship matter-of-factly but also provide for an EU level safety mechanism. It allows for the 
Commission to propose, implement and monitor legislation on EU citizenship and has 
resulted, for example, in the Commission’s (1993; 1997; 2001; 2004; 2008a; 2010a; 2013a) 
informative EU citizenship reports. 
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While its scope for revisions was substantially limited in terms of EU 
citizenship per se, a more progressive approach is visible in the Commission’s 
approach to TCNs’ rights (for an evaluation see Hansen and Hager, 2010). It 
has called for “a common solution not only to the problem of Community 
mobiles but also for those from third countries” even before the introduction of 
EU citizenship took place (European Commission, 1976: 12). The same point 
is apparent today. For example, the 2014 re-shuffling of the Commissioners’ 
portfolios brought external migration and internal mobility together in one 
department – DG JUS. Moreover, it should be noted that some TCNs – those 
with family ties to EU citizens – already enjoy access to intra-EU mobility and 
residence rights (Art. 10, Regulation (EEC) No.1612/68 of the Council and Art. 
3(2) Citizenship Directive). EU treaties also grant some political rights to 
TCNs, including petition to the EP and the European Ombudsman (Art. 227 
and 228, TFEU). Finally, TCNs have different political rights in different 
member states. In some states, including Sweden, they can vote in local 
elections while in others they cannot (for an evaluation see Shaw, 2007).  
 
While, the Commission’s approach to TCNs could be championed as an 
important step in developing a post- or supra-national model of citizenship 
based on the liberal traditions (Soysal, 1994; Kostakopoulou, 2001; Rumford, 
2003), it also blurs processes of exclusions between EU citizens and non-
citizens. As such, it may cause some difficulty to actually identifying what 
rights each group of EU resident have and who belongs to which group, 
especially EU mobiles and long-term TCNs. It could thus prove difficult for 
both member state governments and citizens to exclude the EU’s ‘other’. 
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Since categorisation is an integral part of citizenship politics (Shaw, 2007; 
Karolewski, 2010: 26) and strengthens citizens’ sense of identity (Risse, 2010: 
26), a blurred line between EU citizens and non-citizens may limit the 
significance of EU citizenship in practice.  
 
Nonetheless, neither the CJEU nor the Commission has gone as far as to fully 
revise the bi-level structure of EU citizenship. As a result, there is now a 
contradiction between the rules applied to the acquisition and loss of EU 
citizenship. The acquisition of EU citizenship reinforces the much-criticised 
relationship between citizenship and nationality (Soysal, 1994; 
Kostakopoulou, 2001; Shaw, 2007), while the loss of EU citizenship points to 
an emerging supranational model (Joppke, 2010: 22; Kochenov, 2012: 26). 
This contradiction has led to a dangerous trend during the crisis with the 
Commission turning a blind-eye on how member states treat EU mobiles, 
especially those of Roma ethnicity (Aradau et al., 2013). Actually, even before 
the crisis, the Commission (2008a: 3) admitted profound problems remain with 
how member states have implemented the measures of EU Citizenship 
Directive, concluding that “[n]ot one Article of the Directive has been 
transposed effectively and correctly by all Member States”. More recent 
academic assessment of these measures found that very little improvement 
has been made since 2008 (Guild, Peers and Tomkin, 2014).  
 
Consequently, member state citizenships continue to take precedence over 
EU citizenship. From a comparative perspective, the CJEU may have been 
more successful – and more blunt – in its approach to strengthening the 
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institutional framework of EU citizenship. Actually, the Commission’s 
discourse since 1993 has been rather ambiguous about this issue. For 
instance, it is not very clear whether the Commission considers individuals 
first EU and then member state citizens or the other way around. If and how 
EU citizenship expected to shape the legal and political structure of member 
state citizenships is another question that requires clarification. Since multiple 
and often contradictory expectations are placed on Commissioners due to the 
EU’s institutional structure (Egeberg, 2013), its ambiguous discourse on the 
bi-level structure of EU citizenship might be the best-case scenario (for now). 
However, it has important consequences for the actual significance of EU 
citizenship.  
 
For example, we know that member state influence at the EU level changes 
from one country to the next (see for example Featherstone and Kazamias, 
2014). In so doing, there appears to be an internal hierarchy between states, 
depending on whether or not their membership deemed crucial to sustaining 
the EU project (arguably the original six, especially Germany and France do 
so). This issue was particularly apparent in the recent debates about a 
possible Brexit and Grexit (Zank, 2015).  In this context, we can expect that 
hierarchy also exists between EU citizens based on their country of origins. 
Broadly speaking, citizens from EU-15 and CEE states are likely to have very 
different experiences of EU citizenship (Favell and Nebe, 2009; Ross, 2014). 
Because of the crisis, ethnic background has become the latest factor based 
on which EU citizens are differentiated by member states (Shaw, 2012). 
Against this backdrop, the focus group evidence sheds light on the extent to 
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which different groups of young citizens have been able to realise their EU 
citizenship in Sweden and the UK (Chapters 4 – 6). 
 
2.1.2. EU citizenship – a community of Europeans? 
The role of citizenship in shaping community-building processes – especially 
processes of differentiation and exclusion – was identified as normally 
accompanying debates on citizenship (Chapter 1.2.). EU citizenship is no 
exception. However, we know that the legacy of market citizenship (Everson, 
1995), the top-down introduction of EU citizenship (Laffan, 2006) and the 
public’s growing Eurosceptic attitude (Usherwood and Startin, 2013) make it 
rather difficult to distinguish a community of EU citizens. These developments 
have not quite deterred the Commission’s (2013b: 2, Juncker, 2014a) political 
aspirations, though recent admissions about the desperate state of the EU 
indicates that it is acutely aware of the ‘no European demos’ puzzle. This 
section demonstrates that the Commission’s discourse on how EU citizenship 
shapes community-building processes has two contradictory features. 
Establishing an EU political community was the (projected) objective of the 
introduction of EU citizenship. However, in the everyday context the 
Commission tends to support the development of an EU economic 
community. Due to the EU’s institutional dynamics, the Commission may find 
it easier to promote policies with an economic rather than political bearing 
(Bauer and Becker, 2014). Thus, the introduction of EU citizenship has not put 
an end to the EU’s endless support for and promotion of citizens’ free 
movement and residency rights (see also Chapter 3.2.).  
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The introduction of EU citizenship was, according to the Commission (1993: 
1-2), “[o]ne of the most significant steps on the road to European integration” 
and “underscore[d] that the Treaty of Rome is not concerned solely with 
economic matters”. Although economic considerations were at the forefront of 
its policies prior to the 1990s, the Commission had pondered on the need to 
establishing a “people’s Europe”, a “citizens’ Europe”, a “Community of 
citizens”, “European citizenship”, “European identity” and a representative 
democracy at the EU level before (European Commission, 1973; 1975a, b, c; 
Patijn Report, 1976; European Council 1984).44 Its subsequent statements 
reveal that these early references played a crucial role in the TEU’s final, 
political provisions (see for example European Commission 1993; 1997). Its 
contemporary approach to how EU citizenship may shape community-building 
processes seems similar to these earlier descriptions. Thus for example, EU 
citizenship is perceived today as “the crown jewel of European integration” 
and similar to “what the euro is to our Economic and Monetary Union” 
(Reding, 2013a). While the Commission’s approach seems to be more or less 
the same today as it was 50 years ago, we know that citizens’ support for 
European integration has turned increasingly sceptical (Hooghe and Marks, 
2009). For example, French and Dutch voters rejected the Constitutional 
Treaty in 2005, and Irish voters rejected the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. However, 
these developments did not really halt the Commission’s approach to the 
European integration progress (Church and Phinnemore, 2013). 
 
                                            
44 Maas (2007) shows that the very first articulations of a Europe-wide citizenship model 
predate the free movement provisions of the ECSC Treaty. In fact, the objective of the 
Schuman declaration (1950) was to develop “a wider and deeper community between 
countries”. 
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Thus for example, the political underpinnings of EU citizenship gained further 
constitutional support. Accordingly, the Lisbon Treaty placed EU citizenship in 
the main section on the provisions on the democratic principles of the EU 
(Title II, TEU). The Commission’s (2010a, 2013a) approach to EU citizenship 
was also altered in order to highlight the significance EU citizenship has for 
the everyday lives of citizens. To this end, the Commission (2009a; 2014c) 
initiated a number of citizens’ consultations and programmes, starting with a 
communication on guiding the implementation of the Citizenship Directive and 
peaking with the EYC2013-14 programme. The latter marked the 20th 
anniversary of the introduction of EU citizenship and, by association, the EU’s 
political turn (European Commission, 2011a; 2012b; 2012c; 2013e), and was 
aiming to develop “a holistic EU citizenship policy” (European Commission, 
2014d: 62, emphasis added). The programme then identified citizens’ political 
participation as having a “primary importance” for EU citizenship since, 
[t]he better the people of Europe understand their rights as EU 
citizens, the more informed their decisions will be. Informed citizens 
understand that they have a stake in the European project. They 
therefore want to engage in the democratic life at all levels. This is 
the vision for the European Year of Citizens 2013 (European 
Commission, 2011a: 1). 
 
However, EU participation only came to the forefront of activities during the 
early months of 2014 – that is after the original programme (EYC2013) had 
been prolonged by about six months. Afterwards, EYC2013-14 underlined, 
“strengthening the civic democratic participation of Union citizens” was one of 
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the main aspects of realising EU citizenship (European Commission, 2014d: 
27). Nonetheless, its consultations were (as before) directed at civil societies, 
businesses and different levels of government. In other words, they did not 
include citizens per se. This reflects a broader trend that has prevailed in the 
Commission’ activities – the indirect engagement of EU citizens and the 
promotion of EU level civil societies and participatory democracy (Warleigh, 
2006; Greenwood, 2007). Actually, the pursuit of the latter two objectives 
seem to guide the citizenship programmes run by DG COMM, including Active 
European Citizenship’ (2004-2006) and the Europe for Citizens (2007-2013, 
2014-2020) programmes (European Commission 2011e; 2011f; for an 
evaluation of these programmes see Pukallus, 2012). 
 
Against this backdrop, the Commission’s oft-cited objective – to bring the EU 
closer to its citizens and “create an ever-closer [political] union among the 
peoples of Europe” (Art. 1, TEU) – seems out-of-place (Smith, 1992; 
Cederman, 2001). The more recent remark of the first (indirectly) elected 
Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker (2014a: 14) appears to be more 
appropriate; “[t]he gap between the European Union and its citizens is 
widening” and “[o]ne has to be really deaf and blind not to see this.” As a 
result, after 20 years of citizenship provisions, a political EU community 
remains to be “on the [far] horizon” (Reding, 2013a). The Commission’s failure 
to deliver on this premise has served as grounds for denouncing the genuine 
significance of EU citizenship (Smith, 1992; Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2006; 
Garry and Tilley 2009). However, a closer inspection of the Commission’s 
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discourse suggests that a political EU community has not actually been part of 
its everyday considerations.  
 
Instead, the Commission has had an almost exclusive focus on developing a 
community of EU mobiles. It is apparent in the wider workings of the 
Commission, as well as across its different DGs, including DG JUS, which is 
responsible for the legal scope of EU citizenship (European Commission, 
2013a), DG COMM, which frames EU citizenship policies and strategies 
(European Commission, 2014c), and sectoral DGs, including DG Education 
and Culture (EAC) and DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL). 
In the short-term address setting out the political guidelines for the 2010-14 
period, then Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso (2009: 3, emphasis 
added) established, EU citizenship offers citizens “rights, protection and 
opportunities in the marketplace”. The EU’s long-term agenda, the Europe 
2020 strategy, puts a similar case forward in its call for citizens’ empowerment 
“in the Single Market” (European Commission, 2010c: 20).45 
 
Although the DG JUS's citizenship report (Art. 25, TFEU) is supposed to 
reinforce the actual political implications of EU citizenship two thirds of it is 
devoted to free movement and only one third on citizens' participation in the 
EU (European Commission 1993a; 1997a; 2001; 2004; 2008a; 2010a; 
2013a). Although the TFEU positioned EU citizenship as part of the EU’s 
democratic principles, the Commission’s (2010a; 2013a) reports explored 
                                            
45 Europe 2020 promotes citizens’ digital literacy and accessibility. It also makes a case for 
introducing EU politics at multiple government levels (local, state, regional) in order to allow 
citizens to get a “sense of ownership” of the EU project (European Commission, 2010c: 29). 
Interestingly, the only point in which citizens are mentioned is within the new framework for 
promoting and enhancing cross-border shopping. 
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possibilities to ‘dismantle’ EU rights and deal with the ‘obstacles’ EU mobiles 
face. Even during the lead up to the 2014 EP elections, DG JUS’s action 
programme (Reding, 2013) only included one point which promoted citizens’ 
political participation. The remaining 11 points considered issues related to 
mobility. Similarly, the original aim of the DG COMM run EYC2013-14 
programme was to promote and facilitate intra-EU mobility. “The overall 
purpose of the proposed European Year of Citizens is to ensure that all Union 
citizens are aware of the rights available to them in a cross-border context by 
virtue of their Union citizenship status” (European Commission, 2011a: 2). EU 
participation was only added later to the programme. 
 
Sectoral DGs also tend to promote citizens’ EU mobility, rather than political 
participation.46 This has been the case for DG EAC for quite a while now (see 
for example European Commission, 1976; 2010d: 2) and, more recently, DG 
EMPL. The latter has argued for example that since workers’ mobility is “one 
of the pillars of the Single Market”, a directive dedicated to their rights would 
“guarantee a more effective and homogeneous application of EU law” 
(European Commission, 2013o: 1-2). However, its proposal contradicts the 
original purpose of the Citizenship Directive (2004/38/EC) – to unite various 
EU level legislations on citizenship (European Commission, 2004). It could, 
potentially, set off a proliferation of secondary legislations on different types of 
intra-EU mobility. This is likely to have a negative rather than constructive 
effect for an EU citizenship rigged by tension in its institutional framework.  
                                            
46 Although only two DGs are discussed in this section, the variety of sectoral DGs (including 
DG Internal Policies, DG Administration, DG Tourism and Inter-institutional Relations and so 
on) with the capacity to influence existing legislation on EU citizenship suggests that 
citizenship is an integral part of contemporary EU politics. 
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There is an inconsistency in the Commission’s discourse on the way in which 
EU Citizenship may shape community-building processes in the EU. It has 
been working hard at accentuating what the EU provides its mobile citizens – 
often at the expense of actually engaging with citizens in making EU level 
policies (European Commission, 2010a; 2010b; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c). The 
expectation has been that citizens would, eventually, ‘return the favour’ and 
assist in upholding the EU’s economic market (Barroso, 2009; Juncker, 
2014a). The tension between the economic rationale and projected political 
substance of EU citizenship is bound to lead to a different kind of community 
than those apparent in the member states. We already know that in the latter 
cases, the focus has been on promoting citizens’ sense of identity, rights and 
political participation simultaneously (Chapter 1.2.). Thus it seems that the 
Commission has been working towards realising a community of EU mobiles 
and created an exclusive membership that pays little attention to how stayers 
can realise their EU citizenship. There are thus processes of differentiation 
embedded in the Commission’s discourse and, consequently, in EU 
citizenship’s institutional framework. 
 
Therefore, it seems misguided to search for an emerging political EU 
community. Even if it is not intentional, the mobility-focus of the Commission 
grants an elitist character to EU citizenship. The EP (2009: 16, 14 emphasis 
added; see also 2010) has been particularly perceptive of these shortfalls and 
called on the Commission “to improve [its] communication with the average 
Union citizen and to ensure broad dissemination” of its programmes. It also 
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warned the Commission that failure to do so might lead to the “exclusion” of 
some stayers “from European societies” – those with low level of education 
and ethnic backgrounds. Chapters 5 and 7 on EU identity and EU participation 
provide some indication of the extent to which the EP’s doubts are echoed by 
young EU mobiles and stayers in Sweden and the UK.  
 
2.2. The dimensions of EU citizenship  
The previous section gave an indication of the context in which member state 
citizens could realise a dynamic, yet indirect bond with the EU and the 
expectation that EU mobiles might create an economic EU community. The 
chapter now turns to the final, but perhaps most important aspect of 
citizenship models across diverse historical and political contexts – their 
multidimensional character (Chapter 1.2.). The Commission’s discourse 
recognises that EU citizenship is the source of citizens’ EU identity, rights and 
participation (perhaps most apparent in European Commission, 2001: 7). Due 
to the almost singular focus of the Commission to promote citizens’ intra-EU 
mobility however, it seems to only really expect EU mobiles to realise these 
dimensions. The previous section already hinted that the Commission 
differentiates between citizens on the basis of their mobility status. Its 
approach to the dimensions of EU citizenship makes these processes of 
differentiation even more pronounced. Thus, this section underscores that the 
Commission seems to apply the active/passive (EU) citizenship dichotomy 
along the mobiles/stayers distinctions.  
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2.2.1. EU identity 
Citizens’ sense of EU identity has been an integral part of the Commission’s 
discourse on EU citizenship (Pukallus, 2012). In particular, the Commission 
has assumed that EU citizenship and EU identity have a causal relationship. 
The promotion of EU identity through the provisions of EU citizenship has 
been apparent throughout the workings of DG JUS (European Commission 
2013a), DG COMM (European Commission, 2014c) and among sectoral DGs 
as well, including, most importantly perhaps DG EAC (European Commission, 
2014a). These DGs tend to anticipate citizens’ exercising of their EU level 
rights to enhance the different elements of their EU identity.  
 
Accordingly, DG JUS has claimed that EU citizenship was introduced “with the 
aim of fostering [citizens’] sense of identity with the Union” (European 
Commission, 1993: 2). It was also “meant to make the process of European 
integration more relevant to individual citizens by increasing their participation, 
strengthening the protection of their rights and promoting the idea of an 
European identity” (European Commission, 1997: 6). Against this backdrop, 
the bi-level structure of EU citizenship – especially its dependency on member 
state citizenships – has been expected to assist EU citizens to distinguish 
between their fellows and ‘the other’, the non-citizens (Kostakopoulou, 2012). 
Notwithstanding the considerable overlap between the rights of EU citizens 
and TCNs (Shaw, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2010), the enduring objective of 
the Commission (2004: 4) to disseminate information about EU citizenship 
could then be interpreted in the context of globalisation, which has required 
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that we revise processes of exclusion stemming from citizenship (Chapter 
1.2.).  
 
Moreover, the Commission has attempted to promote citizens’ exercising of 
EU level political rights and, consequently, to enhance their EU identity 
(Pukallus, 2012). Its concurrent approach to these dimensions suggests that it 
perceived the different dimensions of EU citizenship as interlinked (see for 
example Wallström, 2007a; Reding, 2013a; see also Olsen, 2012). This 
collaborates one of the main proposals of this thesis, specifically that we must 
recognise the interlinked character of the dimensions of citizenship and, as a 
result attend to them concurrently (Chapter 1.2.2.). Accordingly, the 
Commission (2013d: 53) has accepted, citizens’ “participation in civil society, 
community and/or political life, characterised by mutual respect and non-
violence and in accordance with human rights and democracy” as fruitful for 
their emerging EU identity. It has even accepted that alternative forms of 
engagement may be useful for developing citizens’ EU identity. EU political 
participation “does not simply mean asking the citizens of Europe to elect a 
European Parliament every five years. It means allowing – and encouraging – 
people from all walks of life to have their say in shaping EU policies” 
(Wallström, 2007b: 5). There is thus an expectation that citizens’ participation 
in traditional forms of engagement – in this case EP elections – would be 
complemented by their active involvement in individual and alternative forms 
of engagement, all of which together provide citizens a “say in shaping EU 
policies”. Thus the Commission has adopted a similar approach to developing 
citizens’ EU identity that historically prevailed at the national level (Leonard, 
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1998; Painter, 1998, 2008; Heater, 2004a; Bellamy, 2010) – placing an 
emphasis on citizens’ political participation.  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of these examples, the Commission has 
actually paid little attention to promoting citizens’ EU level political 
participation in its general discourse on EU citizenship (Maas, 2007; Olsen, 
2012). The focus instead has been on EU mobility. Interestingly, it has not 
even admitted that the majority of citizens have EU level political rights. The 
EU’s primary and secondary laws all require that citizens first move within the 
EU. Against this backdrop, it seems that the Commission has actually 
provided stayers with a rather slim scope for developing a sense of EU 
identity on the basis of their EU participation – that is through similar 
processes as it has been the case at the national level. In contrast, it has 
promoted EU mobility quite extensively. Although DG COMM and DG JUS 
have adopted different approaches to disseminating information on EU 
mobility (for a historical evaluation see Pukallus, 2012), they tend to agree 
that free movement and EU citizenship are “virtually synonyms” (European 
Commission, 2011a: 1). In fact, they tend to adopt a rather dynamic approach 
to promoting EU mobility – one that reflects the broader political context of the 
time. For example, against the backdrop of the crisis, DG JUS has attempted 
to make EU citizenship more comprehensible and its provisions more citizen-
friendly (Pukallus, 2012: 382-6). As a result, its website now includes profiles 
of EU mobiles, which emphasise the genuine significance of EU citizenship in 
the everyday context (see for example European Commission, 2010h, 2010i). 
It also provides sound reasoning for the necessity to introduce further EU level 
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legislation on intra-EU mobility – so as to prevail over the obstacles faced by 
EU mobiles (European Commission, 2010c).  
 
The same approach has prevailed in the case of sectoral DGs. The most 
explicit of these seem to be the argument put forward by DG EAC, which has 
underscored that the learning mobility of EU students “foster[s] a sense of 
European identity, helps knowledge circulate more freely [and] contributes to 
the internal market, as Europeans who are mobile as young learners are more 
likely to be mobile as workers later in life” (European Commission, 2010d: 2; 
for more on this see also Chapter 3.2.). As a result, the Commission (2014a; 
2014g) increased its current budget for the Erasmus+ programme to just 
under 15 billion Euros – just shy of a two-fold increase on the previous budget 
–, most of which is expected to be spent for supporting the learning mobility of 
higher education students. It is important to note however that these changes 
do not only contribute to the political aspirations of the EU – and thus EU 
citizenship – but also correspond with the very real problems facing European 
youth today. The alleged “skills deficits and skills mismatch” seems to 
(partially) explain why over 5 million under 25s were unemployed in January 
2015 (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2015). Thus there are high 
expectations in terms of both political and economic return on the back of 
young citizens’ (increased) learning mobility (European Commission, 2015b). 
 
In addition to this, and despite the fact that member states retain competency 
over educational policies, the Commission has begun to dominate higher 
educational policies in the EU, through the Bologna process, the Lisbon and 
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(more recently) Europe 2020 strategies (Keeling, 2006; Curaj et al., 2012). 
These processes and strategies have one important aspect in common – they 
all facilitate the learning mobility of young EU citizens. Hence, the 
Commission’s integrated approach to learning mobility and EU citizenship 
seem to depict young EU mobiles as the ideal EU citizens.  
 
A recent study by the Commission (2014g: 33, 183) seems to be quite explicit 
about this assumption and underscore the fruitful association between 
learning mobility, EU identity and EU citizenship.   
European citizenship refers to a European identity, fuelled by a 
common history and common customs, and jointly constituting the 
European Union as a political entity… Erasmus wishes to further 
the underlying ideas of European citizenship… [since] [o]ne of the 
core strategic interests of mobility in Europe is the promotion of a 
European identity. 
Its claims shed a new light on Juncker’s (2014b) recent attempt to bring the 
EU’s policies on education and citizenship together for the mandate of the 
current Commission. However, the EP rejected his original proposals due to 
Juncker’s selection of personnel and triggered a re-shuffling of the 
Commission removing citizenship (and internal mobility) from DG EAC’s 
portfolio (Keating, 2014).47 Therefore, it seems not only the Commission, but 
the EP (2013) recognises the positive impact learning mobility has for young 
citizens’ sense of EU citizenship. The same seem to have been the case for 
                                            
47 At first, Tibor Navracsics, the Hungarian Commissioner, was allocated this portfolio. Since 
citizenship, youth and education policies were considered to be under duress in Hungary, the 
EP rejected his nomination (Keating, 2014). 
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the EU Council (1986), which accepted the original proposals introducing the 
Erasmus programme with “a People’s Europe” in mind. 
 
Against this backdrop, a recent admission by Vivien Reding (2013a), then 
Commissioner responsible for DG JUS, that it is EU mobiles, whose “identity 
as EU citizens is being shaped everyday” (Reding, 2013a) hints that the 
Commission’s almost singular attentiveness to securing citizens’ intra-EU 
mobility is likely to stay for the long-term. Thus, rather than EU participation, 
the Commission promotes EU mobility. The resulting market approach to EU 
identity contradicts the Commission’s supranational political aspirations and 
sheds a dubious light on the democratic credentials the EU can really gain 
through EU citizenship. Nonetheless, its approach to EU citizenship – be it on 
the basis of a political or market model of citizenship – clearly accentuates 
that the Commission has had a preference for developing citizens’ EU identity 
through a bottom-up process (see also Pukallus, 2012). 
 
This is not to say that the Commission has not adopted other measures to 
promote EU identity (Shore, 2000; Pukallus, 2012: 248-50; Kaina and 
Karolewski, 2013: 33-8). Indeed, it has been rather active in introducing top-
down approaches to promoting EU identity, citing the common value, history 
and culture of member states, the EU’s commitment to democratic principles 
and the role of EU symbols, including the EU flag, the Euro or hymn 
(European Commission, 2011f; 2013d). Its top-down approach is apparent in 
the ‘Active European Citizenship’ and the more recent ‘Europe for Citizens’ 
(2007-2013, 2014-2020) programmes, both of which are run by DG COMM 
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(European Commission, 2011f). These programmes are, supposedly, 
concerned with engaging citizens directly in EU policy-making. However, town 
twining can hardly be seen as a politically contentious issue. Actually, these 
programmes and, to a large extent, the latest addition to EU rights, the 
citizens’ initiative (CI) seem to facilitate an interaction among an emerging EU 
level civil society and non-governmental organisations at the expense of 
integrating citizens at the EU level (European Commission, 2011a: 2; 2014e). 
A closer inspection of these documents also reveals that the Commission 
tends to be rather broad about, for example, what the EU’s common history or 
values actually refer to. This is particularly apparent in its ‘Unity in Diversity’ 
motto – one that brings to the fore the diversity between the identities and 
cultures of member states and EU citizens (European Commission, 2007a). 
We know that some empirical evidence found these top-down approaches 
fruitful in developing citizens’ EU identity – though often to a varying extent 
(Bruter, 2009; Risse, 2005, 2010). Against this backdrop, the Commission’s 
attempt to develop citizens’ EU identity from the bottom up seems to have had 
a more constant and unambiguous character (Olsen, 2008a: 225-32; 
Pukallus, 2012). 
 
However, even its bottom-up approach to promoting EU identity has its 
shortfalls. Most importantly perhaps, it fails to recognise that EU identity is not 
one-dimensional. The Commission’s (2004) reports often make references to 
EU-wide surveys – often commissioned by DG COMM – which provide 
empirical evidence of citizens’ multiple, crosscutting, hierarchical or nested 
identities (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Risse, 2010; Duchesne, 2012; TNS 
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Social and Political, 2013). These underscore that citizens are not likely to 
have an exclusive EU identity but hold a number of identities simultaneously. 
For example, survey data has revealed that around 44.7% of EU citizens had 
a sense of attachment to the EU (illustrated in Table 1.1.) compared to 91% 
feeling the same for their country of origin in 2012 (EB, 77.3). There is thus 
likely to be much overlap between how citizens approach their sense of 
attachment to the EU and national levels. Even the bi-level structure of EU 
citizenship already hints at the presence of more than one identity for citizens 
(Meehan, 1993: 3). The way in which these two levels of identity manifest is 
then likely to be multiplied by the different ‘frames’ applied by member states 
to European integration and, consequently, to EU citizenship (Medrano, 
2010). Currently, 28 member states as well as the Commission frame EU 
citizenship, allowing for 29 different ‘frames’ to emerge. We also know that 
these ‘frames’ are likely to be multiplied further by the complexity associated 
with identity broadly speaking, including for example its multilayered character 
(Citrin and Sides, 2004). Therefore, it is most likely that the majority of EU 
citizens hold both national and EU identities simultaneously. Empirical findings 
underline, EU citizenship may in fact foster citizens’ national and EU identities 
simultaneously (Rother and Nebe, 2009; TNS Social and Political, 2013). 
While the Commission (2010a) seems to be aware of these possibilities, it has 
not incorporated them into its discourse on EU citizenship and identity. Its 
one-dimensional approach may be too idealistic and make it unlikely for EU 
citizens to ever realise the Commission’s ideals. 
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2.2.2. EU rights  
Due to their historical embedding in workers free movement rights (Chapter 
3.2.) and the CJEU’s expansive reading of relevant secondary laws (Craig 
and De Bùrca, 2008: 819-53), EU citizens’ rights make up the most 
established dimension of EU citizenship. Appendix 3 provides an overview of 
the potentials and limitations of these rights. It demonstrates that rights linked 
to citizens’ EU mobility are the most advanced at present. Actually, most 
rights require that citizens move within the EU, including their right to vote and 
stand as candidates in the municipal and EP elections in the host country (Art 
22, TFEU). Others necessitate cooperation between citizens across member 
state borders, including CI (Art. 24, TFEU). Intra-EU mobility also facilitates 
citizens’ access to further rights, most importantly perhaps, non-discrimination 
on the basis of nationality (Art. 18, TFEU, see also Guild, 2004; Maas, 2007; 
Olsen, 2012). None of these rights are likely to have considerable significance 
for stayers. Even more, in some cases, they led to a form of reverse 
discrimination, where states treat EU mobiles better than they would their own 
national citizens (Shuibhne, 2010). Therefore, the structuring of EU rights is 
prone to reinforce the distinctions between EU mobiles and stayers. 
 
The same trend is apparent in the Commission’s discourse. It has had an 
almost singular focus on citizens’ mobility (Guild, 2004; Maas, 2007; Olsen, 
2012), underscoring the legacy of market citizenship (Everson, 1995; Preuss 
1998) and depicting EU mobiles as the ideal EU citizens (Favell, 2008; Recchi 
and Favell, 2009). Moreover, within its discourse on EU citizenship, the 
Commission has spent more time on discussing, shaping and guaranteeing 
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citizens’ EU rights than their identity or participation (Olsen, 2012; Chapter 
3.1.2.). Against this backdrop, its admission that the dimensions of EU 
citizenship are interrelated seems to be of little significance. Its almost 
singular focus on citizens’ EU rights is prone to have left less scope for 
citizens to activate the other two dimensions of their EU citizenship. 
Therefore, the Commission’s focus on EU mobility might place another 
constraint on citizens’ ability to realise its ideals of EU citizenship.  
 
The transnational scope, historical rooting and dynamic expansion of EU 
rights might account for the Commission’s extensive focus on this dimension. 
Even academics have long argued that these rights carry a real potential for 
realising a post-, supra-national or cosmopolitan model of citizenship in the 
EU (Closa, 1992; d’Oliveira, 1995; O’Leary, 1996; Carrera, 2005; 
Kostakopoulou, 2012; Kochenov, 2012; Maas, 2013; Guild, Peers and 
Tomkin, 2014). Nonetheless, the “exceedingly limited” (Shaw, 1998: 246) 
novelty in these rights in the TEU – they can be traced back to workers’ 
economic and member state citizens’ EP voting rights (Wiener, 1998; Maas, 
2007; Olsen, 2012) – places an profound challenge to the supposed progress 
of EU citizenship beyond the limits of regional economic integration. The 
recent changes made to the structure of EU citizenship demonstrate that the 
Commission (2010a) has some opportunity to revise the text of the treaties. 
Yet, in reality, citizens’ EU rights have been listed in the same order across 
the different EU treaties for over 20 years. First citizens’ mobility rights are 
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spelt out and then their political rights are specified.48 Even the so-called 
‘Citizenship Directive’ (2004/38/EC) only really regulates the mobility of EU 
citizens and their family members (for a recent evaluation see Guild, Peers 
and Tomkin, 2014). These issues underscore that the Commission really 
believes, citizens’ mobility rights are the most important aspect of EU 
citizenship (European Commission, 2004, 2008a, 2010b, 2013a).  
 
Accordingly, it has been seeking “to inform citizens of their [mobility] rights to 
ensure that they actually benefit from such freedoms across the Union” 
(European Commission, 2008a: 3, emphasis added). The very first EU 
citizenship report (2010) responded to this requirement well. It identified 25 
action points to guarantee EU citizens could fully enjoy their mobility rights 
across the EU’s territory (European Commission, 2010b). It was issued 
parallel to the Commission’s last Union citizenship report (2010a) and 
communication on the Single Market (2010g), all of which together afford EU 
citizenship a strong economic focus. These reports recognise the fragmentary 
way in which the Commission deals with EU citizenship and, in order to ratify 
this issue, they seek to create “a Citizen’s Europe” and “a well-functioning 
Single Market”.  To this end, they try to eliminate the “obstacles faced by 
Europeans when exercising their rights conferred to them by the Single 
Market acquis, i.e. when they are acting as economic operators within the 
Single Market, for instance as entrepreneurs, consumers or workers” 
(European Commission, 2010b: 4, emphasis added). Thus the Commission 
shifted focus from EU citizenship and political union to EU citizenship and 
                                            
48 The only exception to this rule is the ECFR, which first lists the right to vote at the EP (Art. 
39) and municipal elections (Art. 40) first, followed by mobility rights (Art. 45) and diplomatic 
protection (Art. 46). 
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economic union. Its shifting focus is not really surprising in the aftermath of 
the institutional changes that were introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (Hix and 
Høyland, 2011: 23-48) and against the backdrop of the crisis (Hodson, 2013). 
It is more than likely that the Commission found it easier and less 
controversial to focus on promoting citizens’ EU rights than their EU identity or 
EU participation – the latter dimensions are, after all, much more politically 
contentious than (economic) rights. The legal specialism of then 
Commissioner in charge of DG JUS Vivien Reding seem to have also made a 
better fit at the time (Pukallus, 2012: 390-2). 
  
The second EU citizenship report (2013) followed the example set out in 2010 
and identified 12 new action points in six areas, all of which, once again relate 
to intra-EU mobility (European Commission, 2013a; 2013i). These include the 
introduction of social security coordination across state borders in order to 
guarantee EU mobiles’ access to social benefits, the requirement to provide 
more opportunities to young EU citizens to participate in cross-border 
traineeships and to offer (an optional) EU identity card to citizens in order to 
ease their intra-EU mobility. Actually, the only action point that touches on 
citizens’ EU participation, relates to an issue that has been raised since 1993 
(European Commission, 1993: 7). In particular, it pledges to identify 
“constructive ways to enable EU citizens living in another EU country to fully 
participate in the democratic life of the EU by maintaining their right to vote in 
national elections in their country of origin” (European Commission, 2013i). 
The Commission (2013a; 2013b; 2013c) seems to understand this pledge as 
a positive development – a direct response to resolving the obstacles faced 
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by EU mobiles. However, it does not propose measures to actually enhance 
mobiles’ participation at the EP or municipal elections, nor does it guarantee 
them the right to vote in national elections in the host country. Even though 
the public consultations considered during the writing of the report identified 
EU mobile voting rights of primary importance (European Commission, 
2012b).  
 
Therefore, the Commission’s discourse on and the institutional framework of 
EU citizenship differentiate between EU citizens on the basis of their mobility 
status. Added to the previous discussion on EU identity, the Commission 
seems to observe EU mobiles as active and stayers as passive EU citizens. 
However, not all mobiles can realise the Commission’s ideals since their 
mobility rights are also limited on the basis of economic resources (Citizenship 
Directive 2004/38/EC) and the transitional measures applied by member 
states (Shaw, 2012). These limitations underscore the presence of further 
differentiation processes in the EU. However, these limitations are not an 
inherent aspect of the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship. They are 
the culmination of issues linked to the bi-level structure of EU citizenship and 
the legacy of the EEC market. Or, from a broader perspective, they stem from 
the EU’s institutional dynamics.  
 
This issue reinforces the notion that the Commission identifies students as the 
ideal EU citizens. By institutionalising learning mobility under the Erasmus+ 
programme for example, the Commission forgoes the earlier mentioned 
limitations on EU mobility. Similarly, students have access to the host 
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country’s labour market by the virtue of their residency, while their national 
fellows must adhere to transitional procedures.  Hence, we can differentiate 
between EU mobiles and stayers on the basis of their economic resources, 
country of origins and, in the case of EU mobiles, also on the basis of the form 
of mobility they undertake. Existing research showed that these distinctions do 
have a considerable influence on how EU mobiles and stayers realise their 
EU citizenship (see for example Recchi and Favell, 2009). Chapter 3 
addresses the issue of EU mobility in a greater detail and sheds light on its 
likely impact on citizens’ perceptions.  
 
2.2.3. EU participation 
EU citizens’ participation in the policy-making process was expected to come 
to the forefront of an EU “representative democracy” (Art. 10(1), TEU; 
Meehan, 1993).49 Nevertheless, we know that it has had a secondary role in 
the Commission’s discourse, especially compared to citizens’ mobility (rights) 
and resulting EU identity (European Commission, 2008a; 2013a, b, c, f, g, h). 
Even when the Commission (2011a; 2013d) has taken a specific interest in 
participation, including both traditional and alternative forms of engagement, it 
has had a tendency to promote and safeguard the political participation of 
some citizens, namely EU mobiles (Maas, 2007; European Commission, 
2010h; Olsen, 2012). The alternative to this trend has been the indirect 
mobilisation of citizens, especially through EU level civil societies and NGOs 
(Greenwood, 2011: 128-75). The Commission established an EU level 
participatory democracy (Kohler-Koch, 2009: 48), engaging with leaders from 
                                            
49 . These rights are listed and analysed in Appendix 1 together with the rest of EU rights. 
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large civil society and non-governmental organisations. This was the case, for 
example, during the Constitutional Convention (The European Convention, 
2002). Its revised approach however, raises questions about the quality of the 
EU’s representative democracy (Kohler-Koch, 2010). This is not to suggest 
that the Commission (2013g: 1) has not acknowledged the need to engage all 
EU citizens in public debates on the future direction of the EU. It even stated 
that the main political role of EU citizens is to vote in the EP elections. They 
can thus guarantee “democratic control and accountability occur[s] at the level 
at which [EU] decisions are taken” (European Commission, 2013g: 2). This 
practice, according to the Commission, would strengthen “the house of 
European democracy” (Barroso, 2012: 9).  
 
To turn its ideals into reality, it argued, EU citizens must be better informed 
about their right to vote in the EP elections and the choices they have 
between different Europarties (European Commission 2000; 2006b; 2010f). 
The prolonged EYC2013-14 programme aimed to inform citizens about the 
upcoming election (European Commission, 2014f) while the Commission 
(2013f) asked national parties to provide information about their EU level 
affiliations. To make EP elections more personal to voters, Europarties were 
also asked to announce their candidates for Commission president prior to the 
elections (European Commission, 2013g).50 Consequently, most Europarties 
announced their candidates for Commission president in advance. These 
candidates received some national media coverage and even had the 
opportunity to participate in EU-wide public debates (Corbett, 2014). The 
                                            
50 Article 14(1) TEU gives the EP the right to elect the Commission president. 
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results of the elections were also announced simultaneously across the EU’s 
28 member states. Despite of these developments, EU citizens did not 
participate in the 2014 EP election in greater numbers than they had done so 
previously (illustrated in Table 1.2.) and well below the expected levels 
(European Commission, 2012h). Citizens’ low turnout might demonstrate the 
Commission’s failure to realise its goals and make these elections 
personalised (Möller, 2014).  
 
Moreover, there is a disparity between the Commission’s consideration of the 
participation of EU mobiles and stayers. EU treaties and secondary legislation 
only regulate the participation of EU mobiles, while ignoring stayers in their 
entirety (European Commission, 1999, 2006, 2010a, g). This is because every 
EU level participatory right requires a cross-border context (see Appendix 3.). 
For example, the right to participate in the municipal elections of the host 
country is only meaningful for EU mobiles. Nonetheless, the Commission 
(2002) has perceived these elections as a necessary component of the EU’s 
emerging democracy. This is mainly due to the EU’s subsidiarity ideal, which 
requires that decisions are made as close to citizens as possible (European 
Commission, 2012a). Moreover, EU mobiles’ right to stand as candidates and 
vote in the municipal elections is the only EU level right that is, traditionally 
speaking, belongs to nation states (European Commission, 1986: 11). Thus 
the Commission has the capacity to alter pre-existing member state legislation 
if and when it wants to do so.  
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According to the Commission’s (2010f: 3) discourse then, EU mobiles are 
likely to have the most opportunity to participate at the EU level and, 
subsequently, to “consolidate their European identity.” Nevertheless, there are 
important deficits in the scope available for the EU participation of EU 
mobiles. For example, the relevant EU directives have not actually 
harmonised member state laws on conducting municipal elections. Some 
rights of EU mobiles have not actually been completely implemented 
(European Commission, 2007, 2012a). Since citizens tend to perceive 
national elections as first-order (Schmitt, 2005), they may not have an interest 
in the municipal elections. Due to the gap between the number of EU mobiles 
and stayers (Chapter 3.2.), the extent to which EU mobiles can enhance the 
democratic quality of the EU is limited. With just under 28% of EU mobiles 
participating in traditional forms of engagement across the EU, national and 
local levels (Strudel and Michalska, 2012: 27), the foundations of a democracy 
made up of EU mobiles seem rather shaky.51 
 
In comparison, there are no EU level rights possessed by stayers only and nor 
do any of the Commission’s recent programmes on EU participation apply to 
stayers (see for example, European Commission, 2013b). Actually, the 
participation of stayers has only been promoted indirectly. For example, the 
Commission’s (2010b) recent public dialogue with EU citizens, which had 
included both mobiles and stayers, led to proposals only relevant to the lives 
of EU mobiles. The exception is, perhaps DG COMM’s long-running 
                                            
51 Not to mention that the EU’s democracy seems to be currently built on EU mobiles’ 
participation at the local and EU levels, leaving out the national level. Against this backdrop, 
the Commission’s tendency to scale-up the significance of the former two levels may be an 
attempt to mask a limitation inherent to EU citizenship – its second-order character. 
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programme on ‘Active European citizenship’ (European Commission, 2012a), 
which seeks to engage and mobilise all EU citizens. It has also been fairly 
outspoken about the significance of citizens’ participation in alternative forms 
of engagement across the different levels of EU policy-making, including 
volunteering at the EU level and town twinning at the local-level (European 
Commission, 2011a). However, these programmes rely heavily on an 
emerging EU level civil society (Decision No 1904/2006/EC; European 
Commission, 2013d) and promote the indirect participation of citizens. Thus 
they do not actually bring citizens closer to the EU.  
 
Both EU mobiles and stayers can exercise the other three EU participatory 
rights, namely citizens’ initiative (CI) and petition to the EP and the European 
Ombudsman. According to the Commission (2013f: 3), “by introducing the 
citizens’ initiative, the Lisbon Treaty enables EU citizens to participate more 
directly and fully in the democratic life of the Union”. EU citizens’ right to 
petition the EP and the European Ombudsman are non-judicial means of 
redress (European Commission, 2004) and have been observed as “a well-
established practice” at the national level (European Commission, 1993: 7). 
Nonetheless, these rights have only been used by a small number of EU 
citizens. In fact, CI ‘only’ requires the signature of one million EU citizens from 
seven member states. It thus has the potential to engage less than 0.25% of 
the EU’s population at any one point in time. Besides, even if a CI passes all 
the requirements set out by the relevant EU regulation (211/2011), the 
Commission can still reject its proposal. This has happened with the very first 
CI that fulfilled these registration requirements. Even though a million 
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signatures were collected, the Commission initially stalled the policy-process 
linked to the Right2Water initiative (Vogel, 2014). Moreover, the initial 
registration requirements have only been met by CIs, which have at least 
some relevance to the programmes run by Commission DGs (Garcia and 
Greenwood, 2014). For example, the objective of Fraternite2020 (2013) has 
been to “enhance EU exchange programmes – such as Erasmus or the 
European Voluntary Service (EVS) – in order to contribute to a united Europe 
based on solidarity among citizens”. It’s objective could have easily been 
taken from any of DG EAC’s points on the ‘Youth on the move’ or ‘Erasmus+’ 
programmes (European Commission, 2010f; 2014a; 2014g; 2015b).  
 
Petitioning the EP and the European Ombudsman does not require collective 
action from citizens and has been used by a tiny segment of citizens since 
their introduction in 1993 (European Commission 2010a). For example, the 
EP received 1,924 and the Ombudsman 727 petitions in 2009. EU mobiles 
actually made the largest number of applications in both cases. However, the 
relevant EU actors did not consider the majority of these applications because 
they failed to pass certain procedural technicalities (European Commission, 
2010a). As a result, these three participatory rights have had a small impact 
on EU citizens’ lives. So, for now, it seems, the Commission has granted EU 
mobiles the largest scope for EU participation. Whether young EU mobiles in 
Sweden and the UK have been able to realise the Commission’s ideal of 
participation is explored in the last empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 7).  
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2.3. Summary 
This chapter investigated the institutional framework of EU citizenship, and the 
scope this framework provides to citizens for realising their EU citizenship. In 
its attempt to make a small contribution to the findings of previous research on 
the institutional framework of EU citizenship (Wiener, 1998; Kostakopoulou, 
2001; 2005; Maas, 2007; Shaw, 2007; Olsen, 2008a; 2012; Hansen and 
Hager, 2010; Pukallus, 2012) the chapter studied the Commission’s ideals 
and discourse on EU citizenship. The findings suggest that the dominant tone 
and key objectives of the Commission has been guided by the legacy of the 
EEC market (similar conclusions reached by Maas, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 
2010; Olsen, 2012). This issue was apparent in the bi-level structure of EU 
citizenship, the support provided to building a community among EU mobiles 
(only) and the expanding scope EU mobiles seem to have for realising the 
dimensions of their EU citizenship. In particular, the Commission seems to 
invest much effort into facilitating and promoting EU mobility – which is then 
expected to impact citizens’ sense of EU identity (and to some extent EU 
participation). Despite this optimistic notion, there is an inherent tension 
between the economic rationales and – as it were – ‘more recently’ introduced 
political objectives of EU citizenship. This is apparent in the everyday 
workings of the Commission, which seem to only really endorse the economic 
rationale of EU citizenship. To a large extent, we can explain this tendency 
through the institutional setting of the EU, which provides member states the 
power to restrict the Commission’s supranational aspirations (Egeberg, 2013). 
The recent crisis intensified member state scrutiny over the Commission as 
133 
 
well as the legitimacy of their scrutiny (Hodson, 2013), and accentuated 
citizens’ growing Euroscepticism with the integration project (Shaw, 2012).  
 
These issues have important consequences for EU citizenship in practice. 
Most importantly, the Commission has had to adopt a discourse on EU 
citizenship that is accepted by member states. Accordingly, national models of 
citizenship retain their political legitimacy in an increasingly integrated Europe. 
Due to the hierarchy between member states, there is a classification of EU 
citizens from the outset. Adding the EU level on top of member state 
citizenships, the Commission has managed to multiply these classifications. 
So rather than bringing citizens together in a ‘European community’, it has 
differentiated between them depending on their mobility status and propensity 
to move in the future. For example, it has had some expectation towards EU 
mobiles, developing a sense of EU identity and participation. Yet, to date, 
there is little, if any, expectation towards stayers realising their EU citizenship. 
Within the legal framework of EU citizenship, EU mobility has become 
institutionalised so as to activate citizens’ EU level status – rather than 
political participation, as is the case with national models of citizenship. This 
issue raises questions about the extent to which EU citizenship really departs 
from previous policies that were simply there to ensure intra-EU economic 
mobility. It certainly leaves a narrow, if any, scope for stayers – the vast 
majority of (potential EU) citizens – to activate their EU citizenship and grants 
a very obvious elitist character to EU citizenship. In this context, the younger 
generation of citizens who fall outside the more elitist, mobile group are likely 
to become susceptible to the appeals of Eurosceptic and nationalist parties, 
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which feed off the economic problems in the aftermath of the crisis (Fligstein, 
Polyakova and Sandholtz, 2012; Sloam, 2014). There is thus likely to be a 
growing gap between the young EU mobiles and stayers. 
 
Moreover, the Commission also differentiates between EU mobiles. There 
seems to be a preferential treatment between EU mobiles depending on their 
country of origin, the type of mobility they undertake and, recently, their ethnic 
backgrounds. The Commission tends to identify (and to this end support) the 
young and highly educated EU mobiles – the visiting EU students – as the 
ideal EU citizens. This tendency is reflected in the effort that the Commission 
pours into promoting intra-EU learning mobility and educational programmes. 
The next chapter builds on these findings and explores how the Commission’s 
ideals on EU citizenship, which clearly emphasise the role of intra-EU 
(learning) mobility, are likely to impact citizens’ actual experiences.  
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Chapter 3. The role of EU (learning) mobility in 
realising EU citizenship 
Much has been written about Europe as “the stereotype of the old world of 
ingrained privilege, tradition, and slow moving change” (Recchi and Favell, 
2011: 51), where the national framework dominates EU citizens’ lives (Favell, 
2008: 9; Skey, 2011a: 148; White, 2011: 29; Duchesne et al., 2013: 3). 
Against this backdrop, the provisions that facilitate the EU mobility of citizens 
signal a shift towards “a new world of [economic, social and political] 
opportunity, achievement and flux” (Recchi and Favell, 2011: 51; see also 
Recchi, 2009). To some extent at least, it corroborates academic readings of 
the EU as the exemplar of cosmopolitanism (Delanty and Rumford, 2005; 
Beck and Grande, 2007).  
 
Existing empirical studies have found that EU mobility has an important social 
aspect (Recchi, 2009), and transforms the identity (Rother and Nebe, 2009) 
and political behaviour of mobiles (Muxel, 2009). Despite these findings 
however, the literature on EU citizenship has largely downplayed the 
significance of EU mobility (Meehan, 1993; Wiener, 1998; Kostakopoulou, 
2001; Bellamy, Castiglione and Santoro, 2004; Bellamy, Castiglione and 
Shaw, 2006; Bellamy, 2008b). Indeed, there is only a small amount of 
empirical research, which recognises the potential of EU mobility beyond the 
usual discussions of spatial or social mobility.52 However, a comprehensive 
                                            
52 The exceptions are the publications stemming from four EU-funded projects; PIONEUR, 
ENACT, MOVEACT and EUROCROSS. Favell (2008, 2010) carried out the very first – and 
since only – ethnographic study of EU-15 mobiles – the ‘Eurostars’. 
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study about how mobility helps citizens to fully realise EU citizenship is still 
lacking.53 This thesis attempts to fill an important empirical gap in the existing 
literature. It also seeks to make a theoretical proposition, namely that we 
should reconsider the conceptual dichotomy of active/passive (EU) citizens 
along the mobiles/stayers distinctions. By focusing on the theoretical premise 
of this doctoral thesis – that EU mobility in combination with education makes 
it most likely for citizens to realise EU citizenship – this chapter assists the 
ensuing interrogation of how EU (learning) mobility might effect the 
perceptions of EU mobiles and stayers (Chapters 4 – 7). 
 
This chapter has three main parts. The first part revisits the transactionalist 
approach (Deutsch et al., 1968) to European integration and the role it grants 
to mobility. The second part considers the development of mobility rights and 
current flows of EU mobility, and the EU’s policies in higher education (HE) 
followed by contemporary student mobility flows. The third part considers the 
main findings of previous qualitative research on (young) citizens’ EU identity 
and citizenship (Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008; Skey, 2011a; Ross, 2014) in order 
to draw out the likely distinctions between mobiles/stayers along the 
active/passive (EU) citizen dichotomy.  
 
                                            
53 The only exception to this trend is Favell (2008, 2010), whose research explored the 
perceptions of EU-15 mobiles across the three dimensions of EU citizenship. However, he did 
not include stayers in his study. If we really want to explore the link between EU mobility and 
EU citizenship however, we must identify the implication of non-mobility for the perceptions of 
stayers. 
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3.1. EU mobility and European integration 
The EU has been understood to “represent the classic historical counter-
example to the political and social ontology of the nation state” (Beck and 
Grande, 2007: 2, emphasis added). The erosion of the nation state in the EU 
is particularly apparent in two (simultaneous) developments – the abolition of 
state borders and growing levels of intra-EU mobility. The impact of these 
developments for citizenship in Europe has been studied extensively, not 
least by considering the opportunity the EU presents for realising a post-, 
supra-national or cosmopolitan model of citizenship (Soysal, 1994; Føllesdal, 
2001; Kostakopoulou, 2001; Hansen and Hager, 2010). However, most of this 
literature tends to search for an opportunity the EU presents to integrate long-
term third country nationals (TCNs). In comparison, there has been minimal 
research on the actual impact of EU mobility on the attitudes and behaviour of 
(formal) EU citizens (Favell, 2008; 2010; Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, 
Magalhães and Tóka, 2012). This is because the majority of the existing 
literature on EU citizenship overlooks or dismisses EU mobility. Once 
observed as an individualist process, it is not expected to serve as the basis 
of citizens’ shared sense of EU identity or EU participation.  
 
A considerably different interpretation of mobility emerges from the literature 
on European integration. More specifically, transactionalist (Deutsch, 1954; 
Deutsch et al., 1968) and neofunctionalist (Haas, 1958; Lindberg 1963; 
Schmitter, 2004) approaches to European integration observe citizens’ EU 
mobility as the counterpart to or natural succession of economic integration. 
Indeed, both approaches identify mobility as one of the basic principles of the 
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EU’s social and political integration. They predict two important outcomes of 
mobility.54 First, it enhances citizens’ EU identity, creating a truly EU level 
society. Second, mobility legitimises community-building processes at the EU 
level. Since transactionalists focus more explicitly on the role of EU mobility in 
furthering European integration, this part of the chapter discusses the main 
argument put forward by these scholars and the extent to which the actual 
experiences of EU citizens – as explored by previous research – correspond 
with this argument.  
 
3.1.1. The transactionalist approach to European integration and 
mobility 
According to Deutsch (1954), European (regional) integration is the result of 
increased cross-border transactions, including transnational trade, capital and 
labour flows, student exchanges, tourist visits and so on. These transactions 
have the potential to create new and meaningful networks of communication 
between citizens and institutions, superseding state borders. It is suggested 
that similar transactions and networks between the elite and the masses 
sustain national societies and generate a shared identity. However, cross-
border transactions and networks may only replicate similar processes if they 
fulfil certain criteria. Regulation through common decision-making structures 
                                            
54 Neofunctionalist and transactionalist approaches interpret European integration from 
different angles. While neofunctionalists focus on the ‘spill-over’ effects of an elite-led process 
(Haas, 1968: 292), transactionalists consider citizens’ cross-border mobility as one of the 
most important drivers of integration (Deutsch et al., 1968: 170). Nonetheless, 
neofunctionalists also recognise that citizens’ cross-border mobility is an important aspect of 
how integration might create a ‘pluralistic society’ and enter in the political realm (Haas, 1968: 
xxiv). 
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and a constant, multifaceted and long-term outlook for transactions are 
identified as requirements (Deutsch et al., 1968: 120).  
 
Deutsch et al. (1968: 54) also recognised that cross-border transactions can 
appear in different forms, including cultural exchanges and scientific 
collaborations. However, they identified citizens’ mobility as “more important 
than [the mobility of] either goods or money” (Deutsch et al., 1968: 54). It 
allows direct interaction between citizens from different member states, which 
may create a sense of shared identity among citizens and support further 
institutional integration. Nonetheless, transactionalists recognise that not 
everyone participates in the integration process equally. In this context, the 
limited mobility of some citizens is anticipated to serve as “a serious deterrent 
to further [integration] progress” (Deutsch et al., 1968: 154). Thus 
transnationalists underline the active and passive roles mobiles and stayers 
have in European integration. 
 
Deutsch’s theory is clearly relevant to some aspects of what the EU 
represents today. Thus for example, an emerging EU society may be 
observed as a ‘pluralistic security community’, which was originally introduced 
in order to abolish war between member states (Deutsch, 1954). The merging 
of states under a common authority – the Commission and, increasingly, the 
European Council – upholds the idea of an emerging EU society. At the same 
time, governmental divisions persist at the national level (Deutsch et al., 1968: 
5-6). We also know that more and more citizens move within the EU, have 
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multi-ethnic backgrounds, are familiar with foreign languages and have been 
exposed to international media (Recchi and Favell, 2009; Favell et al., 2011; 
Sigalas 2010b; Kuhn, 2012a; Bellamy, 2011). A recent application of the 
transactionalist approach to the contemporary EU concluded that due to their 
increased level for EU mobility, citizens will 
come to see each other less as Italians, French, and thus foreign, 
and more and more as sharing common interests, a process that 
will eventually lead to seeing themselves as Europeans and less as 
having a merely national identity (Fligstein, 2008: 139).    
 
This conclusion seems rather optimistic, however. The actual flows of EU 
mobility have been highly complex and uneven. Empirical studies also 
underline the variation in the effect of mobility on citizens’ attitudes and 
behaviour. They hint at the emergence of new processes of differentiation and 
exclusion within the EU. First, citizens’ EU mobility flows and cross-border 
transactions have been highly stratified (Kahanec, 2013). This is 
demonstrated well in Tables 3.1. and 3.2. in the next section. The variation in 
these numbers also highlights the significance of the economic and political 
contexts of the sending and receiving countries. More importantly perhaps, 
they may have long-term impacts due to the pull-power represented by mobile 
networks (Delbecq and Waldorf, 2010). Furthermore, EU mobility has not 
increased citizens’ mobility across the whole of the EU’s territory. It only 
affected some member states. While some EU-15 states, notably Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain and the UK, sent and received a large number of EU 
mobiles – usually from 2004 and 2007 CEE states – the rest received a much 
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smaller portion. Rather than intensified flow of EU mobility then, what we see 
is sporadic trends of mobility in some parts of the EU (Kahanec and 
Zimmermann, 2010). 
 
Second, the interaction between mobiles and stayers has also been irregular. 
It has varied between states and across different national groups. Hence we 
have multiple processes of differentiation between EU citizens, exclusion of 
non-EU citizens and the exclusion of non-nationals in the host state. These 
processes are demonstrated well by the different context in which EU mobiles 
are received in the UK and Sweden (discussed in more detail below). Across 
the EU some mobiles are welcomed by member states – often from EU-15 
states – while others are shut out – usually from CEE states (Favell, 2009). 
Mobiles with certain ethnic and employment background have also found it 
more difficult to exercise their mobility rights, including the Roma (Shaw, 
2012) and sex workers (Aradau, Huysmans and Squire, 2010). Thus, while 
some EU citizens are encouraged to be integrated into an emerging EU level 
society through mobility, others are turned away.  
 
Third, EU mobility has had different impact on citizens’ sense of identity and 
citizenship. Soon after the introduction of workers’ mobility rights in the EEC, 
empirical evidence already underlined that foreign workers’ presence did not 
necessarily lead to the emergence of a cross-national communication network 
(Feldstein, 1967). Similarly, the findings of recent research reveal that the EU 
identity of mobiles and stayers are different, owing to the type of activity they 
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engage in, the length of time they spend abroad and the educational and 
economic resources they have (Bruter, 2004; Fligstein, 2008; Rother and 
Nebe, 2009; Kuhn, 2012a; for an evaluation of these factors see Favell et al., 
2011). Geographical factors have also been found to influence citizens’ 
attitudes. For example, EU citizens who live in border regions and do their 
weekly shopping in different states have different identities than those who 
take on permanent jobs, “shop around” for education or focus on temporary 
work but plan to return home (Favell, 2008; Sigalas, 2010b; Kuhn, 2012b).  
 
Nonetheless, when multiple factors are measured together, empirical research 
usually finds that the sketch of an EU level society is most apparent in the 
context of mobility – made of EU mobiles and those stayers who interact with 
mobiles (Favell, 2008, 2010; Rother and Nebe, 2008; Roeder, 2009; Kuhn, 
2012a). Thus, there is some support for the transactionalist focus on citizens’ 
cross-border mobility as a driver of further integration. However, recent 
empirical studies have underlined that the limitations associated with the 
transactionalist approach could be addressed by applying the contact 
hypothesis (for an overview see Favell et al., 2011). These studies rely heavily 
on Allport’s (1979 [1954]) seminal work on the contact hypothesis. According 
to Allport (1979 [1954]), reduced prejudice between previously separate 
groups is the result of four positive conditions of interaction: (1) equal status of 
groups, (2) common goals, (3) intergroup cooperation, and (4) institutional 
support, rules or customs.55 
                                            
55 The relevant literature in social psychology maybe split in to three clusters. While some 
found evidence that inter-group contact causes more conflict between previously separate 
143 
 
Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the 
individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between 
majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The 
effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by 
institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom, or legal atmosphere), 
and provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common 
interests and common humanity between members of the two 
groups (Allport, 1979 [1954]: 281, emphasis added).  
 
In order to test whether EU mobility guarantees the desired outcome through 
the interactions of EU mobiles and stayers, a growing number of empirical 
studies applied Allport’s conditions. These studies underscore that from the 
different forms of mobility available to citizens, EU mobility for educational 
purposes rather than labour or short-term mobility provides the most 
favourable context for positive cross-border interactions to emerge (Sigalas, 
2009; 2010a; 2010b; Wilson 2011; Mitchell, 2012; 2014). By introducing the 
opportunity for learning mobility, the Commission has adopted a proactive 
approach to promoting mobility among the EU’s population that is likely to be 
most susceptible to changes in their citizenship (Sloam, 2013). Furthermore, 
the institutionalisation of mobility through the EU’s various educational policies 
(specifically in higher education (HE)) overcomes most burdens that EU 
                                                                                                                             
groups (Ford, 1986), others observed it as particularly effective in reducing prejudice and 
conflict between previously separate groups (Harrington and Miller, 1992; Pettigrew, 1998). 
Again others recognised that inter-group contact has the potential to reduce prejudice, but 
stressed the complexity of this process (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). They proposed further 
conditions, such as the need to support and uphold friendships between different group 
members (Pettigrew, 1998). Overall, growing empirical evidence supports the original 
conditions proposed by Allport (Pettigrew et al., 2011). Thus his conditions are usually used in 
the EU context. 
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mobiles would otherwise have to face on their own. We already know that 
these issues are important for citizens’ decisions to move (and stay) (Recchi, 
2009). In particular, they can contribute to the clarification about why we only 
have a small number of EU mobiles after over 50 years of free movement 
provisions. Since education is expected to raise ‘good’ and ‘active’ citizens 
(Dalton, 2009), the mobility of young citizens for educational purposes can be 
expected to raise ideal EU citizens. The next section revisits the development 
of mobility rights and educational policies in the EU, followed by a short 
examination of contemporary mobility flows.  
 
3.2. Mobility rights and educational policy in the EU 
Despite contemporary popular belief and just as transactionalists anticipated, 
EU mobility has been at the heart of the European project since the very 
beginning (Meehan, 1993). It is one of the four pillars upholding integration – 
the other three being the free movement of capital, goods and services. 
Mobility also predates both British (1973) and Swedish (1995) membership of 
the EU. This section provides a short overview of how citizens’ mobility rights 
developed since the early days of the ECSC (for more details see Maas, 
2007: 29-45; Hansen and Hager, 2010: 38-57; Olsen, 2012: 17-31). 
 
3.2.1. An overview of citizens’ EU mobility rights 
Article 69(1) of the Treaty of Paris (1951) (Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community, ECSC Treaty) guaranteed the free movement of 
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workers and non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality (Art. 69(4)).56 
Nonetheless, these rights were limited in scope and applied to sectoral (coal 
and steel) workers. The Council of Ministers (now Council of the European 
Union, EU Council) reserved the right to recognise (or reject) workers’ 
qualifications and define the actual parameters guiding their mobility and 
subsequent integration (Art. 69(2)(3)). The High Authority, the predecessor of 
the Commission, was guiding and facilitating member states (Art. 69(5)). 
Although they had a clearly intergovernmental character, these provisions 
served as the basis for introducing more extensive regulations on peoples’ 
free movement, including EU citizenship (Hansen and Hager, 2010: 38-56). 
Thus the later development of EU mobility is “simply the expansion of an 
already established framework of politically negotiated provisions that granted 
free movement rights” (Maas, 2005a: 1011, emphasis added). 
 
The free movement provisions in the subsequent Treaty of Rome (1957) 
(Treaty establishing the European Economic Community) were considerably 
more detailed (Maas, 2007: 26-9). They granted mobility (Art. 48(1)), 
residence (Art. 48(3)) and establishment (Art. 52) rights to workers, as well as 
non-discrimination on the basis of their nationality (Art. 48(2)). They also 
included various stipulations to enhance workers’ mobility, including the first 
EEC-led scheme to recognise workers’ educational qualifications (Art. 57).57 
In the long-term, these rights broadened the scope of European integration, 
                                            
56 Workers’ mobility rights were in fact introduced on the back of national preference (Maas, 
2005). The Italians wanted to lower domestic unemployment rates and increase the living 
standards of foreign workers (Romero, 1993). 
57 These rights were however “subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, 
public security or public health” (Art. 48(3)). 
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“giving shape to the wish for a political union” (European Commission, 2006a: 
55, emphasis added). A transitional period was set at this point however, 
granting the CoM a policy-making role (Art. 49) and reinforcing the 
intergovernmental origins of EU mobility (Hansen and Hager, 2010: 41-4). 
 
The mobility and residence rights of workers and their families were later 
implemented through different regulations and stages (Maas, 2002: 2). 
Regulation 1612/68 guaranteed non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, 
considering work conditions, salary and unemployment benefits, and access 
to social and tax benefits, including vocational training. Directive 68/360 
scrapped visa requirements within the territory of the EEC for member state 
citizens, allowing cross-border mobility with the use of identity cards. Even 
during the slowdown of European integration in the late 1960s and early 
1970s (Dinan, 2004), workers’ rights were enhanced by secondary laws (e.g. 
social security rights in Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72) (Griffiths, 2014: 165-
84) and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
(Jacobs, 2007: 592). By establishing the principle of non-discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality, the CJEU shifted the economic rationale of mobility 
towards a political ideal (Davies, 2003: 195). It was during the 1970s that early 
discussions of an EU citizenship emerged (Wiener, 1998: 10-1). 
 
The economic recovery of the 1980s gave a new impetus to European 
integration (Dinan, 2010: 78-80) and intensified the scope of mobility for 
member state citizens – from this point observed as their “new personal right” 
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(European Commission, 1982: 5, see also Hansen and Hager, 2010: 58-90). 
In 1985 the Schengen Agreement was signed by seven of the then ten EEC 
member states, abolishing border controls. Its preamble connected this 
intergovernmental agreement with citizens’ free movement (Wiener, 1998: 
130). The agreement was followed by a speedy ratification process of the 
Single European Act (SEA) (1986), which then introduced an “area without 
internal frontiers”. Its (non-binding) preamble also made an explicit reference 
to furthering economic and political cooperation among member states, and, 
for the first time an EU treaty, spoke of the idea of (an indirect) European-level 
democracy. Accordingly, states adopted the SEA “convinced that the 
European idea, the results achieved in the field of economic integration and 
political co-operation, and the need for new developments correspond to the 
wishes of the democratic peoples of Europe”. Subsequently, the mobility 
rights of non-economic mobiles, including students, pensioners and the 
unemployed were guaranteed by secondary legislation (Directives 90/364, 
90/365 and 90/366 – later replaced by 93/96).58 The mobility of some of these 
non-mobiles were then linked to the earliest definitions of EU citizenship 
(Sigalas, 2010a: 1346-7); 
 [W]e must encourage greater integration in educational matters by 
promoting student exchanges. The aim is to give Europeans of 
tomorrow a personal and concrete impression of the European 
reality and a detailed knowledge of our languages and cultures 
since these constitute the common heritage which the European 
                                            
58 Their rights were also subjected to certain criteria, including health insurance and sufficient 
resources so as “to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State during their period of residence” (Art 1, Directive 90/364). 
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Union aims specifically to protect (European Commission, 1976: 
24).  
 
Notwithstanding the significance of the first 40 years of European integration, 
the most important development in the broadening of EU mobility (rights) was 
the introduction of EU citizenship in the TEU in 1993 (Meehan, 1993: 3; 
Wiener, 1998: 7; Maas, 2007: 11; Olsen, 2012: 15; Hansen and Hager, 2010: 
38). Projected as a political turning point in the process of integration 
(European Commission, 1993, Meehan, 1993: 5), the (economic) mobility of 
citizens remained at the centre of subsequent EU citizenship provisions and 
policies (Maas 2007: 45; Olsen, 2012: 82).59 The treaty was followed by the 
so-called ‘Citizenship Directive’ (Directive 2004/38), which brought the various 
pre-existing regulations on free movement together, including some of the 
central tenets of the CJEU’s ruling. It has guaranteed the access of mobiles 
and their family members to welfare benefits in the host country, and their 
right to apply for permanent residence after 5 years (Carrera, 2005: 711-5). It 
has turned the status of EU mobiles into a form of citizenship that echoes 
residency – a so-called “citizenship-of-residence-light” (Shaw, 2007). 
Furthermore, the citizenship provisions of the TEU together with the directive 
have weakened the original intergovernmental impetus of free movement 
(Maas, 2007: 45; Olsen, 2012: 98). By allowing the Commission to propose, 
implement and monitor policies, they strengthen the trans- and supra-national 
scope of EU mobility and EU citizenship (Boswell and Geddes, 2011: 178). 
                                            
59 For an analysis of the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship see Chapter 2. For an 
analysis of EU citizenship rights, including the currently applicable secondary legislation see 
Appendix 3. 
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However, both pieces of legislation also reinforce the economic and neo-
liberal basis of EU citizenship (Hansen and Hager, 2010: 123). Indeed, the 
legacy of market integration from an EU citizenship perspective is the 
emergence of two (legal) categories of EU citizens: mobiles and stayers 
(Everson, 1995).  
 
Moreover, the Citizenship Directive provided a legal basis on which 
differentiation among mobile EU citizens can take place – according to the 
length of time they spend in the host country (see Appendix 3). Further 
categories of EU mobiles were then introduced by transitional measures, 
which allowed EU-15 member states to limit the economic mobility of CEE 
citizens from the 2004, 2007 and 2013 countries. Initially perhaps these 
restrictions were similar to those that had followed previous Southern 
enlargement rounds, namely for Greece (1981), Spain (1986) and Portugal 
(1986). Indeed, both Eastern and Southern enlargements lead to a strategic 
‘race to the bottom’ among Western EU states, especially when it came to 
their social policy provisions for migrants (Kvist, 2004).  
 
However, the scale of EU mobility just after 2004 was at record levels 
(Kahanec, Zaiceva and Zimmerman, 2010) and the period after 2007 has 
been marked by a severe economic and political crisis. As a result, citizens’ 
Eurosceptic attitudes reached new heights (Shore, 2012) and public, media 
and policy antagonism about CEE mobiles have become the norm rather than 
the exception (Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz, 2012). These 
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developments also transformed member states’ approaches to mobility across 
the EU (Jordan, 2014). Most notably, the UK, Germany, Ireland and Austria 
have called for limiting mobility rights and for introducing sanctions against 
‘benefit tourists’ (Mikl-Leitner et al., 2013). 2014 marked another milestone in 
the development of EU mobility. In particular, it highlighted that an uneven 
power relationship between policy-makers persists, favouring member state 
preferences. For instance, the CJEU’s recent decision to curb opportunities of 
intra-EU ‘benefit tourism’ might be interpreted as consenting to the populist 
ideals, which have grown in prominence across the EU-15 states (Elisabeta 
Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, 2014). In this context some 
countries, most notably the UK, have gone as far as to discussing a possible 
exit from the EU. These developments are likely to hinder the Commission’s 
(2010a, 2013a) more recent attempts to underscore the genuine significance 
of EU citizenship by promoting the mobility of citizens. 
 
In the UK, the increasing anti-immigration sentiment of the public and the 
media has been coupled with a surge in the popular support for UKIP 
(Geddes, 2014). They led to a reversal in migration policies and the 
introduction of limitations for Bulgarian, Romanian and Croatian workers. 
These measures did not seem to have met the expectations of an increasingly 
disgruntled British public. The Conservative Party then made a pledge to hold 
a referendum on EU membership, should it win the 2015 general election. 
Yet, UKIP gained more support in the 2014 EP elections and won the majority 
of seats with 27% share of the votes. Following Tory defections, UKIP also 
secured the party’s first two seats in Westminster. The other main parties 
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have begun to follow the example set by the Conservatives and proposed 
policies to curtail EU mobiles’ access to social benefits. Despite these 
changes, survey data tend to show that a substantial segment of the British 
public remains discontented with free movement rules and the UK’s 
membership of the EU (YouGov, 2014). 
 
In comparison, Sweden has maintained its open-border migration policy. 
However, the Swedish public has also become increasingly concerned with 
the growing level of EU mobility and external migration (mainly refugees) 
(Berg and Spehar, 2013). The disparity between Swedish migration policies 
and public sentiment is perhaps most apparent in the growing electoral 
support for the far-right Sweden Democrats (SD). In 2010, SD gained its first 
ever seats in the Swedish Parliament, receiving 5.7% of the votes. By 2014, 
the public support of SD almost tripled. The party gained 13% of the votes in 
the September 2014 elections, making it the third largest party in the 
parliament that also holds the balance of power. SD has acted as the power-
broker between the main parties since September. Siding with the opposition 
on a vote for the centre-left government’s budget, it narrowly missed out on 
triggering a new election for early 2015. According to the latest opinion polls, 
the SD could have won these elections (Milne, 2014). The growing public 
support for populist- and right-leaning ideologies may challenge the 
supposedly ‘ideal context’ Sweden represents for EU citizenship. Sweden 
thus may follow the trend we have seen in other EU-15 states and limit the EU 
mobility of future EU citizens.  
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3.2.2. Contemporary mobility flows in the EU 
Having discussed the context in which contemporary EU mobility takes place, 
this section provides an overview of contemporary mobility flows in the EU. As 
a result of the 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargement rounds, EU membership 
increased from 15 to 28 states and the EU’s population grew from 
approximately 323 million in 2003 to 505 million in 2013 (Eurostat, 2014a). So 
a considerably greater number of citizens could make use of free movement 
provisions after 2004 and their mobility could also be used across a larger 
geographical area than before. Today, 26 of the EU’s 28 member states 
aspire to keep their borders open to EU citizens within the Schengen 
framework.60 Nonetheless, only a tiny segment of the EU’s population has 
been mobile. The annual rate of EU mobility flows over the last ten years has 
stood at an average of 0.29%, compared to 2.4% in the USA, and is unlikely 
to change substantially in the near future (OECD, 2014). In this context, about 
17% of EU citizens are currently saying that they might move for economic 
purposes later (TNS Opinion and Social, 2010). In 2012, there were about 
13.6 million EU mobiles, making up 2.7% of the total population (Eurostat, 
2014a). Their number has also been consistently lower than that of third 
country nationals (TCNs) – at 20.7 million or 4.1% in 2012 (Eurostat, 2014a). 
These numbers underscore that the EU is still “no flat world” when it comes to 
EU mobility (Favell, 2008: 222, emphasis in original). Against this backdrop, 
the prevalent anti-migration sentiments in EU-15 states may seem out of 
touch (Recchi and Kuhn, 2013). Indeed, most negative sentiment can be 
                                            
60 EU member states apart from UK and Ireland are currently Schengen members or have a 
candidate status. The Schengen Area also includes the four members of the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA). 
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explained by the crisis, which has accentuated processes of differentiation 
between EU stayers and mobiles – without much economic basis to support 
these approaches (Blanchflower et al., 2007). For example, EU-15 stayers 
often overestimate the number of CEE residents in their country. They tend to 
have similar misconceptions about CEE mobiles’ educational level and 
contribution to the host countries’ economy (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). 
Even though it is true that most EU2 mobiles come from the lower educated 
segment of their sending countries, EU8 mobiles tend to be better educated 
than the population in the host country (Kahanec, 2012). 
 
Even if the number of EU mobiles looks small compared to the EU population, 
it is also true that EU mobility flows have been on the rise since 2004 
(Kahanec, 2012, 2013; Triandafyllidou and Maroufof, 2013: 374). This is 
mainly due to the mobility of CEE citizens, mainly EU8 and EU2 mobiles 
(Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010). Previous statistics have shown that in 
2004 the number of CEE mobiles residing in an EU-15 state was fewer than 
two million and the average annual rate of their migration was at around 
58,000. Five years later, the number of CEE mobiles reached almost five 
million – signalling an increase of almost 150% – and occurred at an annual 
rate of almost 256,000 (Kahanec, 2013: 139-40). Thus CEE mobiles 
represented 1.2 % of the total EU-15 and 4.8% of the total CEE population. 
These numbers are also considerable in light of the total EU mobile 
population, summarised in Table 3.1. for the 2009-12 period. The table 
demonstrates that although the number of EU mobiles grew until 2010, there 
was a small drop in 2011 – a likely result of the crisis but also the fact that 
154 
 
most CEE citizens who wanted to move for economic purposes had done so 
prior to 2009 (Kahanec, 2013: 145).  
 
Table 3.1. Number of EU mobiles in the EU-27, Sweden and the UK (2004-12, 
in thousands) (Source: Eurostat, 2014a) 
 
Table 3.1. also displays the number of EU mobiles in Sweden and the UK for 
the 2004-12 period. It shows that, relatively speaking, a small portion of the 
total EU mobiles actually arrived to these two countries. However, the 
distribution of mobiles between these countries was highly uneven. The UK 
has received almost six times as many EU mobiles than Sweden. In fact, the 
UK has been one of the most popular destinations for EU mobiles and, 
together with France and Germany, has hosted the largest number of EU 
mobiles since the 1980s (Triandafyllidou and Maroufof, 2013: 375). In the 
recent years, the annual ratio of EU mobiles arriving to the UK varied between 
14 to 20% (Eurostat, 2014a). By 2011, the number of EU mobiles was around 
2.5 million, making up about 3.7% of the UK’s total population (Eurostat, 
2014a). From these numbers, half were CEE mobiles (ONS, 2014: 10). Even 
if considerable in their numbers, the open-border policy of the UK towards 
CEE mobiles seemed to have paid off from an economic perspective 
(Blanchflower et al., 2007). Even more, the skill composition of the mainly 
female composed EU8 mobiles have, over time, improved in the UK, but 
Year/
State
EU-27 1,731.1 1,811.3 1,750.6 1,693.9
Sweden 30.9 32.4 40.8 47.3 48.2 45.4 43.9 45.7 45.8
United 
Kingdom 196.9 211.9 218.7 243.3 282.8 263.4 269.3 252.6 237.8
2010 2011 20122004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
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worsened in the those members states with closed-border policies 
(Blanchflower and Lawton, 2010).  
 
In comparison, Sweden has received only about 2% of all EU mobiles. 
Although it experienced a 15% increase in its EU mobile population after the 
2007 enlargement (as shown in Table 3.1.) its EU mobile population remains 
marginal. In 2012, the number of EU mobiles was around 370, 000, making up 
around 2.9% of Sweden’s total population (Eurostat, 2014a). Most EU mobiles 
came to Sweden from the Nordic countries, though there was an increase in 
the number of CEE mobiles after 2004 (Constant, Nottmeyer and 
Zimmermann, 2013: 64). The ratio of male and female CEE mobiles in 
Sweden was fairly equal and included relatively young and highly educated 
citizens. However, the educational level of CEE mobiles was not reflected in 
their position in the Swedish labour market or in their wages (Gerdes and 
Wadensjö, 2010).  
 
Even though the UK kept its borders closed after the 2007 enlargement 
round, it experienced a similar increase in the percentage of its EU2 mobile 
population as Sweden did (Kahanec, 2012). While some countries have seen 
a decrease in their EU mobile populations, the UK can expect to see larger 
inflows of EU mobiles in the future (Kahanec, 2013: 145). The reasons for this 
are manifold and include social and labour market conditions, such as 
language requirements and the available vacancies with which the (British) 
labour market welcomes EU mobiles (Doyle et al., 2006). We already know 
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that EU mobility flows have been mainly influenced by the different labour 
market conditions, which have prevailed across member states (Kahanec et 
al., 2010). Thus different groups of labour market winners and losers have 
emerged across the EU, and among host and sending countries (Baas, 
Brücker and Hauptmann, 2010). 
 
The increase in the number of EU mobiles is also apparent when it is 
compared to the ratio of TCNs. In fact, by 2012 the number of TCNs and EU 
mobiles were equal – including around 1.7 million people in each category 
(Eurostat, 2014a). However, this ratio varied across member states and, as 
shown in Figure 3.1., EU mobiles considerably outnumbered TCNs in three 
member states, including Luxembourg, Cyprus and Belgium. Actually, in 2012 
EU mobiles outnumbered TCNs in eight out of (then) 27 EU states, including 
Slovakia, Ireland, Malta, Hungary and the Netherlands (Eurostat, 2014a). 
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Figure 3.1. Share of non-nationals in the resident population, 1 January 2013 
(%) (Source: Eurostat, 2014a) 
 
While there has been much discussion of the need to integrate TCNs in a 
‘multicultural Europe’ (Geddes, 2000; Kostakopoulou, 2002; Jacobs and Rea, 
2007), the significance of EU mobiles has been largely ignored in these 
debates. This is interesting since, for academics at least, the integration of 
TCNs, presents the possibility of implementing the first post- or supra-national 
citizenship model in the EU (see for example Soysal, 1994; Shore, 2004; 
Kostakopoulou, 2007; Hansen and Hager, 2010). Yet the integration of EU 
mobiles has not been observed through the same lens. The current ratio of 
mobiles and TCNs, and the on-going growth in the flow of EU mobiles 
modifies the context in which EU citizenship can be realised by citizens, and 
stresses the importance of exploring whether, and if so, how mobility activates 
citizens’ EU status (Boswell and Geddes, 2011: 6).  
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3.2.3. The development of educational policy for ‘active’ EU citizenship 
The previous chapter (Chapter 2) suggested that from the different types of 
mobility, the Commission (1976; 2014a) has promoted the mobility of 
university students as a particularly powerful force for realising EU citizenship. 
This section considers the role of mobility in combination with education for 
realising EU citizenship. To some extent at least, the Commission’s approach 
corresponds with the processes that have prevailed at the state-level (Heater, 
2004c; Arthur, Davies and Hahn, 2008; Biesta, 2011). In fact, most citizenship 
studies would suggest that the democratic quality of any political community 
rests on the educational attainment of citizens (Heater, 2004c: vii). Some 
scholars highlight the normative link between citizens’ education and the 
strength of their national identity (Heater, 2004b; Zajda, Daus and Saha, 
2009). Others vouch for the potential schools represent for promoting 
cosmopolitan and civic values, and human rights among young people 
(Milligan et al., 2004; Dilworth, 2008; Osler, 2008). Again others document the 
political literacy and actual participation of well-educated citizens (Almond and 
Verba, 1989: 315-316; Putnam, 2000: 68; Davies, 2008). These scholars 
convey the same message. “The educated citizen is attentive, knowledgeable, 
and participatory, and the uneducated citizen is not” (Converse, 1972: 324).  
 
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising that nation states have used 
(public) education as a tool for creating (politically) active citizens (Heater, 
2004c: 26-64). The same can be said of the EU. Soon after the introduction of 
EU citizenship, the Commission (1998: 12) adopted a “pedagogic approach to 
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citizenship”. In particular, it stressed that higher education (HE) “plays a 
crucial role in individual and societal advancement, and in providing … the 
articulate citizens that Europe needs to create jobs, economic growth and 
prosperity” (European Commission, 2011g: 2). Although primary and 
secondary education remains shaped by member state policies, HE has, 
gradually, become a transnational policy field (Walkenhorst, 2008: 569) and 
the Commission influences and shapes national HE policies to a considerable 
extent (Keeling, 2006).61 The findings of recent empirical research support the 
Commission’s focus on HE (Arthur, 2005; Reichert, 2009). They show for 
example that the longer a citizen spends in education, the more likely s/he is 
to become politically active. Regardless of early socialisation practices, 
citizens with HE degrees have also been found to be more active in their 
political and cultural roles than those who leave education early (Hoskins, 
D’Hombres and Campbell, 2008: 397).  
 
The EU’s HE policy was already in the making during the mid-1980s 
(Walkenhorst, 2008). The CJEU’s decision to rule discrimination unlawful on 
the basis of nationality was an important step in this regard (Françoise Gravier 
v. City of Liège (1985). It allowed for charging full time home and visiting EU 
students the same tuition fees, and for granting resident rights to visiting EU 
students (Demmelhuber, 2000: 59). These opportunities were further 
enhanced by the introduction of the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) 
                                            
61 To some extent at least, the EU’s focus on HE is also the result of practical considerations. 
EU educational mobility is only feasible if students have the language skills required for 
studying abroad. Moreover, students in HE are on the brink of obtaining employment and 
enhancing their employability is one of the most often cited objectives in the Commission’s 
(2011g, 2014a) relevant documents, especially in the context of the crisis. 
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and the mutual recognition of degrees and competences by member states 
(Wende, 2000: 308-9; see also Huber, 2012 for a critical evaluation). 
However, it was the introduction of the European Community Action Scheme 
for the Mobility of University Students (Erasmus) programme in 1987 that 
really transformed the EU’s HE landscape (Beerkens and Vossensteyn, 2011; 
Corbett, 2012: 48). Under this programme, the EEC became committed to 
making financial contributions to the learning mobility of students and 
academics (Council of Ministers, 1987). Over the next 25 or so years, the 
number of inter-institutional Erasmus agreements between European 
university faculties expanded considerably (European Commission, 2012i), 
leading to a growing number of Erasmus students. In the first year of the 
Erasmus programme 3,244 students studied abroad, by 2012/13 academic 
year it was 268,143. In fact, by 2013, the EU had funded the mobility of nearly 
three million students (European Commission, 2012i: 3).  
 
The current Erasmus+ programme (2014-2020) seeks to provide financial 
support to another four million students in a seven-year period. From the 
proposed numbers, about half are anticipated to be HE students (European 
Commission, 2014a).62 The scope of support for HE students is perhaps not 
surprising in light of the expected (Pépin, 2007; Petit, 2007) and, according to 
some studies, achieved political and economic return (King and Ruiz-Gelices, 
                                            
62 There have been various changes to the structure of the Erasmus programme over the 
years (for an overview see Feyen and Krazkelvska, 2012). It was merged with other 
educational initiatives under the Socrates programme and then with vocational training 
initiatives in the EU’s ‘Lifelong Learning Programme’. The recent return to Erasmus+, which 
now serves as an umbrella programme for educational and vocational mobility underlines the 
central position of HE students’ mobility (European Commission, 2014a). 
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2003; Van Mol, 2013, 2014; Mitchell, 2012, 2014; European Commission, 
2014g). The Erasmus programme in particular was designed to 
strengthen the interaction between citizens in different Member 
States with a view to consolidating the concept of a People’s 
Europe… [and] to ensure the development of a pool of graduates 
with direct experience of intra-Community cooperation, thereby 
creating the basis upon which intensified cooperation in the 
economic and social sectors can develop at the Community level 
(Council of Ministers, 1987: 21). 
  
In this context, the role of universities was identified as highlighting the EU’s 
‘cultural unity’ and ‘common values’. [T]he existence of cultural unity within 
Europe is a fact that is nowhere called into question… One expression of this 
cultural unity is the university, which is an institution common to all the 
member states” (European Commission, 1985: 355). Universities also have 
an important economic role because they grant EU citizens with “the 
necessary competences to face the challenges of the new millennium” 
(Bologna Declaration, 1999: 1). Thus the learning mobility of HE students is 
projected as “an indispensable component” to consolidating and enriching 
their sense of EU citizenship and identity, as well as long-term economic well 
being (Bologna Declaration, 1999: 1). 
 
There is some empirical evidence to support the Commission’s ‘pedagogic 
approach to EU citizenship. For example, HE attainment makes it more likely 
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for students to use their mobility rights later in life (Fligstein, 2008: 25; Roose, 
2010). It is also one of the most useful predictors of students’ propensity to 
develop a sense of EU identity (Citrin and Sides, 2004; Duchesne et al., 
2013). Learning mobility in particular has been found to enhance students’ EU 
identity (King and Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Petit, 2007; Fligstein, 2008; Mitchell, 
2012, 2014; Van Mol, 2014) and improve their awareness of EU level status 
and rights (Fernández, 2005: 60). However, students’ learning mobility may 
have an elitist character. Considerably different economic resources are 
required if a student from CEE or southern states attempt to move to EU-15 or 
northern member states. Although there is some variation in the financial 
assistance the EU provides to students, depending on the living costs in the 
host country (see for example, British Council, 2014), the contribution 
students have to make can still be substantial. These issues have deterred a 
large number of students from participating in study exchanges (Souto-Otero 
et al., 2013). Against this backdrop, the Commission’s neo-liberal approach 
may have detrimental consequences for an emerging (political) EU citizenship 
model. The constant focus on students’ skills and employability (Pépin, 2007; 
Walkenhorst, 2008: 576) and the pressure on universities to support the 
privatisation and commercialisation of (scientific) research have been 
observed to have turned universities into ‘marketised institutions’ (Lock and 
Martins, 2009).  
 
The question is then whether and to what the extent universities can raise 
“attentive, knowledgeable, and participatory” (Converse, 1972: 324) EU 
citizens. Even if we have some evidence about the impact of learning mobility 
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on students’ EU identity and awareness of rights, there has been no research 
about their political behaviour. The inconsistency in these findings and the 
lack of evidence warrant for an in-depth qualitative study – a contribution this 
doctoral thesis seeks to make to the literature.  
 
3.2.4. Learning mobility flows in the EU 
Similarly to EU mobility, the level of students’ learning mobility seems 
negligible compared to the total number of students who study in the EU. 
From a potential pool of 20 million students, just under 3% moved to study 
another EU member state in 2012 (Eurostat, 2014b). Nonetheless, as Table 
3.2. displays, the number of visiting EU students has been on the rise since 
2004.  
 
Table 3.2. Mobility of students in the EU: Visiting EU students in the EU-27, 
Sweden and the UK (2004-12, in thousands) (Source: Eurostat, 2014b) 
 
The difference between the number of students arriving in Sweden and the 
UK was enormous. The UK welcomed twice as many visiting EU students 
than Germany did, which was the second most attractive destination in 2012. 
The table also reveals that, since 2009, almost 1 in 3 visiting EU students has 
studied in the UK. While the number of visiting EU students in the UK has 
EU-27 446.4 458.4 515.4 545.9 553.4 596.2 646.2 - 728.6
Sweden 18.7 18.8 19.1 19.3 11 11.9 12.8 13 13.2
United Kingdom 103.6 106.5 144.4 159.9 165.5 175 186.4 195.4 205.6
Year /                   
State
2010 2011 20122004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
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been on the rise, there was a sharp decline in the number of students arriving 
to Sweden after 2007. In fact, Sweden has received less than 3% of all visiting 
EU students since 2007.  
 
These patterns can only be interpreted speculatively (King, 2003: 159-61) but 
the most important factor is likely to be language. Even today, EU students 
are prone to find the opportunity to study in English attractive. So we see a 
large number of students arriving in EU states where degree programmes are 
delivered (at least partially) in English. By the same token, EU students from 
these states have been less likely to study abroad because there was a 
reduced incentive for them to learn a new language. In addition to language 
considerations, the academic reputation of universities, their facilities and 
organisation levels were also likely to influence students’ choices (King and 
Findlay, 2013: 272). For example, even though CEE countries, Greece and 
Italy have had a considerable outflow of students, only a small number of 
visiting EU students arrived to study there – with the exception of the Czech 
Republic, where the inflow of international students rose noticeably after its 
accession to the EU (King and Raghuram, 2013: 127, see also Eurostat, 
2014b).  
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Table 3.3. Erasmus students in the EU-27, Sweden and the UK (2004-12, in 
thousands) (Source: European Commission, 2012i, 2012j; 2014g) 
 
Against this backdrop, Table 3.3. above summarises the number of Erasmus 
students in the EU-27, Sweden and the UK for the 2004-12 period. The table 
demonstrates that, Sweden received less than 3% and the UK around 10% of 
all Erasmus students. In fact, UK was the fourth most attractive destination 
among Erasmus students in 2012 (European Commission, 2012j). The factors 
which shape EU mobility flows are likely to be responsible for the differences 
in these numbers as well, including language requirements and labour market 
conditions. Nonetheless, Table 3.3. also reveals that there were some 
similarities in the flow of Erasmus students to both countries. For example, the 
number of incoming students exceeded the number of outgoing students in 
both cases – by three times in Sweden and twice in the UK. The number of 
incoming and outgoing students has also been on the rise across the board, 
signalling the growing popularity of the Erasmus programme. Most students 
arrived to both countries from the same states, namely Germany, France and 
Outgoing 
students
Incoming 
students
Outgoing 
students
Incoming 
students
2012/13 268.1 3.7 10.8 14.6 27.2
2011/12 252.8 3.6 10.4 13.7 25.8
2010/11 231.4 3.2 10 12.8 24.5
2009/10 213.3 3 9.5 11.7 22.7
2008/09 198.5 2.7 8.8 10.8 20.9
2007/08 182.7 2.5 8.2 10.3 19.1
2006/07 159.3 2.5 7.4 7.2 16.5
2005/06 154.4 2.5 7.1 7.1 16.4
2004/05 144 2.7 6.6 7.2 16.3
Academic 
year
EU-27 
Total
Sweden UK
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Spain. EU-wide surveys also reveal that the majority of Erasmus students are 
female, on average 22 years old and study abroad during their undergraduate 
degree (European Commission, 2012j). 
 
Overall, the tables in this section of the chapter demonstrated that despite a 
growing anti-EU sentiment and the recent introduction of transitional 
measures, the UK has been a particularly attractive destination for both EU 
mobiles and visiting EU students. In comparison, EU mobiles and visiting EU 
students have been the exception rather than the rule in Sweden. Due to the 
different contexts these states represent, there is a difference in the scope EU 
mobiles have for realising their EU citizenship. The focus group chapters of 
this thesis (Chapters 4 – 7) offer empirical insight into the likely effects of 
these diverse contexts on EU mobiles’ (and stayers’) attitudes and behaviour. 
Having considered the different contexts and cases used in this doctoral 
thesis, the next (and final) part of this chapter sheds light on the dichotomy of 
active/passive (EU) citizens along the mobiles/stayers distinctions. 
 
3.3. Mobiles and stayers as active/passive citizens in the EU 
Recent qualitative studies are indicative of how (young) citizens’ perceptions 
and behaviour are likely to change as a result of their EU mobility and/or 
greater exposure to mobility (Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008; Skey, 2011a; Ross, 
2014). The empirical chapters of this thesis (especially Chapters 4-7) seek to 
complement and build on the findings of these studies. In addition to its 
conceptual contribution – proposing to reconsider the active/passive (EU) 
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citizen dichotomy along the mobiles/stayers distinctions – the thesis also 
makes an important empirical contribution to the literature. Existing studies 
only rely on qualitative evidence from stayers (Bruter, 2005; Skey, 2011a; 
Ross, 2014) or mobiles (Favell, 2008, 2010). This thesis investigates the 
perceptions of both EU mobiles and stayers – though the latter is only to a 
limited extent and for the purpose of control. 
 
Michael Bruter (2005) explored citizens’ perceptions of EU/European identity 
and the way in which the media and political institutions influenced these 
perceptions. His objective was “to understand how EU citizens feel” (Bruter, 
2005: 6 emphasis in original). His evidence indicates that “a mass European 
identity has progressively emerged … and continues to grow, and has already 
achieved high enough levels not to be ignored by academic commentators 
and politicians” (Bruter, 2005: 166). It also supports the proposition that 
political institutions and the media have played an important role in developing 
citizens’ European identity (Bruter, 2005: 123-33).  
 
Most importantly perhaps, Bruter (2004: 26) distinguishes between two 
components of citizens’ EU/European political identity – a cultural and a civic 
component. The cultural component manifests itself through citizens’ sense of 
belonging to the European continent and expected to be shaped by culture, 
social similarities and ethnicity. The civic component manifests itself through 
citizens’ identification with the EU’s political structures, including its 
institutions, rights and rules. The civic component is found to have a particular 
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relevance to how EU citizens feel, because they observe the EU as a source 
of their (mobility) rights and (cosmopolitan) identity (Bruter, 2004: 34-5). In 
comparison, citizens’ cultural European identity stems from a ‘shared 
baggage’ related to a number of historical, cultural and social features (Bruter, 
2005: 85). These findings underscore the “predominantly positive” 
EU/European identity of citizens (Bruter, 2004: 36) that is only really 
challenged by the EU’s changing borders (Bruter, 2005: 159). 
 
Alistair Ross (2014) investigated how young citizens (aged 11 to 19) construct 
their identity in ‘New Europe’ – in countries, which have recently joined or are 
about to join the EU. His evidence shows that the identity of young citizens is 
kaleidoscopic and context-contingent. It “change[s] as one looks through a 
lens, possibly through a filter” because young citizens use “a palette of 
materials” (Ross, 2014: 183) to construct their identity, including socio-
economic background, age, nationality and ethnicity. Their resulting identity is 
“momentary, situational [and] observer-dependent” (Ross, 2014: 184). Ross 
(2012a: 96; 2012b: 41) finds support for the distinctions between the cultural 
and civic components of citizens’ national and EU identities. Nonetheless, he 
detects considerable variability in these identities.  
 
The civic component of young citizens’ national identity was enhanced when 
they compared their home country to countries with (allegedly) lesser 
democratic structures (e.g. Russia) (Ross, 2014: 163-73). In comparison, the 
cultural component of young citizens’ EU identity was accentuated when they 
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discussed how ‘liberated’ they felt compared to the ‘historical fear’ of their 
parents from the “other” (Ross, 2014: 188). By distinguishing themselves from 
older generations, young citizens’ discussions paved the way for the 
emergence of ‘internal others’ at the national and EU levels (Ross, 2014: 90). 
These findings underscore the context-contingent character of young citizens’ 
sense of identity. 
 
Michael Skey (2011a) applied Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986) concept of cultural 
capital in order to investigate the extent to which the ‘idea(l)s’ of national 
belonging, identity and ‘home’ country are imagined and experienced by those 
citizens who make up the ‘dominant class’ in England (namely, the white 
English). His evidence indicates that national idea(l)s were “taken-for-granted” 
by these citizens (Skey, 2011b: 245) and continue to shape the different 
elements of their identity (Skey, 2011a: 148). Skey’s studies also provide 
some innovative insight into how citizens interact with “the Other”.  
 
For instance, cosmopolitanism was recognised as a desirable outlook by this 
group of citizens (Skey, 2012b: 482). As a result, they often “present[ed] a 
rational and enlightened self-image” (Skey, 2011a: 131), receptive to different 
cultures and peoples. However, there was inconsistency in citizens’ actual 
engagement with “the Other”. While the majority seemed eager to travel 
abroad and become acquainted with different cultures, they were detached 
through their engagement with “the Other” and so their engagement did not 
challenge citizens’ original (national) identity (Skey, 2012b: 483). Hence these 
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citizens safeguarded their status as ‘Western citizens, able to wield a 
privileged passport and to expect the support of powerful institutional 
authorities” (Skey, 2011b: 248). Against this backdrop, travelling abroad 
accentuated the significance of the national framework and the values of the 
privileged group of citizens. As a result, their cosmopolitanism had a 
“temporal, conditional and often fragile” character (Skey, 2011a: 8). In order to 
really account for this contrast, Skey (2011b: 146) suggests that future 
research on citizens’ engagement with “the Other” explores “how, when and in 
what context such shifts occur, and the backgrounds of those involved, 
including the type of resources they are able to bring to bear in their 
engagements”. 
 
Adrian Favell’s (2008, 2010) ethnographic research of the ‘Eurostars’ (highly 
skilled EU-15 mobiles) in three ‘Eurocities’ (Amsterdam, Brussels and 
London) is the only comprehensive qualitative study, which explored how 
mobiles realise the different dimensions of EU citizenship. In particular, the 
research inquired about who EU mobiles are and what the social and political 
contours of their EU citizenship resemble. Although Favell (2008: x) seeks to 
compare the experiences of EU mobiles and stayers, the latter group is not 
actually included in his research. Thus stayers cannot corroborate or criticise 
his main conclusion, specifically that “[t]he real boundaries [of the EU] lie only 
at the edge of the nation [state]” (Favell, 2008: 222).  
 
Favell (2008: 15-61) finds evidence to support some aspects of the 
Commission’s approach to EU mobility. For example, the emerging EU 
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identity of a few ‘Eurostars’ seems to assist them in juggling between and 
feeling comfortable with their otherwise incompatible national and regional 
identities. There are also ‘Eurostars’ with ‘de-nationalised’ identities, whose 
main reason to move was to be free from national frameworks (Favell, 2008: 
3-11). These findings indicate that distinctions are emerging between the 
identities and lifestyles of mobiles and stayers in the EU, especially 
considering their sense of ‘freedom’.   
The European movers thus open up dimensions in their life, 
inaccessible to the national stayers: the people back home whose 
lives are immersed and contained in their own national culture. 
Move even once, and it has consequences; it changes you. You 
can never really go back. The liberating feeling can even get to be 
quite addictive. You might keep chasing it. It could even hold the 
key to the deepest freedom of all: freedom from your self (Favell, 
2008: 11, emphasis in original).  
 
Nonetheless, Favell’s (2008) main findings underscore that European 
integration and EU mobility reinforce the on-going significance of the national 
framework. This seems to be the case despite the (presumably) ideal contexts 
of his research – each city was selected for its ‘de-nationalised’ setting with 
cosmopolitan tendencies. For example, a few ‘Eurostars’ were even sceptical 
about the homogenising effects of European integration (Favell, 2008: 60). 
Although they initially appreciated being treated on an equal footing with 
stayers (Favell, 2008: 74), the inconsistencies in national provisions on social 
welfare cast a dubious light on the equality of stayers and mobiles. Since 
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stayers were observed to have benefited from these provisions, ‘Eurostars’ 
did not expect to see “the replacement of the stabilized national structures for 
a fully massified and thereby Europeanized system” (Favell, 2008: 96). Even 
more, they felt that the perils of EU mobility could only ever be enjoyed by the 
few rather than the ‘masses’. These findings present a clear challenge to the 
transactionalist approach to European integration and the Commission’s 
almost exclusive focus on mobility as the basis of EU citizenship (Chapter 2). 
 
By the same token, a rather gloomy portrait emerges when the political 
participation of ‘Eurostars’ are explored (Favell, 2010). They hardly expressed 
the kind of political citizenship the Commission (2012d) and other researchers 
with a clear pro-EU stance have vouched for (for example Bruter, 2005; 
Fligstein, 2008; Risse, 2010). While ‘Eurostars’ seem to be more interested in 
politics than stayers and often have the opportunity to make a considerable 
impact on the host city’s political landscape, the actual level of their political 
participation in traditional forms of engagement was found to be negligible 
(Favell, 2010: 203-12). The non-participation of ‘Eurostars’ was highest in 
London, but similar trends were revealed in all three cities. The main reasons 
cited for abstention were interest in home country politics or the presumed 
complexity of the registration system in the host country. Nonetheless, 
‘Eurostars’ did participate in alternative forms of engagement, which was most 
apparent in “the choices and actions of consumers, tourists, students, and 
cross-border workers” (Favell, 2010: 212).  
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Table 3.4. Analytical framework for reconsidering the dichotomy of 
active/passive EU citizens  
 
In light of the aforementioned qualitative studies, Table 3.4. provides an 
analytical framework to how we could reconsider the dichotomy of 
active/passive EU citizens along the proposed mobiles/stayers distinctions. 
More specifically, it proposes recognising active citizens as mobiles – they 
have the opportunity to actually engage with the “other” on a daily basis. 
However, their engagement is likely to accentuate the presumed differences 
between various peoples and cultures, and their national identity is expected 
to have a central stage in making sense of these differences. As a result, 
mobiles are likely to participate in the politics of their home country. In 
comparison, passive citizens are the stayers – their attitudes towards and 
capabilities and actual engagement with the “other” is likely to be limited in the 
everyday context. Furthermore, because these differences are mostly 
noticeable through mobility, it may be used as a point of reference that 
distinguishes mobiles from stayers and vice versa. Therefore, a real 
Active EU citizens Passive EU citizens
Mobiles Stayers
Actual engagement with 
the “other”
Willingness (?)  to 
travel abroad
Civic (EU) identity Cultural (national) 
identity
Non-political forms of 
engagement at the local 
level in the host country
Political participation in 
the home country
Political participation 
at the national and 
local levels
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cosmopolitan outlook (through the cultural component of mobiles’ EU identity 
for example) is not expected to develop among either group. 
 
3.4. Summary 
This chapter shed light on the role of EU (learning) mobility in two themes; 
realising the dimensions of EU citizenship (1) and leading to new processes of 
differentiation and exclusion (2). The first theme has been discussed by 
previous empirical research, which often tests the transactionalist approach to 
European integration. However, they rarely link their studies to EU citizenship 
literature nor do they analyse the dimensions of EU citizenship concurrently. 
So they reach diverse and inconsistent conclusions about EU citizenship. 
These issues warrant for further empirical exploration into the extent to which 
EU (educational) mobility enhances citizens’ notions of EU citizenship, 
identity, rights and participation. The ensuing chapters of this thesis (Chapter 
4 – 7) will make an empirical contribution to this literature.  
 
The second theme has not been considered within the EU context before. 
This is surprising considering that the community-building role of any 
citizenship model entails processes of differentiation and exclusion and 
transforms the dimensions of citizenship. Moreover, previous qualitative 
research into the perceptions of EU mobiles/stayers already suggested that 
there might be important distinctions between their attitudes and behaviour as 
EU citizens (as illustrated in Table 3.4.). Building on their findings, this thesis 
proposes that we reconsider the dichotomy of active/passive (EU) citizens 
along the mobiles/stayers distinctions, The next chapters (Chapters 4 – 7) 
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explore the proposed distinctions between the perceptions of EU 
mobiles/stayers, using original focus group evidence. In so doing, they make 
an empirical contribution to the EU citizenship literature (discussed in Chapter 
1.1.). 
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Chapter 4. The values of citizenship 
The previous chapters of this thesis set out the analytical framework for 
approaching the issue of EU citizenship (Chapter 1) – defined as a dynamic 
bond between the EU and its member state citizens (Laffan, 1996; Painter, 
2008; Bellamy, 2008b). Although the relevant chapter proposed observing EU 
citizenship as another example in the long list of citizenships, more often than 
not EU citizenship has been seen as sui generis either because it cannot 
match the significance of national models of citizenship (for example Smith, 
1992; Shore, 2000) or because it to signifies “a new kind of citizenship” 
(Meehan, 1993: 1) which is “superimposed” on member state citizens 
(European Commission, 2001: 7). Against this backdrop, the European 
Commission has emphasised the reliance of EU citizenship on EU mobility, 
expecting the “practical significance” of EU citizenship to be visible to “the 
many nationals of member states who exercise the right of free movement” 
(European Commission, 2001: 13; Chapter 2). More specifically, the young 
and educated EU mobiles are expected to act as the ideal EU citizens 
(European Commission, 2010d).  
 
Nonetheless empirical studies usually reach inconclusive and contradictory 
conclusions about how EU (learning) mobility affects the sense of EU 
citizenship among these so-called “ideal EU citizens” (Sigalas, 2009; 2010a; 
2010b; Van Mol, 2013; Kuhn, 2012a; Mitchell, 2012, 2014). In order to 
complement these findings, this chapter provides a more in-depth 
investigation of young and educated citizens’ perceptions of EU citizenship, 
using original focus group evidence from Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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(UK). More specifically, it seeks to illustrate the distinctions between the 
perceptions of EU mobiles about EU citizenship. Overall, the chapter 
demonstrates the contingent and temporal character of young and educated 
citizens’ sense of EU citizenship. Whilst most groups perceived EU citizenship 
as bi-level – incorporating both EU and national citizenships –, important 
differences between the interpretations of participants on what this bi-level 
structure might indicate emerged. For EU mobiles, this structure highlighted 
the “novelty” of EU citizenship that is “different” from national citizenships. For 
stayers, it accentuated the idea that EU citizenship is second-order and an 
extension of their national citizenships. Nonetheless, both groups emphasised 
the implications EU mobility can have on the perceptions of citizens (rather 
than participation in politics as is the case with national models) (Research 
Question 1). Hence, the initial discussions in the focus groups corresponded 
with the anticipated distinctions between EU mobiles and stayers (Research 
Question 4).  
 
Due to the contingent character of EU citizenship however, the chapter also 
challenges the Commission’s observations of EU mobiles as the ideal EU 
citizens (Research Questions 2). In fact, EU mobiles did not seem to use their 
EU citizenship as a reference point for their identification as (EU) citizens and 
most of them seemed to find the idea of introducing themselves as EU 
citizens as amusing. There were considerable differences between how the 
groups in Sweden and the UK approached the future of the EU and EU 
citizenship. Swedish groups seemed fairly certain that the EU and EU 
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citizenship would become more prominent in the (near) future, while those in 
the UK seemed less convinced about the prospects of their EU citizenship.  
 
This chapter is the first of four chapters to follow, which uses original focus 
group evidence of young and educated citizens’ perception of their EU 
citizenship in Sweden and the UK. In order to begin answering the main 
research questions of the thesis (as indicated above), the chapter refers to the 
opening discussions that took place in the focus groups and illustrates how 
participants approached the issue of citizenship (broadly speaking). The 
chapter has three main parts. The first part provides a short insight into the 
process that was associated with conducting focus group research. The 
second part offers an insight in to the opening phase of the focus group 
discussions, exploring participants’ perceptions of national and EU 
citizenships. The third part discusses the limits of the EU and EU citizenship 
as identified by the participants.  
 
4.1. Working with focus groups 
Before we begin to explore how participants perceived EU citizenship, this 
part of the chapter offers a short overview of the process that was associated 
with conducting focus group research. In particular, this part illustrates the role 
of the researcher prior, during and after the fieldwork, and the group dynamics 
that emerged during the focus groups.   
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4.1.1. Role of the researcher 
Since the outset of her doctoral studies, the researcher was puzzled by the 
lack of empirical analysis on what EU citizenship signifies and how it is 
realised and perceived by citizens. Having read extensively about the 
opportunities the EU grants to its citizens and having directly benefitted from 
free movement rights and associated benefits, it seemed obvious that EU 
citizenship was a novel model of citizenship with much potential for the future. 
Previous experiences of conducting empirical research on the same topic 
albeit, admittedly, on a much smaller scale at undergraduate and 
postgraduate levels (with Hungarian mobiles and then Somali and Roma 
mobiles in the UK) added a further layer of optimism to her approach. Some 
contradictions about the actual significance of EU citizenship and citizens’ 
attitudes towards the EU had already been noted by empirical studies, most 
notably by Favell (2008) and Fligstein (2008). Nonetheless, the preparation for 
the fieldwork in Sweden and the UK were done in anticipation of illustrating 
the way in which EU citizenship is, surely, realised by students – the ‘ideal’ 
(EU) citizens – and so as to complement functionalist and transactionalist 
approaches to European integration (Haas, 1968; Deutsch et al., 1968). 
 
Despite the lack of funding and difficulties that emerged during the recruitment 
process for the focus groups, especially to find and enlist visiting students for 
the EU groups in Sweden, a sense of eagerness characterised the fieldwork. 
Participants were recruited using posters, social media and email alerts, which 
were circulated across the larger universities in Stockholm and London. There 
had been very little contact between participants and the researcher prior to 
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the Swedish groups – amounting to a couple of email exchanges confirming 
the time and place of interviews at most. In comparison, the majority of 
participants in the UK groups had met with the researcher prior to the 
interviews. For some, she acted as seminar tutor, for others she was a fellow 
PhD student.  As a result, her role as the moderator of focus groups was 
considerably different in the two countries.  
 
Due to her slightly detached status in Sweden, it is perhaps not surprising that 
she had a more formal role in moderating these groups. Despite of the 
generally energetic atmosphere there, these discussions had a tendency to 
start off slightly slower than those in the UK. For example, initial responses 
were often made in the same order in which participants were seating and 
they had a descriptive and complementary character. It was thus necessary 
for the moderator to ask follow-up questions and be more interactive. As 
participants established rapport with one another, their debate had an 
increasingly dynamic tone and the moderator’s contribution lessened. 
Nonetheless, her (simple) presence appeared to have some sway over the 
direction of the debates. Every group was introduced to the topic of the thesis 
and the main research questions at the beginning of the session. However, 
only in Sweden did one or another participant point out if and when the 
debates appeared to depart from the original topic. In comparison, the UK 
groups had a more open atmosphere and participants appeared at ease 
throughout the discussions. They were quick to challenge the answers 
provided by one another or, quite often, started laughing and speaking in 
smaller groups – expressing their opinion in different ways. In some cases 
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they even challenged the moderator’s questions, allowing for less involvement 
from her.  
 
The focus groups were originally planned to last for about 1.5 hours and were 
broken down in to three main parts.63 The discussions opened with broader 
questions about what national and EU citizenship meant to participants so as 
to ease them in to the group setting. After about 20 minutes, more specific 
questions about the dimensions of (EU) citizenship were posed. The main 
objective of the thesis has been to investigate whether, and of if so, how 
young citizens realise EU citizenship (Research Question 1), to draw attention 
to the multidimensional character of their EU citizenship and the effectiveness 
of mobility in activating these dimensions (Research Questions 2, 3 and 4). 
Therefore, the second part of the focus groups, which explored these issues, 
were expected to last the longest – approximately 45 to 55 minutes. To come 
full circle, the discussions ended with more general questions about what 
participants were likely to take away from the groups and how they would 
advise other citizens about the significance of their EU citizenship.  
 
The evidence was then transcribed, reduced and analysed by the 
researcher.64  An initial ‘profile’ for each group was developed based on the 
first reading of the transcripts and the researcher’s notes from the 
discussions. These profiles made references to the definitions of national and 
EU citizenships as provided by the groups, followed by approaches to the 
                                            
63 The questionnaires for the mobile and control groups are included in Appendix 2. 
64 Following the ‘guidelines’ and reflections provided by academics working with focus groups 
as a research method (especially Morgan (1998), Burnham et al., 2008; Byman, 2012; 
Halperin and Heath, 2012) or in relation to EU integration (Duchesne et al., 2013; Ross, 
2014). 
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various dimensions of (EU) citizenship – EU identity, EU rights and EU 
participation. The themes, which emerged from the reflections at the end of 
the focus groups, completed these initial profiles. Another reading of the 
transcripts allowed for the identification of key issues each groups settled on 
or tended to diverge from. Based on these more polished group profiles, the 
first drafts of joint profiles for the two countries were also drawn. It was only 
after the third, fourth and sometimes fifth reading (in the case of UK stayer 
group for example) that an evaluation of participants’ individual attitudes 
towards the EU and EU citizenship, and their positions within the groups were 
noticed. The broader group dynamics only really came to light much later in 
the analysis process.  
 
Despite of what may seem a one-directional process, the different stages of 
analysis described above were often repeated. In fact, it was well in to the 
drafting of empirical chapters that the researcher begun to really grasp the 
issues, which were at the heart of the evidence she had collected. It was 
particularly challenging to recognise, acknowledge and incorporate the 
contradictions between her (and the Commission’s) expectations and the 
evidence. More specifically, it became apparent that the focus groups drew 
attention to the main challenges young citizens were facing in their attempts to 
realise a “so-called” EU citizenship – the existence of which they often did not 
know about and at other times expected to have little relevance. It is true that 
during the discussions the researcher had noted that participants expressed 
some doubts about the significance of (their) EU citizenship. Actually, similar 
issues were raised across the groups and in both countries. However, these 
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seemed trivial at the time of the discussions. By reading and re-reading the 
transcripts and adopting an increasingly systematic approach to analysing the 
evidence, the researcher’s expectations were gradually subdued, allowing for 
participants’ perceptions to really dominate the evidence presented in the 
empirical chapters (Chapter 4 – 7). 
 
4.1.2. Composition of groups and group dynamics 
Before exploring these young citizens’ perceptions of EU citizenship however, 
this section provides a short assessment of the group dynamics. The previous 
section already noted that group dynamics were often shaped by the 
presence of the moderator. Additional factors shaping these dynamics 
included participants’ social backgrounds, including language skills and the 
length of time they had spent in the host country, and whether or not the 
groups were comprised of participants who had known one another 
previously. All groups were interviewed in English. While it was the official 
language of study for participants in the UK, only a minority used English in 
their everyday lives in Sweden. Coupled with their recent arrival to Sweden, it 
perhaps not surprising that the contribution of a few participants to the 
discussions – most notably French Male in EU Group 2, German Female in 
EU Group 3 and Italian Male (2) in EU Group 4 – was more limited. The 
groups in the UK were mainly composed of friends and university fellows, 
whilst the groups in Sweden, especially the EU groups, brought together 
students who had not met before. These factors added a further layer of 
‘formality’ to the Swedish groups, while easing the atmosphere of the UK 
groups. The next few paragraphs offer a closer insight in to the dynamics of 
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each group and the opportunities and limitations the moderator was presented 
with in her attempt at working with these groups.    
 
EU Group 1 in Sweden included four participants, none of who had known 
each other prior to the research. Perhaps due to the smaller number of 
participants and their expertise and genuine interest in European politics, they 
appeared to ease into the group setting fairly quickly. The Italian and 
Portuguese Male formed an alliance early on and so agreed with the issues 
raised by one another throughout the discussions. While no such alliance 
formed between the other two participants – French Male and German 
Female –, it was the insightfulness of the French Male that usually dominated 
the ensuing debates. Overall, the discussions appeared to have a natural flow 
and there was hardly any requirement for the moderator to pose follow-up 
questions or request the involvement of any one participant. 
 
EU Group 2 was slightly larger than Group 1 and the discussions had a 
similarly natural flow, though some involvement from the moderator was 
necessary on occasion. Two participants had known each other prior to the 
discussions – German Female and Italian Male – but it was, once again, a 
couple of male participants, who formed some sort of an alliance – British-
Hungarian and Portuguese Males. Accordingly, when the Bulgarian Female 
and Portuguese Male disagreed about something – this happened a couple of 
times throughout the discussions –, the latter enjoyed the support of the 
British-Hungarian Male. The Bulgarian Female was not disheartened 
however, and kept putting her arguments across. Instead of her, it was the 
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French Male who appeared slightly out of place. He hardly engaged in any of 
the main debates and only spoke up when the moderator asked him to do so 
specifically. 
 
German Female 3 was similarly quiet and had a somewhat limited 
involvement in the debates that occurred in EU Group 3. In comparison, the 
arguments of the most outspoken participant of the group – Lithuanian Male – 
were often rebuffed by the others. None of the participants had met prior to 
the research and no ‘alliances’ – that could be compared to those in the 
previous two groups – emerged. However, it was apparent that three 
participants – Hungarian Female, German Female and French Male – 
understood one another slightly better. This somewhat uneven dynamic was 
particularly apparent when the discussions turned to EU participation. The 
Lithuanian Male answered the question of the moderator, asking the others to 
contribute as well. However, his request was met with silence. The others 
simply did not follow up – they did not question, disagree nor complement his 
comments. Their silence marked the end of participants’ consideration of EU 
participation in this group. Moreover, the female participants had a tendency 
to acknowledge the perceptiveness of their French Male fellow. So when the 
Lithuanian Male challenged the issues raised by his French counterpart, they 
were quick to offer their support in his defence. The moderator intervened in 
this group so as to ensure that the German Female spoke up. 
 
EU Group 4 was the largest in Sweden and the only group where CEE 
mobiles outnumbered their EU-15 fellows. The two Romanian and two Italian 
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participants were friends, but the others had not met prior to the research. 
Both Polish females had a tendency to express themselves powerfully 
throughout the discussions – though they often disagreed with one another. 
Actually, the sentiments of Polish Female (2) were usually met with 
disagreement from the rest of the group. Polish Female (1) appeared as a 
member of the group but her overly positive stance on the EU and EU 
citizenship separated her from the others towards the end. Once again the 
male participants appeared to form an alliance. Although the three of them 
had not met prior to the research, the Italian and French participants were 
usually in agreement and offered some support to each other’s comments. 
The debate in this group was lively from the outset and apart from 
encouraging Italian Male (2) and Romanian Female (1) to speak up every now 
and then, the moderator’s role was limited to asking questions. 
 
The Swedish control group was particularly lively and the discussions lasted 
for well over the original time frame – for about 1.75 hours –, prompting a 
couple of participants to leave before the final questions were asked (about 
participants’ reflection on the focus group). Most participants knew each other. 
They had studied together or were taught by one of the PhD students who 
were present. Only one participant – Swedish Female (5) – studied something 
different than political science but she too was an active member of the group 
from the beginning. The most vocal member of the group was, perhaps, 
Swedish Female (2). She responded to the moderator’s every question – 
usually starting off the debates – and often requested her fellows to answer as 
well. Some members of this group expressed a slight uneasiness of having to 
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debate in English, however most of the discussions went smoothly and 
without any major disruption. Due to the informal atmosphere of the group and 
participants’ similar attitudes towards the EU and EU citizenship, the 
moderator’s role was, once again, limited to asking questions.  
 
Compared to the Swedish groups, most UK groups were comprised of 
participants who had known each other for years, studied politics together and 
had a good command of English. Participants’ attitudes towards the EU and 
EU citizenship often had a contradictory and quite cynical character. While 
they were often in favour of the EU, the UK’s broader and more pronounced 
Eurosceptic context had a very clear and palpable impact on their ensuing 
debates. Overall, these groups had a stimulating atmosphere filled with 
energetic discussions. The moderator’s role was mostly limited to asking 
questions and settling disputes, instead of asking follow-up questions or 
prompting any one participant to engage in the debates. 
 
Apart from the Italian Male, the other members of EU Group 1, UK knew each 
other well. Their friendship may explain why they had a tendency to question 
his comments – much to the frustration of the Italian participant. The German 
and Dutch Male were in agreement throughout the discussion – though they 
did not quite form an alliance that can be compared to that in the Swedish 
groups. The German, Italian and German-Swiss Female also had a somewhat 
similar ‘bond’ forming. However, it was the position of the Romanian Female 
that was particularly interesting in this group. As the only CEE mobile, her 
references to the restrictions she had encountered whilst studying in the UK, 
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were met with silence from the others. She turned to the only other CEE 
mobile in the room for support – the moderator –, often reservedly smiling and 
looking at her. 
 
All members in EU Group 2 had known each other and studied politics at the 
university. This group included the only female alliance across all groups – 
between the two Finnish participants. It also comprised the only EU mobile 
who had used her free movement right as a child – the French-British Female. 
However, her long-term settlement (and no doubt integration) in the UK 
appeared to have had no clear impact on her approach to EU citizenship – at 
least none that would have separated her from the others in this group. 
Actually, these participants often agreed with one another and their comments 
were supportive in character. No disputes or debates arose within the group 
and the particularly good-natured discussions that took place lasted for less 
than 1.2 hours – the shortest time of all interviews. This group required quite a 
bit of involvement from the moderator. However, her attempts to start off some 
debate were quickly pacified by participants’ complementary responses.  
 
EU Group 3 had a more lively debate with the German-British Female quickly 
establishing herself as an EU and the Swedish participant as a world citizen – 
albeit the latter changed considerably as the discussions progressed. While 
both participants appeared to be pro-EU, the other two female members of the 
group had more cynical attitudes towards the EU and often questioned the 
very idea of EU citizenship. Due to the disagreement between these 
participants and, no doubt, the ease with which they carried themselves in 
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front of one another – a number of heated debates erupted in the group. It 
was the late arrival of Swedish Male – 45 minutes after the discussion started 
– that injected some balance to the discussions. However, it is possible that 
his actual arrival rather than comments or contribution shaped the flow of the 
discussions. The moderator’s attempts to complement the emerging debates 
were mostly without success. Participants expressed their opinions rather 
enthusiastically – and long after the ‘formal’ discussions ended. 
 
A similarly animated debate ensued in EU Group 4, with the moderator having 
to ask participants to speak slower and avoid talking at the same time with 
others. It was apparent that these participants knew each other well and felt 
confident to speak openly about their experiences of EU citizenship in the UK. 
Contrary to the other UK groups – where no one participant appeared to take 
a leading role – the two Italian participants and German Female (1) were, 
clearly, shaping the direction of these debates. The Austrian Female made a 
few interventions and made her reservations about these emerging dynamics 
known. The subsequent rebuff from her from fellows then made her slightly 
detached from the rest of the group. Compared to the outspoken attitude of 
most members, the French participants were, perhaps, slightly quieter – 
possibly a sign of their nervousness and somewhat poorer command of 
English language. 
 
With 13 members, the UK control group was the largest of all. It was also the 
most energetic and vigorous with the debates lasting just under 2 hours. 
Almost every participant had known each other before the research and, apart 
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from one– British Female (3) –, they were actively engaged from the very 
beginning until the end of the discussions. Strong personalities – British Male 
(1), (2) and British Female (1) – and much disparity in participants’ 
perceptions of the EU and EU citizenship, created a group filled with heated 
disputes and cynical smirks. There was a requirement for the moderator to 
step in the resulting debates often and in order to move the discussions along 
or ensure that everyone had a chance to speak up when they were wishing to 
do so. 
 
4.2. The structure of national and EU citizenships 
Having provided an insight into the processes associated with conducting 
focus group research, the reaming of this chapter focuses on the initial 
debates that took place across the focus groups. All discussions opened with 
a general question on what citizenship meant to participants. Most participants 
seemed initially puzzled by the broadness of the question but once they 
begun responding, a debate about the definition and significance of national 
and, eventually, EU citizenships emerged. It shed light on the similarity 
between the approaches of participants to their national citizenship and the 
impact mobility seemed to have on their approaches to EU citizenship. This 
section illustrates the main distinctions between the perceptions of EU 
mobiles and stayers of what citizenship signifies.  
 
4.2.1. Defining (national) citizenship 
Citizenship was often defined as an “agreement”, “exchange” or “contract” 
between the state and the individuals – a dynamic and direct bond.  
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Finnish Female (1), EU Group 2, UK: To me, it’s a guarantee of 
rights you get. It’s a contract between you and the state. It’s 
guaranteed, for example, education and other public goods, um, 
and that when you go abroad you have a place to go to. Like, an 
embassy, if you are in a problematic situation. So you have 
external and internal dimensions, including defence and police 
force, and things like that. It’s entrusting the state like that. 
 
Subsequently, participants focused on the reciprocal value of citizenship and 
highlighted its dependence on democracy and democratic values. 
French Male, EU Group 1, Sweden: I would relate [citizenship] 
more to a democratic kind of state because … it implies rights and 
duties. But it also implies, I think, [an] agreement from the citizen in 
his relation to [a] state. And in a more authoritarian state, I think, 
the agreement is not really present. So it's kind of different from 
that relation. It’s more like subjection, than citizenship. 
Actually, the majority of participants seemed to agree on these two issues, 
suggesting that their approaches to citizenship did not seem to have been 
affected by EU mobility.65 
 
However, it should be noted that the Swedish stayer group approached 
citizenship differently from the other groups. It described a top-down process 
and focused on the “rights”, “entitlements” and “benefits” the Swedish welfare 
                                            
65 A couple of other participants, mainly the well-educated and male participants (and only 
one female (6) student in the British stayer group), took a similar stance. For them, citizenship 
was important due to its cosmopolitan ideal. Some of these participants then categorised 
national borders and laws as limiting the ideals of citizenship. 
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state provides to its citizens. Swedish stayers suggested that their citizenship 
was different from other national models in Europe because the identity 
dimension, which usually binds citizens together, was not as important.66 At 
this point of the discussions, participants appeared to be in general 
agreement. Hence they approved of and built on each other’s statements.  
Swedish Female (1), Stayer Group, Sweden: It's not like you are 
proud to be Swedish because you haven't gone through the 
process to become Swedish citizen… 
Swedish Female (5): I don't really feel that like Swedish. Sweden 
isn't a country where, you're not so very like, I don't feel like 
Swedish people in comparison to other nations … we're not very 
Swedish. We don't, you know, talk a lot about our own Swedish, 
you know, culture and just identity overall. 
Therefore, they depicted some form of a post-national Swedish citizenship, in 
which the emphasis was on the values, rights and welfare benefits Swedish 
citizens received. 
 
Hence the initial approaches of Swedish stayers correspond with the literature 
on Swedish citizenship, which depicts this model as an ideal of post-national 
citizenship (Brochman and Hagelund, 2012: 26) that relies on principles of 
community and generous welfare state provisions for all (Bernitz, 2012). 
However, the difficulty EU mobiles faced in their attempts to integrate into the 
Swedish (student) society indicate that the ideal presented by the literature on 
                                            
66 For the same reason, Swedish stayers alleged that they were more likely to develop a 
sense of EU identity than others (Chapter 5.1.). 
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Swedish citizenship is likely to be far from the reality experienced by to-be-
citizens. 
 
In their broad definitions of (national) citizenship, every group touched on the 
three dimensions of citizenship, namely identity, rights and participation as 
defined in this thesis (Chapter 1.2.). The following dialogue in EU Group 2, 
Sweden exemplifies well the complementary nature of these early exchanges.  
British-Hungarian Male, EU Group 2, Sweden:  It is the right to fully 
reside in a country without limitations and fully have to obey their 
laws ... 
Portuguese Male: Being part of that nation, member of that nation 
to be full member, to have full rights, to be part of it. 
German Female: Since I study Political Science, maybe I have 
more of a theoretical background. For me it's the social and civil 
and political rights. 
Bulgarian Female: From [an] anthropological perspective, culture is 
very important for me. And sharing common values and it's things 
like that... but then if I have to define it more strictly, I would also go 
for having certain rights in a certain space. It's a combination of 
both.  
 
Nonetheless, some disagreement between participants and the groups about 
the importance and weight of the different dimensions of citizenship emerged 
with the progression of the focus groups. These disagreements are explored 
in more detail in the subsequent chapters. For now however it is important to 
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note that three groups, the Swedish Stayer group, EU Group 4, UK and EU 
Group 3, Sweden did not follow the same pattern as the others. They adopted 
a more static concept of citizenship. From the earlier example it is evident that 
for Swedish stayers, the most important dimension of their citizenship was 
rights. And so rights dominated the majority of their debates. For example, this 
group considered in length how Swedish rights were likely to impact citizens’ 
sense of Swedish identity. The other two groups defined citizenship mainly 
with reference to identity.67 So for example, even when the moderator asked 
more specific questions about the other dimensions of citizenship – rights and 
participation –, these two groups referred back to identity. In contrast, other 
groups, were more flexible in their conceptualisation of citizenship. For 
example, some groups did not seem quite comfortable with the idea that there 
is a link between citizenship and (national) identity, they found it difficult to 
separate the two concepts. “I think that’s really important. I mean how to 
separate citizenship as a political institution from identity as a social 
construct?” (British-Canadian Male, Stayer Group, UK). One group did not 
want to link identity and citizenship together (the British Stayer Group).68 The 
emerging diversity in the approaches between and within these groups 
suggests that citizens – similarly to academics and policy-makers – may have 
a preference for one or another of the dimensions of citizenship. These 
exchanges hint that contemporary citizenships in Europe are likely to be 
contested. 
 
                                            
67 This could have also been the result of research bias. It is plausible that participants’ 
approaches to EU citizenship were influenced by the follow up questions of the moderator. 
68 This issue maybe linked to the ‘many categories’ of British citizens (Dummett, 2006). 
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4.2.2. Defining EU citizenship 
When probed about EU citizenship, the initial reaction among participants 
was, once again, that of surprise. It quickly became apparent that none of 
them really comprehended EU citizenship as comparable to their national 
citizenship – a form of “exchange” for the lack of a better word. In fact, a good 
majority of participants across all groups looked puzzled when the moderator 
introduced the topic of the doctoral research. Even after 10 or so minutes into 
the discussions, most of them were surprised that EU citizenship per se 
existed. Of course, citizenship is not a topic students would have to actively 
think about in their everyday lives – even if they study politics. Nevertheless, 
their initial reactions shed a rather dubious light on the real extent to which the 
so-called ‘ideal EU citizens’ are aware of their EU level status – despite of 
what the Commission would have us believe (Chapter 2.2.). 
 
Once students moved beyond their initial surprise, they suggested that there 
are likely to be important differences between citizens’ approaches to national 
and EU citizenships based on their mobility status.69 Most importantly 
perhaps, none of the stayers was expected (nor appeared) to identify as EU 
citizens, but the majority of EU mobiles was expected (and appeared) to do 
so. This finding supports one of the basic assumptions of this thesis: EU 
mobiles are the most likely to identify themselves as EU citizens (Chapters 
2.2.1. and 3.2.3.). Even more, EU mobiles seemed rather optimistic about 
                                            
69 This section builds on the idea that in the case of the EU it is possibly more accurate to 
examine individuals’ identification with the EU rather than their collective EU identity 
(Duchesne, 2008; Favell, 2008; Medrano, 2010). There was much overlap between the focus 
group debates about these two issues. Hence it was not always evident which point made by 
participants belonged to the section on identification with the EU and which point to EU 
citizenship as identity (Chapter 5). The examples included in this chapter are those in which 
participants made references to their individual identification as EU citizens. 
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what EU citizenship signified to them (Bruter, 2005) and perceived it as 
something “novel”, an “extra feature of citizenship” that is “a guarantee” and 
“security”, especially during travels. Considering the structure of EU 
citizenship, most participants suggested that it did not diminish the 
significance of national citizenships. The majority agreed with one another on 
the assertion that states remained the first point of call for issues most 
relevant to their lives, such as welfare and educational programmes, paying 
taxes and so on (Favell, 2008; Skey, 2011a; Duchesne et al., 2013). As a 
result, they expected to find considerable variations between citizens’ senses 
of national and EU citizenships. This section sheds further light on these 
issues. 
 
The early exchanges between EU mobiles about EU citizenship were largely 
complementary. They thus spoke of the different “contexts” in which they were 
likely to identify as (national and/or) EU citizens. Their discussions portrayed 
multiple, intersecting (Risse, 2010) and kaleidoscopic identities (Ross, 2014, 
see also Chapter 1.2.1.). Many suspected that it was “hard to separate” 
citizenship “from the context it comes from” and subsequently stressed how, 
in certain situations, including during their residency in a host state, the 
significance of the EU was liable to intensify.70 These issues are illustrated 
well in the following exchange in EU Group 4, Sweden. Each participant 
seemed to agree with previous comments and, at the same time, 
                                            
70 Except for EU Group 3 Sweden and EU Group 4 UK. This chapter makes references to the 
dimensions of EU citizenship in order to provide a more accurate portrait of how participants 
initially defined EU citizenship. These dimensions are discussed in considerably more detail in 
the later chapters (Chapters 5 – 7). 
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complemented them. Hence there is some form of incremental progression in 
these earlier exchanges about EU citizenship.  
Polish Female (1), EU Group 4, Sweden: I think that's how it works, 
that there are different levels of citizenship… It's like you are citizen 
of your city and then of your region, maybe of your country and 
then [the] European Union. And then there [are] some, like, citizens 
of the world. But I don’t know about that. …And then it's linked to 
how you feel, the identity. 'Cause, I guess, there are some people 
that feel mostly the citizens of their own country. But there are 
some that feels more like citizens of the Europe or the city. … 
French Male: I think it's a kind of belonging. You belong to a 
community and this community could be small or wider. You have 
different scales of identity of community. …  
Bulgarian Female (1): So maybe we then have to differentiate 
between citizenship by nation, by where you are coming from, your 
origin, and citizenship within the boundaries of the EU.  
Polish Female (1): Yeah! 
Bulgarian Female (1): ‘Cause you say citizenship is to be bound to 
some kind of community and, at the same time, you have the 
European Union... [which] allow[s] a uniform system between old 
[and] different kind[s] of citizenships. 
 
Subsequently, nearly everyone assumed that citizens have an abstract and 
shallow sense of identification with the EU. The abstract nature of the EU 
stemmed from everyday personal benefits (European Commission, 2001; 
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Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008; Duchesne et al., 2013), such as paying with the 
Euro, using one’s European passport outside the EU and the crossing of 
national borders within the EU. These benefits afforded a sense of “freedom” 
to citizens, which was often presumed to be “taken for granted” by the 
younger generation.71  
Dutch Female, EU Group 3, UK: [EU citizenship] really just means 
that I have less passport checks. It’s, like, really easy to travel and 
that’s literally all it means to me. It’s probably because I’m not a 
taxpayer or something like that. Like for me, it’s just easier to travel 
it’s easier to pay with Euros everywhere...  
Swedish Female: It opens up more, yeah, possibilities for you. It’s 
more freedom, I would say! Like you have this kind of citizenship… 
or it’s a sense of belonging. You belong in the European Union. 
Like, everywhere is home! You’re allowed everywhere. You can do 
the same things almost as you can do at home in whatever country 
you choose.  
 
Only three EU mobiles (interestingly all female and in three separate groups) 
assumed that realising a political form of EU citizenship – that stems from 
citizen participation in EU level politics (European Commission, 2012a) – was 
already possible (French-British and German-British Females in EU groups 2 
and 3 in the UK, and Polish Female (1), EU Group 4, Sweden). Instead, the 
majority of EU mobiles and the EU groups more broadly supported the idea 
                                            
71 Similarly to the findings of Ross (2012a, b; 2014), participants then believed that their 
sense of belonging to the nation state was also likely to be less rigorous than it has been the 
case for older generations, who “had to fight for” recognition. 
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that EU mobility was the most relevant aspect of their EU citizenship, and 
assumed that EU citizens only really knew about their mobility rights.  
Romanian Female, EU Group 1, UK: I think most of the European 
citizens just know that they can travel. They can travel without visa. 
I think, that’s the main thing that all European knows. And other 
than that, I think, no one knows. I mean, aside from European 
Studies students. 
 
Nearly every EU mobile suggested that EU mobility makes citizens’ 
identification with the EU more likely. The same point is emphasised when we 
consider the approaches of EU mobiles and stayers to EU citizenship. EU 
mobiles were more inclined to expand on what EU citizenship personally 
meant to them. The majority of these participants – mostly females – identified 
as EU citizens during their EU mobility. “[I]f you speak about European 
citizenship, I never felt so European than this year as an Erasmus student. 
And I see that I can share much with the other people from Europe” (French 
Male, EU Group 3, Sweden). “You know, studying here it's always about I'm 
[a] member of the European Union. I have a lot of advantages! So you get this 
feeling that you are a European citizen” (German Female, EU Group 1, 
Sweden).72 
 
Once EU mobiles focused on the role of mobility, they spoke of EU citizenship 
as their formal “status”, which made them “something between” TCNs and 
national citizens. This meant that EU citizenship gave EU mobiles a “huge, 
                                            
72 This is not to say that there was not any disagreement between participants about how EU 
mobility might affect citizens’ identity. This issue is discussed in more detail in the chapter on 
EU identity (Chapter 5). 
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incalculable advantage over other [non-EU] citizens”, making their EU status a 
“convenience”. Their responses correspond to the main hypothesis of this 
thesis, namely that EU citizenship is likely to be most relevant to a small group 
of potential EU citizens: the EU mobiles (Bruter, 2005) and, specifically, the 
young and educated (student) segment of EU mobiles (Ross, 2014).73 
 
In comparison to the complementary and incremental discussions that took 
place across the various mobile groups, the control groups did not define EU 
citizenship as new or different, and made sense of it through a comparison 
with their national citizenships. The following example illustrates that stayers 
hardly used personal stories to explain their approaches to EU citizenship and 
were much less likely to identify as EU citizens than EU mobiles (cited earlier). 
As a result, the descriptions of EU citizenship among the two control groups 
appeared to signal the “extending [of] national citizenship” and a shallow 
sense of “belonging to a wider community”, granting a second-order character 
to their EU citizenship. 
 
Initially at least, Swedish stayers seemed excited about the prospects of 
assessing EU citizenship and almost all of them believed that it was important 
for their daily lives – as an extension of their national citizenships. Later 
however, two stayers openly admitted that they had never heard of EU 
citizenship prior to their university studies and/or participation in the research.  
                                            
73 Moreover, participants with dual citizenships and/or multicultural backgrounds often said 
that EU citizenship was their preferred status (see for example the comments made by 
Swedish Female, EU Group 3, UK). This finding seems to support the small but important 
number of existing studies, which show how identification with the EU might resolve cognitive 
dissonance in citizens’ identities (Favell, 2008, 2010; Rother and Nebe, 2010). Furthermore, 
male EU mobiles often observed global rather than EU citizenship as the best alternative to 
the conflicting nationalities in Europe (especially apparent in EU Group 4, Sweden).  
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Swedish Female (2), Stayer Group, Sweden: Yes, more and more. 
We have extended our rights outside the national borders and it 
means that it should be easy to live in another European country 
the same way that you live in your own country. You can work, 
study or travel without any problems. And therefore we are now 
European citizens. That identity has now been prolonged, stretched 
and I think that's the ambition of the EU is to create the notion of 
European citizen. 
Swedish, Female (1): I heard it for the first time in our political 
theory course when we were talking about citizenship. I've never 
come [into] contact with the concept ‘European citizen’ [before] and 
I find it surprising because I consider myself being, well, at least not 
ignorant. … So I was also surprised that I haven't been well, no one 
had tried to convince me that I am a European citizen. Well, that's 
my reflection. 
 
British stayers assessed EU citizenship in quite the opposite manner. They 
distanced themselves from the rest of the EU from the very beginning of the 
focus group discussions. Their negative perceptions towards the EU and, 
consequently, EU citizenship was justified on the basis that the EU was not 
relevant to their everyday lives. Some stayers alleged that without adopting 
the Euro, EU citizenship was unlikely to foster British citizens’ EU identity. 
Others believed differences in language, culture and the UK’s proximity to the 
rest of the EU – the “British moat” – prevented British citizens from realising 
EU citizenship. Subsequently, most British stayers identified themselves as 
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EU citizens among other identifications and two approached EU citizenship as 
an extension of their national status. 
British Female (6), Stayer Group, UK: I think, European citizenship 
is quite economic in terms of working. And, I think, it’s quite 
different living in the UK because we don’t have the Euro. And, I 
think, that living here we are not as attached to being European as 
maybe other countries are. And I think that’s something that hasn’t 
been created. … 
British Male (3): I would back that and …the Schengen as well … 
And European citizenship is for them, not us. There’s a lot of mind-
set going on. Well, mind-set in my opinion. But that’s how it could 
be considered. We say European. You don’t think of the UK. 
British Female (5): I suppose it’s partly our fault that we don’t really 
like to get involved… 
British Male (4): I think,… European citizenship is, uh, about being 
part of something a little bit bigger, a little bit greater than just our 
quite small, pathetic little island… 
British Male (2): I think, I could feasibly describe myself as 
European. But it [would] probably be one in a succession of 
things... I would first probably say I’m from Suffolk and then I would 
go greater and say I’m English, then I’m British and then I’m 
European! But I think it’s [a] particularly banal statement to make 
that you are ultimately going to describe yourself as a European 
citizen.  
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Whilst EU mobiles recognised both internal mobility and external migration as 
useful in highlighting the “practicalities” of their EU citizenship status, the 
control groups did not really see EU mobility as useful for developing their 
identification as EU citizens. Moreover, only a handful of Swedish and a 
couple of British stayers expected EU mobility to assist in realising EU 
citizenship.74  
 
Therefore, the initial discussions hint at important distinctions between young 
and educated citizens’ perceptions of EU citizenship and identification as EU 
citizens on the basis of their mobility status. EU mobiles were more likely to 
use personal stories about EU citizenship and identify as EU citizens. In 
contrast, stayers had a tendency to define EU citizenship as an extension of 
their national status. These discussions then reflect the expected distinctions 
between EU mobiles and stayers. However, in some instances the 
significance of national citizenship was also stressed, pointing to the 
limitations of EU citizenship as the (proposed) ‘fundamental status of citizens’. 
The next part interrogates the limitations EU mobiles and stayers identified 
when attempting to realise their EU citizenship, including issues linked to 
defining what the EU signifies and, subsequently, the type of community EU 
citizenship may establish by bringing member state citizens together. 
 
                                            
74 The two exceptions were two (female) stayers, one in each control group, who had 
identified as EU citizens during their previous experiences of EU mobility. However, they 
seemed to have lost their EU identification once they returned home. 
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4.3. Limits to realising EU citizenship 
The contradictions between participants’ definitions of EU citizenship, 
contradictions which characterised the main part of the discussions, are 
reflected well in the rich and rather diverse conceptions of the EU and the 
references they made to ‘regionalisation’, cross-border divisions and the EU’s 
external borders. Participants appeared to really struggle with identifying a 
clear set of values that is common across the EU and depicting where its 
geographical, cultural and social boundaries are. In fact, the tone of 
discussions about these issues kept changing and had a strong, contradictory 
character not only between, but also within groups. Furthermore, a large 
number of participants adjusted their responses on this topic as the 
discussions progressed. The focus group evidence presented in this section 
of the chapter emphasises the consequences and challenges associated with 
separating the EU (civic) and European (cultural) spheres (Bruter, 2005) of 
young and educated citizens’ identification as EU citizens (Ross, 2014). 
 
Although participants were not required to give a definition of the EU, every 
group attempted, and failed, to agree on whether it is an “economic union”, a 
“political construct”, a “community of Europeans”, a “European federation” or a 
“congregation” of nation states. The diversity in their definitions could be 
linked to the distinctive framing of the EU within each member state (Medrano, 
2010) as well as the Commission’s inability to really move beyond the EU’s 
economic legacy towards a political community (as revealed in Chapter 2.). 
These issues are illustrated in more detail in the next two sections of this part 
of the chapter. 
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4.3.1. Defining an EU characterised by regionalisation, internal divides 
and external borders 
First, it is worth noting that the majority of participants could not imagine the 
EU as a single political union due to the historical differences between and on-
going relevance of member states. Whilst they seemed to recognise that the 
EU was different from the rest of Europe, participants often made sense of it 
as the prototype example of ‘regionalisation’, signalling a move towards a 
nation-like community at the EU level (Karolewski, 2009). Perhaps because 
these issues were discussed during the initial stages of the focus groups, 
participants were more inclined to complement than contest each other’s 
comments. In some cases – mainly in the EU groups in Sweden – this 
approving approach spilled into a rather optimistic interpretation of the EU 
and, by extension, EU citizenship.   
Lithuanian Male, EU Group 3, Sweden: I think [the] European 
Union and Europe are different. I would say… So you can be, like, 
from also Europe but not part of the European Union. So they 
would still refer to you as European.  
German Female: Yes, that's true! 
Lithuanian Male: So, I think, it’s a political construct, the European 
Union citizenship. And [it] does not really work. Well, they are trying 
to [make it work], but I do not think so it does at the moment.  
Hungarian Female: Yeah. It is a construction, as you said. And so, 
we are kind of in the European Union. And maybe in our head it 
even goes further than that. But it isn't [doing so in practice]. … 
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French Male: And then if we are going to become a European 
federation, I don't know, you will still identify yourself from your 
country or from your region, even if there is European citizenship. 
…  
Lithuanian Male: But, I think, “European” does not exist in general. I 
don’t think “European identity” exists. It's just politically constructed. 
If you see, the countries are very different. Like, you have France 
and Portugal, Dutch and then English kind of civilisations. … It's 
very different approaches, not alike.  
French Male: But, look at the nations as well! Like, France, Italy, 
Germany – [they] were [first] nothing … but politically and 
economically constructed a few hundred years ago. And then the 
[national] identity was founded after that. 
Lithuanian Male: Yeah, sure. … I think, in general, that Europe is 
changing. And that Europe… [used to be the place for] nationalism-
construction. So now, I think, national states will fade away and 
become, like, more institutionalised organisations. Like, kind of [the] 
European Union. And then Latin America tries to do UNASUR 
[Union of South American Nations] – maybe a similar thing? But, I 
do not know. They have been focusing on different things. I think, 
it's [a] new creation, regionalisation! 
 
However, not all groups were as optimistic about where the EU is heading as 
the example suggests above. Others quickly identified the significance of 
regional divides within the EU along the east/west, and north/south contrasts. 
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They then considered how these divides influence citizens’ ability to realise 
EU citizenship. Residency in Western states was seen as more constructive 
towards realising EU citizenship than residency in an Eastern state. Even in 
the Swedish EU groups – which originally adopted an optimistic tone – EU-15 
mobiles were increasingly vocal about the fact that they perceived Eastern 
states as “a little bit weird” part of Europe that “doesn’t feel so home” (EU 
Group 2, Sweden). The political influence of these states was also considered 
in some groups, suggesting that certain states were “more European” and had 
more “value” than others. For example, Swedish stayers did not recognise 
Sweden to be one of the “more European” states. Nonetheless, they believed 
that it had a higher “value” – political influence – than “many of the former 
Soviet countries”.  
 
The debate among British stayers added an extra facet to these regional 
divides. Referencing vibrant differences between the UK and the rest of 
Europe, including geography, language and culture, the discussion of these 
participants identified internal EU ‘others’.75 The use of “they” – continental 
Europeans – and “us” – British – marked the earliest instances where 
divisions were drawn within the EU and among its citizens.76 Even if most 
British stayers appeared to agree with these notions, some – if somewhat 
limited – attempts were made by a couple of participants to bridge these 
differences. In the exchange below, British Female (5) suggests that even if 
                                            
75 What is also interesting about this exchange between British stayers is that they observed 
English language – recognised as the European language by all other groups – as 
detrimental to their ability to realising EU citizenship. In this context, the reasons cited by 
British stayers seem to especially resonate the ‘framing Europe’ thesis (Medrano, 2010). 
76 This points to relevance of applying cultural capital to the case of the EU and is discussed 
in more detail in the section on ‘Shared EU identity among EU citizens’ (Chapter 5.2.). 
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the UK is ‘separated’ from mainland Europe, it is not “that far away” 
geographically. Although she was a vocal pro-European member of the British 
stayer group, she subsequently admitted that there likely to be more “in 
common” between the British and the Americans, than the British and ‘some 
Europeans’ – in this case referring to Italians. Her contribution then allowed 
another member of the group to invoke the “peculiarities of the Anglo-sphere”.  
British Male (3), Stayer Group, UK: [I]t comes down to also 
geographical things as well. … [I]f you live in… the west side of 
Switzerland or something, to get all around Europe, you can drive 
there [in] a couple of hours! And you can take advantage of [the] 
Schengen [Area] and the language barriers to a point aren’t 
[important]. If you are a natural, say, French-speaker, if you like. 
The language barrier to an Italian or a Spanish, at least what I 
understand, is, you could get by…! Whereas, we don’t have that! 
…[T]hey can feel European because they are all sort of there 
together … 
British Female (5): Saying that, we are not that far away! 
British Male (3): Oh, I know! 
British Female (5): I mean, in terms of transportation… like, it takes 
… two hours on [the] Eurostar. It’s not like it takes seven hours to 
get there. Yet, we still have, seem to have, more in common with 
[the] Americans than with [the] Italians in terms of how we see 
others… 
British Male (2): …[T]hat’s the peculiarities of the Anglo-sphere. 
209 
 
These peculiarities would later allow for British stayers to underline that, for 
example, English was not actually a European language.77 
 
Not surprisingly perhaps, British stayers’ Eurosceptic approach had a strong 
impact on EU mobiles’ perceptions. EU mobiles often claimed that they had 
more in common with other European visiting students (including those 
coming from beyond the EU’s borders), than with British stayers. These 
issues then shed a dubious light on the prospects of realising a political EU 
community that could be comparable to national communities and clearly 
challenge the optimistic expectation of functionalist approaches to European 
integration – in particular the awaited positive effects of cross-border 
interaction among mobiles and stayers (Haas, 1958; Deutsch et al., 1968; see 
also Chapter 2.1.2.) 
 
Once they highlighted the presence of regional divides and the “peculiarity” of 
EU membership, participants begin to probe whether these differences should 
be preserved or not. Their opinions on this point were rather contradictory and 
often varied from one issue to the next within a single focus group. For 
example, Swedish stayers were quite vocal about the damaging character of 
the EU’s homogenisation policies on education, which had led to the 
introduction of university fees in many EU states and, in Sweden affected 
international students. However, they were disapproving of the EU’s failure to 
introducing a single professional language – English – that could ease 
                                            
77 The link between language and EU identity is explored in detail in Chapter 5.2. 
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citizens’ EU mobility further.78 Their focus on regional divides and internal 
differences and whether, and if so, how the EU should deal with these issues, 
suggests that these EU mobiles and stayers could not quite resolve the 
question of what the EU currently signifies or should signify.  
 
Moreover, the fact that participants shared “common references” with non-EU 
European citizens obscured their definitions of the EU. For example, the fact 
that Switzerland is not an EU member state did not seem to matter for 
participants, because it was treated as “European”. Indeed, participants did 
not think being part of the EU necessarily meant that EU citizens associated 
with each other more closely than with those Europeans who stayed outside 
of the EU. “[Swiss] shares the language with Austrians and Germans [and 
though Switzerland is not in the EU] do you ever hear an Austrian say they’re 
more affiliated with the Germans?” (German-British Female, EU Group 3, UK). 
Some groups went further and underlined the link between some member 
states and non-European countries – like in case of British stayers who made 
references to an “Anglo sphere” (cited earlier). Against this backdrop, a 
handful of participants seemed worried about how the EU and EU mobility 
might create ‘artificial’ boundaries between EU and European citizens. 
Although the latter group does not have mobility rights, some students 
believed they too shared common history and traditions with (some) EU 
citizens. Actually, European citizens were often included in discussions of 
cultural/ European identity. 
                                            
78 The majority of Swedish stayers originally chose their university course because it was 
taught in English. 
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German Male, EU Group 2, UK: I think, at the same time, it’s 
interesting to see how … especially freedom of movement, 
obviously sort of reinforces external boundaries. … The way that 
countries have, in the past, defined themselves… a lot more 
[based] on geography. …Whereas in a way, the European Union, 
you could argue, sort of levels that out a bit … then suddenly there 
is a border to one side. And that sort of overlap of different 
identities or even ethnicities, uh, if that can sort of flow anymore? 
Then that creates … an artificial situation.  
 
However, demographic factors influenced participants’ approaches to what 
this “artificial situation” of EU community signified. Previous quotes have 
already hinted that some participants appeared to have preferred considering 
the EU community as part of an emerging cosmopolitan community. Actually, 
apart from one EU mobile (French Male, EU Group 2, Sweden), the other 
male mobiles in Sweden exhibited a cosmopolitan outlook, and spoke of a 
sense of belonging to the world. They did not consider the EU level as 
important for their identification as citizens, though their sense of national 
belonging remained significant in some respects (mainly in relation to 
exercising citizenship rights and privileges). In comparison, only a female 
participant (Polish Female (2), EU Group 4, Sweden) seemed convinced 
about the appropriateness of thinking about the EU with a cosmopolitan ideal 
in mind. Accordingly, she adopted a broader approach to understanding her 
experiences of EU mobility, comparing this with what we might find in the 
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USA. However, before and after this comparison, she reverted back to a more 
‘Eurosceptic’ attitude.79 
 
4.3.2. EU(ropean) values and the shaping of an (un)political mobile 
community for the future 
Although participants seemed to find it quite challenging to define what the EU 
signifies and where its borders should end, they recognised that it was easily 
associated with certain values, namely democracy, freedom and safety, as 
well as Christianity and a ‘European mind-set’. The importance of these 
values is the topic of this section. For instance, quite a few participants in the 
UK deemed the EU safer and more democratic than the rest of the world and, 
more importantly perhaps, than the rest of Europe.  
British Male (3), Stayer Group, UK: [W]hen I went outside the EU 
this academic year, and it wasn’t a completely unsafe place, but it 
was on my mind that, no, you are outside the EU. No one is coming 
to get you help if all goes wrong here. And there … [is a] perceived 
[sense of] security maybe that you are safe here. Your rights are 
safer within the EU. 
 
This finding is particularly interesting because only one EU mobile in Sweden 
made a similar comment, Polish Female (1) in EU Group 4, who was also the 
only participant to believe that EU citizenship already existed. However, her 
fellows did not follow her optimism and a couple of them even questioned the 
extent to which “EU standards” – for instance drinking water standards – really 
                                            
79 Her rather ‘fluid’ approach is illustrated well across the various quotes from this group, 
especially those in Chapter 5.2. 
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worked. Others felt that citizens “misunderstood the European Union”, which 
has a sole purpose, namely to promote economic integration. Providing 
security was then observed as an important part of state-function. 
Italian Male (1), EU Group 4, Sweden: [T]he right to be safe is 
secured by the state because we don't have any European army. 
And this is another really difficult thing. I mean, we have 
experienced 50-60 years of peace so we don't know who is going 
to defend us if there will be a war in the future. And it will not be 
Europe. 
 
Instead of safety, most groups in Sweden emphasised the role of religion, 
particularly Christian values, and an essentially ‘Western’ culture as 
necessary part of “European lifestyle” and useful in depicting what the EU 
does not signify. They made an extensive use of ‘categorisation’ processes 
and stressed that new processes of differentiation and exclusion are emerging 
in the EU. For example, a French EU mobile in EU Group 1 probed the 
perceptions of his fellows about the role of religion and culture in deciding 
whether Turkey should be allowed to join the EU some day. His questions led 
to a number of statements about the need for a geographical border for the 
EU and debates about “what is not European”. Although participants 
appeared to find it difficult to define what consists of being European, they 
were quick to dismiss certain countries and values as non-European.  
 
As one participant pinpointed, by deciding what does not constitute being 
“European”, there was a sense among her fellows about what is “European”. 
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The following deliberation between EU mobiles reflects well the vibrant 
discussion that took place in almost all groups, which tried to define European 
and/or EU values.80 Initially, some participants seemed uncomfortable with 
using religion as an identity signifier. As the discussion progressed however, 
more and more participants got involved in the debate and observed Turkey 
as “they” compared to “us” – the “truly Europeans”. Issues linked to culture, 
religion, lifestyle, history and geographical position were raised, dismissed 
and raised again. Against this backdrop, the participation of Turkey in some 
EU-led initiatives, such as European Capital of Culture, and Cyprus’s EU 
membership seemed to hinder rather than enhance these EU mobiles’ sense 
of identification with the EU.81  
French Male, EU Group 2, Sweden: What do you think about 
Turkey wanting to become a member?... Don't you think that the 
main problem about Turkey is, like, that they are Muslim and we 
are not?  
Portuguese Male: I hope it's not! 
Hungarian-British Male: Yeah, but I think for a lot of people this is 
the main reason. 
German Female: Yes. 
Portuguese Male: Probably. 
French Male: They are Muslim and like [us, we are] European. We 
are Catholic.  
Italian and Portuguese Male together: Christians, basically. 
                                            
80 Also discussed in relation to the EU’s “external other” (Chapter 5.3.). 
81 The idea that it is difficult to develop a sense of EU identity due to geographical proximity, 
historical ties and cultural distinctions have been identified by other empirical studies (see for 
example the findings in Ross (2012c) about young citizens’ sense of EU identity in Cyprus). 
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Bulgarian Female: In terms of the European identity, it's based on 
the Judeo-Christian or Roman Catholic [religions], something along 
these lines.  
Italian and Portuguese Male nod in agreement. 
French Male: I think it will be weird for me to say like, ‘Yes, Turkey 
is Europe[an]’. I mean, like, Istanbul is a very nice city and people 
there live like us. Like, European [people]. Like in Paris or London. 
But the rest of Turkey… it's totally different. 
Bulgarian Female: But what is confusing is that actually Istanbul 
was European capital of culture.  
French Male: Yeah! And they live, like, European. This is like 
European lifestyle. They can drink alcohol. They have clubs. 
Bulgarian Female: What I was thinking is, what is European? 
Because they [Turkish people] do participate in certain European 
initiatives but yet they are not truly European.  
Italian Male: If there are no limitations on who joins Europe, then 
even Israel wants to join Europe someday, which is quite far. So it 
has to be some process that countries have to follow… And, it will 
take some time for them to join Europe even if it's relevant and, 
possibly, good for them and [for] Europe to let them join. Because 
you can make them join, … but where will we stop? We say that St 
Petersburg is part of Europe. But now St Petersburg is part of 
Russia. Can you give European status to the whole [of] Russia? 
And it goes all the way to the United States and China. Or should 
we just give European citizenship to people that are from this 
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[Western] part of Russia? So there is always this question. Do you 
really want to open this?! Because there is no limit. Everyone wants 
to be in Europe! … And it starts taking over. I don’t know. It's 
complicated… 
Bulgarian Female: But then you have Cyprus, which is not really 
that close to Europe. It's closer to Turkey, closer to Asia. How 
come they are members?  
Italian Male: Half of Cyprus! 
Bulgarian Female: Well, yeah, politics and such, but still! Part of 
Cyprus is in the EU. So is it geographical? 
German Female: But isn't that funny that when we feel threatened 
that Europe is going to be too big, then we already say “No, these 
countries are not European”? Doesn't that say that we already feel 
European and we can already say well, we have certain habits and 
certain characteristics that these countries don't have? I think that's 
very interesting because we started from the point where we said I 
am here I come from there [referring to a member state], you come 
from there. But now we already say “No, you know, the rural area 
of Turkey isn't European enough.” I mean, there must be 
something that we feel truly European for us to be able to say, “No, 
they are not!” … I think that's always a thing with a threat. As soon 
as [you] feel threatened you create already a community. You say, 
“Okay, we are this block.” And I agree with you [refers to Italian 
Male] we can't expand Europe too much. 
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All groups seemed to agree on or make references to the latter point: the 
easiest way of constructing a community was believed to be in response to a 
threat.  
 
The first part of this chapter demonstrated that – once they moved beyond 
their initial puzzlement – participants adopted somewhat different approaches 
to their national and EU citizenships. The majority of groups perceived 
national citizenship as some kind of an “exchange” between the nation state 
and its citizens. Yet, none of them really comprehended EU citizenship as an 
“exchange”. In fact, quite a few participants were surprised to learn that it 
already existed. This finding calls into question the real depth of these 
participants' identification with the EU that was ‘exposed’ during the 
discussions. The same issue is underscored by the fact that participants did 
not really consider their EP voting right as part of EU citizenship. This is 
important since almost every group underlined the importance of voting at the 
national elections as a duty of citizens. Yet, almost none of them mentioned 
that EU citizens had a duty to participate in the EP elections or that EU 
participation was necessary to realising EU citizenship.82 If this select group of 
citizens – most of whom studied political science or European studies at the 
time of the interviews – tend to separate EU citizenship from EU participation, 
                                            
82 The only group, in which more than one participant discussed EU participation within the 
framework of EU citizenship and identity prior to the direct questions posed by the moderator 
was EU Group 2, UK. Here the three female EU mobiles had more favourable perceptions 
towards the EU’s political union and how this might evolve, using a bottom-up approach as 
example. A German-British mobile in EU Group 3, UK also had a more positive perception of 
this issue. Interestingly, in the other cases where EU participation was raised during the initial 
stages of the interviews (mainly by the male participants) in EU Group 1, 3 and 4 in Sweden – 
was so as to underline the weaknesses associated with a political union and EU citizenship 
more specifically (Chapter 7). 
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it is even less likely that ordinary citizens will observe a link between these 
two issues. 
 
On this basis, it is not startling that most participants did not vote in the 
previous EP elections - though quite a few said that they were too young to do 
so. “I was too young for the EP elections, but for the next one, it’ll be fine. 
Yeah I will vote next year, probably, why not?” (Italian Male, EU Group 1, UK). 
The small number of participants who had voted before did not feel their vote 
had a real impact on the EU’s decision-making process because it “doesn’t 
count as much”. They also believed that being aware of this limitation “turn[s] 
people off”. As a result, participating in the EP elections had little or no 
constructive impact for most participants’ sense of EU citizenship. “I don't 
even feel like I have that European citizenship when I vote for the European 
Parliament” (Portuguese Male, EU Group 1, Sweden). This point will be 
repeated throughout the rest of this thesis: apart from three participants, the 
focus groups did not link EU participation to EU citizenship. 
 
These issues challenge the Commission’s (2013a) assumption that EU 
mobiles are politically active and correspond with the findings of previous 
empirical studies, which draw attention to mobiles’ (lack of) political 
participation (Muxell, 2009; Favell, 2010; Recchi, 2012; see also Chapter 7). 
Because of the (proposed) interlinked character of the dimensions of (EU) 
citizenship (Bellamy, 2008a: 12), these issues may restrict the ability of EU 
citizens to fully develop a sense of EU identity and awareness of their EU 
rights (similar conclusions reached by Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012).  
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Both EU mobiles and stayers seemed to recognise EU mobility rather than 
(political) participation as the key to realising their EU citizenship. However, 
their discussion questioned the supposition that EU mobility can have long-
term positive effects on citizens’ perceptions of the EU. In fact, their 
responses suggest that EU citizenship – based on mobility – is unlikely to 
establish a permanent bond between the EU and its citizens. Rather, there is 
a possibility that EU citizenship is but a temporary phase in citizens’ lives, 
similarly to their EU mobility. Accordingly, a number of EU mobiles said they 
identified as EU citizens only “briefly” and in “isolated spots”.  
Italian Male, EU Group 1, Sweden: I am European but in 
occasions, not structurally. Travelling, crossing borders freely. 
Moving especially in the West German-Dutch-Belgian joint where 
you can experience that a form of European Union has already 
been reached. It's multi-speaking and really moving communities 
long before Schengen Agreement. So in some occasions travelling, 
I did experience that very closely, but in just isolated spots. 
 
Since the majority of participants assumed that citizens “always see national 
government[s] first”, it is plausible to propose that once EU mobiles return 
home, they might lose their previous identification with the EU. Two stayers 
did just that. They said that they had only ever identified as EU citizens during 
their previous experiences of EU mobility. During this time they could relate to 
other EU citizens. However, since they have returned home, they identified as 
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national citizens and could grasp the differences between themselves and 
other EU, non-national citizens. 
Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden: When I was working 
in France for a month, I met some… Russians and a guy from 
Jordan… In contrast to them, I really felt like me and the French 
people had more in common. …Even though here, in Sweden, … 
these French [people], they are so different from me! But there, I 
really felt this European notion. 
British Female (6), Stayer Group, UK: I think that living in a different 
European country makes you slightly more European. I don’t think I 
would have ever considered [being a European] if I haven’t lived in 
Spain for a year. And now… I have done that, been living there and 
I can speak Spanish, I probably relate [to this feeling] more than 
before. 
 
Hence the focus group evidence suggests that contemporary EU citizenship 
maybe nothing more than a temporary phase in citizens’ lives. It thus 
challenges the possibility of developing a community of EU mobiles – one that 
is constantly realised by citizens. Since EU mobility is circular (Kahanec and 
Kurkova, 2011), it is likely that the majority of mobile EU citizens only identify 
as EU citizens for the duration of their mobility. Once they return home or, 
alternatively, stay in the host country and integrate into that society, they are 
likely to turn back to the national framework. The findings of previous research 
on the on-going significance of the national framework seem to support this 
suggestion (Skey, 2011a; 2012b). Clearly, more research is needed to show 
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whether EU citizenship is likely to have a temporary character and how, if at 
all, EU mobility might affect citizens’ perceptions in the long term. Moreover, 
more research is necessary on how different types of mobility (including 
circular mobility, non-mobility, learning mobility, etc.) may lead to new 
processes of differentiation and exclusion in the EU. For now at least, the 
evidence suggests that EU citizenship has not quite built a community of 
citizens at the EU level. 
 
Some debate also emerged about where the EU is heading and if citizens 
were likely to realise EU citizenship in the near future. Participants then spoke 
of the economic crisis as an important change to the current legitimacy of the 
EU. However, almost all participants in Sweden and quite a few in the UK 
seemed to believe that the EU is, currently, in a state-building process and its 
significance might be enhanced later.  
Finnish Female (1), EU Group 2, UK: [W]e’ve got a nascent 
institution and a nascent form of supranational, in quotation for the 
record, “democratic institutions”. And just because it’s so new and 
now, because of the euro crisis, it’s going through a lot of dispute. 
It’s going through a lot of political argument to disassociate and 
create in-fighting in the European Union. But …political institutions 
change and, I don’t know. I think, that the public sentiment towards 
the European Union will change and the idea that we can still be 
who we are. We’ll adopt with the European Union, if that makes 
sense? It’s just so young at the moment that it hasn’t been as 
accepted as it perhaps will be by future generations. 
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Most of these participants also assumed that the growing number of EU 
mobiles has already begun to assist in the state-building process in the EU. “I 
think this European Union citizenship is going to be more visible in the future 
because… we are travelling so much now” (Polish Female (1), EU Group 4, 
Sweden).  
 
However, the debates in the UK portrayed a different picture. The majority of 
stayers and a good number of EU mobiles in Groups 3 and 4 claimed that it 
will always be “very difficult” to realise a form of regional citizenship in the EU.  
Italian-Mexican Female, EU Group 4, UK: I’m just saying that, right 
now, it is still too early … Maybe in the future it’s gonna be a good 
option. Uh, especially for people who had a very, uh, multicultural 
background… But you also have to consider that some people, 
even though they are aware of this, uh, cultural difference that 
exists, will still prefer to pick a nationality that [is] attached to their 
country…. Because even though I’m aware of this, and I feel like, 
it’s a great thing to study abroad and just like … share your values 
and traditions … I will still prefer to have a nationality that attaches 
me to Italy. 
 
4.4. Summary 
This chapter provided a short overview of the processes associated with 
conducting focus group research, explored EU mobiles’ and stayers’ 
perceptions of national and EU citizenships, and the limits they identified to 
realising their EU status. The main findings seem to raise serious questions 
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about the relevance of EU citizenship today. Although EU mobility did not 
appear to change EU mobiles’ approaches to national citizenships, it altered 
their observations of EU citizenship considerably. In particular, EU mobiles 
were more vocal about their identification as EU citizens. These findings 
underline the anticipated distinctions between EU mobiles and stayers. 
 
Nonetheless, most participants did not believe that their EU citizenship was an 
appealing alternative to their national citizenships. An obvious question arises 
here: why would they then practice their EU participatory rights? The focus 
group evidence and previous empirical findings about EU mobiles’ political 
participation (Muxell, 2009; Favell, 2010; Recchi, 2012) suggest that they 
would not. So, it is unlikely for EU mobiles to realise a political EU community. 
Besides, only a small segment of participants recognised their exercise of EU 
rights within the framework of EU citizenship. This was due to either a lack of 
knowledge about EU citizenship or an assumption that it did not (yet) exist. If 
the young and educated citizens, the so-called “ideal EU citizens” did not 
know that EU citizenship already exists, how could they activate it? These 
findings are in sharp contrast with recent Eurobarometer data, which suggests 
that more and more citizens are aware of their EU citizenship (see for 
example TNS Opinion and Social, 2011). The inconsistency of these two 
findings goes to the heart of current debates about the significance of the EU 
and the role of EU citizenship in integrating citizens at the EU level (Shaw, 
2012; Reding, 2013). In order to begin answering some of the questions this 
chapter raised, the next three empirical chapters of the thesis will look into the 
dimensions of EU citizenship in more detail, starting with EU identity. 
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Chapter 5. EU citizenship as EU identity 
EU identity is, perhaps, the most studied aspect of EU citizenship – so much 
so that some scholars have used these two terms interchangeably (Laffan, 
1996; Habermas, 1998; Painter, 1998; Kostakopoulou, 2001; Bruter, 2005; 
Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Karolewski, 2010; Risse, 2010). This 
tendency is not surprising considering that the introduction of EU citizenship in 
the Maastricht Treaty coincided with a shift in citizens’ attitudes towards 
European integration – from ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and 
Scheingold, 1970: 277) to ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 
9). However, the very concept of identity is ambiguous at best, leading to 
doubts about its actual purpose for social research (Brubaker and Cooper, 
2000: 2). In light of this issue, the tendency to expand the meaning of EU 
identity is only likely to have extended the existing ambiguity in this concept 
(for more in-depth criticism of this issue see Kanter, 2006; Duchesne, 2008; 
Kaina, 2013).  
 
Starting on the premise that EU identity has a legitimising role in the European 
integration process (Shore, 2000), empirical studies have adopted a range of 
approaches and (as a result) reached contradictory conclusions about its 
actual meaning and significance (for a comprehensive overview of the existing 
literature see Kaina and Karolewski, 2013). Some investigated whether 
citizens’ sense of EU identity includes a civic as well as a cultural aspect 
(Bruter, 2004; 2005; Fligstein, 2008; Ross, 2014). Others placed the issue of 
EU identity in the context of public attitudes towards European integration 
225 
 
(McLaren, 2006; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Medrano, 2010; Gaxie, Hubé and 
Rowell, 2011; White, 2011; Sanders et al., 2012; Duchesne et al., 2013; Van 
Ingelgom, 2014). Again others studied whether and, if so, how EU identity fits 
with citizens’ pre-existing national identities (Carey, 2002; Citrin and Sides, 
2003; Duchesne and Frognier, 2007; Karolewski and Suszycki, 2009; 
Sanders, Magalhães and Tòka, 2012).  
 
Nonetheless, some agreement between these scholars has also emerged, 
including the way in which EU (civic aspect) and national (cultural aspect) 
identities are expected to become compatible over time (for an optimistic 
evaluation see for example Risse, 2010: 39-46). There is also an increasing 
agreement about the diversity in citizens’ sense of (EU) identity (Gaxie, Hubé 
and Rowell, 2011; Duchesne et al., 2013; Ross, 2014) – one that is likely to 
be multiplied by the experience of EU mobility (Favell, 2008; Rother and 
Nebe, 2009; Roeder, 2011; Siklodi, 2014). These studies underline that EU 
identity remains highly susceptible to context and to contextual changes 
(including political and economic changes) (illustrated in Table 1.1.). 
Accordingly, the recent crisis is likely to have challenged citizens’ emerging 
sense of civic EU identity rather than supporting it (Fligstein, Polyakova and 
Sandholtz, 2012; Henjak, Tóka and Sanders, 2012). Nonetheless, it is 
precisely a crisis that was expected to make EU identity ever more salient 
(Cram, 2012). The diversity in the EU identity literature makes it ever more 
surprising that, in its discourse on EU citizenship, the Commission has only 
ever recognised EU identity as one-dimensional (Chapter 2). These issues 
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warrant an in-depth interrogation of EU identity as a dimension of EU 
citizenship. 
 
Against this backdrop, the chapter explores young and educated citizens’ 
sense of EU identity using original focus group evidence from Sweden and the 
UK. More specifically, it explores the perceptions of these citizens about the 
first dimension of EU citizenship – EU identity. A previous chapter 
conceptualised EU identity as composed of three elements – sense of 
belonging to the EU, shared identity among EU citizens, and recognition of the 
“other” (the non-EU citizen) (as defined in Table 1.3.) –, which served as 
empirical indicators for the analysis of focus group evidence presented in this 
chapter. Overall, the findings of the chapter suggest that EU mobility is 
effective in developing the three elements of citizens’ sense of EU identity to a 
certain extent (Research Question 2). However, even the mobile specific 
segment of ideal EU citizens appears to find it difficult to form a  “community 
of Europeans” and then separate this community from the “other” (Research 
Question 3). Rather than a “community of Europeans”, mobility seems to lead 
to processes of differentiation between EU mobiles and stayers, and also 
within these two groups, allowing for the emergence of ‘internal EU/national 
others’ (Research Question 4). EU mobility is also expected to obscure 
(some) processes of exclusion, especially when it comes to having to 
recognise whom the non-EU citizens are in the everyday context. In light of 
these findings, the role of EU identity in furthering political integration in 
Europe seems uncertain at best (Research Question 5). 
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This chapter forms the first of three empirical chapters (Chapters 5 – 7), which 
probe how young and educated EU citizens perceive one of the dimensions of 
their EU citizenship. In so doing, these chapters together provide a response 
to the main research question, namely whether and how young and educated 
citizens realise their EU citizenship (Research Question 1). The chapter has 
three main parts. The first part illustrates how participants perceived their 
sense of belonging to the EU. The second part sheds light on their 
perceptions about whether a “community of Europeans” exists and illustrates 
differentiation between categories of EU citizens (internal EU/national others). 
The third part draws attention to emerging processes of exclusions, which 
seem to divide young EU citizens from the non-EU citizens (the EU’s “other”).  
 
5.1. Sense of belonging to the EU  
In an attempt to explore what participants understood under ‘being EU 
citizens’, they were asked about the relationship between citizenship and 
identity, the different levels of their identity and how their EU mobility 
experiences (or lack of experiences in the case of stayers) may have 
influenced their sense of EU identity. The majority of groups then saw EU 
mobility as effective in developing a sense of belonging to the EU among EU 
mobiles. However, they were quick to suggest external migration as even 
more effective than EU mobility. Yet, it was top-down approaches to EU 
identity promotion that these participants recognised as perhaps the most 
productive for enhancing their sense of belonging to the EU. In order to shed 
more light on the perceptions of young and educated citizens’ sense of 
belonging to the EU, these issues are discussed in the next two sections.  
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5.1.1. Developing a sense of belonging to the EU through mobility 
The previous chapters of this thesis already suggested that there is likely to 
be a distinction between citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU on the basis of 
their mobility status (especially Chapter 3.3.). The focus group evidence 
appears to confirm this expectation, illustrating that EU mobility can contribute 
to EU mobiles’ emerging sense of civic belonging to the EU (Bruter, 2005; 
Ross, 2014). The majority of EU mobiles in the focus groups suggested that 
mobility was necessary to make the EU “relevant to [their] lives” as EU 
citizens and to “develop [their] sense of belonging to Europe”.  
Italian Male (1), EU Group 4, Sweden: When you move out and 
you travel you can develop this sense of “Europe”... I think we are 
developing this kind of identity in this vague sense. We are an elite 
compar[ed] to our national fellows, [our] compatriots. I mean, it's 
easier for us to feel European in general than people that don't 
move away. 
 
However, as the above example suggests, the discussions quickly resonated 
the extant literature about the multi-layered and multilevel character of 
citizens’ sense of identity – one that is highly contingent on political and social 
contexts (for an overview of the relevant literature see Duchesne, 2008). 
Participants’ recognition of the complexity associated with citizens’ sense of 
identity then led to doubts about the actual extent to which EU mobility was 
likely to only affect EU identity. This issue was apparent in the discussions 
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that took place across the various EU groups. In their attempt to shed light on 
their sense of belonging to the EU, most EU mobiles started off on an 
optimistic note about how EU mobility had enhanced their sense of EU 
belonging (as cited above). Increasingly however, EU mobiles expressed a 
sense of uneasiness about the distinctions EU mobility may lead for both EU 
mobiles and stayers’ senses of belonging to different communities.  
 
The gradual change that occurred across the various EU groups is illustrated 
particularly well by EU Group 2, UK. To start with, the participants in this 
group did not believe stayers are EU citizens or can be seen as “Europeans” 
to the same extent as mid- or long-term EU mobile residents, who “move 
around” and “actually sort of live in other places” are. Their initial notions thus 
corresponded to the expected distinctions between mobile (active) and 
stayers (passive) EU citizens. However, these participants became 
increasingly concerned about whether EU mobiles can actually be observed 
as “better Europeans” than stayers. Even though they attended to a contested 
issue – identity – and began to move away from the group’s original 
observation – an optimistic notion of the role of EU mobility –, the actual tone 
of their subsequent discussion was complementary and supportive. On the 
one hand, EU mobility was observed to not only enhance EU mobiles’ sense 
of belonging to the EU but other communities as well. In fact, EU mobiles 
suspected that EU mobility strengthened their senses of belonging to the EU, 
country of origin and local regions because it highlighted the similarities and 
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persisting differences between member states.83 The resulting exchanges 
were personal, descriptive and supportive of one another’s stories 
German Male, EU Group 2, UK: I define myself as a Berliner, … 
[and] I feel German. But I also feel European. So, in a way, you 
could argue that there is a multilevel identity thing going on. [Others 
nod in agreement.] But, I think, it sounds sort of weird, I guess. … I 
like to think of it spatially. So my base is my home city but the 
people who speak my language, who vote for the same parliament, 
I guess, you could say that’s sort of the next level, the country. But 
then, at the same time, Europe is sort of the wider geographical 
base where I can move around freely, where I can enjoy the rights 
of being a citizen without … feeling foreign, I suppose. So, yeah I 
would say that there is sort of a two-level identity going on. 
Finnish Female (2): I consider myself to be from Helsinki. But then 
I’m Finnish, like, that is my nationality and that’s where I’ve always 
pretty much lived. But there is also this bigger [and] wider concept 
of being part of the EU and being a part of Europe. And I do 
understand that identity as well…  
German Male: But, I think, … for us it becomes clearer because we 
don’t live where we … [are] originally from. Or, let’s say, were 
raised or lived for the most period of our lives. So it becomes 
clearer the further you move away [from] those different levels. … 
                                            
83 EU mobiles’ observation of EU identity was usually portrayed with some references to how, 
in general, EU identity and EU citizenship are likely to reinforce national identities too. 
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French-British Female: I really think European identity can coexist 
or is already coexisting with other forms of identity. And after many 
adolescence identity crises [All laugh.] because of the fact that you 
can have all sorts of different identities depending on the context in 
which you are in. Sometimes, you’re European. Sometimes, you’re 
something else. 
 
On the other hand, some participants – as in the group above – were very 
perceptive in their recognition that some stayers may also have a strong 
sense of belonging to the EU. “[I]f you are perfectly happy with staying in your 
small town, more power to you! And you feel European, that’s great!” (Finnish 
Female (2), EU Group 2, UK). In considering these two, rather optimistic 
examples, the members of this group collectively raised an important question 
– whether it is appropriate to distinguish between different categories of EU 
citizens according to their mobility status. Similar debates took place in the 
other EU groups as well. Overall, these exchanges indicate the likely variety in 
in the effects EU mobility can have on citizens’ sense of identity.  
 
For some EU mobility EU mobility was also observed to be fruitful for 
accentuating their sense of belonging to their ethnic group (Rother and Nebe, 
2009). This was the case especially across the EU groups in the UK. Due to 
the UK’s multicultural character, participants observed an emphasis on 
peoples’ ethnic background rather than their nationality or legal status. This 
emphasis was observed to create a peculiar context in the UK, the result of 
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which was that, none of the EU mobiles developed a sense of belonging to 
the UK. 
Austrian Female, EU Group 4, UK: [I]t’s never been as important 
before to... associate yourself to where you come from. Because, 
ever since I’ve come here, the first question is always, “Oh, where 
are you from?”... Austria, which is my nationality, which is where 
my culture, my home, everything is based. But, especially in Britain, 
I find because they have such a diverse background… they don’t 
have this shared sense of citizenship. I don’t think it exists in 
England. Everyone is very-very, yeah, very close still to where they 
come from, if they’ve immigrated. 
Naturally, the majority of EU mobiles also observed the Swedish context as 
peculiar and so they too failed to develop a genuine sense of belonging to 
their host country.  
 
EU mobiles also underscored, more specifically, that context was an important 
factor in how their (EU) identity emerged. Their approaches to this issue were 
often contradictory however, illustrating ‘kaleidoscopic’ identities (Ross, 2014). 
For example, they underlined that certain member states tend to be “more 
European” than others. These were then observed as ideal contexts for 
underlining the significance of the EU for citizens’ lives and were subsequently 
observed as enhancing citizens’ disposition to “feeling more European”. 
Interestingly though, the “less European” (i.e. relatively Eurosceptic) 
atmosphere of Sweden and the UK seemed to have also been quite effective 
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in enhancing EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU. To elucidate this 
trend, EU mobiles compared the geographical proximity, cultural peculiarities 
and national identity of these countries to the rest of Europe. Geographically, 
Sweden was perceived as “not too far away” and the UK as “far away” from 
the core of the EU. Hence, in the UK, EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the 
EU was often associated with continental Europe.  
Dutch Male, EU Group 1, UK: I even feel that [European identity] 
here in the UK. And that’s not so much European, but more 
“continental-European”. Well, the difference is mostly made by the 
British themselves. [All laugh.] So, if they ask me about, like, “How 
do they do this or that in Europe?” I thought we were already in 
Europe! So I started out from seeing all of Europe and now I do see 
a distinction. And that makes me more kind of conscious about the 
fact that I relate more to, say, the French and the Germans than I 
do to the English, perhaps.  
 
Similarly, in terms of their cultural background and national identities, both 
Sweden and the UK were perceived as exclusivist by EU mobiles.  
German Female, EU Group 1, Sweden: Actually, most of my 
Swedish friends that I have, and there is a quite a couple of them, I 
do speak English with [them]. I don't speak Swedish with them. I 
think, the language is not a barrier at all. I think, it's more that 
cultural thing that you just explained. [Portuguese male nods in 
agreement.] Everything that comes from the outside is viewed as 
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quite sceptical, first of all. So they keep their distance. And I mean, 
different studies [have] shown like, for example, studies with 
diplomats that if they come from Scandinavian or Nordic countries 
they always … keep on moving backwards. Because they keep 
th[eir] distance. They are friendly. But, they don't get so attached in 
the first place. And they're not, like, really open. 
Even EU mobiles acknowledged that the ‘exclusivist’ character in the cultures 
of these two countries were particularly effective in promoting their sense of 
belonging to the EU. 
French Female (2), EU Group 4, UK: I think, I felt that I am more 
European since I’m in England, because I feel like English people 
feel that they are not European. And I’ve heard quite a lot of [the] 
time people [are] saying, “Oh you’re European!”, as if they were 
not! [Some sarcastic smiles from the others in the group.] And I 
think that I felt pretty European since this moment.  
 
Therefore, EU mobility was likely to promote EU mobiles’ sense of belonging 
to the EU simultaneously with their sense of belonging to their country of 
origin (Favell, 2008; Rother and Nebe, 2009). Even if the cultural aspect of 
their sense of belonging seemed limited compared to that of their national 
sense of belonging (similarly to the findings underscored by previous 
qualitative research Bruter, 2005; Ross, 2014), it was considerably stronger 
than the attachment EU mobiles had for their country of residence (Favell, 
2008). The evidence also indicates that context was particularly important for 
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participants’ sense of belonging to the EU and that mobility ‘reconfigured’ their 
already multilayered and kaleidoscopic identities (Ross, 2014). Against this 
backdrop, both “more European” and “more Eurosceptic” member states 
seemed to serve as ideal contexts for developing EU mobiles’ sense of 
belonging to the EU. It is hence possible that member states with a more 
neutral approach may be less useful for developing EU mobiles’ sense of 
belonging to the EU – exactly because the EU would not score highly on the 
every day political and social agenda. However, this proposition needs further 
empirical investigation. 
 
By contrast, stayers did not really perceive EU mobility as effective in 
enhancing their sense of belonging to the EU. Swedish stayers said they felt 
“dull” when they were mobile in the EU because their nationality was not as 
interesting as other EU nationalities. They believed that due to a lack of 
Swedish national identity and culture, Swedes “don’t really feel that … 
Swedish”, which is likely to make them “almost feel more European than 
Swedish”. They observed Sweden as a peculiar country in the EU, different 
from other states where national identity had a pivotal role, such as France 
and Italy. They then portrayed a post-national Swedish community (similarly to 
that of the literature on Swedish citizenship, for example Roth, 2006), where 
shared values, including “equality” and “justice” promoted a sense of 
belonging to Sweden. Similarly, their sense of belonging to the EU was 
(supposedly) enhanced through specific values, including “peace” and 
“democracy”. However, Swedish stayers also believed that for other EU 
citizens (that is, non-Swedes) a common national history was an important 
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aspect of their identity. These EU citizens were then projected to have a 
stronger sense of belonging to their (nation) state than the EU.  
Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden: I'm also wondering, 
as you were talking a bit about if Swedes are not that promoting of 
their national identity like other nationalities maybe are. So, I'm 
thinking, if I were living in France, for example, or in another 
country with a strong sense of national identity, maybe my national 
identity would grow stronger in comparison with the European 
notion. Maybe Swedes don't treasure their national identity [as] 
much and …[their] European feeling [is] maybe stronger. 
In comparison, EU identity was seen  “as part of Swedish identity”, because 
the EU “takes a big part of Swedish politics”. Hence, Swedish stayers 
suggested that a sense of belonging to the EU might be more pronounced in 
Sweden than in other parts of the EU. However, their exchanges ultimately 
underlined the (presumed) importance of (national) contexts (Ross, 2014).  
 
Nonetheless, a few Swedish stayers also acknowledged that the idea of EU 
citizenship was new to them, questioning the extent to which their approaches 
to developing a sense of belonging to the EU can be generalised to other 
Swedish citizens.  
Swedish Female (1), Stayer Group, Sweden: I always think about 
this European notion that prior to the political science [course] for 
me ‘European’ was a name only heard in American movies... I 
never felt like a European myself. And I'm not ignorant either! But 
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I've never come across that people talked that we were Europeans 
instead of Swedish. So, I thought, it was very peculiar … It's 
something for us in political science. We are, how to say? [We are] 
aware of it in another way than the usual Swedes. 
Moreover, as the discussion progressed, Swedish stayers became more and 
more agitated about what the EU signifies (this issue was already discussed 
in detail Chapter 4). For instance, they expected citizens’ sense of belonging 
to the EU to be “contradictory” because of the ‘unity in diversity’ approach of 
the Commission (see also Chapter 4). Their sentiments thus underline the 
kaleidoscopic (Ross, 2014) and exclusivist character of citizens’ EU identity.  
 
Compared to Swedish stayers, UK stayers were more likely to consider some 
aspects of EU mobility constructive towards their sense of belonging to the 
EU. They suggested living in the territory of another EU member state, 
interacting with other EU citizens, being part of the Schengen area or the 
Eurozone could “make [citizens] slightly more European”. While almost half of 
UK stayers claimed to have had a sense of EU identity, they were also aware 
of a distinction that exists between UK and other ‘European’ citizens. 
Interestingly however, this distinction was anticipated to be a result of how 
British politicians and the media portrayed the relationship between the EU, its 
member states and the UK.  
UK Male (5), UK Stayer group: [T]he conceptions of Europe that we 
have is always to refer to something other than ourselves. 
Whenever you hear it mentioned in the news or you have a kind of 
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substantial discussion about European citizenship, the European 
Union or aspects of the European identity, you often hear with 
reference to decisions the Europeans made. Being referred to as 
“Europe said this”. And European [Union is] being presented as 
something “otherly”. And there is Europe and there is Britain that’s 
somehow sucked into this, but doesn’t really belong.  
UK Male (1): [Smiles] That’s true, actually. It doesn’t really come 
across as we are a part of it. 
UK Female (6): The media puts it across as them and us… It’s not 
always together, is it?... It’s never “We decided this”. 
 
Whilst these stayers appeared to be in agreement about the role media and 
political actors might play in challenging the prospects of developing UK 
citizens’ sense of EU identity, others relied on post-imperialist and, quite often, 
a populist logic (similarly to what Skey, (2012a) expects to see). Hence, due 
to its geographical proximity, including the role of the British “moat” that 
surrounds “our little island” some participants felt “far away… from Europe.”84 
These examples suggest that territorial identities (Bruter, 2004a) and 
‘geographical imaginaries’ (Abell, Condor and Stevenson, 2006) were 
important for some stayers’ approaches to their sense of belonging to the UK 
(and the EU). Even those UK stayers who were originally more enthusiastic 
about discussing the EU and expressed a sense of belonging to the EU, later 
acknowledged the negative impact the UK’s geographical position can have 
                                            
84 The same notion was expressed by participants in EU Group 4, UK. 
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on citizens’ perceptions of the EU’s political system.85 Since both Swedish 
and British stayers were able to probe and even alter each other’s 
perceptions’ of their sense of belonging to the EU, most stayers’ original 
perceptions were probably instinctive (rather than reasoned) and certainly 
very shallow. 
 
5.1.2. External migration and EU symbols as an alternative for 
developing a sense of belonging to the EU 
The evidence presented in the previous section suggests mobility can be 
constructive towards EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU, but 
substantial differences are then likely to emerge between the identity of EU 
mobiles and stayers. In fact, quite a few EU mobiles seemed to agree with 
stayers about the limitation EU mobility can have when attempting to enhance 
a sense of belonging to the EU more broadly. Most importantly, they all spoke 
about the exclusive character EU mobility has, referring to the type of EU 
citizens, who can use this right compared to those who cannot be anything 
other than stayers. Subsequently, participants identified external migration 
and certain EU symbols as having a more positive effect on developing 
citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU.86  
 
Firstly, participants perceived EU mobility as a “privilege” because “a big issue 
is money… for a lot of people”. They also believed that time spent in the 
                                            
85 This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
86 Participants’ focus on different forms of movement could be the result of research bias – 
since, from the outset, the focus group discussions revolved around some form of movement 
and citizenship. 
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country of residence, citizens’ educational background and knowledge of 
foreign languages, mainly their proficiency in English, might also impact their 
EU identity. Subsequently, participants identified the well-off, educated and 
(longer-term) EU mobiles as the category of EU citizens who has the 
opportunity to develop a sense of belonging to the EU.  
Polish Female (1) EU Group 4, Sweden: If we don’t travel and we 
stay in our own country, then probably we feel our national identity. 
… [I]if somebody stays in one village for his/her whole life, then it's 
very possible that this person would have, like, local identity instead 
of [a] national identity. And, I think, it's the same with the national 
and European identity. … [I]f you don't travel then you have to be 
extremely ambitious and motivated to follow what's happening 
around Europe and read a lot and learn languages and follow all 
the news. But it's much easier if you just travel and talk to people, 
go to the museums, [and] learn some culture. And that's what we 
do! [Others nod in agreement.] 
Italian Male (1): Yeah, I think, it's not only a thing of travelling, 
because it depends also on our level of education. Because we 
know English, and that's why we can develop this sense of 
“Europeanness” … So, if we would be only tourists… and if we 
come here without knowing English …  we wouldn't develop this 
kind of ‘sense of membership to Europe’. I think that's a matter of 
travelling, but also a matter of being educated [and] knowing 
foreign languages. 
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Similarly to what is apparent from the latter half of the above exchange, a 
number of EU mobiles (and Swedish stayers) linked the ability to develop a 
sense of belonging to the EU with a ‘necessary’ educational level and English 
language proficiency. Moreover, a clear differentiation was made by the 
majority of EU mobiles between different categories of EU citizens, depending 
on the reason for citizens’ movement in the first place. Long-term stayers’ EU 
mobility (in fact any type of movement) was often depicted as the portrait of 
the EU’s very own “parochial tourist” (Thompson and Tambyah, 1999: 216). 
These citizens were expected to go abroad for holiday purposes and stay in a 
hotel without actually engaging with members of the host community. Their 
subsequent cosmopolitan outlook could then be nothing but momentary at 
best (Skey, 2013). 
German Female, EU Group 2, Sweden: When I look at my friends 
that never have left Germany. They don't feel European. They 
really don't. I mean, it's nice for them to go [outside of Germany] 
once in a while for a summer holiday, all inclusive, staying at the 
hotel, doing a bus-trip and going to the beach... [T]hey go outside 
of Germany to go on holidays, but not to feel part of [the host] 
community.  
 
Despite the critical tone apparent in the last two exchanges between EU 
mobiles, every group, including stayers suggested external migration – 
outside the EU – as predominantly constructive towards developing citizens’ 
sense of belonging to the EU. This was mainly because external migration 
(allegedly) made being “European” more pronounced than any other 
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reference point. In comparison, EU mobility was alleged to bring national 
citizenships into clearer focus. “I think I would feel more European if I was 
outside of Europe but within Europe I think my Swedish background would 
prevail [over] other feelings” (Swedish Female, Stayer Group, Sweden). 
German Female, EU Group 1, Sweden: I think it's an interesting 
fact what I realise when I see other Europeans. Once you are 
within this kind of area where you're considered a citizen you 
always, like, more specifically refer to your country. So within 
Europe I am from Germany, I am from Sweden, bla-bla-bla. But 
once you leave Europe, it becomes more evident that you are 
European. So that's a really funny way. Like, from the EU, from the 
inside, we always look differently than when you leave it. Then it's 
like “Okay, now I'm a European”. What I gain from my own 
experience, leaving Europe is more dominant. I am from Europe. 
 
Actually, the only time a British stayer said he could imagine introducing 
himself as a European was during his stay “far away” from the EU.87 His 
sentiments were, of course, in sharp contrast to the general tone of the 
discussion in the UK stayer group and led to quizzical looks, a couple of 
follow-up questions and laughs. Interestingly, the collective reaction of the 
group and the negative approach of British Female (1), who exhibited stronger 
Eurosceptic sentiments than the others, initiated a slight shift in the approach 
of British Male (2). Initially, he was surprised by the optimistic approach of 
                                            
87 Some Swedish stayers also expected external migration to be effective in promoting their 
national identity because “when you are outside of Europe it's very obvious that you're 
Swedish”. 
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British Male (3). Later however, he considered the claims put forward by 
British Female (1) as slightly exaggerated. The constantly changing attitudes 
of UK stayers and the dynamics within the group – the outspoken approach of 
some members and the openness with which others reacted to what has been 
said – is particularly well illustrated in the following exchange. 
British Male (3), Stayer Group, UK: I think for me, personally, 
citizenship in the EU is something unrealised, something they are 
trying to foster. They want us to be members of a European 
community, uh, when you go abroad you call yourself European, 
not British. We are states of a federal Europe, if you like... When 
I’m outside the EU. And I felt, and the law and order was not quite 
what it would be. So … there is a slight [sense of] belonging to a 
secure world maybe as well.  
British Male (2): But would you ever introduce yourself to someone 
by default as the European? 
British Male (3): That depends on where I was. If I was really far 
away, maybe! 
[All laugh.] 
British Female (1): I don’t think I ever referred to myself or will ever 
refer to myself as being a European citizen. Like, … we are so far 
away it feels from Europe. 
British Male (3): We are not that far away! What is it like…? 
[Laughs.] 
British Female (1): I can’t walk there though… 
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British Male (3): You could swim there if you want[ed]! 
British Male (2): It’s not quite far away as the Atlantic is…  
British Female (1): It’s not like we’re bordering them. It’s like… 
 
Furthermore, quite a few participants anticipated that, from a legal perspective 
as well, the international outlook of EU citizenship (status) was more positive 
than any national citizenship could be. Indeed, most participants considered 
their EU status and passport to have a similar value to that of an American 
passport. Hence not only internal mobility, but also external migration 
underlined the significance of EU legal status. It, once again, appeared to 
underline participants’ sense of civic belonging to the EU (Bruter, 2005).  
German Female, EU Group 3, UK: As EU citizens, you’re hailed to 
a higher account than [non-EU citizens.] You’re on the same level 
as an American citizen, I think, internationally as least. You can go 
wherever you want and you’ll never struggle to get a visa. 
Italian Male, EU Group 1, Sweden: It's much more convenient to be 
a European citizen just because [the] passport of the European 
Union is possibly so much better when you travel. If you have [a] 
passport from Columbia, you might be hindered [from] travelling to 
some states into obtain[ing] residence and so on. So to be a 
European citizen for me it also means huge incalculable advantage 
over other citizens. 
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These examples suggest that external migration could be used to enhance 
citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
participants comprehended EU mobility and external migration quite 
differently. While they were sceptical about the costs and prerequisites of EU 
mobility (illustrated in the first half of this section), only one group evaluated 
the economic and social prerequisites of external migration. Actually, quite a 
few groups agreed that they preferred to continue their studies within the EU 
because it was easier or cheaper to do so. They spoke of the decreasing 
costs of travelling within the EU due to the recent boost in budget airlines 
(especially the low prices of Ryanair flights) and the accessibility of EU rail 
services (especially the Eurostar). Yet, there were little or no considerations 
about the costs external migration carried – the latter is, of course, likely to be 
substantially greater than that of EU mobility.  
 
In addition to the focus of the discussions on movement, there were some 
references made to the role EU symbols have in promoting EU identity. These 
references indicate that EU symbols had a variable effect on participants’ 
sense of belonging to the EU. From the different EU symbols available to 
them, most groups, including the control groups, mentioned the European 
Health Insurance Card (EHIC) as particularly effective in symbolising the EU’s 
“commonalities” – an EU symbol that is directly related to EU mobility.88 Since 
the EHIC can turn EU citizens’ (supposed) equal rights in to reality, it was 
projected to have significant impact on citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU. 
                                            
88 Also discussed in Chapter 6.1. in relation to participants’ awareness of their EU rights and 
entitlements. 
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In fact, the EU was expected to be the most visible to its citizens through “little 
things like that”.  
British Male (2), Stayer Group, UK: In some specific ways I always 
feel, like, when I travel inside the EU and have my EU [EHIC] card 
with me, it’s like my mind is calm. It’s little things like that. And 
thank goodness I never actually had to use it for anything! Touch 
wood! But I… actual feel that by having it on me, just this tiny piece 
of purple, laminated plastic … there is a kind of symbolic aspect to 
it. 
Swedish Female (6), Stayer Group, Sweden: I think also when I 
received my European Health Insurance Card and that was some 
kind of symbol [Others nod in agreement] … I haven't used it. But I 
kind of knew I think that we have a common health insurance 
system. Those kinds of benefits or entitlements are… strengthening 
the [EU] feeling. 
 
In addition to EHIC, Swedish stayers referred (albeit with some cynicism) to 
the role of the Euro and the Eurozone in supporting citizens’ emerging sense 
of belonging to the EU. Accordingly, they felt that the current economic crisis 
underlined the legacy of the EEC market and emphasised the contradictory 
character of the concept of EU identity. By using the Euro crisis example, 
Swedish stayers revised their previous definition of national identity, which 
was now presented as a form of identity that “should be stronger than borders 
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and passport, it should be [culturally] linked to this country, for [realising] this 
loyalty”. 
Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden: [Y]ou just adjust to 
what's happening right now, and when it's not going very well for a 
certain state, it's very easy to just kind of, well, you know, “Are we 
really gaining anything from this? Is this working out for us and for 
our country?” It's about your country at the end of the day anyway. 
Similarly, UK stayers were critical about the market legacy of the EU, but also 
believed that in the Eurozone and Schengen areas citizens were more likely 
to develop a sense of belonging to the EU than those in the UK. This relates 
back to the earlier point made in this section about how some member states 
were presumed to be “more European” than others. Hence, the focus group 
evidence suggests that EU symbols which highlight the actual benefits of EU 
membership – especially the EHIC or the Euro – can be quite effective in 
making the EU more tangible for some EU citizens.  
 
Therefore, the focus group evidence suggests EU mobility was effective in 
enhancing EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU. EU mobility experiences 
(or lack of experiences in the case of stayers) appeared to have clearly 
influenced this aspect of participants’ sense of EU identity. However, the 
exclusive character of EU mobility appeared to propel participants to suggest 
alternatives to enhancing citizens’ sense of belonging – which then led them 
to debating the effects of external migration and EU symbols. While external 
migration seems to be a new proposition – with obvious limitations to the 
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extent to which it may be made relevant to ordinary citizens’ lives – the role of 
symbols has been much debated by previous empirical research. They too 
underline the discrepancy in the actual effectiveness of these symbols across 
the EU’s member states (see for example Bruter, 2005; 2009; Risse, 2010; 
TNS Opinion and Social, 2010). 
 
5.2. Shared EU identity among EU citizens 
Similarly to their sense of belonging to the EU, the focus group evidence 
indicated that EU mobility was likely to have a constructive effect on young 
and educated citizens’ sense of shared EU identity. However, their resulting 
EU identity was in fact divided between EU mobiles and stayers. EU mobiles 
often stated that they had “something in common” with each other due to their 
“similar experiences” of EU mobility, which brought a “family of Europeans” 
together in Sweden and the UK. There was thus a very explicitly articulated 
link between EU mobility and shared EU identity – a reference to the 
interlinked charter of the dimensions of EU citizenship. However, the “family of 
Europeans” did not seem to include stayers. Even more, EU mobiles’ sense of 
shared EU identity appeared to lack a cultural aspect and so differences 
between categories of stayers and EU-15 and CEE mobiles were recognised. 
Even more, in a few cases, the possibility was raised that a shared EU identity 
was not EU-specific at all but an example of broader trends – a component of 
cosmopolitan identity. In order to shed light on young and educated citizens’ 
perceptions of their shared EU identity, this section explores these three 
issues in more detail. 
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The majority of EU mobiles agreed that EU mobility is likely to serve as the 
basis for their sense of shared (civic) EU identity since it intensified cross-
border interactions with other “people from Europe” (as expected by Bruter 
2005; Risse, 2010 and Ross, 2014). “[T]he more people you come across, the 
more you realise that there is something you share on the basis of being 
European” (British-French Female, EU Group 2, UK).  
British-Hungarian Male EU Group 2, Sweden: [I]t’s like when you 
are here, when you are out with your friends and you feel like it's an 
international community of Europeans. You don’t go like, “Yeah, 
that's German people. That's French people.” We are like 
Europeans, but no one kind of says it. It's just in the air. You feel it, 
like we are from kind of the same place but different areas of it. 
 
The only EU mobile who did not seem to have a shared EU identity with his 
EU fellows was a French male participant in EU Group 2, Sweden. His 
approach maybe explained by the limited time he had spent with the 
“community of Europeans” – he only arrived a week before the focus group 
research took place. He kept quiet most of the time and when he did speak 
usually emphasised the importance of cultural aspect of his national identity.  
There is therefore a possibility that the length of time EU mobiles spent 
abroad greatly influenced their sense of shared EU identity. Nonetheless, the 
general proposition by the different groups about the requirement to be mobile 
in order to develop a sense of shared EU identity seems to support the 
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expectations of transactionalist and neofunctionalist approaches to European 
integration (Haas, 1964; Deutsch, 1968).  
 
The idea that EU mobility was a requirement for citizens to develop a sense of 
shared EU identity could be interpreted in the (proposed) framework of the 
interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship. As the previous chapter noted, 
similar expectations have been an important part of citizenship studies 
literature, though, differences are likely to emerge between models of 
citizenship (Chapter 1.2.). In the case of national citizenships for example, 
developing a sense of national identity among citizens is normally linked to 
their collective participation (see for example Brochman and Hagelund, 2012: 
26; Borevi, 2012: 70-3). In comparison, the focus group evidence suggests 
that when we consider the interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship, rather 
than EU participation, we may have to focus on the relationship between EU 
mobility and EU identity. As a result, the initial evidence on young and 
educated citizens’ sense of EU identity already hints at the relevance of 
applying the mobiles/stayers distinctions – and so active/passive EU 
citizenship – to our analysis of EU identity.  
 
Nonetheless, EU mobiles’ sense of shared EU identity was characterised by 
contrasts, some of which may explain why we have a wide-ranging diversity of 
findings about the effects of EU (learning) mobility on EU identity (compare for 
example King and Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Fligstein, 2008; Wilson, 2010; Sigalas, 
2011; Kuhn, 2012a; Mitchell, 2012; Van Mol, 2013). Along with their sense of 
belonging to the EU, EU mobility often appeared to enhance EU mobiles’ 
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shared national and EU identities. Even more, whilst the majority of EU 
mobiles agreed that EU mobility made them feel they “have something to 
share” with other EU citizens, it did not always translate into a common sense 
of being “Europeans”. This issue was usually linked to the absence of a 
cultural aspect that could support EU mobiles’ emerging EU identity. In 
comparison, their national identity was assumed to be more stable due to its 
strong cultural aspect. 
Italian Female, EU Group 4, UK: [W]hen I relate to, like, other 
European people, well European people who come from the 
European Union, I just feel that we have something to share. But 
that doesn’t make me feel European at all. Like, I feel Italian. Like, 
I’m never gonna say, “I come from the European Union”. I’m just 
Italian. But there’s something shared there, between, like, maybe 
the way we behave or because we’re just people who came here. 
So we’re, like, we did this effort. So maybe, we… sort of bond 
better. I don’t know if it makes sense? 
 
Hence EU mobiles appeared to have become more disposed to “stick 
together” with their fellow mobiles than to socialise with stayers. Some even 
assumed that European integration provided an excellent context for EU 
mobiles to meet, but not to bring EU mobiles and stayers together. The EU 
was then identified as “a place to meet with fellow visiting students, but not so 
much a place where British [residents] and foreigners encounter” (German 
Male, EU Group 1, UK). The (supposed) antagonistic contexts of Sweden and 
the UK were once again deemed as helpful in building a “family of Europeans” 
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– as long as this family did not include Swedish or UK stayers. In EU Group 1 
UK for example, it provided an ideal backdrop for bringing together EU 
mobiles, including both EU-15 and CEE mobiles. So by observing English 
stayers as particularly different from them, EU mobiles could refer to a sense 
of “mutual understanding” among them. 
Moderator, EU Group 1, UK: Who do you socialise with, could you 
please also mention that? [In response to claims from group 
members that much personal exchange in the UK “remains on the 
surface”]. 
Romanian Female: I think, not English. I think, with an English 
person you’d have a beer and a talk about football. But you meet 
an Italian or German person the next week for a coffee rather than 
you’d meet an English person. … 
German Female: I live with only British people and I have, like, only 
European friends. … I really feel like the Europeans stick 
together… 
German-Swiss Female: I have much more European friends than I 
have English friends, actually. I don’t know why that is. Might just 
be because we have, at least in our course, at least half of the 
people are European or [are] from [Europe]… 
Italian Female: Yeah, there is a kind of mutual understanding. 
German-Swiss Female: Yeah! 
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In the broader context of EU mobility however, these two groups of EU 
mobiles had been observed as quite distinctive – making this a particularly 
dominant theme in the focus group.89 
 
Similarly, stayer groups recognised that EU mobiles were more likely to “stick 
together” than to interact with stayers. They even supposed that some EU 
mobiles, from France, Germany or Italy were disposed to exercise their EU 
mobility rights more so than Swedes or the British citizens, due to their 
language skills and cultural similarities. Subsequently, stayers believed that 
EU mobiles from the aforementioned member states were particularly well 
placed to develop a sense of shared EU identity.  
British Female (6), Stayer Group, UK: I think, if you lived in another 
country and spoke another European language. I think, language is 
a big part of it. I mean, being in Spain and being in the Erasmus 
programme, … I was meeting people that were German but then 
spoke six other European languages. And, I think, they would 
associate more with being European citizens because they spend 
so much time in other European countries and can speak to so 
many other European people. But for me, it was just English and 
Spanish. So, I think, living [abroad] and speaking other European 
languages makes you more of a part of that community. 
It is interesting that British stayers’ perceptions about proficiency in English 
was observed as an insufficient basis for developing a sense of EU identity 
                                            
89 This divergence and the resulting dynamics between the CEE and EU-15 members of EU 
group 1, UK is illustrated in detail in Chapter 6.3.2., which considers the impact of national 
stereotypes on young citizens’ perceptions of their EU citizenship. 
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with other EU citizens. English is, after all, often recognised as the 
international language by the academic literature (King, 2003; Alaminos and 
Santacreu, 2009; Igarashi and Saito, 2014) and it was also perceived as a 
requirement for developing a sense of shared EU identity by the other EU and 
stayer groups. The difference between British stayers’ perceptions about 
‘European’ language requirement is then likely to be the result of particularly 
strong Eurosceptic sentiments, which have been visible in the UK during the 
crisis (Geddes, 2014), rather than logical considerations – just like their earlier 
proposition about and the so-called “peculiarities of the Anglo sphere” coupled 
with the assumption that the very idea of EU citizenship signals the peculiar 
place of the UK in the EU (both cited earlier). 
 
As the discussion progressed both EU mobiles and stayers became agitated 
by the requirement to move within the EU in order to belong to the ‘community 
of Europeans’. Hence the idea that EU mobility led to a genuine, unifying 
force, was questioned by the finding that it also served as the basis of 
separation between EU mobiles and stayers. “[S]ince we can move it starts to 
be relevant to be European but that's the problem I think, not for us but for 
people that don't move. Why should they feel European?” (French Male, EU 
Group 1, Sweden). Stayers were then referred to as “they” in the EU groups 
and were categorised as some form of an ‘internal EU other’, while the 
community of EU mobiles was expected to be the “minority” and the “elite”.  
French Male (1), EU Group 4, Sweden: [W]e are kind of [a] 
minority. We are the elite. We are students and of course we have 
this Erasmus exchange. And it gives us opportunity to go abroad. 
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But it's also based on your social class, I would say, and your 
education level. …So, I think, this is more a student elitist 
community than European community and this is a minority. I think 
of course we are very different from people who don't move from 
their place.  
 
British and Swedish stayers also predicted that a shared EU identity required 
EU mobility (and knowledge of European languages). They then criticised the 
(current) elitist quality of shared EU identity and were clearly worried about the 
extent to which it could (ever) be realised among all EU citizens. 
Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden: [I]n the lower classes 
maybe the national identity is very strong, because they have not 
been abroad. They haven't travelled to all these European 
countries and they are not citizens of the world in the same extent 
as middle class people [are]. So, maybe, we are evolving into 
something [like a] middle class European citizenship. 
These examples correspond with the expectation that EU (learning) mobility 
leads to novel processes of differentiation between EU mobiles and stayers 
(as illustrated in Table 3.4.). Participants underlined that EU mobiles 
interacted or at least had the opportunity to interact with the non-national 
“other” during their EU mobility and so developed a sense of (civic) EU 
identity. However, (some) stayers – from lower classes and without the 
necessary language skills – could not participate in these processes. As a 
result, these stayers were not expected to develop a sense of EU identity that 
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is comparable to that of EU mobiles’ identity. Actually, their national (cultural) 
identity was projected to remain “very strong”.  
 
Since similar discussions did not emerge about categories of EU citizens on 
the basis of their EU participation, the evidence supports the proposition made 
in the theoretical chapter of this thesis: we should reconsider the dichotomy of 
active/passive EU citizens along the mobiles/stayers distinctions. As a result, 
we may also have to reconsider how we assess the depth of citizens’ sense of 
EU identity. The traditional approach considers the weakest level of citizens’ 
sense of EU identity to be positioned at the cognitive level (awareness of EU 
citizenship), followed by affective (evaluation and sense of EU citizenship) 
and, the deepest, at the behavioural level (EU participation) (Abdelal et al., 
2009: 27-31). Based on the evidence presented in this section (and 
considering the oft-cited low level of EU participation in the context of 
declining citizen participation – also discussed in Chapter 7) the last of these 
three levels does not seem to be applicable to the case of the EU. Instead, 
the evidence suggests that if we accept the role of EU mobility in activating 
EU citizenship – which is what a growing number of studies appear to do so 
(most notably Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008; 2010; Recchi and Favell, 2009; 
Recchi et al., 2012; Ross, 2014; Siklodi, 2014) – we should begin to really 
assess which groups of EU citizens use their EU mobility rights and how this 
effects their (emerging) sense of EU identity. 
 
Existing research has already demonstrated that EU citizens (including 
students) who have a greater disposition towards developing a sense of EU 
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identity are more likely to use their EU mobility rights (see for example 
Fligstein, 2008; Rother and Nebe, 2009; Khun, 2012a). These findings then 
point to the possibility of distinguishing between further categories of stayers. 
The young and educated stayers who participated in the focus groups raised 
similar ideas, for example, when they spoke of an emerging ‘middle class 
European citizenship’. However, almost every stayer (admittedly) belonged to 
the segment of stayers that is better positioned on the socio-economic ladder 
and can, as a result, exercise their EU mobility rights at some point. These 
stayers then spoke of the “lower class” stayers as ‘they’ – the member state-
oriented citizens as an ‘internal EU/national other’, who cannot use EU 
mobility rights to the same extent.90 As the discussions progressed, it became 
apparent that from all the stayers, only one counted herself in the category 
that was unlikely to exercise EU mobility rights in the future (British Female 
(1)). Nonetheless, her perception of EU citizenship did not appear to be 
distinctively more negative than the other stayers’ in the UK group. This 
example might be another illustration of the importance (country) contexts 
have for how stayers’ sense of (EU) identity is configured (an oft-cited 
character of EU identity, see for example Duchesne and Frognier, 2007; 
Duchesne et al., 2013). 
 
Even if the focus groups seem somewhat inconclusive about what the ‘internal 
EU/national other’ might look like, it strongly suggests that we could and 
should begin to explore which community EU mobiles engage with whilst 
                                            
90 Recent qualitative studies have already begun to ‘unpack’ the likely distinctions between 
groups of stayers’ as ‘internal national/EU others’. Duchesne (et al., 2013) and Van Ingelgom 
(2014) suggest that socio-economic factors, especially type of employment and country 
context is likely to be important for how stayers approach European integration. A recent 
qualitative study by Ross (2014: 90) also adds age as an important factor. 
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residing abroad. Do they close up between themselves and only socialise with 
their fellow national citizens? Do they start to realise a community of (mobile) 
Europeans (and so replicate the Commission’s expectations)? Or, possibly, 
do they integrate into the host society? Since welcoming and pro-EU country 
contexts might lead to integration into the host society at the cost of an 
emerging sense of EU identity (as it has been shown by Rother and Nebe, 
2009), there is a strong indication that antagonistic member state contexts 
towards the EU might be the most effective in enhancing EU mobiles’ sense 
of shared EU identity.    
 
Nonetheless, the focus group evidence also suggests that EU mobility led to 
further processes of differentiation between EU mobiles and so further 
categories of ‘internal EU others’. Once EU mobiles admitted that they often 
socialised along the mobiles/stayers distinctions, in so doing, they also 
admitted that they hardly socialised with just any EU or European citizens. As 
a result, the opportunity for more intense cross-border ‘transactions’ between 
different groups of young and educated EU citizens (Council of Ministers, 
1984) did not seem to translate into a single ‘community of mobile 
Europeans’. Instead, these EU mobiles appeared to realise a community of 
EU-15 mobiles and another community of CEE mobiles. As a result, their 
emerging shared EU identity had a contradictory and exclusive quality – it 
included some EU mobiles while excluding others.  
 
Even though EU Group 4 UK did not include any CEE mobiles, the Austrian 
participant seemed puzzled by her fellows’ tendency to speak about EU-15 
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mobiles as “the Europeans”, leaving out those citizens, who originally came 
from CEE member states. Consequently, she tested the actual cosmopolitan 
outlook of her fellows. The others in the group acknowledged the validity of 
her point but continued to support their original point – it was easier for them 
to socialise with EU-15 than CEE mobiles. This example suggests that the 
desirability of presenting oneself with a cosmopolitan outlook (and so with a 
strong sense of EU identity may be defeated by national, regional and cultural 
stereotypes (Skey, 2013). 
Austrian Female, EU Group 4, UK: [T]hat’s one of the points I 
wanted to make earlier. Because we keep speaking of the Italians 
and French and Germans and maybe Spanish, but we’ve left out all 
the other Europeans or European Union members that there are… 
And I have lots of friends who are from Bulgaria, for example, 
which are European Union members but they are not necessarily 
as often referred to as being European. But they’re just as well my 
friends as others, as the French are, or the Italians, Spanish or 
wherever they may be from. … but then there are distinct cultural 
differences. There is still this common denominator that they all 
make the effort to come here [smilingly]... this long way from home 
and I think, wherever they may be from, I just doubt that their 
similarities count rather than their differences. I think that’s the 
important part. … Because if you just keep focusing on all the 
differences that there are, you just make your life that much more 
difficult. 
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German Female (2): I agree … we have to embrace everyone 
around us and with all the differences and all the things we share. 
Because it’s not about where a person is from, it’s how much we 
have in common… But I believe that like the average person from 
the Eastern European country … is different than the average 
person from the middle European county.… [T]hey don’t share the 
same history, they don’t believe in the same things, they have other 
cultural values. ... Like, obviously I can bond with anyone that I feel 
that there is a connection. But I think that just when you think about 
the average person there and the average person in Western 
Europe, … there [are] differences.  
 
It is interesting to note that the underlying rationale for separating EU-15 and 
CEE mobiles appeared to be on the basis of cultural differences based on a 
historical divide between Western and Eastern Europe – a divide these young 
and educated citizens did not actually get a chance to experience at first 
hand. Yet, even CEE mobiles felt that these cultural differences – often 
referred to as national stereotypes, though they were usually made along 
regional divides – were important and so impacted their experiences of EU 
mobility to a considerable extent. 
Bulgarian Female (1), EU Group 4, Sweden: To some extent I feel 
that I am discriminated even if I go as a European citizen... 
because, [coming from] the new EU countries, people all expect 
that we are beggars and everything bad and negative… [W]e are 
not even given the chance to show who we are!... 
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Romanian Female (1): I come from Romania. I experienced this 
transition form when we entered the European Union… It's true that 
by presenting our nationality, people already get a picture … 
according to the stereotypes or the image the country has in 
Europe.  
 
These examples illustrate that the way in which EU mobiles approached their 
separate ‘community of mobile Europeans’ introduced further processes of 
differentiation in the EU context – and so led to further categories of ‘internal 
EU others’. Accordingly, EU-15 mobiles, may signal that they are distinctive 
from their non-privileged fellows, in this case CEE mobiles. Moreover, as the 
above exchange suggests, rather than making an attempt to challenge these 
distinctions, CEE mobiles also appeared to re-establish the ‘distinctive’ 
position of EU-15 mobiles. Their mutual acknowledgement of these 
distinctions might suggest that certain regional divisions between EU citizens 
are too deep-rooted for intensified flows of EU mobility to rectify – despite 
what transactionalist approaches to European integration would expect to see. 
Hence, in addition to the differences between EU mobiles and stayers as 
categories of EU citizens, further categories of ‘internal EU/national others’ 
were also distinguished by the focus group participants. The resulting 
distinctions of citizens are illustrated in Table 5.1. below. 
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Table 5.1. Internal EU/national others 
 
Although Table 5.1 might suggests that considerable distinctions are likely to 
emerge between EU citizens, it should be noted that there were a few 
instances where EU-15 mobiles did not consider their experiences of EU 
(learning) mobility to be exclusive to the EU context. In these instances, EU 
mobiles, mainly male participants in Sweden, referred to an “international 
experience” of (learning) mobility that is likely to be the same across different 
regions. They even suggested that their resulting shared (EU) identity was not 
European at all, but part of an emerging ‘cosmopolitan’ identity. These EU 
mobiles exhibited a strong sense of ‘cosmopolitan outlook’ (Skey, 2011a) and 
spoke of “the international community of visiting students”. There appeared to 
be a clear gender divide on this issue however.  
 
Actually, only one female participant agreed with the notion that her EU 
(learning) mobility experience was not likely to be exclusive to the EU and 
would be similar to what participants experienced when they studied in the 
USA, for example. However, she appeared to have considered the broader 
international context due to peer-pressure in her group – the male participants 
Categories of EU 
citizens
Internal EU/ 
national others
EU mobiles
EU-15 and CEE 
mobiles, and 
stayers
Stayers
EU mobiles and 
CEE mobiles
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in this group exhibited traces of a cosmopolitan outlook – rather than as a sign 
of a genuine interest in this issue. Before and after she made the comparison, 
she reverted back to a more ‘Eurosceptic’ attitude. Thus her ‘cosmopolitan 
outlook’ was rather short-lived. 
French Male, EU Group 4, Sweden: It’s not that our small Erasmus 
community is more international than globalised than European. 
Because you have the exact same thing in American universities 
with people from all over the world. And here, of course, we are 
European people. But if you go to students’ housing, you have 
people from all over the world and not only [from] Europe. These 
people are together and it's not even the European scale, but it's 
kind of international student community. Which is based on the 
common language, which is English. It's not even European 
language, because we are more talking American English. I think. 
Yes, it's Europe, because we are in Europe. But it could be the 
same … in [the] US or Australia. According to the laws, this is a 
European privilege. But according to the social reality, this is a 
more international student educated privilege. 
Polish Female (2): I think you are right.  It's more of a global 
experience. Of course, it's much harder for people from outside 
[the] European Union to study here in Sweden or in [the] European 
Union in general. But I think it's just you travel, you talk to people 
from other places, you get to know different cultures and it 
educates you in a way. And I think that's mostly it. 
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The thesis has already hinted that Polish Female (2) represented a quite 
distinct voice in EU Group 4 (Chapter 4.1.2.). For example, she often tested 
the points raised by the other participants, though she shared a similar 
personal background and experiences with them. In fact, all females in this 
group came from CEE states and had lived in a number of member states 
prior to their arrival in Sweden. There is a possibility that she was looking to ‘fit 
in’ with the male members in this group when she drew attention to the 
similarities between the experiences of student migrants more broadly. 
Nonetheless, by the end of the focus group, it was apparent that she had a 
quite different point of view compared to the rest of the group.91 
 
In the UK groups, EU mobiles and stayers, with multicultural backgrounds but 
regardless of their gender exhibited a similarly (shallow) cosmopolitan outlook 
that was “fragile” and “momentary” in character (Skey, 2013: 238-40). For 
example, despite of her original claim to having a ‘global’ identity, the identity 
of a Swedish participant did not seem to be inclusive in reality but associated 
with a “Western” community. 
Swedish Female, EU Group 3, UK: For me, … the international 
society really does not have any boundaries. For me, it is the 
feeling of, like, I can’t [describe it]… Like, if someone ask[ed] me 
where I feel most at home, I would not be able to [give an 
answer]… Because for me, there is no [such] place… I could 
                                            
91 Even if the male participants appeared more receptive towards her Eurosceptic comments, 
they too found her cynicism about the importance of citizens’ political participation slightly 
excessive. See Chapter 7.1. for an illustration of the dynamics of this group towards the end 
of the focus group. 
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probably say that it would be somewhere we call the “west.” Like, 
the US and Europe. Like, I can say that’s somewhere there. 
Apart from a stayer (British Male (1)), all participants in the UK groups who 
had a multicultural background also completed their secondary education in 
international, more specifically, in one of the European Schools.92 They then 
used their shared educational experiences to enhance the division between 
them and their EU mobile and stayer fellows (this issue is discussed in more 
length in Chapter 6.2). The differences between Swedish and the UK groups – 
in terms of gender – might then be interpreted as another indication of the 
context-specific and kaleidoscopic (Ross, 2014) identities of (young and 
educated) citizens more broadly. 
 
Hence, even when EU mobiles and stayers recognised that a specific link 
between EU mobility and shared EU identity existed, the “family of 
Europeans” did not seem to include stayers. Even more, EU mobiles’ sense of 
shared EU identity appeared to lack a cultural aspect and so differences 
between EU-15 and CEE mobiles and different categories of stayers were 
drawn upon. Even when a shared international identity was discussed – a 
supposed component of cosmopolitan identity – it was likely to be exclusive in 
character. 
 
                                            
92 The implication of their educational background for the approaches of these participants to 
their EU status is discussed in more detail in the next chapter (Chapter 6). 
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5.3. Recognising the EU’s “other” 
The previous two sections of this chapter have found some evidence to 
support the twofold approach of the Commission towards citizens’ EU mobility 
and EU identity (Chapter 2.2.1.). Perhaps the benefits of EU mobility were 
most apparent when participants made a distinction between who EU and 
non-EU citizens are. In this respect, EU mobility or, rather EU rights appeared 
to be very effective in separating EU citizens, including stayers and EU 
mobiles, from the “other”, the non-EU citizens. Against this backdrop, 
university contexts might actually prove effective in separating EU and non-
EU citizens from one another. Nonetheless, EU mobility also appeared to 
multiply the number of “others” young and educated citizens recognised. They 
actually described two types of “others”: the EU’s (external) “other” (the non-
EU citizens) and the ‘internal EU/national other’ (different categories of EU 
citizens – as illustrated in Table 5.1.). However, once participants admitted 
that EU mobility intensified processes of differentiation to the extent that it 
weakened citizens’ prospects of (ever) realising an all-encompassing EU 
community, they once again turned to external migration as more effective in 
underlining who EU and non-EU citizens are and so creating a more common 
sense of EU citizens. In order to flesh out the diversity in young and educated 
citizens’ perceptions about the EU’s “other”, the rest of this chapter considers 
the possible impacts of EU mobility and external migration. 
 
EU mobiles and stayers across the focus groups felt that citizenship and 
identity are “always very closely connected to some kind of exclusion” and 
“often or always developed in opposition to something”. Hence they proposed 
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that a clearly defined EU “other” is likely to be constructive towards their 
sense of EU citizenship and citizens’ emerging EU identity. Once participants 
had some definitions of what “European” meant for them personally, their 
debate about EU mobility seemed to have helped them to collectively observe 
who belongs to the EU’s external “other” – that is who the non-EU citizens 
are. EU groups looked to find it easy to distinguish between EU and non-EU 
citizens on the basis of their EU level rights of mobility and equality. 
Accordingly, they distinguished between EU citizens and the “other” using a 
civic component of their EU identity – linked to EU rights (Bruter, 2005). EU 
mobiles compared their “freedom” and how “easy” it was to reside, study or 
work in different EU member states to the limitations imposed on international 
migrants. The majority could see that EU citizens enjoy a “special status” in 
the EU, which is not readily available for external migrants or long-term 
residents.  
 Italian Female, EU Group 3, UK: [Y]ou do have freedom. Like, to 
choose where to study… Like, it’s pretty easy… it’s everything is 
much easier. Like, we don’t have to pay, like, extra fees like 
international students, like, we pay, like, UK students. And, I think, 
its pretty good. Like, we can literally decide! We have so many 
chances, so many opportunities! Much more than if you, like, live 
somewhere else or if you are, like, an international student.    
Subsequently, the differences between the rights of EU and non-EU citizens 
enhanced a couple of EU mobiles’ sense of EU identity.   
German Female, EU Group 1, Sweden: You always have this 
special status as an EU student, at least. …[I]n Sweden, you have 
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an extra line, which goes a lot quicker than the other applicants 
from non-EU countries. And also studying here, it's always about 
I'm member of the European Union. So I have a lot of advantages. 
So you get this feeling that you are a European citizen. And there's 
something else here, the non-European citizen, the distinction of 
others that makes you feel more European. 
 
Similarly, the majority of stayers recognised the differences between the legal 
statuses of EU and non-EU citizens in Sweden and the UK. When asked 
about whether the EU makes everyone equal, most British stayers said that 
EU and UK citizens were equal because if EU citizens “come over, they will 
have the same rights as UK citizens, more or less”. But they also 
acknowledged that there were some important differences between the rights 
of EU citizens and international “refugees and migrants”. 
British Female (6), Stayer Group, UK: Well in terms of refugees, we 
learnt just few weeks ago that they have a certain amount of 
months to find work and if they don’t they are either deported or get 
food stamps. And the conditions are so bad that, to the point where 
it’s easier for them to go back than stay here! And…  it’s done on 
purpose. … So in that sense they are not treated equally! Whereas 
for us, we’d be given time to find, we don’t have six months time 
limit to find work or anything like that.93 
 
                                            
93 This was not true at the time for Romanian and Bulgarian nationals. 
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The Swedish stayer group discussed the difficulty international migrants faced 
when seeking to study and travel within the EU or participate in politics. 
Interestingly, nearly all Swedish stayers were rather surprised about the gap 
between the entitlements of Swedish, EU mobiles and international students. 
The disparities between the statuses of these groups were evident for them 
mainly because Swedish universities had recently introduced “pretty high” 
tuition fees for international students but Swedish and EU citizens could 
continue studying for free. In terms of identity, Swedish stayers considered the 
shared values of EU citizens as distinct from the values of non-EU citizens. 
For them, the EU’s external “other” was clearly linked to the Eastern regions 
of the world and an “Eastern apprehension”. Their debate suggests that the 
“apprehension” of non-EU citizens from the western parts of the world, like 
Americans or Canadians, was not much different from that of EU citizens.  
Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden: It's again, I think, it's 
about contrasts. When I was working in France for a month, I met 
some, there were working some Russians and a guy from Jordan 
and everything and, in contrast to them, I really felt like me and the 
French people had more in common than, even though here in 
Sweden I would, these French they are so different from me. But 
there, I really felt this European notion … in contrast to the more 
Eastern apprehension of things. It gave more a sort of European 
belonging to see how to identify with European values. I think that I 
do. 
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Even when the distinctions between EU and non-EU citizens appeared to blur 
in the minds of some participants, especially in the case of EU mobile males 
in Sweden and participants with multicultural backgrounds in the UK, they 
admitted that they hardly socialised with international migrants. This was 
supposedly not the result of individual preferences but that of the “separatist 
culture” Swedish and British university contexts imposed on them. Actually, 
nearly all groups believed educational contexts in these countries reinforced 
the gap between different categories of citizens – including those linked to the 
EU and international groups.94 
British Female, Stayer Group, UK: Last year, there was a student 
who came to me. He was really distressed and he said he was 
having a nervous breakdown and … I was trying to ask him why he 
was upset. And he had stressed himself out with a lot of workload. 
But, he was Russian, and … he was really secluded because he 
was put in a flat with other Russian students. And he hadn’t come 
to the UK to be with Russian students. He came to the UK 
[because]… he wanted to speak English and learn about British 
culture. 
Thus the university contexts appeared to institutionalise processes of 
exclusion in the EU. The evidence then seems to complement more recent 
suggestions about how a ‘hierarchically structured global educational field’ 
can keep some applicants (those from the East) out, while let others mainly 
from the West in (in particular Igarashi and Saito, 2014). Actually, even when 
                                            
94 For the UK stayer group the university context served as the place to meet with 
international and EU mobiles for the first time. But this interaction was likely to reinforce their 
local, regional and British or English identities rather than develop a shared EU or 
international identity – as the previous part of this chapter suggests. 
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international students gain access to these ‘better’ ranked universities, the 
differences with the host society and Western societies more broadly are likely 
to be reinforced by institutional rules on how to integrate students – seemingly 
achieving the opposite of what these rules set out to do in the first place. 
Nonetheless, the institutional separation of EU and international students did 
prove useful for embedding processes of exclusion in the EU context. 
Coupled with the way in which EU-15 mobiles created a community of 
‘exchange students’ that excludes CEE mobiles, it became apparent that 
these institutionalised processes of exclusion added a further layer to what a 
‘community’ of young and educated EU citizens might look like today. 
French Male, EU Group 3, Sweden: I think I don’t have Indian or 
African friends here. And it’s not because I don't try, but precisely I 
communicate easier with people from Europe or, maybe, even 
Western Europe. There are not so many people from Eastern 
Europe. Estonia is not in Eastern Europe, yes? But not so many 
from Romania or Bulgaria. Like, most of my friends are from 
Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Sweden also, from the Masters. 
And these people I know they are not “Stockholmers”. They are 
also kind of exchange [students] here in Stockholm. [All smile.] 
That helps and they need to make friends too.  
German Female: Actually, there are a lot of Chinese students at 
KTH [Royal Institute of Technology] at least. But I do not so much 
mix with them. Because where I live they have put all the Asian 
guys together. On one floor it's only Chinese people and on the 
next floor it's only European people. So that doesn't really make it 
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easier for us to mix. And I think it's because they are kind of 
different. It's easier for them and easier for us actually to stick to 
our group let's put it that way. 
 
Therefore, EU mobility and the rights of EU citizens were considered 
important factors by the majority of young and educated citizens when 
attempting to distinguish who the EU’s external “other” is and appeared to 
enhance young and educated citizens’ sense of EU identity. Thus it is 
plausible that the decision taken by the relevant Swedish and British 
universities to separate home, EU and international students was beneficial 
for some participants’ ability to recognise who the EU’s (external) “other” is.  
 
However, because EU mobility also underscored processes of differentiation, 
a number of participants suggested external migration was perhaps a better 
alternative to underlining the differences between EU and non-EU citizens. 
They often considered their nationality and national stereotypes as their first 
point of reference within the EU. However, externally, the EU or Europe was 
taken as reference points. Nearly all participants agreed on this point: the 
differences between EU citizens and the EU “other” were expected to be more 
noticeable externally. 
German Female, EU Group 1, Sweden: On [the] one hand, just the 
basic fact that I'm able actually to move … and study in different 
places in Europe more easily than outside of the EU, makes me 
feel more European. On the other hand, like living in this 
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international environment, being an international student, it always 
pointed back closer to my actual national identity. So you [are] 
more referring to yourself as I am the German… It would be funny 
to like see how people react[ed] if you say “Where are you from?” 
“From Europe, I'm European.” [All laugh.] [It] would be interesting to 
see [their] reaction. 
French Male: I think [in] the United States they have this reaction.  
Portuguese Male: Yeah! 
French Male: Oh, you are from Europe?  
Actually, the way in which the “other” used the EU or Europe as a reference 
point to approach participants when meeting abroad appeared to be 
internalised towards developing a sense of EU identity.  
German Male, EU Group 2, UK: I think if you travel outside the 
European Union you realise that other people regard you as a 
European and that you yourself come to think of yourself as a 
European. At least I find that happens to me or has happened to 
me.  
Even those participants who had never migrated externally assumed external 
migration would be an effective approach to enhancing their sense of EU 
identity.  
Italian Male (1), EU Group 4, Sweden: I think it [considering 
ourselves as European citizens] depends on the context where you 
are because here [in Sweden] I consider myself as an Italian 
citizen. But I don't know how I would consider myself if I was in 
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Asia or Latin America. Maybe, I would describe myself as more 
European only to make the people understand who I am because 
it's very difficult for [non-EU] people to understand the difference[s] 
between a French guy and an Italian guy. So maybe I would 
describe myself as a European citizen. But I don't know … because 
I've never been away from Europe. 
 
The majority of participants also appeared to believe that external migration 
was advantageous in elucidating the differences between EU member states 
– particularly the East-West divide – and between the EU and the rest of the 
“Western world”.95 Some pinpointed that “relating to” EU citizens was much 
easier for them than “relating to” American citizens, especially so when they 
resided outside the EU. Even the Eurosceptic and slightly more cynical groups 
seemed to agree on this point. For example, most participants in EU Group 4, 
UK were sceptical about the EU’s future and the existence of a single EU and 
European citizenship (cited earlier in relation to the distinction between EU-15 
and CEE mobiles, and EU mobiles and stayers). Yet, they too proposed to 
have found common ground with EU and European citizens whilst residing 
outside the European continent. Actually, this was the only time where the 
members of this group did not challenge the Austrian participant’s sense of 
attachment to CEE citizens – the ‘Eastern Europeans’.  
Austrian Female, EU Group 4, UK: I met some US, like, some 
people from the US. And I would say I would distance myself in 
                                            
95 The same point was made in the previous two sections on students’ shared EU identity and 
sense of belonging to the EU. 
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cultural terms from them so much. And I would relate to every 
single European, [including] Eastern European unlike to them, like, 
in every single way. 
Italian Female: Yeah, I don’t know who said that at the beginning 
that you can relate to Europeans so much when you’re outside 
Europe…  
French Female (3): Yeah. Yeah.  Relate yourself to it. 
Italian Female: …but you can’t really relate yourself to Europe 
when you’re inside it. But if I go, I went to America a couple of 
weeks ago and all I could think was, like, “Europe is different.” I 
wasn’t thinking Italy is different. Europe is different. Like, you 
know… 
[The three French students nod in agreement.] 
Austrian Female: I think, if you live there, it is like a unique 
experience and you get a different perception of it.  
Italian Female: Probably. 
These examples indicate that external migration may be the most fruitful 
towards developing citizens’ sense of EU identity.  
 
5.4. Summary 
The focus group evidence sheds new light on the role of EU mobility in 
developing a sense of EU identity among citizens. At first, it may appear as if 
EU mobility enhances EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU, their shared 
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EU identity and ability to recognise the “other”, the non-EU citizen. In fact, 
there were quite a few examples throughout the focus group discussions to 
suggest that there is some support for the supra- and transnational 
expectations placed on EU mobility in furthering European integration (Haas, 
1958; Deutsch et al., 1968), and activating the EU identity of citizens 
(European Commission, 2001; Bruter, 2005; Ross, 2014). These findings also 
indicate that the interrelated dimensions of EU citizenship is likely to have a 
positive relationship – as long as this relationship is observed through the 
exercising of EU mobility (and external migration) rights and the way in which 
these rights shape citizens’ sense of EU identity. The exercising of EU 
participation was hardly mentioned by participants, suggesting that its impact 
on their sense of EU identity is likely to be marginal. 
 
However, a closer inspection of the focus group evidence revealed that EU 
mobility is also likely to enhance processes of differentiation within the EU, 
contesting the sense of belonging to the EU among both EU mobiles and 
stayers. It is also anticipated to lead to an elitist sense of shared EU identity 
among EU mobiles and, consequently, appears to create different ‘internal 
EU/national others’ – as illustrated in Table 5.1.. Considering for example that 
participants appeared to find it difficult to bridge the differences between CEE 
and EU-15 mobiles in their approaches to socialising in the host country, the 
evidence suggests that their EU identity is particularly exclusive and, at most, 
likely to have a civic aspect. This finding seems to resonate with earlier 
references made to the so-called “Eurostars” (Favell, 2008, 2010) – the 
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alleged ideal EU citizens, whose actual sense of EU identity is, in fact, far 
from progressive. 
 
These findings suggest that functionalist approaches to the way in which EU 
mobility enhances European integration (Haas, 1958; Deutsch et al., 1968) 
may just be too simplistic to really explain the actual exchanges, which take 
place between citizens. Similarly, the evidence seems to shed a rather dim 
light on the relevance of normative frameworks, which observe EU citizenship 
as ‘cosmopolitan’ (Habermas, 1996, 1998, 2003; Linklater, 1998, 2002; 
Delanty, 2007) and the more optimistic tone of previous quantitative studies of 
EU citizenship and identity (Sanders et al., 2012: 222; see also Bruter, 2005; 
Fligstein, 2008; Recchi and Favell, 2009; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 
2012). Actually, by drawing our attention to emerging processes of 
differentiation between young and educated EU mobiles, the evidence also 
seems to defy the hopeful tone of studies about EU learning mobility and 
identity, which would be difficult to study using quantitative data. 
 
Moreover, the evidence highlights that processes of exclusion in the EU are 
considerably different from those present in the national contexts. There may 
well be a cosmopolitan context in the EU (Beck, 2006), especially in English 
speaking universities (King, 2003: 160), in which these participants could 
make contact with international students. However, these contacts were 
institutionally framed and the resulting cosmopolitan outlook of participants 
was characterised by relative “obscurity” (Skey, 2011b). Thus, even the 
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“cosmopolitan outlook” of young and educated citizens is likely to reinforce the 
importance of the national framework. These findings call in to question the 
extent to which EU identity is likely to contribute to a single EU citizenship 
and, subsequently, boost the EU’s democratic credentials. The next chapter 
complements these findings by exploring young and educated citizens’ 
perceptions of EU citizenship as EU rights. 
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Chapter 6. EU citizenship as EU rights 
Rights are usually seen as the principle dimension of citizenship (see for 
example Marshall, 1950; Isin and Turner, 2002: 1). So it is not surprising that 
in the case of the EU, academics have long argued that EU rights carry a real 
potential for realising a post-, supra-national or cosmopolitan model of 
citizenship (see for example Closa 1992; d’Oliveira 1995; O’Leary, 1996; 
Carrera 2005; Olsen, 2008b; Kostakopoulou 2012; Kochenov, 2012; Maas, 
2013). Against this backdrop, the Commission has admitted that a lot of 
“pedagogical work is required” to explain EU rights to citizens (Reding, 
2013b). As a result, it has invested endless efforts into informing citizens 
about these rights – recently under the umbrella of the European Year of 
Citizens 2013-14. If we are to address the issue of EU citizenship through 
rights alone (as has been the case with the scholars cited earlier), the 
Commission’s focus on this dimension could be interpreted as a signal of its 
supranational aspirations. However, by adopting a more inclusive approach to 
EU citizenship, we might expect EU rights to be the least politically charged 
aspect of EU citizenship. This may explain why EU institutions have allowed 
the Commission to focus on this dimension to a much greater extent than has 
been the case with EU identity, for example (Chapter 2.2.2.).  
 
Despite of the Commission’s efforts, citizens remain extremely ignorant about 
their EU rights (see for example Favell, 2008; TNS Opinion and Social, 2010; 
European Commission, 2010; 2013a). Actually, citizens’ ignorance and the 
effects of the crisis have created a context in which national governments 
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have begun to challenge the legitimacy of EU rights. For example, David 
Cameron (2013) announced a crackdown on EU mobility and even threatened 
to veto the EU’s future enlargement rounds if other member states did not 
support his policies (Parker, Barker and Fontanella-Khan, 2013). In its 
response, the Commission made clear that even if “a lot of pedagogical work 
is required to explain European rules” to citizens, “[t]he right to free movement 
is not up for negotiation” (Reading, 2013b). Hence the Commission has, 
seemingly, stood its ground in the face of national adversity. However, a 
closer inspection of its discourse reveals that its programmes on EU rights 
have had a clear focus on EU mobility and associated advantages (as 
illustrated in Chapter 2). With just under 3% of the EU’s population mobile 
each year (Eurostat, 2014a), the Commission has clearly overlooked the 
largest segment of EU citizens – the stayers.  
 
Against this backdrop, empirical evidence about citizens’ awareness and 
perception of their EU rights is urgently needed. This chapter makes a 
contribution to the aforementioned debate on EU rights by illustrating the 
young and educated citizens’ perceptions about the significance of these 
rights. To this end, the chapter uses original focus group evidence of EU 
mobiles and stayers in Sweden and the UK and breaks EU rights down into its 
constituent elements – awareness of EU rights, access to civil, social and 
political rights across the EU, and membership in the EU (and host countries) 
(as defined in Table 1.3.). The evidence suggests that young and educated 
citizens are most likely to be aware of their EU mobility rights and their 
associated civil, social and economic entitlements. In this sense, they seem to 
281 
 
realise the ideals of the Commission (Research Question 2). However, they 
do not in general, make use of their EU participatory rights, especially voting 
in EP and municipal elections (an issue that was also raised in Chapter 4). 
Since the dimensions of EU citizenship are interlinked, not activating one 
dimension might challenge the extent to which young and educated citizens 
fully realise EU citizenship (Research Question 3). In its investigation into the 
extent to which EU rights provide access to member state and EU 
communities, the chapter emphasises emerging processes of differentiation 
and exclusion in the EU (Research Question 4). In so doing, it challenges the 
idea that EU citizenship allows for a ‘community of Europeans’ to emerge, a 
community that could eventually solve the EU's democratic problem 
(Research Question 5).  
 
This chapter forms the second of three empirical chapters (Chapters 5 – 6), 
which probe one of the dimensions of EU citizenship. In so doing, these three 
chapters together provide a response to the main research question, namely 
whether and how young and educated citizens realise their EU citizenship 
(Research Question 1). This chapter is structured as follows. The first part 
sheds light on young and educated citizens’ awareness of their EU rights. The 
second illustrates how EU mobiles and stayers accessed their EU rights and 
associated entitlements. The third part elucidates the extent to which EU 
mobility provides access to member state and EU communities.  
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6.1. Awareness of EU rights  
The moderator explicitly asked participants to name their EU rights, the main 
advantages of their rights, whether and to what extent these rights guaranteed 
equality among citizens, and access to member state and (possibly) EU 
communities. Initially, both EU mobiles and stayers appeared to be quite 
optimistic about the EU’s ‘homogenising’ effect for education and health care 
provisions and depicted the EU as an area of ‘freedom’, ‘security’ and 
‘guarantees’. However, their approach to EU rights changed considerably as 
the discussions progressed. Some of this could be due to the ordering of the 
focus group questions. Some groups were asked about the advantages of 
their EU rights and then were requested to identify any disadvantages they 
had experienced during their residency abroad. Others were questioned about 
EU citizens’ equality – though this question was raised as a follow-up and 
complementary to the discussions about the disadvantages of EU rights. The 
order and actual phrasing of questions might have influenced how participants 
approached their EU rights. Nonetheless, a similar dynamic emerged across 
the groups as the discussions progressed; participants became increasingly 
critical about their EU rights and could not explain why some (EU) rules were 
applied differently from one member state to the next.  
 
In the exchange below, for instance, EU mobiles seemed quite excited about 
the opportunity to discuss their EU rights, or, at the very least, to showcase 
their awareness of EU rights. Accordingly, even if having to show their 
passports at the UK border was considered to be a “hassle” by a couple of EU 
mobiles, they continued their discussion on an optimistic tone, citing the EU’s 
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healthcare provisions as a “good” example for the EU benefits they had 
enjoyed.  
Moderator, EU Group 2, Sweden: Can you think of any advantages 
of being EU citizens? 
Bulgarian Female: Free Education. 
Hungarian-British Male: Easy travel, no border control[s].  
German Female: Although you do have border control when you 
come from the UK! 
Hungarian-British Male: Yeah, it's true. But, do you know how tight 
that border control is? You just walk through. 
Italian Male: But you need the document in your hand. 
German Female: Yes! 
Italian Male: If you didn't have it, you wouldn't walk through. You 
would be sent back!… 
Portuguese Male: The health insurance we have.  
Hungarian-British Male: Yes! 
Portuguese Male: You just take it in your country and it's available 
everywhere.  
Hungarian-British Male: That's a good one! 
Portuguese Male: It's a good one.  
The majority of participants (again) observed EHIC as a particularly 
advantageous aspect of their EU status. The similarly beneficial aspect of 
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European Health Insurance Cared (EHIC) was noted in the previous chapter 
as the only example observed by all groups as effective in promoting citizens’ 
sense of EU identity. It is also interesting to note that while EU mobiles in 
Sweden often perceived UK border controls as a ‘hassle’, EU mobiles in the 
UK felt that it was in fact constructive towards their sense of EU identity. 
 
EU also mobiles spoke about the social and economic entitlements their EU 
status granted. These discussions usually focused on migration and EU 
mobility rights, especially, learning mobility, and associated entitlements, 
including reduced fees, fee-waivers and easier registration processes.96 In 
fact, the overwhelming majority of EU mobiles were really outspoken and, 
usually, quite positive about their experiences of EU mobility. However, they 
were quick to note that citizens would not necessarily stop at every point and 
express gratitude for the benefits they receive from the EU. Indeed, 
participants underlined that most benefits were likely to be taken for granted 
and so go unnoticed by citizens in their everyday lives. This issue is illustrated 
well in the discussion that took place in EU Group 3, UK. Participants 
appeared upbeat about the opportunity to speak about their EU rights (as was 
the case in the previous example) and, at the same time, shed light on the 
ambivalence, which is likely to characterise citizens’ perceptions of their EU 
rights.97 
                                            
96 The same finding was reached by previous qualitative research on this issue (Férnandez, 
2005; Favell, 2008; Siklodi, 2014). 
97 Their points echo the findings of more recent qualitative studies on citizens’ attitudes 
towards the EU and European integration (White, 2011; Duchesne et al., 2013; Van 
Ingelgom, 2014) 
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Swedish Female, EU Group 3, UK: Well, if I am in a crisis in a 
country where there is not a Swedish embassy, I can always go to 
the other ones, which is just quite practical… we can travel. [At a 
later point in the discussion, this participant mentioned that knowing 
she had the right to ask for help from any of the EU embassies, 
made her feel more secure during a previous visit to Pakistan.] … 
Italian Female: Yeah I think, you do have freedom, like to choose 
where to study… [and] it’s pretty easy... We have so many 
chances, so many opportunities! Much more than if you [were] like, 
living somewhere else or if you were, like, an international student.    
Yeah, so I think, everything that has to do with bureaucracies, like, 
[it’s] really easy for us. … 
German-British Female: I think [also], the idea that you can drive 
somewhere and [you] don’t have to show your passport … I mean 
my parents, … [when] they travelled East to the USSR. The idea 
that … First, you have to get a visa to go over to East Germany. 
Then, you have to give your passport and then you were 
interrogated! You know, all these things that we can’t really 
imagine.  I mean, we often forget that [these are benefits coming 
from the EU]. 
Dutch Female: That’s what I’m saying. We take it [EU rights] for 
granted. 
Besides their EU mobility rights and associated entitlements, four EU mobiles 
also mentioned their rights to consular protection from the embassy of another 
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member state outside the EU – in the UK across three EU Groups (1, 2 and 3) 
and in Sweden in EU Group 1. Only two (female) EU mobiles – in the UK EU 
Groups 2 and 3 – linked their right to vote in the EP to EU rights, from a 
positive stance, that is. Actually, the male participants in EU Group 1, Sweden 
dismissed the (oft-cited) idea that citizens’ EU level political participation 
presents an opportunity for them to develop a sense of EU citizenship at the 
very beginning of the focus group. Interestingly, not once did the same EU 
mobile name both of these rights. Moreover, the fact that a couple of EU 
mobiles in the UK were the only ones to mention EP voting rights in a positive 
light counters the expectations laid down at the outset of this thesis where 
Sweden was identified as the most likely context in the EU for post-national 
citizenships to emerge (Chapter 1.2.). 
 
Hence, EU mobiles seemed, on the whole, well-informed about their EU 
rights. This was especially the case for EU mobility and associated 
entitlements since these rights were considered as having a personal 
relevance to participants’ lives. Subsequently, EU mobiles also seemed to 
express a sense of worry about EU mobility rights being taken for granted by 
young citizens. This was, in fact a reoccurring trend across the focus groups. 
After EU mobiles and stayers listed their EU mobility rights, they stressed that 
younger citizens may not appreciate the actual advantages of these rights 
because they would be considered as part of everyday life within the EU. 
 
Similarly to EU mobiles, stayers in both control groups spoke of the 
“pragmatism” that is associated with their EU rights. But then they too ended 
287 
 
up focusing on their EU mobility rights. Their claims were, as a result, 
paradoxical. While stayers argued EU mobility, even EU learning mobility, had 
a personal connotation to them, they were the same participants who decided 
not to take advantage of these rights and stayed in their country of origin for 
educational purposes. In comparison, the only EU right that stayers could, in 
reality, exercise – voting for the EP – was not raised during the discussions by 
either of the stayer groups. This finding may contradict the expectations laid 
down in the institutional framework (Shaw, 2007) of and the Commission’s 
(2010f) discourse on EU citizenship, namely that EP voting rights integrates 
all member state citizens at the EU level. 
 
Nevertheless, British stayers did speak about the EP at this point of the 
discussion in response to whether or not equality existed in the EU. The 
moderator was, in fact, interested in participants’ personal experiences about 
equal treatment, rather than their perceptions of whether or not equality 
existed across the EU. British stayers debated the later issue and provided a 
small glimpse into how even citizens who (seem to) have a fair level of 
knowledge about the EU are, perhaps, most likely to adopt a critical attitude 
towards the EU. Since Swedish stayers remained more optimistic about the 
EU, the disapproval of British stayers is likely to be the result of being situated 
in a notoriously Eurosceptic country. 
British Male (1), British Stayer Group: I think, I don’t know whether 
this concerns us, as British citizens of Europe, but … I thought. I 
know the EU quite well, but from what I understand, … the 
important seats given in the European Parliament sort of reflects, to 
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a certain extent, the size of the country. But, arguably, that limits 
the influence of smaller countries within the European Union. So 
you could stretch that and say that they are not, not on an equal 
footing with the British, because they haven’t had larger population! 
We therefore have more say. And whether that’s justifiable or not, I 
suppose that’s a debate in itself. … 
British Male (3):  If you have Luxemburg, they are really heavily 
weighted! 
British Male (1): Well, yeah! Exactly… That’s true! Yeah, I guess. 
Maybe. 
British Female (6):  Isn’t it all kind [of] done proportionately?... 
British Female (5): That’s not entirely proportionate. 
British Female (6): No, no, but then how would you ever get 
proportionate [representation]? 
British Male (1): Hmm, true. 
British Female (6): It’s [a] very sensitive and very highly 
judgemental [issue]… 
British Male (3): Equality is a very, very broad thing.  
 
Due to the (self-proclaimed) peculiar case of the UK in the EU, it is perhaps 
understandable that British stayers made references to states, which are 
supposedly on “equal footing with” one another. Interestingly, Swedish stayers 
also spoke of the inequality between member states and explored how some 
states are usually considered ‘more European’ – in their value system but also 
in how they could influence EU decisions – than others. Swedish stayers then 
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identified the original six and the UK as having the principal role in reaching 
EU level political decisions. Although Sweden was not expected to have an 
important say in EU level decisions, Swedish stayers stressed that Swedish 
opinion was likely to be more influential than that of CEE (states). Even more, 
they believed Sweden benefited from its EU membership, which raised the 
country’s profile against the backdrop of globalisation. “[I]t's more competitive 
to be part of the European Union rather than being Sweden in Scandinavia, I 
think we have more to say now being a bigger actor than of having these little 
European countries” (Swedish Female (2), Stayer Group, Sweden). Thus, 
both stayer groups touched on the idea that some states were ‘more 
European’ than others. British stayers were, naturally, more sceptical about 
the UK’s membership in the EU than Swedish stayers. Nonetheless, in their 
observation of the differences between member states influence within the 
EU, stayers placed the UK into the ‘more European’ category. 
 
In addition to member states’ inequality, the control groups also focused on 
their EU mobility rights and associated entitlements. For instance, British 
stayers mentioned they had benefited from the EHIC card, less visa 
applications and mobile workers’ rights previously. Swedish stayers also 
spoke of EU mobility, but mainly in relation to educational mobility. Actually, a 
number of stayers in this group said that their EU rights made it more likely for 
them to continue studying within, rather than outside the EU.  
Swedish Female (2), Stayer Group, Sweden: I think, that 
accessibility, to be able to move and travel and study abroad, and 
have the same opportunities in Sweden as in the rest … of Europe. 
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I think, that's the way I've been in touch… with the [EU] rights... 
[F]or example, [I’d] prefer to study in Europe than the US because 
it's much easier. And it's much cheaper. And you have Erasmus, 
and you have these others [programmes] that make you feel the 
incentives to study in Europe.  
There was thus a possibility that EU mobility, even if taken for granted, 
granted a sense of geographical proximity between young EU citizens and the 
EU (Siklodi, 2014), including stayers. 
 
Hence, in their initial discussion of EU rights, both EU mobiles and stayers 
paid particular attention to the “practical” and personal advantages of their EU 
citizenship, namely mobility and the associated civic, social and economic 
entitlements they received (Férnandez, 2005; Favell, 2008; Ross, 2014; 
Siklodi 2014). Participants were, in fact, fairly well-informed about the range of 
EU rights and entitlements that were available to them. This finding could be 
used as the basis for reaching positive assumptions about the relevance of 
EU citizenship or, at least, the relevance of EU mobility today. In their attempt 
to address and analyse EU rights however, most (EU-15) participants 
suggested that they often took EU mobility for granted. There might thus be a 
requirement to inform EU citizens about their mobility rights as coming from 
their EU rather than national citizenship. On a more positive note, participants 
appeared to firmly embed EU mobility as part of their everyday life within the 
EU. Especially Swedish groups, but also a good number of participants in the 
UK expressed a sense of geographical proximity to the EU. EU mobility was 
not only identified as the most advantageous of the various EU rights, but 
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appeared to serve as a foundation for building a dynamic bond between the 
EU and its young and educated citizens – which is precisely what we 
understand by the concept of ‘citizenship’ (see for example Heater, 2004a: 2). 
 
6.2. Accessing political rights, and civil, social and economic 
entitlements across the EU 
Contrary to the largely optimistic tone of the previous section, both EU 
mobiles and stayers were quite quick to note that the link between EU mobility 
and EU citizenship granted an exclusive character to EU citizenship. The way 
in which these citizens accessed their EU rights is the subject of this section. 
In particular every group expected EU citizenship to be relevant to citizens’ 
lives once they were mobile within (or migrated outside) the EU. As such, it 
was likely to be irrelevant to the lives of stayers: “I think we just experience the 
fact of European citizenship when we go abroad, as we are now. But in our 
country, I think, we never think ‘Okay I have European rights’, only our 
national rights” (French Male, EU Group 4, Sweden). As a result, EU 
citizenship was not perceived as a political, but a liberal model of citizenship. 
 
Moreover, EU mobiles were quick to underscore the ‘obstacles’ they faced 
when attempting to benefit from the civil, social and economic entitlements, 
accompanying their mobility rights (the very same ‘obstacles’ were identified 
by the Commission (2010a) as well). Some participants felt these obstacles 
underlined that EU citizenship did not make a huge difference in their 
everyday lives and experiences of EU mobility. Others assumed these 
obstacles to be country-specific. In fact, similar exchanges took place in all EU 
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groups and each group spoke of similar ‘obstacles’, including  opening bank 
accounts, taking out mobile contracts and accessing health care services. 
Therefore, the following example is illustrative of the type of exchanges, which 
occurred across the EU groups when discussing the ‘obstacles’ they faced 
when exercising their EU mobility rights. 
Dutch Female, EU Group 3, UK: [But] as a Dutch citizen, I couldn’t 
get a bank account here. It was impossible! It only worked when I 
was there [in person] and they [were] like, looked at their 
international bank accounts. They wouldn’t let me have one [until 
then]! And they wouldn’t let me have a phone contract unless I paid 
extra… 
German-British Female: I think that’s bank specific to be honest. 
Swedish Female: But there are so many other things like…[when I] 
first came here it was a year before I started studying … and I 
wanted to work. But for that I needed a national insurance number. 
So I went to get a national insurance number and they told me, “But 
you don’t have a job, so you can’t get a national insurance 
number.” And then I was like, “Ok, I’ll get a job!” And then, I tried to 
get a job and they [prospective employers] were like, “No, you need 
a national insurance number to get a job”. So it’s … sometimes it 
feels like the country is working against you a little bit … 
German-British Female: I think that’s England specific I don’t think 
it has anything to do with being an EU citizen… Yeah, I think that’s 
just a lack of organisation … 
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Dutch Female: I think it wouldn’t make a difference for me… Like, it 
[EU citizenship] didn’t make it easier for me to get a bank account 
at all or a phone contract … 
As apparent from the above dialogue, the obstacles EU mobiles faced were, 
in large part, believed to be due to a lack of knowledge among Swedish and 
British bureaucrats and service providers about EU citizenship. 
 
Even if the participants, including EU mobiles and stayers appeared to turn 
increasingly critical about the extent to which they could exercise their EU 
mobility rights, it was in relation to mobility rights that their discussions 
generated some debate. Even when participants touched on EU participatory 
and consular protection rights, it appeared as if though these rights were not 
heard by anyone in the groups or were mentioned in order to demonstrate EU 
mobiles’ awareness of the political aspect of their EU rights (see for example 
second quote in this chapter). There was no follow-up question about any of 
these rights. Even when an EU mobile admitted to knowing nothing about his 
right of consular protection (German Male, EU Group 1, UK), he did not probe 
his fellows about what this right actually entailed. When one of his fellows 
offered an explanation saying, correctly, that this right is included in all EU 
passports, the other members in the group asked sarcastically, “who reads 
that?”.  
 
Quite contrary to their perceptions about the personal advantages of EU 
(mobility) rights, participants appeared to struggle when they were asked to 
identify the advantages these rights grant to member state citizens more 
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broadly. When they could not think of what benefits other citizens received 
from the EU, they offered an alternative interpretation of EU citizenship. 
Suddenly, EU citizenship was not about EU rights or EU mobility, but EU 
identity – the relevance of which dimension they had dismissed previously. 
This issue illustrates the tendency mentioned in the previous chapter; rather 
than addressing a problematic dimension of EU citizenship at hand, almost all 
groups of students attempted to make up for the shortfall in one dimension of 
EU citizenship by pointing to another dimension. Hence the very same 
groups, which had previously questioned the existence of and prospects for 
developing EU identity through EU citizenship (as a legal status) as long as it 
assisted in easing the weight of the on-going discussion. Accordingly, when 
the discussions turned to addressing the advantages of EU rights, many 
participants suggested equating EU citizenship with EU identity instead. A 
good example for the change in participants’ approaches is the case of EU 
Group 1, UK. The unease that had surfaced during the discussion of citizens’ 
lack of EU identity – including, EU-15 and CEE mobiles, as well as stayers – 
was long forgotten. This shift may illustrate that, as expected, citizenship is a 
difficult issue to address and not one that is much considered by (these) 
young citizens extensively (Ross, 2014). 
German Female, EU Group 1, UK: [M]aybe with European 
citizenship, it’s more about identity than knowing about your rights 
and obligations. Like, I think, not many people know what are the 
rights and obligations. Like, what are the national rights and what 
are the European rights. You don’t make really a distinction. 
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Romanian Female: I think most of the European citizens just know 
that they can travel. They can travel without visa. I think, that’s the 
main thing that all Europeans know. And other than that, I think, no 
one knows. I mean, aside from European Studies students. 
German Male: It’s not very practical, I would say. I mean, if we go 
to the airport and then there you have a row for EU citizens when 
you have to show your passports. And then there is another row for 
others. And then you feel a bit European, I would say. But that [i]s, 
well, the exception. 
The latter half of this quote suggests that participants also addressed, albeit 
implicitly, the (proposed) interlinked character of EU identity and EU rights. 
However, with EU rights presumed as “not very practical”, this dimension was 
expected to make citizens feel “a bit more European” and only in exceptional 
circumstances.  
 
Stayers also had a tendency to speak of EU mobility as the main advantage 
of their EU rights. However, their focus on EU mobility could not be interpreted 
as being a result of their actual personal advantage. Instead, stayers’ focus 
was likely to have been result of the media and political hype surrounding 
intensified EU mobility flows against the backdrop of the crisis. Actually, the 
crisis and Eurosceptic perceptions were, perhaps, at their height at the time of 
the interviews. Greek protests and the increased support of the UKIP 
dominated the news headlines. Both stayer groups made references to the 
crisis and, subsequently, raised important questions about the rationale for EU 
membership and the future of the EU. As the following exchange between 
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Swedish stayers illustrates, these participants expected the political structures 
of the EU to be particularly susceptible to changes. More specifically, they 
expected to see future changes to underscore the on-going relevance of 
member states. Perhaps because most Swedish stayers agreed with this 
proposition, they could draw upon a supportive group context in their attempts 
to develop each other’s ideas further. Starting from the contested 
characteristic of the European integration process, they moved on to discuss 
the current developments in Greece and, more broadly, the different “value” of 
member states and their varying impact in (future) EU policy-making.  
Swedish Female (2), Swedish Stayer Group: [I]t's interesting to see 
in the case of the EU, in one way it feels like we're going to this 
kind of the federation with the states … and it feels as if the 
European identity is growing ... But on the other hand, when you 
see the crisis, like in Greece … and you see Germany and France 
being very rigid, and you feel that maybe this [federation] will 
collapse. Maybe, they will go back to their national [countries]. … 
Swedish Female (5): At the end of the day… Yeah, like what's 
happening in Greece. … things are going pretty bad in Greece … 
people are… questioning should they maybe just leave the 
European Union because this isn't really working out … and when 
it's not going very well for a certain state [in the EU], it's very easy 
to just kind of, well, you know, “Are we really gaining anything from 
this? Is this working out for us and for our country?” It's about your 
country at the end of the day anyway… 
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Swedish Female (2): I would actually agree … [and] say that there 
is a difference between the European countries. I think there is still 
a clear line between East and West and I think that obviously being 
France and Germany and the UK, … their ideas [are], perhaps 
more in focus … whereas, look at Greece, for example. People 
blame Greece [for the crisis]. … And look at Italy! … I think there is 
a very [clear] difference between the countries… [A]nd I think that 
even though for example Sweden does not have many places in 
the [European] Parliament, it still has much of its, like, soft power in 
terms of having “high value” in the EU. Whereas I think perhaps 
many of the former Soviet countries don't have that value in the 
EU. 
Hence, the context in which the focus groups took place had an important 
effect on how these participants accessed EU citizenship. So it is perhaps 
less surprising that none of the control groups spoke about EU participatory 
rights as a benefit of their EU rights and, instead, considered the national level 
as more apparent in this respect. Nonetheless, the final point of Swedish 
Female (2) is quite paradoxical. She raised the possibility that Sweden had 
gained a form of ‘soft power’ through its EU membership, especially its 
position in the EP. Yet, as mentioned before, none of the (Swedish) stayers 
actually participated in the EP elections prior to the focus groups.98 
  
Therefore, almost every participant identified EU mobility as the main 
advantage of his or her EU status. However, it was likely to have been 
                                            
98 For further details on the reasons for stayers’ abstention from EP elections, see Chapter 
7.1.. 
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selected as a topic of discussion for quite different reasons by EU mobiles and 
stayers. While mobility had a clear, personal relevance to EU mobiles, stayers 
were observing political debates about the future of the EU at the time of the 
interviews. If we are to accept that mobility – for better or worse – is at the 
heart of EU rights and, more broadly, EU citizenship, the question arises 
whether it can also guarantee citizens’ access to an EU community – one of 
the elements of citizenship as rights this thesis identified. Since the 
contemporary EU community is made up of member state communities, EU 
mobility must also provide access to these communities. In order to shed light 
on the extent to which EU mobility fulfils this requirement, the next part of this 
chapter will consider the issue of membership. 
 
6.3. EU mobility for membership in member state and EU 
communities 
This section looks at two of the most cited obstacles participants identified as 
preventing them from exercising their EU mobility rights fully. On the one 
hand, almost every participant mentioned member state differences, including 
national languages, cultures and welfare state systems as greatly influencing 
their experiences of EU mobility. On the other hand, the debates touched on 
the very real inequalities, which exist between different categories of EU 
citizens, mainly citing the differences between the rights of stayers and 
different groups of EU mobiles, including CEE and EU-15 mobiles. The 
second section thus underscores the way in which contemporary processes of 
differentiation appear to classify different categories of EU citizens. In light of 
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these two obstacles, almost all participants suggested that the EU is “far away 
from being a unitary union”.   
 
6.3.1. Member state differences and the exercising of EU mobility rights 
The political, social and economic differences, which we know to prevail 
between member states, seem to have made it quite difficult for participants to 
consider their EU citizenship as a means to accessing EU and member state 
communities. Although EU mobiles spoke of similar issues at this point – 
national languages, cultures or registration requirements – perhaps it is not 
surprising that they adopted quite different approaches to this issue, 
depending on their country of residence. In Sweden, most EU mobiles 
identified proficiency in Swedish language and assimilation into an (allegedly) 
peculiar socialising culture as especially difficult. On top of these issues, a 
number of EU mobiles, particularly those who planned to stay in Sweden for a 
shorter period of time – up to 10 months under the Erasmus exchange 
programme – found obtaining a Swedish personal identity number an almost 
impossible task. While the first two issues were likely to hinder participants’ 
socialising prospects (though proficiency in Swedish language would have 
also been a requirement for obtaining employment), the last issue clearly 
infringed the ability of EU mobiles to live their lives on an equal footing with 
Swedish stayers.  
French Male, EU Group 1, Sweden: I don't speak Swedish.  
Everyone together: Yeah, that’s a big problem! 
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Portuguese Male: That’s a big problem in terms of circulating in the 
European Union. Okay, you want to work here and there. But, if 
you don't know the language [in the host country]… 
German Female: No. But, I think, in Sweden that's not actually the 
problem at all if you don't speak Swedish.  
Portuguese Male: Why? Can you get a job? [Shakes his head in 
disagreement.] 
German Female: Maybe not when it comes to working, but 
regarding participating in Swedish life. It's not necessary...  
Portuguese Male: But how do you participate in Swedish life 
without money, without working? 
Italian Male: When it comes to work, language is still det[rimental].  
However, compar[ed] with the rest of the [EU] countries, there are 
lots of levels of interaction that can actually take place without 
[speaking] Swedish. Only the most structural thing at all cannot 
take place. … 
German Female: Consider life in Sweden without a personal 
number! 
Italian Male: You can’t even rent a DVD! 
German Female: That's the main issue in Sweden! [All nod in 
agreement.] If you don't have those 10 digits, you don't exist. You 
can't even get into the system without it! They need to create it. If 
you come somewhere with an emergency, you can't get treated 
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because you don't fit in the system, because you don't have 10 
digits.  
Italian Male: You are a pain in the ass for any type of 
administration. 
 
From an initial disagreement about the relevance of speaking different 
European languages in order to integrate in the host country, EU mobiles 
moved to express a collective sense of frustration in relation to the more 
country-specific requirement of obtaining a Swedish personal number. Similar 
exchanges surfaced across the other groups also. While familiarity with 
foreign languages is a challenge every EU citizen must face if they intend to 
use their EU mobility rights, the Swedish personal number is a country-
specific issue and so its challenge might have been seen as more personal 
and only really understood by fellow EU mobiles residing in Sweden. A 
challenge commonly experienced by EU mobiles may then help in developing 
a sense of ‘mutual understanding’ – to use the phrase put forward by Italian 
Female, EU Group 1, UK – among a specific group of EU mobiles. Such 
sentiments were certainly felt and were much articulated by the EU groups in 
Sweden. A few EU mobiles then expressed a sense of uneasiness with the 
‘uneven’ system that seems to prevail within the EU and across member state 
borders.99 Even if the interaction between these participants suggested that a 
sense of “mutual understanding” may be developed as a result of facing 
                                            
99 Another example for this was apparent in EU Groups 1 and 2 in Sweden, where UK 
mobiles participated and for whom the prospects of introducing a single EU identity card 
appeared to be peculiar in the first place. 
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common challenges, they often observed these challenges as another 
example underlining the importance of national frameworks.  
 
EU mobiles in the UK adopted a somewhat different approach to the question 
about EU citizens’ equality and (subsequent) ability to access member state 
and EU communities. The discussions were particularly interesting because a 
good number of EU mobiles had attended a European School before. It is 
precisely these type of pre-university schools that have been portrayed as 
most favourable to providing access to an increasingly globalised and 
hierarchically structured HE system (Igarashi and Saito, 2014). The evidence 
suggests that EU mobiles were aware of this issue and identified international 
educational contexts as particularly effective in raising young and educated 
citizens with a (desired) cosmopolitan outlook (as defined by Skey, 2011b). 
For example, they were quite outspoken about their previous educational 
experiences as being much stronger than that of British stayers. They then 
identified their EU mobility as helping them become even more “aware” of EU 
similarities and national differences than they had been hitherto. Yet, for EU 
mobiles these (alleged) differences between the abilities of EU mobiles and 
British stayers were found to be not recognised by the UK HE system – much 
to the annoyance of participants. 
French Female, (3), EU Group 4, UK: I think the biggest 
disadvantage I ever felt … it’s kind of the level of education you 
need to come into the UK [higher education system]. Like they 
expect so much more from non-UK students in order to study here. 
… I did the international bachelorette … [and it] is worth 20 A-levels 
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…it’s ridiculous! I don’t know, my first year, it was actually a joke. 
There are people who didn’t know how to write their essays. And I 
had written so many essays… they were just catching up with me 
… 
Austrian Female: Yes. 
German Female (1): Yes, I totally agree with you.  
Austrian Female: I think the same. 
German Female (1): Because last year, I felt like I am on summer 
vacation.  
French Female (3): I felt like I went back a few years!  
German Female (1): I felt like, I don’t know, I felt like I could have 
taught some of the courses cause I knew the things … And I think 
that is also one of the key differences [between stayers and the] 
people that come from abroad… And we have to know so many 
different things, that when we come here we are more open-
minded. And then the people, the students here are rather limited 
in what they, not knowledge-wise, I won’t say they’re stupid, I don’t 
say … 
Italian-Mexican Female: Yes they are! 
The above exchange hints that these EU mobiles did not only make 
distinctions between EU mobiles and stayers but also identified an exceptional 
group of EU mobiles – those who were raised to have a ‘cosmopolitan 
outlook’. 
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Nevertheless, it seems likely that registration processes and migrant 
integration requirements at the national level are deliberately stopping the 
integration of EU mobiles. All EU groups mentioned that their actual access to 
welfare services was hindered by their lack of knowledge about these 
processes. Indeed, EU mobiles said that the EHIC – the very symbol 
participants previously observed as being most effective in cementing a sense 
of EU citizenship – did not always work. For EU mobiles in Sweden this issue 
was once again intensified by the requirement of having a Swedish personal 
identity number. “[I]t is hard from my experience if you don't have the Swedish 
personal number. I [am] only stay[ing] for 10 months and I don't get a personal 
number because you have to stay for more than a year (German Female, EU 
Group 3, Sweden). 
 
Although most EU mobiles in the UK seemed to have found it easy to register 
with the National Health Service (NHS), a few seemed disappointed about the 
lack of information that was available to them when attempting to use this 
service. Subsequently, EU mobiles established that member states do not 
make it easy for them to take advantage of their civic, social and economic 
entitlements, which stem from their EU rights.  
German Female (2), EU Group 4, UK: [T]he medical system for 
example… I have [a] health condition and when I go to the doctor 
here, it’s just awful! … [I] don’t get the right medication … and the 
things is..., I tried to explain to them [my condition] and they don’t 
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want to give me antibiotics. It’s just that they are so strict, narrow 
minded on their things. And they didn’t even give me like the 
address, or the opportunity of me seeing another doctor… [I] have 
to go to the healthcare centre of the uni[versity] and [am] not 
allowed to go somewhere else. And, I don’t know! But if I want to 
see someone else, I can see someone else… this system is so 
weird! They don’t make it possible for you as a foreigner to 
understand it or to integrate. …  
Italian Female: But that’s not Europe… 
German Female (2): It’s the system [that] exploits you. 
Italian Female: But, it’s the country! 
Austrian Female: In terms of medical treatment, for example, you 
are always allowed to get a second opinion. 
German Female (2): … I know I’m allowed, but where the hell am I 
supposed to go if I don’t know any [other centres]? 
 
Hence, a lot of frustration and disappointment characterised EU mobiles’ 
debates about the way in which they could (not) take advantage of their EU 
mobility rights and associated entitlements in both countries. These EU 
mobiles clearly relied on civic, social and economic services, which are not 
harmonised by the EU. But even when there are certain EU level initiatives to 
help EU mobiles for the duration of their residency abroad, such as the EHIC, 
citizens’ actual experiences of using these non-harmonised initiatives are 
likely to underscore the continuing priority of member states. Such differences 
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are likely to have two-fold impact on the attitudes of EU mobiles. They may 
underline the importance of member states. They could also assist in 
developing a sense of “mutual understanding” among EU mobiles – but only 
those, who reside within the same member state. There is thus a chance that 
these differences lead to further categories of EU (mobile) citizens. The next 
and final section of this chapter sheds light on the resulting categories of EU 
citizens. 
 
6.3.2. Categories of EU citizens 
This section sheds further light on EU citizenship as EU rights, illustrating the 
way in which possible categories of EU citizens – some of which were also 
identified following the analysis of the Commission’s discourse on EU 
citizenship (Chapter 2) – are likely to be realised by young and educated 
citizens. Some of the exchanges included in the previous sections of this 
chapter already gave some illustration of the likely similarities and differences 
between EU mobiles and stayers’ perceptions of their experiences of and 
exposure to EU mobility. In addition to the (primary) mobile/stayer distinctions, 
every group made references to further categories of EU citizens. In their 
discussion of whether or not EU citizens were equal, participants implied that 
depending on their country of origins – especially whether they came from 
EU-15 or CEE but also Northern or Southern member states –, EU mobiles 
were treated differently. At this point, national immigration, integration and 
labour market polices were identified as limiting the ability of CEE mobiles to 
fully exercise their EU rights.  
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Although EU learning mobility and the young and educated EU citizens in the 
focus groups are expected to be the least affected by these policies, the 
dynamics in the groups changed considerably at this point. In fact, these 
students begun to explicitly classify EU citizens into different categories 
according to their ability and propensity to use EU mobility rights. Thus for 
example, when CEE mobiles stressed that their EU citizenship was partial, 
EU-15 mobiles suggested it was not surprising since their country of origin 
only recently joined the EU and were often compared to countries, which have 
been EU or EC members since the inception of the European project. This 
issue was particularly apparent in EU group 2 in Sweden. As the exchange 
below demonstrates the dynamic shifts slightly between the Portugal and 
Bulgarian mobiles when discussing this issue. Once the Bulgarian mobile 
suggests that she is treated differently to her EU-15 fellows, the Portugal 
mobile underscores that she is from a recent member state and should try to 
understand that people do not know about her EU status yet. The other EU-15 
mobiles then join in and, by supporting the claim that EU-15 citizens might not 
know much about the recent countries, they too appear to reinforce the 
distinctions between different categories of EU mobiles. Their resulting debate 
underlines the limitations of contemporary EU citizenship.  
Bulgarian Female, EU Group 2, Sweden: Here [in Sweden] I have 
to explain [Bulgaria is] within the EU. Like when I dealt with 
bureaucracy …  
Portugal Male: It's a recent member so... 
Bulgarian Female: 2. 5 years! 
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Portugal Male: One of the last ones, or they are the last ones. 
Croatia is just coming through. So you are the last ones. So that's 
why. You understand why? No? Well, you are compar[ed] with 
countries that entered like 20 years ago.  
Hungarian-British Male: Like, the original members. 
Portugal Male: I am not saying that I agree with it, but I can 
understand. 
Bulgarian Female:  No, I also understand and am being very 
patient with it, but still. It's a bit annoying… 
German Female: But then again, if you would truly feel there exists 
a European citizenship then you would be much more interested in 
if there is another country joining! Right? I mean, take Germany. 
We have 16 federal states. If we had a 17th federal state joining, 
everyone would know about it.  
Italian Male: … [A] number of countries joined 5 years ago, but if 
you would ask me to name them now for a million SEK [Swedish 
Crowns] I would not be able to [do that). …  
German Female: But I think that's a drawback ... I mean, we are 
not truly there yet with European citizenship that we really feel we 
are one and we are very interested in one another. 
 
Even more, CEE mobiles from EU2 states, Romania and Bulgaria, indicated 
that their EU citizenship was partial compared to mobiles from EU8 states, 
including Hungary and Poland. Although EU-15 participants, including mobiles 
and stayers appeared to agree with these sentiments at first, they did not 
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seem to quite understand just how these issues might affect CEE mobiles’ 
ability to exercise their EU rights nor did they appear particularly interested in 
finding out more about this issue. They, once again, appeared to reinforce 
their more established status in the EU. The following exchange in EU Group 
1 in the UK demonstrates these tendencies well. When a Romanian 
participant spoke of the limitations she faced in her attempt to secure 
employment in the UK, there was very little or no follow up from her EU-15 
fellows.  
Romanian Female, EU Group 1, UK: As a Romanian, I am 
restricted for my working hours. I don’t need a visa, but I needed a 
residence and working permit, which was more or less the [same] 
process [as applying for] a visa. It means you have to show that 
you’ve got fantastic funds, or you have a very generous sponsor 
who wants to pay for all your expenses, and other paper works, of 
course. And, as a student, my working permit … was quite easy to 
get in comparison to if I was just a [Romanian] person wanting to 
come here and work because they have [to pass] even more 
formalities. I can only work 20 hours a week and I can’t go over that 
because it’s registered… The good news is that by 2014 they 
promised to take that off and I will be able to work just as Polish 
people and other people do. However, they are trying to write like a 
petition and cancel it for another five years. 
German-Swiss Female: Who wants to put that into place? 
Romanian Female: I think it’s English people-initiated. So, yeah! In 
my experiences, it’s quite hard. And, it’s going to be quite hard 
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because I’m graduating and I need a working permit … and it’s 
going to be very-very hard to get… 
German-Swiss Female: Maybe you won’t stay here. 
Romanian Female: Yeah, I could go somewhere else. 
 
Thus once she voiced her concern, the Romanian participant did not really get 
a chance to speak more about how to resolve the difficulties she had to face 
whilst residing in the UK. This is apparent in the suggestion that “maybe she 
won’t stay” in the UK – a simple, seemingly understanding remark, that 
seemed to have also had an underlying message: the discussion should 
move on. Subsequently, the other mobiles in the group, all of whom came 
from an EU-15 state, returned to discussing the advantages of their EU rights, 
rather than dwell on the difficulties of CEE mobiles.  
 
In addition to limiting their rights, CEE mobiles also spoke about the 
detrimental effects national stereotypes had on their experiences abroad.100 
This issue was debated in detail in EU Group 4 in Sweden, which included 
more CEE mobiles than any other groups did. In fact, it was the only EU group 
where CEE mobiles (5) outnumbered EU-15 mobiles (3). These CEE mobiles, 
could, as a result, dominate the part of the discussions they considered most 
relevant to them – unlike the dynamics, which prevailed in the other EU 
groups as illustrated above. Thus, when asked about equality, CEE mobiles 
were quick to draw attention to their personal experiences in which they felt 
                                            
100 The impact of national stereotypes on the identity of participants was illustrated in Chapter 
5. 
311 
 
discriminated. Once again, the differences between EU2 and EU8 mobiles 
were drawn upon. 
Bulgarian Female (1), EU Group 4, Sweden: I feel that I am 
discriminated even if I go as a European citizen 'cause Bulgaria is 
part of the EU [but] sometimes, I am being considered as a person 
coming from somewhere else that doesn't belong to the EU. 
Because it's Bulgaria! Because [from] the new EU countries people 
all expect that we are beggars and everything bad and negative. 
It's kind of like, we are not even given the chance to show who we 
are. 
Polish Female (1): But don't you think it's maybe, now a little bit 
better than if you stayed outside of EU? Cause, I'm coming from 
Poland and, uh, sometimes I feel quite [the] similar way. … 
Polish Female (2): [If] young people like us, keep on travelling and 
going to different places and meet different people, then perhaps 
those stereotypes will phase out.   
 
Nonetheless, as the second half of the exchange illustrates, these CEE 
mobiles also observed some progress over time – associated with accession 
to and membership in the EU – and seemed, on the whole, optimistic about 
how CEE mobiles will be able to exercise their EU mobility rights in the future. 
Their optimism corresponds with that of other EU groups in Sweden about the 
future of EU citizenship more broadly. The only exception to this trend was the 
place of mobile Roma – an issue only really raised in the Swedish groups – 
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which appeared to illustrate, once again, the limitations of a non-harmonised 
EU system. 
Swedish Female (6), Stayer Group, Sweden: [L]ook at how Roma 
people are treated and that's [a] very clear example [of inequality 
between EU citizens]…  
Swedish Female (2): Exactly! … France is [supposed to be] a 
democracy. … [Y]ou know, it's contradictory I think. You create this 
Union to keep the stability and democracy and interdependence. 
And then you have these people who are not part [of this Union]. 
That is a [form of] exclusion to say that, well they are not part of this 
Union, “So out you go!” 
Swedish Female (6): … they were from Romania, Bulgaria, 
Greece. 
Swedish Female (5): So again, very contradictory, … when it's suits 
you, [EU membership is] great! [A]nd when… [there is] a problem, 
you just kind of want to get rid of it. … [A]nd it's kind of absurd to 
have such a big, huge system in all of Europe, because you don't 
really follow your own rules.  
 
Moreover, the sense of optimism in Swedish groups about the position of CEE 
mobiles did not appear to prevail in the UK groups. In fact, both EU mobiles 
and British stayers attempted to avoid lengthy discussions about these 
stereotypes. In these groups one, at most, two participants drew attention to 
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discussion when the opportunity arouse (as illustrated in the excerpt from EU 
Group 1, UK earlier). The same internal dynamics prevailed in the British 
stayer group. In this group however, the participant raising the issue of 
national stereotypes – British Male (2) –managed to turn the discussions 
around and, unintentionally perhaps, he touched upon the notion that coupled 
with EU mobility flows, these issues weakened the status of stayers. His 
monologue complements the citations from EU-15 mobiles earlier – about the 
differences between EU-15 and CEE citizens –, and sheds light on the 
significance of the member state in an increasingly integrated EU. 
Accordingly, the dominant group within member states might hold on to their 
privileged positions and express an apparently desired cosmopolitan outlook, 
but one that is “temporal, conditional and often fragile” in character (Skey, 
2011a: 8). 
British Male (2), Stayer Group, UK: I went to Malta. … I got on the 
plane the same way [as] a couple of months before… [when] I went 
to Edinburgh and I didn’t really think about it. I thought it was quite 
novel! I thought it was quite nice, if you contemplate going on a 
little break in another country. [Some laughs.]  How cosmopolitan it 
made me feel! But then, … if you ask a lot of British people … they 
would say that [EU mobility] kind of works against us. You’re 
constantly bombarded with [this] rhetoric, which claims that far too 
many people are coming into this country and that… [there is a] 
flow of Eastern European migrants who are coming in and 
snapping up jobs! And there are people like Nigel Farage who, 
although they aren’t implicitly saying things that are racist, … [they 
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are] kind of quoting … the fears that a lot of people have about this! 
[I am]  coming from East Anglia where fruit-picking, for instance, is 
quite a big business during the summer. [Some smiles.] And you 
end up with a lot of seasonal workers! And I remember, speaking to 
… a Polish chap I met in the pub and he had a Masters degree and 
yet he was coming over to do fruit picking because … he wanted to 
work! He really did! … I thought it was quite admirable. I thought 
that was quite impressive. I thought he has the initiative to come 
over here because … he’s following money. Whereas, I don’t think 
if anyone offered me a job, fruit picking in Poland… I would be 
particularly happy about it! ... But one joke that I heard was that we 
have a lot in common with the Polish people. We are both from 
quite heavy drinking cultures [Some laughs.], we both have a 
national love of meat-based dishes and… 
British Male (1): Terrible! 
British Male (2) : … and a shared similarity is that none of us want 
to be in Poland! [A lot of heavy, but also sarcastic laughs.] And as 
funny as it is, I actually thought, ‘Yeah, that’s not really something 
you can say.’ But there is, sadly, a little bit of truth in it. [Others still 
laugh.] I’m the only one in the room whose face has gone red! 
 
In addition to the aforementioned differences between CEE and EU-15 
mobiles, most participants also differentiated between stayers. The latter 
distinction was made on the basis of whether EU citizens could afford to 
exercise their EU mobility rights. Two types of stayers were classified; the 
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potential EU citizens, who have the means to be mobile at some point in their 
lives, and member state-oriented citizens, who cannot afford to do so. The 
latter group was expected to be the largest segment of the EU’s population 
today. Nonetheless, from the two stayer groups, only one stayer classified 
herself in the later category of EU citizens. Thus the others belonged to, most 
likely, the ‘potential’ EU citizens category. 
British Female (1), Stayer Group, UK: I think, a big issue is money. 
Like, the majority of people can’t afford to go, like anywhere. 
[Sarcastically.] …I mean, like, I remember … talking to my parents 
about the [EU] benefits and they were just like, ‘Well, how does this 
affect me? We can’t afford to go to [another] country anyway!’ 
British Male (3): [That is the case] for a lot of people. 
British Male (5): Ahham. 
British Female (1): So, yeah. It’s very much, … it [is] aimed at 
probably the middle class [and] upwards, you know? 
British-Canadian Male: I think this is really interesting… I mean, I 
agree with both of what you guys said as well, especially about the 
freedom of labour, the freedom of movements. It’s not that equal at 
all, in anyway!  
 
Every group suggested that the different categories of EU citizens, were “here 
to stay”, making it rather unlikely for EU citizenship (with its current roots in 
mobility) to become relevant for the less privileged segment of the EU’s 
population. In fact, both EU mobiles and stayers suggested that it could, one 
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day, replace the role of class structures in the EU. Thus the majority of 
participants agreed that national rather than dual (national and EU) 
citizenships were likely to remain the main point of call for them. 
French Male, EU Group 1, Sweden: [S]ince we can move, it starts 
to be relevant to be European. But that's the problem I think, not for 
us but for people that don't move. Why should they feel European? 
They do not take advantage of it. Okay, it's like an extra-upper 
institution that they don't really understand and I think it will create 
very soon a gap between like cosmopolitan citizens, whether they 
are European or not, and national citizens [who] can't be anything 
but national citizens. It will be just a social difference.  
Portuguese Male: Do you think that might replace class structure in 
a sense? 
French Male: I think class will still be relevant but like in forbid 
relations because our lower class that won't be able to travel or to 
meet the other people of the world or Europe or whatever, they will 
close [up between] themselves. And that actually what'd happened 
because unfortunately quite an important part of our lower class 
turned their vote from left parties to far-right parties. Sweden might 
be different, but in Denmark, in France, in Germany, in Switzerland 
[that is what’s happening]. There will be really a distinction of 
people that could feel European or citizen of the world or whatever 
and the people that can't because they just don't have the 
opportunities even to experience travel. So it's not …a general 
citizenship. At least I think it's like national citizenships will be the 
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same at the end, you can be French, British or whatever, but it 
does not mean that you are co-national [EU] citizens.  
 
Therefore, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish and Romanian mobiles, who 
participated in the focus groups, classified themselves as having a different 
type of EU status from that of EU-15 mobiles. Even EU-15 mobiles (and EU-
15 stayers) recognised that they were more encouraged to practise their EU 
mobility rights and, subsequently, had different opportunities across the EU 
than their CEE fellows. Thus two categories of EU mobiles emerged from the 
focus group debates: the ‘Eurostars’, in this the case EU-15 mobiles (Favell, 
2008; 2010) and second-class ‘Eurostars’, in this case CEE mobiles. 
 
Moreover, all groups suggested that stayers might find the basic concept of 
EU citizenship baffling – similarly to the reaction of some Swedish stayers 
(quoted in Chapter 4). They also made distinctions between further categories 
of stayers, depending on whether or not these stayers could afford exercising 
their EU mobility rights in the future. Stayers who do not speak foreign 
languages or have the necessary economic resources to move within the EU 
were expected to remain member state-oriented citizens. They were expected 
to “close up between themselves” in response to European integration and 
thus exhibit Eurosceptic attitudes. However, most stayers in the focus groups 
appeared to make up yet another category of EU citizens. They belonged to a 
(supposedly) growing group of stayers who had the potential to exercise their 
EU mobility rights but decided to stay in their country of origin due to personal 
or professional reasons or, quite often, because it was assumed to be “easier” 
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to do so. These stayers are likely to be part of the “median European” group 
who expresses a sense of ambivalence rather than outright scepticism 
towards the EU (Van Ingelgom, 2014).  
 
Table 6.1. Categories of EU citizens 
 
The resulting categories of EU citizens are illustrated in Table 6.1.. The table 
suggests that rather than uniting EU citizens in a truly EU society, EU mobility 
rights are likely to lead to further processes of differentiation. Even if not 
explicitly, these categories of EU citizens are embedded in the Commission’s 
discourse and the institutional framework of EU citizenship, both of which 
define an exclusive model of EU citizenship. These categories are, thus, not 
the outcome of the recent crisis or the result of unreceptive host country 
contexts and, unless the institutional framework of EU citizenship changes, 
likely to shape citizens’ experiences of EU mobility for the foreseeable future. 
 
6.4. Summary 
The evidence in this chapter suggested that both EU mobiles and stayers 
were fairly well-informed about their EU rights, especially their EU mobility 
rights and associated civic, social and economic entitlements. They also 
appeared fairly upbeat when discussing these rights, especially when the 
Eurostars Potential EU citizens
Second-class Eurostars Member state-oriented 
citizens
Active EU Citizens Passive EU Citizens
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focus was on how EU ‘harmonisation’ processes ensured health care 
coverage for EU mobiles and the effective implementation of the EHIC card. 
This finding complements previous studies about the tendency among 
(young) citizens to substitute the advantages of their EU citizenship with EU 
mobility rights (Férnandez, 2005; Favell, 2008; TNS Opinion and Social, 
2010). Moreover, when participants spoke about the way in which EU mobility 
is already “taken for granted”, they suggested it might already be a significant 
aspect of citizens’ everyday lives within the EU. As such, EU mobility 
appeared to create a sense of geographical proximity between the EU and its 
citizens (Siklodi, 2014). Even more, it was observed to build a dynamic bond 
between the EU and its citizens – which is precisely how scholars in the field 
of citizenship studies defined the concept of ‘citizenship’ (see for example 
Aristotle, 1946; Isin and Turner, 2002; Heater, 2004a; Magnette, 2005). 
Nonetheless, obstacles faced by EU mobiles in Sweden or the UK were also 
identified, including for example when EU mobiles attempted to open a bank 
account or use health care services. The same obstacles were identified by 
the Commission (2010b) in its very first EU citizenship report. Although it has 
recognised that rectifying these obstacles requires the urgent attention of 
policy-makers, the Commission has not really provided a solution so far.  
 
There were no major differences between the approaches of EU mobiles and 
stayers to EU rights. Both EU mobiles and stayers spent little time discussing 
EU participation at this point – though it is the only EU right stayers could 
exercise in their country of origin. Nonetheless, there was an interesting 
difference between the approaches of EU mobiles in the two countries. Due to 
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the emphasis on the principles of neutrality and cognitive mobilisation among 
the public, Sweden is usually identified as the ideal context for post-national 
models of citizenships to emerge (Agius, 2006: 588; Welzel and Inglehart, 
2010: 55). Accordingly, every group in Sweden adopted a rights-based 
approach to (EU) citizenship. However, it was the UK rather than the Swedish 
context, which increased the likelihood for EU mobiles to consider EU 
participation within the theme of EU rights (albeit to a limited extent here as 
well). In this context, factors, which were likely to prevent mobiles from 
realising their EU citizenship, including the array of European languages, 
cultures and welfare state provisions (especially those related to health care 
and education) (Favell, 2008; European Commission, 2010b; 2013a), and the 
distinctive levels of member state influence within EU institutions (Moravcsik, 
1998) were debated by participants in much more detail.  
 
These debates then illustrated the way in which EU mobility is likely to lead to 
new processes of differentiation and exclusion. Although the young and 
educated citizens are likely to be the least affected by national migration 
policies and stereotypes, EU (learning) mobility appeared to accentuate the 
importance of these issues, leading participants to classify different categories 
of EU citizens, depending on their mobility status (EU mobiles/stayers), 
country of origin (especially along the East/West and North/South divides, and 
length of membership in the EU) and socio-economic backgrounds (students/ 
workers, ethnic backgrounds, language skills, economic resources and 
educational qualifications). Depending on their country of residence, 
participants also had different hopes so as to whether these categories of EU 
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citizens were likely to become more clearly delineated in the future – with the 
UK groups exhibiting more cynical attitudes.  
 
These findings seem to shed a rather dim light on the likelihood of these 
citizens (ever) realising a ‘community of Europeans’ and, in so doing, 
legitimising the EU’s democratic quest. The only other way for citizens to 
rectify these issues was through EU participation. However, the preceding 
chapters already hinted that participants often overlooked EU participation. As 
a result, the moderator probed each group about the participatory dimension 
of their EU citizenship towards the end of the discussions. The next chapter 
presents the key issues young and educated citizens’ identified as important 
for realising EU citizenship as EU participation. 
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Chapter 7. EU citizenship as EU participation 
Citizens’ participation activates models of citizenship and, as a result, has 
dominated most of the literature within the field of citizenship studies on the 
dichotomy of active/passive citizenship (see for example Magnette, 2003; 
Bellamy, 2008a: 97-123; Welge, 2015). However, the introduction of EU 
citizenship did not boost citizens’ EU participation. Actually, their EU 
participation has declined since the 1990s (as illustrated in Table 1.2.). This 
decline seemingly supports the second-order thesis of EP elections, which 
depicts EP elections as secondary to general elections (Seif and Schmitt, 
1980; Schmitt, 2005). It has also been explained in light of the EU’s 
enlargement to CEE states with historically lower levels of participation than in 
EU-15 states, and changing public attitudes towards the European integration 
processes, EU institutions and national politics (Hix and Marsh, 2007; Muñoz, 
Torcal and Bonet, 2011; Söderlund, Wass and Blais, 2011; Armingeon and 
Ceka, 2014; Tilley and Hobolt, 2014).  
 
Considered through the framework of EU citizenship, these findings are not 
particularly surprising. For example, the Commission’s (2010a, 2013a) 
discourse seems to suggest that its focus on EU participation is temporary 
and selective at best. Actually, due to its almost exclusive focus on EU 
mobiles’ participation, its discourse seems to question the extent to which EU 
citizenship is there to enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy in the first 
place (Chapter 2.2.3.). However, the findings of existing research on EU 
mobiles’ participation are clearly at odds with the Commission’s expectations. 
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These studies underline the rather limited, just short of negative, impact EU 
mobility has on citizens’ actual EU participation (Mattila, 2003; Muxel, 2009; 
Favell, 2010; Strudel and Michalska, 2012). The previous empirical chapters 
of this thesis also indicated that young and educated citizens rarely 
considered their EU participation within the framework of EU citizenship and, 
in the very few cases they did, appeared rather sceptical about its actual 
relevance to their (and more broadly to citizens’) lives (Chapters 4 – 6). 
Considered together, the institutional and empirical frameworks of EU 
citizenship suggest that the lived experiences of EU citizenship might not be 
comparable to national citizenships. 
 
Against this backdrop, the chapter explores young and educated citizens’ 
perceptions of participation in more depth. More specifically, it interrogates EU 
mobiles and stayers’ perceptions of EU participation, using original focus 
group evidence from Sweden and the UK. The evidence considered in this 
chapter further refines the distinction between EU mobiles and stayers (that 
has been a focal point of the previous chapters, especially Chapters 5 and 6). 
In exploring the indicators for citizens’ participation, which have been set out 
previously (see Table 1.3.), the chapter draws a rather complex portrait, 
echoing broader trends associated with issue-based approaches to and 
rational cost-benefit calculations of (EU) participation (Downs, 1957; Smets 
and van Ham, 2013). Most importantly perhaps, the chapter frames EU 
participation as the weakest dimension of EU citizenship for both EU mobiles 
and stayers (Research Questions 2), and one that is likely to call into question 
the relevance of the other two dimensions of their EU citizenship as well 
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(Research Questions 3). Instead of EU participation, the focus among 
participants was, once again EU mobility and how it made citizens ‘more 
knowledgeable about the EU’, leading to further processes of differentiation 
between EU citizens (Research Question 4). This finding has important 
consequences for how we should approach the quest for democratic 
legitimacy in the EU (Research Question 5).  
 
This chapter forms the last of three empirical chapters (Chapters 5 – 7), which 
probe how EU mobiles and stayers perceive one of the dimensions of their EU 
citizenship. In doing so, these three chapters together provide a response to 
the main research question, namely whether and how young and educated 
citizens realise their EU citizenship (Research Question 1).  The chapter has 
three main parts. The first part underscores the complexities in EU mobiles 
and stayers’ perceptions of (EU) participation. The second part underscores 
the relevance of (EU) mobility to addressing the issue of EU citizenship and 
makes references to the (perceived) interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship 
and the categories of EU citizens, which may emerge when EU mobility and 
approaches to EU participation are combined. The third part sheds light on 
what young and educated citizens considered to be the most appropriate 
avenues for promoting the EU and EU citizenship. 
 
7.1. EU mobiles and stayers’ perceptions of (EU) participation  
Although a number of opportunities were given to participants to discuss their 
participation in traditional and alternative forms of engagement in EU, national 
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and local politics – not to mention that most of them were studying politics at a 
university at the time the focus groups were carried out – they did not really 
speak about this issue until the moderator probed them directly. In fact, from 
the ten focus groups, only one discussed EU participation without probing.101 
Hence it seemed as if though EU participation was not, in the eyes of young 
and educated citizens, as contentious or important dimension of EU 
citizenship as EU identity or EU mobility rights. To some extent at least, this 
finding should not be surprising. All EU mobiles and stayers were studying at 
a university at the time of the interviews. So they were likely to have been 
removed from the political sphere in which other types of EU mobility takes 
place. They also would not have had to go through the same bureaucratic 
hassles EU labour mobiles do. As a result, they can be expected to harbour 
particularly positive opinions about EU mobility (Cairns, 2010).  
 
However, the focus groups were composed of a select group of young and 
educated citizens – mostly with an interest and expertise in politics and/or 
European studies (see Appendix 2 for demographic information). Considered 
in this light, it is rather surprising that most participants did not deliberate on 
EU participation within the framework of EU citizenship. Nonetheless, after the 
moderator asked them about (EU) participation, their expertise in politics 
                                            
101 The issue of EU participation was raised in four groups but only one discussed it in detail. 
It has already been illustrated that the German-British mobile in EU Group 3, UK appeared to 
be particularly enthusiastic about realising a political model of EU citizenship compared to her 
fellows. In Sweden, EU mobiles mentioned the low level of EU participation as another reason 
why they preferred to adopt a ‘cosmopolitan’ sense of citizenship. EU Group 2, the UK was 
the only group, where some discussion about EU participation between participants took 
place. Actually, from the outset it was quite apparent that the three female EU mobiles in this 
group had a more favourable attitude towards realising a political union in the EU – especially 
by integrating citizens into the EU level. 
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manifested through the rather long and detailed debates that ensued about 
the most important level of participation and most effective forms of 
engagement available to EU mobiles and stayers.102 Even then however, it 
quickly became apparent that hardly any of these young and educated 
citizens had participated in EU politics prior to the focus group research. The 
next two sections shed light on these issues, considering first EU mobiles and 
then stayers’ perceptions of participation. 
 
7.1.1. ‘Are we making an impact?’ EU mobiles’ approaches to (EU) 
participation 
Most discussions started out by a consideration of how young and educated 
citizens could make their voices heard in politics. At this point almost every 
participant – regardless of his or her mobility status – suggested that 
participation was issue-specific and had a personal connotation. In the 
ensuing discussions however, this basic assumption led to some differences 
between how EU mobiles and stayers approached (EU) participation. This 
section sheds light on these emerging differences. 
 
The basic assumption that their participation was issue-specific shaped how 
EU mobiles selected the level (local, national or EU) of their participation. In 
particular, most EU mobiles adopted a multi-level approach to participation – 
                                            
102 This was the case in all groups apart from EU Group 3, Sweden – where the educational 
background of students was more mixed (see Appendix 2). 
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similarly to their approaches to identity – and suggested citizens will likely 
select one or the other level based on the issue they find the most important.  
German Male, EU Group 1, UK: I think the subsidiarity principle 
should be applied to [participation in] Europe. Where you get these 
European issues that the European-level should be dealing with, 
and there are national issues that should be dealt with at the 
national level.... The European-level should be dealing with foreign 
policies, defence. But then if you take them to be the most 
important, then definitely [the EU level is important for you]! But if 
you think it’s more about education and things like that, then maybe 
it’s the national level that’s more important. 
Accordingly, those EU mobiles who previously exhibited traces of a 
cosmopolitan outlook seemed to prefer participating in alternative forms of 
engagement, and especially when the issue at hand had an international 
scope.  
French Male, EU Group 3, Sweden: I went to the 1st of May march 
with Swedish friends. [All laugh.] Precisely, the workers’ day is 
international and by walking there with the Swedes, I was actually 
kind of walking with also French people, or everybody in the world! 
That made sense for me.  
These examples suggest that the approaches of most EU mobiles to 
participation were dynamic and issue-specific. They also appear to echo the 
expected shift in how young citizens’ approach participation. Specifically, in 
order to make their voices heard on the issues they consider the most 
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important, young citizens are expected to participate in a range of traditional 
and alternative forms of engagement (see for example, Sloam, 2014a).  
 
As the discussions progressed however, it became apparent that the 
approach of EU mobiles to EU participation, especially, was anything but 
dynamic. At first almost every EU mobile said EU participation, usually 
understood as voting in the EP elections, was important to them. Later they 
revealed that the EU and its institutions looked “too abstract” and “complicated 
to really understand” and so a good number of EU mobiles said they did not 
feel they could have “any real influence” over the decisions reached by the EU 
executive.103 As a result, only seven of the total 52 EU mobiles, who 
participated in the focus groups, voted in the EP elections (two across the 
groups in Sweden and five across the groups in the UK). 
Bulgarian Female, EU Group 2, Sweden: … I don't think anyone 
gets European politics, like voting for your MP in the European 
Parliament. I don't get it! I don't understand what these people do 
there. Like, what decisions they make [or] how they make them. I 
was a bit annoyed a couple of years ago when they voted the 
European President [Herman Van] Rompuy. Who voted [for] him?! 
… 
Portuguese Male: Yeah, you didn't vote for him… I would agree 
with you, that with European politics you don't really know what's 
                                            
103 In fact, quite a few EU mobiles – predominantly females and mainly those in Sweden – 
also expressed a sense of disappointment when it came to the effect of their political 
participation more broadly. 
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happening. But then suddenly you see all these things happening, 
the certifications and … these common laws. And I like it. So I'm 
not going to criticise. I think they are doing a good job. Maybe, they 
are doing such a good job that it's not so political …! 
As apparent from the response of the Portuguese mobile, some EU mobiles 
shifted the focus of the prevalent discussions and suggested it was 
acceptable not to participate at the EU level, because this level is, perhaps 
“not so political” and even if citizens did not participate, “everything still 
worked”. Actually, this EU mobile appeared to grant the EU a regulatory 
function, which does not require ordinary citizens to really understand EU 
politics or, for that matter, to participate in EU politics (echoing the case put 
forward by Majone, 1998).  
 
Nonetheless, it is more likely that the response of the Portuguese Male served 
a very specific purpose – to justify citizens’ (and so his) abstention from EU 
participation. This is only one of a number of examples where similar points 
were raised by EU mobiles. However, if these ‘ideal EU citizens’, did not 
consider EU participation as a necessary part of their every day life, it is even 
less likely that other EU citizens would do so. Moreover, it is interesting to 
note, once again the dynamics between these two EU mobiles – the frustrated 
Bulgarian Female is ‘calmed down’ by the ‘more knowledgeable’ Portuguese 
male. It appears to resonate with the example earlier when the (same) 
Bulgarian Female was speaking about how EU-15 bureaucrats did not appear 
to know her country was in the EU (Cited in Chapter 6). This exchange once 
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again indicates the possibility that the previously identified distinctions among 
EU mobiles were relevant to discussions about EU participation as well. 
 
The discussions which took place in EU Group 3, UK support the point raised 
earlier: EU mobiles did not seem to adopt a dynamic approach to EU 
participation. Actually, EU mobiles engaged with this dimension to a rather 
limited extent. There were a couple of exceptions nonetheless. Perhaps the 
most obvious occurred in EU Group 3, UK where a participant – German-
British Female – tried really hard to find an alternative to enhancing the level 
of citizens’ EU participation and, consequently, sense of EU identity. She 
suggested introducing an EU-wide list of candidates for the EP elections – so 
as to draw attention away from national parties and national politics, and turn 
these elections into truly ‘European’ affairs. However, the other participants in 
her group did not find her idea convincing and were quick to rebuff it. They 
cited a number of reasons on why an EU-wide list of candidates would not 
work in practice, including citizens’ lack of knowledge about (non-national) 
candidates, the increase in the (already) elitist character of EU elections and, 
most importantly perhaps, the clash of European and nationalist ideals. The 
tone of the discussion hence turned from a sense of eagerness – expressed 
by the German-British Female participant about the prospects of enhancing 
citizens’ sense of EU citizenship – to that of (Euro)scepticism – articulated by 
the other members in the group.  
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German-British Female, EU Group 3, UK: I would feel much, much 
more European if I voted for example for a Hungarian candidate 
for, no, let’s say for example that, or an Italian candidate… 
Italian Female: But … [y]ou wouldn’t have the knowledge to do 
that. That’s what I think. 
German-British Female: Why wouldn’t I? I can read about it, can’t 
I? 
Dutch Female: You don’t know whether [the candidates] are 
capable. You don’t know. Like, you would have to do research… I 
don’t think many people would [do that]. 
German-British Female: But that would make it European!... 
Italian Female: I think only a really rich politician [could run an EU-
wide campaign]… 
Swedish Female: But then I think there is a national bias as well. 
Because I think it’s, like form a perspective from someone from 
Sweden, to say that an Italian person is a best person, no offence 
to be in the EU, first will be like “No! A Swedish person is the best!” 
Because that’s what you know … 
Dutch Female: Patriotism, yeah! ... 
German-British Female: I don’t believe that… 
Swedish Female: I think a Swedish person would say, “But what 
does this Italian person know about Sweden?” We’re like on 
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different poles! Like we are cold and … population wise really tiny 
country compared to Italy or the UK. Why would we want someone 
who … doesn’t understand our society? 
 
The way in which some of these issues were raised – in short and often cut-
off sentences – may suggests that most participants were slightly frustrated 
with the strong pro-EU stance of German-British Female. Rather than offering 
alternatives to enhancing citizens EU participation, they identified reasons for 
why her proposition was flawed in the first place. Similar dynamics were 
prevalent between the members of this group throughout the discussion. 
Actually, similarities can be drawn between the main dynamics that occurred 
in EU Group 3, UK and EU Group 4, Sweden – the two groups with a strong 
pro-EU participant each (German-British Female and Polish Female (1) 
respectively). Compared to these two participants then, the others may have 
seemed somewhat ‘Eurosceptic’. However, labelling them as such may not 
quite grasp their actual perceptions.  
 
As apparent from the exchange above, most participants in EU Group 3 were 
not (simply) addressing the issue of EU participation but the manner in which 
it was framed by their German-British fellow. Their frustration then led to a 
lively discussion that sometimes was lacking in substance.104 The critical and 
passive approach they adopted to EU participation was present in the others 
                                            
104 It is also worth noting that the Swedish Female who brought up the issue of national pride 
was the same who originally declared herself as a “world citizen”. Her comments once again 
suggest that her ‘cosmopolitan outlook’ was “fragile” (Skey, 2013) at best. 
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groups too. In these groups however, participants were in agreement and so 
their discussion was cut short. These examples suggest that in reality EU 
mobiles’ approaches to EU participation – and actually to participation more 
broadly – were not really guided by issue-based considerations. Instead, they 
depended on group dynamics and, specifically, the perceived impact their 
participation was likely to have. 
Polish Female (2), EU Group 4, Sweden:  I don't think we have any 
real influence in politics on a bigger level, like [the] EU level or any 
actual big decisions. I'm a bit pessimistic about it… I think that 
where there is money involved, lots of money especially, no one 
will back [away from] the decisions that will allow him [or her] to 
earn millions... Of course, it's important for people to be heard and 
for people to have a medium to voice their opinion. But I really don't 
think that we have any big influence on the things that happen on 
this huge [EU] level… 
French Male (1): It's also a technical question. How to participate? 
Where is the European-level when you are in your county? [It is] 
difficult to find it. You're more used to know your average realities... 
Of course, to be a volunteer is maybe the [simplest] way to 
engage… But for the election, … I'm a bit more pessimistic as you 
are in this [EU] level. Because we voted against the European 
Constitution and it passed! So yes, this is something more 
personal.  
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From the various explanations scholars have put forward to explaining 
citizens’ participation (and more recently wide-spread abstention) from (EU) 
politics (for an overview see Smets and van Ham, 2013), EU mobiles’ debates 
appeared to have underlined the importance of perceived impact and, 
subsequently, the role of rational cost-benefit calculations.105 Both of these 
issues seemed to have stirred EU mobiles to abstain, rather than participate in 
EU politics.   
 
Once EU mobiles accepted that they were likely to have little or no impact on 
how EU decisions are made, most of them selected participation at the 
national level as the most relevant to their and (ordinary) citizens’ lives more 
broadly. Considered in this light, their debates granted EU participation a 
second-order character (compared to participation in the general elections). 
This is precisely what scholars who work on turnout at the EP elections have 
assumed to be the case (especially Schmitt, 2005). 
Finnish Female (1), EU Group 2, UK: … I still think that national 
elections are the most important. Yeah, just because of like, issues 
of taxation and defence and what not. All the things that make a 
state a state are decided at that level and elections feed into that – 
that is the public policy process. Although, I think, the European 
Union is really important. I just think that national elections are the 
most important. 
                                            
105 There was only one exception to this at the group level – in EU Group 2, UK. Here 
participation was discussed as a duty of citizens. 
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Finnish Female (2): I think since moving to the UK, local elections 
have become, I still vote in them, but it’s become less important for 
me. Just because I’m not in Finland that much anymore… I still 
vote because I believe everybody should participate. ... But it’s not 
that important. But it definitely does play a part… I also agree that 
national elections are more important for me, especially ‘cause it’s 
the whole, entire country. But I didn’t vote at the European 
elections either, so I can’t say [much about that]. Next year though, 
will see… 
Since most EU mobiles only considered participation within their country of 
origin, this dimension was, once again, clearly placed within the national 
citizenship framework (the same point was apparent in EU mobiles and 
stayers’ initial approaches to citizenship – illustrated in Chapter 4). In 
comparison, hardly any EU mobiles mentioned that their EU citizenship 
allowed them to participate in the local and EP elections in Sweden or the UK. 
Nonetheless, quite a few EU mobiles, especially those in the UK, anticipated 
in the 2014 EP elections – as the quote from the Finnish Female (2) 
suggests.106  
 
In the few cases where the right to participate in the host country was 
mentioned, differences between EU mobiles’ perceptions of this issue 
emerged, depending on the length of time these participants had spent in 
                                            
106 This was more apparent in the EU groups in the UK, probably because of the timing of the 
focus groups – they took place almost a year after the Swedish interviews and just a year 
before the 2014 EP elections. At the time a possible ‘Brexit’ was offered by the Conservatives 
and the popularity of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) was also on the rise. 
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Sweden and the UK. Those EU mobiles, who stayed in Sweden or the UK on 
a semi-permanent basis or for a longer period of time, had a tendency to 
participate in the host country as well as in their country of origin. They were 
also much more likely to support the granting of national electoral rights to EU 
residents – an option the Commission has also been thinking about for a few 
years (see for example European Commission, 2010f).107 In the case of 
Sweden in particular, EU mobiles often said they did not know enough about 
Swedish politics to help them make a choice. Moreover, a long-term EU 
mobile mentioned that Swedish parties never “really reach[ed] out to migrants” 
and instead “focused on Swedes”. As a result, only one of the 25 EU mobiles 
had participated in Swedish politics prior to the focus groups. 
German Female, EU Group 2, Sweden: [Full time student, lived in 
Sweden for 3.5 years.] [E]ven though we live outside of our home 
countries and some longer than others, we still vote in our national 
elections... But we don’t actually live in that country! ... [W]e don't 
participate in the policies that are taking place where we live that 
could actually benefit us.  
 
In comparison, temporary EU mobiles only ever participated in their 
country of origin. They identified a number of reasons for their abstention 
from Swedish and UK politics, including a lack of knowledge about their 
EU electoral rights, which provided them the option to participate in the 
                                            
107 Mainly male students expressed the sentiment that it was not “their place” to participate in 
the host country, while female students supported the idea of granting national electoral rights 
to EU mobiles. However, due to the small number of cases in which these issues were raised 
and the limited scope of students’ debates, it is difficult to really underscore whether students’ 
sentiments really differed based on gender or if it was the result of peer-pressure and focus 
group contexts. 
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first place and a sense of uneasiness these EU mobiles felt about 
participating in a society of which they were not full members. These 
mobiles then assumed it was not “their place” to participate in the host 
country. In response, EU mobiles with semi-permanent residency 
became critical about the reasoning behind recent EU mobiles’ 
abstention from participating in the host country. The ensuing debates 
then revealed that, quite often, these young and educated citizens were 
not familiar with the residency requirements that were attached to EU 
mobiles’ right to participate in the host country.  
Italian Male, EU Group 1, UK: The thing with participating in 
another country is that, firstly, I wouldn’t like the person who comes 
[here] for one month to have a voice. Not because he can’t, but 
because it’s not really right. Live there for one year, two years and 
then you decide. Obviously, if you live there for a long time, you 
work there, you live there, you have family there – it’s right that you 
can actually vote. But, like, last year there were some council 
elections and I didn’t even think of going. Because it wouldn’t feel 
right! Why would I do that, you know? I came here in September, 
why would I vote in October?.… 
German-Swiss Female: But maybe if that had happened at the end 
of your three years here, you would have had something to add. 
Just because other students will be living here in Egham, in the 
university… 
Italian Male: Yeah of course! If you live for a long time in one 
place… But I didn’t know anything about it! 
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German-Swiss Female: …Yeah, I know. I’m saying if it had 
happened after[wards]… 
Dutch Male: I would also feel the same way as well. Even, for 
instance, in the Netherlands I studied in Maastricht which is not my 
hometown. I didn’t feel like I could vote for them [or] I could make a 
decision for them. Even if I lived there for three years! It would still 
feel just wrong.  
Regardless of whether these EU mobiles expressed a preference for 
participating in the country of origin or the host country, the ensuing 
discussion between them appeared to reinforce an earlier finding of this 
chapter – participating at the national level was observed as the most 
important by these young and educated citizens. 
 
Although no differences emerged between EU mobiles’ perceptions of the 
importance of EU participation and preferred level of participation, there was a 
slight variation in their approaches to different forms of engagement, 
depending on the host country. EU mobiles in the UK usually focused on 
national elections, while those in Sweden appeared to favour alternative forms 
of engagement, including for example volunteering at the EU level.108 This 
finding seem to contradict the broader trends we have observed to take place 
in both of these countries – with Sweden showing particularly high and the UK 
particularly low turnout levels in national and EU elections (as illustrated in 
                                            
108 In the case of the EU mobiles in the UK, alternative forms of engagement were mentioned 
when participants spoke about issues that they considered important, like helping Syrian 
refugees. Their subsequent participation in alternative forms of engagement was then not 
linked to the various levels of politics in the EU. 
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Table 1.2.). Actually, the extant literature has underlined, when considered 
from the broader EU context, young people’s preference for participating in 
alternative forms of engagement is, perhaps, most visible in the UK (see for 
example Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Sloam, 2013). The same did not seem to 
hold true for the case of the select group of EU mobiles who participated in 
the EU Groups in the UK.  
 
While the evidence appears to contradict the broader trends, which have been 
apparent in these country contexts, EU mobiles’ responses seem to 
complement the idea that the recent transformation in (young) citizens’ 
participation can be issue specific  (Norris, 2002; Franklin, 2004; Favell, 2010; 
Sloam, 2012a, b). Actually, for the first time it was apparent that these EU 
mobiles’ participation (at least in) alternative forms of engagement could have 
been guided by issue-specific considerations. 
Romanian Female (1), EU Group 4, Sweden: I volunteered in an 
NGO wh[ich] had projects funded through [the] EU. But in a way, 
they only worked with people from the [national] ministry that 
filtered the money from the EU. So everything was also inside the 
country, except the money was coming from [the] outside.  
Polish Female (1): I participated in a couple of training courses like 
…the European Youth in Action programme. [M]y organisation 
[has] also established … [the] ‘national youth organisation council’ 
and all of the European countries have this… [it] is responsible for 
whenever, for example the Commission wants to introduce new 
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laws [and it wants to] … consult the youth. … And I know, it's [a] 
very little thing, but I think it helps. There is also something called a 
‘structured dialogue’ and it's basically the idea that in every country 
[we] consult the youth … on topics like unemployment … or 
participation in democracy and so on… [The resulting 
recommendations] go to the European Commission. And of course 
it has no real legal force, but I think it's good that youth has some 
kind of voice. …  
Bulgarian Female: Do you really think that the Commission reads 
this? 
Polish Female (1): Oh they have to! Because some people are 
attending this conference and there are some people from the 
European Commission that are involved. [Although] I don't know 
what … they do later with this [recommendation]. 
Polish Female (2): At least it exists! 
Polish Female (1): As I said, it might be a little drop in the sea. 
However, even when some EU mobiles expressed a sense of enthusiasm 
about participating in alternative forms of engagement and on issues that they 
felt closest to, there were one or two EU mobile who then questioned the 
extent to which these forms of engagement could really make an influence. 
Similar tendencies emerged in the other groups as well, suggesting that the 
majority of EU mobiles’ (in both countries) selected both the level of their 
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participation and forms of engagement according to the perceived impact their 
participation could have on politics.  
 
At this point it is perhaps worth noting that a couple of EU mobiles also spoke 
about the various participatory rights they had as EU citizens. However, these 
rights were mentioned only fleetingly and without generating much discussion. 
For example, the right to petition the EP or the European Ombudsman was 
only cited in one group and by the openly pro-EU participant who was also 
keen to make the EP elections truly ‘European’ (German-British Female, EU 
Group 3, UK). Similarly, only one EU mobile in Sweden spoke of the 
European Citizens’ Initiative (CI). In this case however, he expressed a very 
strong sense of sarcasm about the real purpose of CI. His tone echoed that of 
the other male EU mobiles in Sweden who appeared to have a ‘cosmopolitan 
outlook’.  
French Male, EU Group 1, Sweden: I'm really looking forward to 
the day it will be used, the [European citizens’] initiative. Because 
one million of Europeans, yeah, okay. I think, it's only possible if 
[the] European Union decided to attack the United States. Then 
you will have 200 million [or] so of Europeans signing the petition 
“No we should not!” [All laugh.] Otherwise, I don't want to be 
pessimistic, but look at the turnout for the European election[s]! It's 
so low. [Portuguese and Italian males nod in agreement.]… [It is] 
even lower in [the] recent countries that have joined the Union. 
Whereas, it should be so high [there], because it's so important for 
them!   
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Hence there is some indication that EU mobiles’ preferred forms of 
engagement were likely to differ from one issue to the next. In light of the 
focus group evidence, it appears as if these young and educated citizens only 
really agreed on one issue – the distant character of EU politics and the very 
little return they could expect to see from their EU participation. In this context 
there seemed to be very little, if any, support in the evidence that would 
suggests that EU mobility made it more likely for these citizens to participate 
in EU politics. The evidence seems to echo the findings of previous empirical 
research that has shown that EU mobility does not enhance mobiles’ 
disposition to participate in politics (Mattila, 2003; Muxel, 2009; Favell, 2010; 
Strudel and Michalska, 2012). The evidence does not seem to suggest that 
EU mobiles became particularly engaged in the host city’s political landscape 
– contrary to what older generations of EU-15 mobiles seem to do (Favell, 
2010). This finding could, however, be the result of selection bias – all EU 
mobiles were in full time education at the time of the research and the 
educational context would have (more or less) shielded them from having to 
experience the political adversities, which arose in the (local) host society.  
 
Similarly to what we found with EU mobiles and despite of their earlier claims 
about the importance of issue-specific deliberations, rational considerations 
appeared to guide stayers’ approaches to participation as well. As a result 
hardly any stayers participated in EU politics and most found the local-level to 
be the most attractive. The latter was deemed “easier” to influence and did not 
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seem to “feel” as “political” as national and EU level politics. These examples 
are illustrative of oft-cited transformations in (young) citizens’ approaches to 
politics (see especially Norris, 2003; Sloam, 2014a). The rest of this section 
sheds light on stayers’ perceptions of (and subsequent approaches to) the 
various levels and forms of participation available to them in their role as (EU) 
citizens.   
 
7.1.2. ‘We are making an impact’: Stayers’ approaches to participating 
in local politics 
Contrary to the very apparent impact-focus of the EU groups in their 
discussion of participation, a number of UK stayers maintained, from the 
outset that citizens’ participation should not (ever) be judged on the basis of 
the likely impact they were to make.109 Most UK stayers then alleged that for 
them participation was “just” about raising “visual awareness”, especially 
when they participated in alternative forms of engagement. Yet, whether these 
UK stayers exercised their EU participatory rights clearly depended on the 
extent to which they perceived their participation to have an influence on EU 
politics – similarly to the EU groups before. They too then granted a 
secondary character to EU elections. 
British Male (5), Stayer Group, UK: I think that voting didn’t come 
up [in the previous discussions about citizenship], shows the kind of 
                                            
109 Interestingly, the same participant (British Male (5)) spoke about how important it was to 
“see the benefits” of participation (in the EU context especially) in order to mobilise citizens. 
Yet, he later concludes that “participation should [n]ever be judged on whether it was effective 
or not”. The shifting opinion of this participant illustrates well the often sporadic and 
contradictory points put forward by these young and educated citizens. Evidently, discussing 
a sense of citizenship is and can prove difficult to students (even to experts on the subject). 
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change in notions of contemporary citizenship … So, you know, the 
idea of voting in the European elections is something so distant. 
Whereas, you know, … we want to… be involved with participatory 
acts that we can see having the benefits [of]… 
British Male (2): There are so many great problems, I think, with 
participation at the European-level and the fact that … we fight the 
elections on national issues. They seem to be an extension, … a 
little sub-act to our national elections. If they occur separately from 
a national election, it’s your opportunity to punish a government for 
things that it’s done domestically, rather than because you admire 
any kind of views that they have on Europe. Unless [Sarcastically], 
you’re a UKIP voter and just want to spoil your ballots…  
 
Interestingly however, some stayers appeared to be almost more critical about 
their abstention from EU participation than (most) EU mobiles had been 
hitherto. In fact, a Swedish stayer actively encouraged her fellows to 
participate in future EP elections. The earlier example from EU Group 3, UK 
illustrated how little effort EU mobiles were likely to make in order to enhance 
their (and citizens’) disposition to participate in the EU elections.  
Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden: When I think about it 
the commissionaires and the people in the council they are 
representatives of the [national] government[s] or are appointed by 
the national governments so still the national governments have a 
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say in the European Union. So by voting in the national level you 
also interact in the European Union. 
Swedish Female (4): Sometimes I think, well I don't have to know 
so much to vote in the European Union, because you can… vote 
[for] the socialists, the conservatives or if you choose the extreme, 
vote for the Greens. You can choose your political ideology and 
vote for that, [and] then, hopefully. things will turn out fine. I mean 
… you do not have to know so much to go to vote. I do not think we 
should take it as seriously as some do, because it's hard to get to 
know information about the European Union, [about] what will 
[candidates] do if they come to power. [So] just go there and vote!  
Nonetheless, even these stayers’ approaches to enhancing citizens’ 
disposition to participate in EU politics appeared to accentuate the second-
order character of EU elections (Schmidt, 2005). In fact, the idea that citizens 
“should not take” EU participation “as seriously” because they “don't have to 
know so much to vote in the European Union” seemed to have granted a 
secondary character to their EU participation and, by association, their EU 
citizenship status. This is a considerable shift from the initial suggestion by the 
very same stayers who said they felt ‘more European’ than Swedish because 
national identity was not deemed an important aspect of their Swedish 
citizenship (Chapter 5). The evidence then suggests that these stayers did not 
consider EU participation as an important aspect of their EU citizenship. 
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Once probed about which level of politics stayers preferred to participate in, 
the majority spoke of the local level because it was seen to have a clear 
relevance to their lives and still did not ‘feel’ as political (or from the previous 
exchanges distant) as the national or EU levels. The following exchange 
between UK stayers is also useful in illustrating the somewhat indifferent tone 
of the discussions, which occurred when the groups were prompted to 
address the issue of (EU) participation. This dimension of EU citizenship has 
been studied extensively by academics (see for example Muñoz, Torcal and 
Bonet, 2011; Söderlund, Wass and Blais, 2011; Armingeon and Ceka, 2014; 
Tilley and Hobolt, 2014). Yet, the indifferent tone that characterised the 
discussions at this point or the largely ambivalent approach of participants in 
their discussion of this dimension – may already underline that (EU) 
participation was the last thing on the minds of these citizens. Hence they did 
not take up the offer of the moderator to discuss various forms of participation 
and their relevance at different levels of policy-making in the EU. The 
discussions that emerged were then slow-paced, shallow and descriptive – 
despite of numerous attempts by the moderator to challenge the points raised 
by participants.  
 
Admittedly, the somewhat slow-pace of these discussions may also be the 
result of the focus group settings. After all, EU participation was the last 
dimension discussed by these groups, starting approximately an hour into the 
focus groups. However, in the exceptional cases when the moderator probed 
groups about EU participation at an earlier point of the discussion – as was 
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the case with EU Group 1 UK and EU Group 1, Sweden – similar sentiments 
and dynamics emerged.  
British Female (1), Stayer Group, UK: But also, … if you want 
something done at the local-level, it doesn’t feel political. Whereas, 
if you get it to [the] European-level or [the] national level, it does. … 
British Male (1): It’s got the weight to it. But then, the kind of 
effectiveness with which you can deal with it, just really dissipates 
the bigger and bigger the issue becomes. 
British Female (1): Yeah! … I remember when my family were 
getting involved with phone marketing, I was like, ‘Oh, you’re 
engaging in politics! You’re doing something!’. And they were like, 
‘No, this isn’t politics. Not doing anything to do with that!’ … 
British Male (5): It’s true. I also think the British [public] kind of 
envisages politics as party-politics… And … they could get very, 
you know, involved in campaigns like that and not see it as political 
participation… 
Hence, most stayers appeared to echo the well-documented shift among 
young citizens in the EU, who are expected to prefer participating in 
alternative rather than traditional forms of engagement and at the local-level – 
at the level of the politics they perceived as having the most relevance to their 
lives (see for example, (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Sloam, 2012; 
2014a).  
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The previous section already underlined that there was slightly more 
discussion about alternative forms of engagement among EU mobiles in 
Sweden than in the UK. The opposite was the case for stayers. Swedish 
stayers only discussed different levels of participation in traditional forms of 
engagement, while British stayers debated the convenience and impact of 
alternative forms of engagement. Once again, the discussion among British 
stayers was framed around the proposition that their participation was issue-
specific. 
British Male (1), Stayer Group, UK: [S]ometimes it’s just about 
visual awareness and…, obviously, [protests] didn’t stop the Iraq 
War. As you said, it wasn’t successful. But, it’s still, like, … the 
student protests here, like, the tuition fees. ... [T]here was… a 
visualisable amount of people against that. And that in itself meant 
that the government couldn’t use the discourse “Well, everyone’s in 
agreement. This is the right thing to do.” Just little things like that. It 
is visibly aware that there are people against it[‘s policy] and… that 
in itself can have, consequences…  
 
It is interesting to note the similarities between EU mobiles and stayers’ 
explanations of their reasons for participating in alternative forms of 
engagement. For EU mobiles, participating in alternative forms of engagement 
was seen as “a little drop in the sea”, but still worth the effort. Similarly, UK 
stayers said participating in alternative forms of engagement was not about 
making an “impact” but was there to create “visual” awareness on a broader 
scale. In comparison, all groups appeared to be quite critical about how little 
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impact they could make on EU politics, which then meant that they abstained 
from EU elections all together. Hence it seems these young citizens applied 
different principles to their approaches to local-, national and EU level politics. 
Since hardly any of them participated in EU level politics, it seems dubious 
that EU participation was relevant in their everyday lives. Compared to the 
preceding debates about EU identity and EU rights, the evidence suggests 
that EU participation was the weakest dimension of young and educated 
citizens’ EU citizenship.  
 
Therefore, the focus group evidence suggests that country contexts might 
have had little, if any impact on EU mobiles’ perceptions of and approaches to 
participation. Nonetheless there were some differences between the 
perceptions of EU mobiles and stayers, especially since EU mobiles appeared 
to favour participating in national, while stayers preferred local level politics.  
However, there were also considerable similarities between the approaches of 
EU mobiles and stayers to EU participation. Actually, every group appeared to 
find EU level participation to be secondary to the national and local levels, 
respectively. Most participants also appeared to prefer to adopt an issue-
specific approach to participation, however their actual approach to 
participation appeared to have a rational connotation. Hence young and 
educated citizens’ choices between different forms of engagement were 
seemingly made on whether or not they could really make an impact at the 
local and national levels. Accordingly, the evidence indicated that the 
abstention of EU mobiles and stayers from EU participation was another 
manifestation of the broader trend of declining citizen participation (Norris, 
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2002; Franklin, 2004; Sloam, 2014), and the second-order character of EP 
elections (Schmitt, 2005), rather than an indication of the crisis of EU 
citizenship (Bellamy, 2008b). 
 
7.2. Reinforcing the link between EU mobility and EU 
citizenship  
The previous section and even the previous chapters of this thesis have 
underlined that focus group debates about EU participation were often short-
lived and quite limited in scope. The implications of these findings for the 
interrelated dimensions of EU citizenship and emerging processes of 
differentiation are considered in this part of the chapter. It illustrates how EU 
mobiles and stayers expected the interlinked dimensions of their EU 
citizenship – in light of the almost non-existent level of citizens’ EU 
participation – to affect their EU citizenship (and shape the future of the EU). 
Moreover, their approaches to the dichotomy of active/passive EU citizenship 
appear to, once again, distinguish between EU mobiles as ‘knowledgeable’ 
and stayers as ‘uninformed’ citizens. In doing so, this part of the chapter 
complements the findings in the previous chapters (especially Chapters 5 – 6) 
about the way in which we can shed light on emerging processes of 
differentiation between EU citizens based on their mobility status.  
 
At this point is important to note that, two groups did not discuss participation 
in any great detail – though they too were directly probed about this by the 
moderator (EU Group 3, Sweden and EU Group 4, UK). Nonetheless, the 
discussions kept going back to the same issue: how mobility and different 
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forms of movement was likely to enhance citizens’ prospects for realising the 
EU citizenship. Accordingly, young and educated citizens associated political 
participation and national citizenship, and mobility and EU citizenship (as it 
was illustrated in Chapter 4). Similarly, the previous part of this chapter 
suggested that when young and educated citizens considered the link 
between EU citizenship and EU participation, they granted a second-order 
character to EU citizenship.  
 
The same point was evident when the various groups spoke about the 
interlinked character of the dimensions of EU citizenship. Interestingly, it was 
in the context of EU participation where every group made some references to 
the interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship. Participants usually invoked this 
ideal in order to explain why they (and more broadly citizens) did not 
participate in EU politics. Some of these issues were already apparent in the 
previous quotes (e.g. in how the UK Stayer Group approached EU 
participation). In other groups, participants addressed this issue more 
explicitly. Interestingly, even the Swedish stayers, who originally adopted a 
value-based approach to (EU) citizenship, mentioned that their abstention 
from EU participation might explain their lack of EU identity. “I might not feel 
much like a European citizen because it doesn't feel like anything I will do will 
make a difference on [the] European-level” (Swedish Female (1), Stayer 
Group, Sweden). Participants in EU Group 1 UK appeared to reach similar 
conclusions – not only about their abstention from EU participation but more 
broadly about how (young) citizens are likely to approach this issue today. 
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As with their discussion on identity and rights, this group first acknowledged 
the peculiar case of the UK – on the account of which the media was likely to 
ignore the developments in the EU. As a result, British citizens were not 
expected to develop a bond with the EU. However, these EU mobiles went 
beyond simply criticising the UK example in order to underline how little every 
other EU citizen was likely to know, “do” and “feel” about the EU.  
Romanian Female, EU Group 1, UK: I think there is so many things 
happening and you can watch the news everyday on the BBC and 
you’re not gonna see anything. I think if we don’t have that 
information [about EU politics delivered by the media], you do have 
to do the research on your own. But that takes a lot of initiative … 
[in order] to awake that kind of willingness to go and vote and 
contribute to something…   
German Female: British people [especially] don’t really, like, have 
[a] big connection to the European Union… they are like not 
connected at all. …This feeling about Europe or the European 
Union is just not as present [as elsewhere]. … 
Dutch Male: I think, everywhere in Europe it’s going downhill in the 
sense of activeness and ‘informedness’ in politics… in terms of the 
EU, yeah, definitely! British people are probably way less interested 
in the EU than other European countries. But even in other 
European countries… My football friends [in the Netherlands] really 
don’t do anything about the EU and probably don’t know anything 
about [it]… 
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Italian Female: I really would like to know which country really 
believes in the cooperation of countries … that’s why also maybe 
people don’t feel very European as we didn’t build yet this kind of 
sense of cooperation between states. 
Hence, observed through the interlinked character of the dimensions of EU 
citizenship, participants appeared to draw attention to the limitations EU 
citizens faced in their attempts to realise a political model of EU citizenship 
(especially against the backdrop of the crisis). This issue then led EU Group 4 
in the UK – one of two groups, which adopted an identity-based approach to 
citizenship – to question whether the EU has a future at all (as illustrated in 
Chapter 4). 
 
Since EU mobility did not lead these young and educated citizens to question 
the very existence of the EU, these findings appear to provide further support 
to one of the main propositions of this thesis: the dichotomy of active/passive 
citizenship from a political engagement perspective seems irrelevant for the 
case of the EU. In comparison, once observed as “the kind of citizenship that 
belongs to mobility”, young and educated citizens appeared to find it easier to 
approach the issue of EU participation as well. Actually, in so doing, they, 
once again, portrayed various categories of EU citizens – along the EU 
mobiles/stayers distinctions and depending on citizens’ educational level. 
 
Hence EU mobiles identified an emerging and very elitist ‘European mobile 
community’ that is made up of well-educated EU mobiles, in this case 
‘knowledgeable’ EU citizens, and is separated from stayers, in this case 
354 
 
‘uninformed’ EU citizens. EU mobiles were then labelled as being “cultured”, 
“intelligent” and “aware”. This community could not include stayers, who were 
perceived as “ignorant” and “nothing”. These emerging distinctions between 
EU citizens led to a long and in-depth debate in EU Group 4, UK, about who 
(which category of EU citizens) should be allowed to vote in the EP in the first 
place. These exchanges draw attention to how, when considered together, EU 
mobility and EU participation are likely to reproduce and (even) widen the 
existing differences between EU citizens.  
 
The dynamics that prevailed during the discussion of EU participation suggest 
that participants felt quite strongly about the likely distinctions between EU 
mobiles and stayers levels of awareness about EU politics – a distinction that 
was expected to be enhanced further in the future. Once again, participants 
did not probe but complemented each other’s points – resonating to the initial 
parts of their discussions. Similar exchanges took place in all EU groups. 
Hence, the distinctions these participants touched upon are likely to have at 
least some relevance to what is happening in the context of intensified EU 
mobility. EU Group 4, UK spent a considerable amount of time on debating 
this issue. The frankness and often amusing detail with which this group 
discussed the likely distinctions between EU mobiles and stayers may 
underline the added benefit of recruiting participants with whom researchers 
have strong professional relationship.  
Italian-Mexican Female, EU Group 4, UK: I swear to God most of 
the people back at home see me as an alien. Because I’m studying 
abroad and I’ve decided to stay here and never go back to Italy. 
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They are like, ‘Oh my God, I don’t know how you can do that?!’  
And I’m like, ‘Well, I don’t know how you can stay in a small town 
for the whole life, you know?’ [Some laughs.] … ‘Do you think that 
people in the rest of the world are aware of the town where you’re 
living right now? Like, you’re nothing!... [My difference] is based on 
… how I’ve been raised… My family always told me, “Don’t stay in 
the same place. Go and travel.” …Even though it’s in Europe, like, 
from the differences that you can find between the cultures, you 
can actually become ‘more cultured’. And you can actually learn 
something from these differences. It’s not like you are ignorant. 
French Female (3): Yeah…. [I]f you stay in the same country, you 
are ignorant. … And I feel, like, you still need to travel a lot to… be 
just intelligent, overall. Like, not even just intelligent school-wise, 
but just be aware. Aware! Aware of, like, … everyone else...  
German Female (1): [But] we have to be thankful to our parents [for 
that]... We can’t just generalise it and just say, well, we travel more 
so we vote [or] we want to vote [more]. I don’t think it’s that. 
Because there are people who travel a lot and [don’t vote]… 
Italian Female: That’s true. 
German Female (1): And then, at the end, they just don’t 
understand [the EU] because … they weren’t raised in a way that 
enables them to perceive things in the same way [as us]. 
Italian Female: [Quietly.] So again, not everybody should be able to 
vote who are European!... [I]if you don’t have the knowledge, you 
can’t vote… [And then] if you want to vote, … at least you have to 
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know what you’re voting for. … [And then], if you don’t want to vote, 
if you don’t want to study, … then you … shouldn’t do it and just 
stop complaining about everything that happens around you. That’s 
what people do all the time. 
 
Rather than uniting EU citizens in a truly EU level political community, as the 
Commission (2010f) and some of the existing literature (which have applied 
the political engagement perspective to the case of EU citizenship) have us 
believe (Bruter, 2005; Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 
2012), it is possible that when approaches to EU participation is influenced by 
experiences of EU mobility, it accentuates processes of differentiation 
between different categories of EU citizens. Accordingly, well-educated EU 
mobiles, in this case ‘knowledgeable’ EU citizens, are separated from stayers, 
in this case ‘uninformed’ EU citizens. The association made between mobility 
and level of knowledge also suggest that the more mobile EU citizens are, 
they are also more knowledgeable, while those who do not move at all are 
likely to be the least informed. The resulting categories of EU citizens are 
illustrated in Table 7.1. below.  
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Table 7.1. EU participation: Further categories of EU citizens 
 
Against this backdrop, and considered together with the findings of previous 
studies on EU mobiles’ almost non-existent EU level participation (Mattila, 
2003; Muxel, 2009; Favell, 2010; Strudel and Michalska, 2012), the 
Commission’s attempts to promote a political union among EU mobiles seem 
misplaced. Instead, to try and bring the emerging differences between EU 
citizens along their level of mobility and (supposed) disposition to participate 
in politics, more information must be provided to citizens about the EU. The 
next and final part of this chapter demonstrates what sources of information 
young and educated citizens expected to be the most effective in informing 
EU citizens. 
 
7.3. Notifying (EU) citizens about their EU citizenship 
The last part of the focus group discussions turned to the issue of how to 
inform citizens about their EU citizenship, including EU mobility and 
participatory rights and EU politics more broadly. In light of the earlier finding 
EU mobiles Stayers 
The 
“knowledgeable” 
citizens
The “uniformed” 
citizens
More mobile – 
more 
knowledgeable
Less mobile – 
less informed 
Active EU 
Citizens
Passive EU 
Citizens
358 
 
about an emerging distinction between EU citizens on the basis of their 
mobility – and associated knowledgeable quality – it seem that providing 
information about the EU and about citizens’ EU status should become a 
priority. Accordingly, most groups first spoke about the requirement to build 
the EU through bottom-up processes, including mobility and EU participation 
in order to make the EU relevant to citizens’ lives, and so legitimise the 
current level of European integration. Subsequently, references were made to 
the need for more extensive media coverage, introduction of EU politics in the 
secondary school curricula and national government support for the on-going 
initiatives undertaken by EU institutions to inform citizens. This final part of the 
chapter sheds light on these issues.  
 
In the very initial stages of the focus group discussions, some participants 
said they did not expect (ordinary) citizens to have in-depth knowledge about 
their EU citizenship status. In fact, a couple of EU mobiles and stayers looked 
surprised to hear that they would be counted as EU citizens already. In some 
cases, this led to attempts at pinpointing the most appropriate ways to advise 
citizens about their EU status – including its significance and benefits 
(especially EU Groups 1 and 4, UK – cited earlier). The moderator probed the 
other groups about this issue directly. In nearly every group, participants 
initially said they would advice citizens to use their EU mobility because “it’s 
quite a good thing. It’s a cool thing. You can travel freely! (Swedish Female, 
EU Group 3, UK). Due to the age group of participants, this point often 
translated into the possibility of participating in Erasmus – even by stayers.  
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Swedish Female (3), Stayer Group, Sweden: In the position we are 
in today, we are students and maybe I would like try to advocate, 
trying to go abroad within the Erasmus program that is close to us 
and close to them. 
 
In response to the moderator’s questions abut how to inform citizens about 
the EU, both EU mobiles and stayers mentioned the role of media – especially 
the lack of “visibility” EU institutions and EU politicians suffered from – the 
most often, along with introducing the EU in secondary curricula. In terms of 
EU media coverage, participants identified the almost exclusive focus 
European national level politics received compared to the sporadic and, 
usually, sceptical reporting about the EU and EU institutions.  
Romanian Female, EU Group 1, UK: I think, there should be more 
media coverage on the European Union to awake[n] that kind of 
willingness [among citizens] to go and vote and contribute to 
something. 
Romanian Female, EU Group 2, Sweden: I think Europe really 
need[s] like a more unified media exposure kind of thing. We don't 
really have media where you can get a sense of what's happening 
in [the] Europe [Union]. I do think that there is more European news 
in the media, but it's not the same. It's not really in the European-
level but more on a [cross-]national [level], like choosing a new 
president, … or the Dutch government failing a couple of weeks 
ago, but not really European structural-level, so to say. 
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UK groups seemed especially worried about how the distorted portrait of EU 
politics is likely to affect the attitude of an already Eurosceptic British public, 
especially against the backdrop of the crisis (see earlier example from EU 
Group 1, UK).  
 
A solution that every group mentioned was introducing the EU in school 
curricula. This education should really stress how different levels of European 
politics works and therefore increase people's participation in EU politics. 
However, not every participant seemed comfortable with the idea that citizens 
should wait around to receive information (from the top down) without actually 
doing something to receive information.  
Polish Female (2), EU Group 4, Sweden: I think that education of 
the people is the key, because people are not very conscious of 
what's going on around them in general. I'm talking about the 
majority...   
Romanian Female (2): I was thinking that being a member state 
means that every decision taken at the EU level impacts on the 
local [-level]. In a way, there is an influence between them. If more 
people were educated about Europe they would get more involved 
in the European elections that now people don't really participate 
in… 
Bulgarian Female: I just wanted to say that we are all excusing 
ourselves for not being informed. But when are we going to be 
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informed? Who is going to give us this sphere of knowledge when 
we cannot define things like EU citizenship?  
  
Debates about the role of media and education were often followed by the 
role of politicians, especially EU institutions and national governments in 
raising awareness among citizens. However, there were some differences 
between participants’ perceptions of whether politicians were doing enough 
already. Quite a few EU mobiles stated that EU institutions were fairly pro-
active in this respect, but their efforts were in vain because they did not have 
the support of national governments. Subsequently, a number of groups, 
including the UK stayer group, were critical about the way in which national 
governments ‘do not trust’ their citizens’ capability to understand that both EU 
and national level politics are important today.  
German Male, EU Group 2, UK: I think… the European institutions, 
let’s not kid ourselves, they do a lot to sort of publicise themselves. 
And there’s only so much they can do. And if we say “Oh the 
European Commission has to be more present in our daily lives…”, 
… I think it’s as much the responsibility, well firstly [the] individuals 
but also … [the] national governments, acknowledging the 
European component… and sort of trusting people to understand 
that there is another dimension… would be a big step. I think it’s an 
issue of communication … But that has to come from not only the 
European Commission but also, let’s say, national governments, 
more regional governments… 
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French-British Female: I think that when national government 
figures, like our prime minister rally up Eurosceptic views … 
basically, just to distract people from other issues, I think they’re 
really wronging people. I think it’s an injustice done to the people to 
create and reinforce this perceived separation [between the UK and 
the EU]. I think it’s really, really unjust. And it’s very patronising as 
well… I think national governments play a big role … As you said, 
institutions of the EU can only do so much to publicise themselves. 
[The EU] is online. It is present.  
 
Similarly critical sentiments were raised across all groups. It is interesting that 
it was almost at the end of the discussions when, for the first time, national 
governments were criticised by young and educated citizens, including the UK 
stayer group. The latter group even suggested that other national 
governments were also disposed to use the EU as a “very easy scapegoat”. 
The EU was (somewhat dramatically) compared to the Soviet Union to 
illustrate how both have been “blamed” for everything. 
British Male (5), Stayer Group, UK: Europe is something like a very 
easy scapegoat for things that have gone wrong, it’s like “Oh yeah, 
it’s Europe’s fault!” [Some smiles.] “It’s not our fault! We have to do 
it because of Europe!” 
British Male (2): It’s Europe and our assumption of Europeans as 
different from us. We are not complicit within Europe in anyway. It 
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is presented as being so and having things inflicted upon us rather 
than actually participating in their creation, I think. 
British Male (3): Don’t politicians do it in every country though? 
Blame it on Europe?... 
British Male (1): Yeah. [Some laughs.] Before it was the USSR 
[Soviet Union] and now it’s the EU [Laughs]. 
 
A good number of participants also said that the focus group discussions were 
useful in highlighting the importance of the EU and EU citizenship to them. 
Certainly, the initial surprise some participants expressed about their EU 
citizenship status appeared to wear off during the discussions. Most 
participants were, generally, engaged and enthusiastic throughout the 
discussions, regardless of whether or not there were disagreements within the 
group. Participants also seemed at ease during the discussions – as apparent 
especially in how they tackled some really sensitive issues, especially in their 
discussions of the emerging processes of differentiation in the EU. Hence the 
focus group evidence suggests that in-depth group discussions where citizens 
are probed about their perceptions could be quite effective in raising 
awareness of their EU citizenship and the EU more broadly. 
Lithuanian Male, EU Group 2, Sweden: I think in general these 
discussions are really good. And I think we will hear more about 
these issues [the EU and EU citizenship] in the popular media 
probably and then the youngsters and stuff, and the situation will 
radically change in 50 years.  
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French Male: So progressive! 
Lithuanian Male:  Yes. I think we will move towards more union.  
French Male: Lower barriers, and you will marry a Swede and your 
children will be naturally European! 
Lithuanian Male: Yeah. Of course! I mean that's different times. For 
example, I have a good friend, she was actually born in France but 
her father is British, her mother is Swedish and she lives in... 
Germany. And She is a European! Because, I mean, who she is? 
She can't live in a box, can't put herself in a box. And more people 
are like this I think, or becoming like that.  
As the above exchange illustrates, the discussions usually ended on a 
positive note, through which young and educated citizens expressed a sense 
of anticipation about where the EU and its citizenship were heading (– 
similarly to the findings of Bruter, 2005).  
 
7.3. Summary   
This chapter illustrated that the (initially) fleeting debate about EU participation 
in the focus groups was a reflection of a general trend among young and 
educated citizens; hardly any of them had participated in EU politics prior to 
the focus groups. Even though these citizens believed the EU was important 
for their everyday considerations, they perceived EU level politics as “too 
distant” and “abstract”, and therefore hard to really influence. As a result, EU 
mobiles preferred participating at the national level (in their country of origin or 
in the host county), while stayers at the local level of politics. Although most 
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participants suggested that their approach to participation was based on 
issue-specific considerations – these considerations seem to have only 
influenced their approaches to alternative forms of engagement. In 
comparison, rational considerations seemed to guide their actual participation 
at the EU level. Accordingly, the findings in this chapter complement previous 
studies which have suggested that EU mobility does not enhance EU mobiles’ 
disposition to participate in politics (Mattila, 2003; Muxel, 2009; Favell, 2010; 
Strudel and Michalska, 2012). 
 
Moreover, quite a few participants interpreted their abstention from EU 
participation as a sign of their fragile sense of EU identity and lack of 
knowledge about EU rights – making an explicit reference to the proposed 
interrelated relationship between the dimensions of (EU) citizenship (Tilly, 
2003: 611; Bellamy, 2008a: 12, 2010: xvi). In light of the findings from the 
previous chapters, we can assume that the lived experiences of EU 
citizenship – as long as it is activated by EU mobility – is likely to be 
substantially different from that of national citizenships – which are activated 
by citizens’ participation. These issues then led to further debates and the 
supposition that the combination of EU mobility and (interest in) EU 
participation separated EU mobile/knowledgeable from stayer/uninformed 
citizens. Nonetheless, once prompted, participants identified prospective 
avenues for raising awareness among citizens – all of which had a top-down 
course. Overall then, the findings in this chapter seem to echo the conclusions 
reached by the previous two chapters of this thesis on EU identity and EU 
rights (Chapters 5 – 6): rather than EU participation, EU (learning) mobility 
366 
 
makes the realisation of European Union (EU) citizenship most likely. The 
concluding chapter provides an overall assessment of the resulting model of 
EU citizenship, and considers its implications for scholars and policy-makers 
interested in addressing this issue. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion and discussion  
Globalisation processes are transforming the relationship between nation 
states and citizens (Isin and Turner, 2002), revising processes of 
differentiation and exclusion (see for example Skey, 2011a). These 
transformations are particularly evident in Europe (Beck, 2006), where the first 
direct bond between a transnational political community (the EU) and the 
individuals (member state citizens) was introduced in the form of EU 
citizenship. Despite their newly found transnational status, EU citizens have 
exhibited discontent with the project of European integration (Favell, 2008; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014). 
Centrifugal forces emanating from the recent financial crisis and depression 
have led to a growing sense of Euroscepticism (Shore, 2012; Kuhn and 
Stoeckel, 2014), and, in some cases, demands for exiting the EU (Geddes, 
2014; Wellings and Baxendale, 2015). These developments have not quite 
deterred the Commission’s (2013b: 2; 2014f) political aspirations – even 
though it is aware of the obstacles it must tackle before any supranational 
ideals can be turned into reality (Juncker, 2014). The mismatch between the 
attitudes of citizens, national and EU political actors to European integration 
compel us to address the issue and significance of EU citizenship today. 
 
Against this backdrop, the thesis investigated how EU citizenship is realised in 
practice. More specifically, it explored whether and how young and educated 
EU citizens realise their EU citizenship (Research Question 1), and, in so 
doing, the extent to which they also realise the Commission’s ideals of EU 
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citizenship (or are ever likely to do so) (Research Question 2). Adopting a 
more inclusive approach to its study, an additional question was raised about 
the relationship between the dimensions of EU citizenship – EU identity, EU 
rights and EU participation. Accordingly, the thesis was interested in how the 
dimensions of EU citizenship are likely to transform one another and, 
eventually, shape the broader structure of EU citizenship (Research Question 
3). Due to the role of EU mobility in activating EU citizenship, the thesis then 
interrogated resulting processes of differentiation and exclusion in the EU 
(Research Question 4). Finally, the thesis examined the alleged link between 
EU citizenship and political integration in Europe (Research Question 5). 
 
In order to investigate how citizens realise their EU citizenship, the thesis 
embedded its study in the broader field of citizenship studies (Chapter 1). It 
emphasised the requirement to adopt a more inclusive approach to EU 
citizenship and, as a result, attend to the various frameworks and dimensions 
of EU citizenship concurrently. The thesis then studied the institutional 
framework of EU citizenship and the scope it provides for citizens to realise 
their EU status. In an attempt to make a small contribution to previous 
research on the institutional framework of EU citizenship (Wiener, 1998; 
Kostakopoulou, 2001; 2005; Maas, 2007; Shaw, 2007; Olsen, 2008a; 2012; 
Hansen and Hager, 2010; Pukallus, 2012), Chapter 2 included a critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) of the Commission’s discourse on EU citizenship. 
Once the institutionalised connotation between EU citizenship and EU 
(learning) mobility was illustrated, the thesis begun to explore the likely effects 
mobility can have on citizens’ perceptions. To this end, the thesis considered 
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the findings of existing qualitative studies on (young) citizens’ sense of EU 
citizenship and identity (Bruter, 2005; Favell, 2008; 2010; Skey, 2011a; Ross, 
2014; see also Table 3.4.). To complement and develop these findings further, 
it used original focus group evidence with young and educated citizens in 
Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). More specifically, the focus group 
evidence investigated the perceptions of EU mobiles and stayers (as the 
control group) about EU citizenship broadly speaking (Chapter 4) and across 
the aforementioned dimensions of EU citizenship (Chapters 5 – 7).  
 
Building on the key findings from the five empirical chapters, this concluding 
chapter presents an overall assessment of EU citizenship and sheds light on 
how contemporary EU citizenship is likely to shape the course of political 
integration in Europe. The chapter has three main parts. The first part 
summarises the key findings from the empirical chapters and, especially, 
illustrates the likely distinctions that may emerge as a result of young citizens’ 
different experiences of EU mobility. The second part considers the likely 
implications these findings have for scholars and policy-makers interested in 
addressing the issue of EU citizenship, including the never-ending debate 
about democratic deficits. The third part identifies potential research agendas 
and questions for future studies. 
 
8.1. Main findings  
Chapter 2 analysed the institutional framework of EU citizenship, and made 
an attempt to illustrate the scope these frameworks grant for citizens to realise 
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their EU citizenship. To this end, it examined the Commission’s ideals on EU 
citizenship. The chapter drew attention to the continued emphasis placed on 
promoting (member state) citizens’ EU mobility – a finding that has been 
emphasised by previous research as well (Wiener, 1998; Kostakopoulou, 
2001; 2005; Maas, 2007; Shaw, 2007; Olsen, 2008a; 2012; Hansen and 
Hager, 2010; Pukallus, 2012). For example, rather than expecting to raise a 
‘community of Europeans’, the Commission appears to support the building of 
a community of EU mobiles. It provides an ever-expanding scope for EU 
mobiles to realise their EU citizenship. Even more, the chapter suggested that 
the Commission (2010d; 2012i; 2014a) seems to place a special emphasis on 
facilitating and promoting the learning mobility of young and educated EU 
citizens. In this sense, the educational setting, which supposedly raises ideal 
national citizens (Heater, 2004c; Arthur, Davies and Hahn, 2008; Biesta, 
2011), is projected to replicate similar results at the EU level (see for example 
Council of Ministers, 1987). 
 
Despite its optimistic tone, there is an inherent tension in the Commission’s 
discourse on EU citizenship. Specifically, the original economic rationale of 
EU mobility – it was introduced to facilitate EU labour mobility (Maas, 2007) – 
seems to supersede the political objectives of EU citizenship. This tension is 
perhaps due to the institutional dynamics of the EU, which has weakened the 
Commission’s influence (Egeberg, 2013) but increased the legitimacy of the 
EP and the EU Council (for an overview see for example Hix and Høyland, 
2011: 23-48). Hence, the Commission might find it easier to shape economic 
rather than political decisions (Hodson, 2013; Bauer and Becker, 2014). This 
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could explain why there is a permanent focus in its discourse on economic 
rights – EU mobility – instead of the political dimensions of EU citizenship – 
EU identity and EU participation. In fact, these political dimensions have only 
really come to the fore during the lead up to (recent) EP elections and EU 
treaty revisions. These issues have important consequences for the scope 
citizens have for realising EU citizenship. In particular, only through EU 
(learning) mobility can citizens realise the ideals of the Commission. Using 
original focus group evidence from Sweden and the UK, the four subsequent 
empirical chapters shed light on the extent to which these ideals were indeed 
realised by young and educated citizens.  
 
Chapter 4 drew attention to the distinctiveness in the initial approaches of EU 
mobiles and stayers to EU and national citizenships, and the contingent 
character of their sense of EU citizenship. Most importantly, the chapter 
underlined that EU mobility was likely to lead to a brief experience for EU 
mobiles and was perceived as somewhat irrelevant by stayers. For example, 
while EU mobiles observed EU citizenship as a “novelty”, stayers saw it as “an 
extension” of their national citizenship. In support of their argument, EU 
mobiles had a tendency to use personal stories, which underlined the “huge 
[and] incalculable advantage[s]” of their EU status. These advantages were 
then observed as effective in enhancing EU mobiles’ sense of identification as 
EU citizens. By contrast, hardly any stayers identified as EU citizens and 
some appeared to be surprised by the proposition that they could be regarded 
as EU citizens from a legal perspective. The oft-cited British Euroscepticism 
manifested itself in the UK stayer group early in the discussions. Actually, the 
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UK stayer group identified EU citizenship as yet another aspect that 
accentuated the peculiar position of the UK compared to “the rest of Europe”.  
 
Nevertheless, the other groups also underscored the contingent character of 
EU citizenship and, especially, the reasons why EU citizenship was not an 
attractive alternative to, or a possible replacement for their national 
citizenships. For example, European integration did not draw attention to the 
similarities across the EU but emphasised the divisions between member 
states and intra-EU regions (East-West/ North-South). The dynamism of the 
EU’s external borders was then identified as another factor undermining the 
idea of a single EU community. Moreover, a good number of EU mobiles and 
stayers assumed that EU citizenship did not yet exist. While the focus groups 
in Sweden expected EU citizenship to become more prominent over time, UK 
groups concluded that due to the precedence of national citizenships, it will 
always be “very difficult” to realise a deeper sense of attachment to EU 
citizenship. 
 
Hence, the initial findings of the focus groups corresponded with previous 
arguments about the importance of personal advantages, especially mobility 
in developing citizens’ sense of identification as EU citizens (Bruter, 2005; 
Favell, 2008; TNS Opinion and Social, 2011; Sanders et al., 2012; European 
Commission, 2013a; Ross, 2014). The evidence suggests that nationalist 
approaches to EU citizenship (Smith, 1993; Delanty, 1997; Bellamy, 2008b) 
might be the closest to explaining how the majority of EU citizens – the 
stayers – approach their ‘second-order’ EU status. Moreover, these findings 
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support the conclusions reached by previous qualitative studies that point to 
the ambiguity in how citizens perceive European integration (White, 2011; 
Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014). By comparison, the generally 
more favourable tone of quantitative studies (Recchi and Favell, 2009; TNS 
Opinion and Social, 2011; Recchi et al., 2012; Sanders et al., 2012; Sanders, 
Magalhães and Tóka, 2012) was only really corroborated in the Swedish 
groups and only when EU mobiles and stayers considered what the future of 
the EU and EU citizenship might hold.  
 
The subsequent empirical chapters explored more specifically young and 
educated EU citizens’ perceptions of the different dimensions of EU 
citizenship – EU identity, EU rights and EU participation – and the likely 
impact EU mobility had on their perceptions. Chapter 5 illustrated the diversity 
in young and educated citizens’ sense of EU identity. Both EU mobiles and 
stayers were quick to underscore the context-contingent and “kaleidoscopic” 
character of their national and EU identities (Ross, 2014). These identities 
were then reconfigured by citizens’ varying experiences of EU mobility, which 
enhanced EU mobiles’ sense of belonging to the EU and shared EU identity 
with their fellow mobiles. In this context, an antagonistic rather than 
welcoming or neutral country context emerged as constructive for EU mobiles’ 
sense of EU identity. In reality, EU mobility appeared to contribute towards a 
sense of contradictory civic EU identity among EU mobiles – assigning the 
cultural aspect of citizens’ identity at the national level (Bruter, 2005; Ross, 
2014). Moreover, it was likely to lead to a growing “community of visiting EU 
students”, and sometimes to a community of visiting students only, with the 
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latter also including international students. However, a “community of 
Europeans” based on an increased level of transaction between EU mobiles 
and stayers (Deutsch et al., 1968) did not materialise. In this context, stayers’ 
exposure to EU mobility either did not have any effect on their sense of EU 
identity – nourishing a sense of ambivalence towards the EU (White, 2011; 
Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014) – or hindered rather than 
enhanced their sense of EU identity. In the latter case, EU mobility was shown 
to accentuate persisting national differences and the ‘peculiarity’ of Sweden 
and the UK within the EU.  
 
Nonetheless, both EU mobiles and stayers appeared to be quite perceptive of 
the deficits in their sense of EU identity. They proposed external migration and 
top-down approaches as possible alternatives to promoting EU identity. 
However, none of the participants acknowledged the costs associated with 
external migration – even though the same issue made it more likely for both 
groups of citizens to continue studying within rather than outside the EU. They 
simply replaced an elitist process of EU identity promotion – EU mobility – 
with an even more elitist process – external EU migration. In comparison, top-
down processes of EU identity promotion appeared to be more effective in 
enhancing citizens’ sense of EU identity, especially in the case of symbols, 
values and regulations, which emphasised the practical benefits of their 
countries’ EU membership. Nonetheless, the actual effects of these top-down 
processes were highly dependent on member state implementation 
procedures. Existing studies also demonstrate the inconsistent effect of these 
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processes and prevalence at the cognitive level of citizens’ sense of EU 
identity (for an overview see Kaina and Karolewski, 2013: 33-5).  
 
Chapter 6 shed light on the perceptions of EU mobiles and stayers about their 
EU rights. The initial findings suggested that both groups were fairly well-
informed about their EU rights, especially their EU mobility rights and 
associated civic, social and economic entitlements. This finding complements 
previous studies about the tendency among (young) citizens to substitute the 
advantages of their EU citizenship with EU mobility rights (Férnandez, 2005; 
Favell, 2008; TNS Opinion and Social, 2010). The chapter went beyond this 
finding by suggesting that both EU mobiles and stayers had a tendency to 
firmly embed EU mobility as a significant aspect of citizens’ everyday lives 
within the EU. Mobility then created a sense of geographical proximity 
between the EU and its citizens (Siklodi, 2014). Even more, the subsequent 
debates suggested that EU mobility might effectively serve in creating a 
dynamic bond between the EU and its young and educated citizens – which is 
precisely how scholars in the field of citizenship studies define the concept of 
‘citizenship’ (see for example Aristotle, 1946; Isin and Turner, 2002; Heater, 
2004a; Magnette, 2005).  
 
Nonetheless, EU mobiles quickly identified a range of obstacles they had to 
face whilst residing in Sweden or the UK (when they had attempted to open a 
bank account for example). Both EU mobiles and stayers then spoke about 
the diversity in European languages, cultures and welfare state provisions 
(especially those related to health care and education) (Favell, 2008; 
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European Commission, 2010b; 2013a), and the uneven influence of national 
governments at the EU level (Moravcsik, 1998) as limiting citizens’ scope for 
realising their EU status. Although the Commission has not offered a solution 
of its own, it has also acknowledged that most of these issues require the 
urgent attention of EU policy-makers (European Commission, 2010b).  
 
Against this backdrop, EU mobiles suggested that EU citizenship might be 
irrelevant for stayers because it did not deliver them any advantages. 
However, stayers also focused on EU mobility as the main advantage of their 
EU rights. Interestingly, none of the stayer groups spoke of EU participation at 
this point – though it is the only EU right they could use within their country of 
origin. Thus there were no major differences between the approaches of EU 
mobiles and stayers to EU rights. Nonetheless, there was an interesting 
difference between the approaches of EU mobiles in the two countries. 
Although Sweden is usually identified as the ideal context for post-national 
models of citizenships to emerge (Agius, 2006: 588; Welzel and Inglehart, 
2010: 55), it was the EU groups in the UK, which considered EU participation 
within the theme of EU rights (albeit to a limited extent as well).  
 
These debates illustrated the way in which EU mobility likely to lead to new 
processes of differentiation in the EU. Although young and educated citizens 
are likely to be the least affected by national migration policies and 
stereotypes, EU (learning) mobility appeared to accentuate the importance of 
these issues. As a result, different categories of EU citizens were classified, 
depending on their mobility status (EU mobiles/stayers), country of origin 
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(especially along the East/West and North/South divides, and length of 
membership in the EU) and socio-economic backgrounds (students/ workers, 
ethnic backgrounds, language skills, economic resources and educational 
qualifications). Similarly to the discourse of the Commission (2014b), EU-15 
mobiles were then identified as having the best prospects to fully exercise 
their EU rights. However, the Swedish groups predicted that these different 
categories of EU citizens would likely to disappear in the future. 
 
This somewhat optimistic assumption was, however, challenged by the 
findings of Chapter 7, which shed light on young and educated EU citizens’ 
perceptions of EU participation. It suggested that the (initially) fleeting debate 
about EU participation in the focus groups was a reflection of a general trend 
across the focus groups; hardly anyone had participated in EU politics – 
understood here as the participatory right enjoyed specifically by virtue of the 
status of EU citizenship. Abstention from EU participation was interpreted by 
the participants as a sign of citizens’ fragile sense of EU identity and lack of 
knowledge about EU rights – making an explicit reference to the interlinked 
dimensions of (EU) citizenship (Tilly, 2003: 611; Bellamy, 2008a: 12, 2010: 
xvi). In practice however, the abstention of EU mobiles and stayers appeared 
to be either the result of ineligibility (due to age restrictions) or issue-based 
approaches to participation coupled with rational cost-benefit calculations. 
Since they observed the national or local levels as the most relevant to their 
lives, these citizens mostly participated at these two levels of politics. Hence 
their resulting abstention from EU participation was another manifestation in 
part of the second-order character of EP elections (Schmitt, 2005) and the 
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broader trend of declining citizen participation more broadly (Norris, 2002; 
Franklin, 2004; Sloam, 2014). Considered in light of the findings from the 
previous chapters, especially the emphasis placed on experiences of EU 
mobility, it is quite apparent that the lived experiences of EU citizenship are 
likely to be substantially different from that of national citizenships. The almost 
non-existent participation among these young and educated EU citizens in EU 
political activities granted to them specifically by virtue of their status as EU 
citizens could also be interpreted as replicating the differences between these 
two models of citizenship. The same point is supported by the previous 
findings about the way in which most of these young and educated citizens 
admitted to taking EU mobility rights for granted. Similar discussions did not 
ensue in relation to EU participation. 
 
Moreover, a number of differences between and among EU mobiles and 
stayers’ perceptions of (EU) participation emerged. Most importantly perhaps, 
EU mobiles were more likely to use alternative forms of citizenship 
engagement to make an impact, while most stayers (especially in Sweden) 
used traditional forms of engagement. Some of these differences could 
perhaps be explained by the variation between EU mobiles’ perceptions about 
their preferred forms of engagement. Those who had arrived in Sweden or the 
UK recently and for a temporary period, expressed a sense of awkwardness 
about being able to participate in the local and EP elections there. In 
comparison, EU mobiles who resided in one of these countries on a semi-
permanent basis, were also more prone to support the granting of general 
electoral rights to EU residents. Since EU mobility flows are circular and 
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temporary in character (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010), the above-
mentioned differences between short and long-term EU mobiles’ perceptions 
may shed light on why the majority	  of EU citizens do not participate in the host 
country (Strudel and Michalska, 2012), but do so in their country of origins 
(Muxel, 2009) or through alternative forms of engagement (Favell, 2010).  
 
The role of EU mobility in new processes of differentiation was once again 
noticeable when EU mobiles and Swedish stayers differentiated between EU 
citizens, depending on their perceived awareness of EU politics. EU mobiles 
equated awareness of EU politics with mobility status and suggested that the 
opportunity to participate in EU politics should be made on the basis of 
whether citizens were mobile and thus more “knowledgeable” about the EU or 
stayed in their country of origin and remained “uninformed”. Nonetheless, 
prospective avenues for raising awareness among citizens were also offered, 
including the introduction of the EU as a unit in secondary schools as well as 
more extensive media coverage of EU level politics. The UK groups were also 
outspoken about the role national governments should play in disseminating 
information about EU citizenship and EU rights. Most of these avenues 
require little if any initiative from citizens, perhaps echoing the broader context 
of citizens increasing preference for passive forms of non-engagement (Smets 
and van Ham, 2013; Sloam, 2014). 
 
Thus the empirical chapters complemented one another by providing different 
insight into how young and educated citizens were likely to realise EU 
citizenship in relation to the distinctive but interlinked and related dimensions 
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of identity, rights and participation. By considering these findings together, we 
can also make some inferences about how the interlinked dimensions of EU 
citizenship might transform one another. From the preceding discussion the 
inconsistencies in participants responses should be apparent. Every now and 
then an attempt was made by the participants to supplement the perceived 
shortfall of one dimension of their EU citizenship by pointing to the substance 
of another dimension. For example, when participants recognised the diversity 
in their perceptions of EU identity, they suggested EU citizenship is perhaps 
best understood as EU rights. However, having decided that EU rights – 
mostly EU mobility – did not support their attempt to access member state and 
EU communities, participants then spoke about EU citizenship as having the 
utmost meaning as a sense of EU identity. Yet, during their discussion of EU 
participation, EU identity was once again deemed too fragile to mobilise 
citizens and EU rights were deemed irrelevant.  
 
These findings suggest that EU rights (especially EU mobility) and EU identity 
are likely to be perceived as having a positive reciprocal effect on one 
another. However, EU participation – clearly the weakest dimension of EU 
citizenship for both EU mobiles and stayers – questions the relevance of the 
other two dimensions. If anything, these findings underscore the distinctions 
between the dimensions of national and EU citizenships. That is, the 
dimensions of EU citizenship are likely to affect one another differently to the 
dimensions of national citizenships. Against this backdrop, advocating the 
promotion of EU participation in order to strengthen citizens’ sense of EU 
identity and awareness of EU rights (beyond mobility) (Sanders et al., 2012; 
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Sanders, Magalhães and Tóka, 2012) might prove futile. Instead, the main 
challenge for scholars is to resolve the exclusive character EU mobility grants 
to EU citizenship.  In other words, to ensure it is not perceived as an exclusive 
status reserved for EU mobiles only. 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that EU mobiles and stayers are likely to 
have different approaches to realising their national and EU citizenships 
(Research Question 1). Accordingly, the Commission’s expectations of the 
role of EU citizenship in shaping community-building processes effectively – 
and following the example set out by national citizenships – are likely to be 
misplaced (Research Question 2). The exclusive character of EU citizenship 
is reflected in how citizens’ approach their EU status (and experiences). 
Moreover, EU mobility – the principal right of EU citizens – seems to give an 
uneven boost to the other dimensions of EU citizenship (Research Question 
3). While the evidence suggests that mobility might encourage a temporary 
sense of EU identity and (to some extent) awareness of EU entitlements 
among EU mobiles, it is not likely to make them more interested or engaged in 
EU participation. In contrast, EU mobility is prone to make EU citizenship 
almost irrelevant to the lives of stayers – the overwhelming majority of EU 
citizens. Rather than bringing EU mobiles and stayers together, EU mobility 
seems to serve as a basis for (new) processes of differentiation and exclusion 
in the EU. The evidence suggests that these processes are apparent even 
among a supposedly ideal group of EU citizens – those who are the most 
protected from the adversities of the recent crisis or the differences in the 
immigration policies of member states. Rather than building a ‘community of 
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EU citizens’, these processes seem to accentuate the differences between 
(young and educated) EU mobiles and stayers (Research Question 4). These 
findings cast doubt on the extent to which contemporary EU citizenship – 
founded on mobility in the Union – can further the Commission’s supranational 
political aspirations  (Research Question 5).  
 
There are several reasons why the findings of this thesis should not be 
overstated. Most importantly perhaps, the focus group evidence was drawn 
from a small and non-representative sample and so it is not suitable for 
making generalisations about the broader population of young and educated 
EU mobiles and stayers. Similarly, it is not appropriate for establishing the 
effects of EU learning mobility and, by association, country contexts on EU 
citizenship. The evidence is only illustrative of these processes. Moreover, 
due to the focus group setting, it is likely that group interactions influenced 
individual answers. However, the group setting allowed for the expression of 
diverse views and the pattern of discussion drew attention to the issues 
participants considered most important. The resulting evidence is likely to be 
more in-depth and exploratory in character than data drawn from interviews or 
surveys. The focus here on two country cases is a starting point, but does not 
allow generalisations across the EU-27. As the thesis has shown, the 
differences between Sweden and the UK are already large. Such differences 
even within a small study suggest the value of extending the study further. 
The findings presented by this thesis are a basis for a more ambitious 
interrogation of what EU citizenship signifies, how EU (learning) mobility is 
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likely to shape young citizens’ perceptions and what the associated processes 
of differentiation and exclusion might look like in the EU context.  
 
8.2. Implications  
This section considers the likely implications the thesis’s findings have for 
scholars and policy-makers interested in addressing the issue of EU 
citizenship. First, the discursive and focus group evidence underlined the 
benefits of adopting a more inclusive approach to EU citizenship and 
attending to its frameworks and dimensions concurrently. By exploring the 
Commission’s ideals on EU citizenship and whether young and educated 
citizens realise these ideals, the thesis suggested that an economic rationale 
instead of the EU’s democratic quest dominates the various frameworks of EU 
citizenship. Similarly, the Commission’s approach to, and citizens’ perception 
of, the dimensions of EU citizenship were found to fluctuate considerably from 
one day to the next. Besides, the evidence indicated that the interlinked 
relationship between the dimensions of EU citizenship (i.e. identity, rights, and 
participation) is important and likely to be different from what we have 
observed in the nation state context. As a result, unless we account for the 
various frameworks and dimensions of EU citizenship together, citizens’ often 
fragile sense of EU identity and their abstention from EU participation might 
be interpreted as signalling the crisis of EU citizenship. In contrast however, 
these findings might be telling us that there are already a handful of EU 
citizens – the EU-15 mobiles – who have already begun to realise the current 
ideals of the Commission. In order to make EU citizenship – as a meaningful 
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status – more common, there is a requirement to revise the Commission’s 
exclusivist ideals. We could either decouple EU citizenship from EU mobility – 
and risk losing the only aspect of EU citizenship citizens cherish – or make 
access to EU mobility more affordable to everyday citizens.  
 
Second, the almost exclusive focus on EU mobility raises serious questions 
about the broader significance of EU citizenship today. It has little, if any, 
bearing for the lives of the majority of EU citizens – the stayers. Even if EU 
mobiles’ sense of EU citizenship alters following periods of EU mobility, often 
allowing for more favourable attitudes to emerge, their resulting attitudes are 
expected to be temporary – they last whilst citizens reside aboard but do not 
integrate into the host country (similar conclusions were reached by Favell, 
2008). If we do accept the role of EU mobility in activating EU citizenship, it 
becomes evident that there is an urgent need to address the temporary 
character of EU mobiles’ sense of EU citizenship. We could attempt to 
complement the role of EU mobility by placing more emphasis on the non-
neutral (and often antagonistic) approaches to the EU, which seem to prevail 
in some member states. Similarly, EU symbols, which underline the practical 
benefits of EU membership, might have a more lasting effect on citizens’ 
sense of EU identity. In order to make the EU “more democratic” – if, indeed, 
that is what the Commission aspires to do – putting an emphasis on these 
issues could prove rewarding. Since the EU is an ever-expanding community, 
making the EU level more attractive for current and prospective EU mobiles 
should be a priority. Failing to do so could pose a real threat to attempts to 
realise a dynamic bond between the EU and the individuals – what EU 
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citizenship was created to achieve in the first place (see for example 
European Commission, 1993: 2). 
 
Third, a closer inspection of the dimensions of EU citizenship made a 
compelling case for addressing the dichotomy of passive/active EU citizens 
along the stayers/mobiles distinctions. EU mobility reconfigures citizens’ 
perceptions of the dimensions of EU citizenship. The evidence suggested 
that, for active EU citizens (in this case ‘EU mobiles’) EU citizenship is chiefly 
connected to their mobility experiences, while for passive EU citizens (in this 
case ‘stayers’) EU citizenship has a second-order status and flows from their 
existing national citizenships. Further sub-categories of EU citizens were also 
identified throughout the empirical chapters, though these categories varied 
somewhat from one dimension of EU citizenship to the next. Interestingly, 
even though young and educated citizens form a specific segment of the EU’s 
population, those who are safeguarded from the adversities of member state 
policies, they too found their EU rights as being particularly important in 
accentuating the differences between EU-15 and CEE mobiles. Further 
categories of stayers were also identified, according to whether or not citizens 
could afford to exercise their EU mobility rights in the future. Accordingly, 
primarily member state citizens might exhibit Eurosceptic attitudes and 
potential EU citizens a sense of ambivalence towards the EU (see Table 6.1. 
for an illustration of these categories). If we are to build a “community of 
Europeans” we should seek to identify avenues for bringing the different 
categories of EU citizens together.  
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Finally, the overall findings of the thesis emphasise that we must explore the 
effects of EU mobility on how citizens realise their (EU) citizenship and, 
subsequently, the distinctions between the perceptions of EU mobiles and 
stayers and their approaches to one another. For example, depending on their 
mobility status, EU mobiles and stayers classified each other as ‘internal 
EU/national others’, indicating how the interpenetration of EU and national 
citizenships has provided a further basis for differentiation and internal 
othering within Europe. In this respect, EU mobility has led to new processes 
of differentiation between and among EU mobiles and stayers, and blurred the 
distinctions between EU citizens and the “other”, the non-EU citizens. 
Accordingly, some EU mobiles developed a sense of shared identity with 
international students instead of their fellow EU citizens (the stayers). 
Distinctions were also made within the categories of EU mobiles and stayers, 
depending on citizens’ country of origins. Taken seriously, the findings of the 
thesis suggest that any concrete efforts made by the Commission to further 
develop EU citizenship, as a relevant status in practice, needs to reflect the 
variegated ways in which it is experienced and practised by EU citizens 
themselves. Processes of differentiation and exclusion are a central feature of 
European societies – local, regional, national and, as the findings here would 
suggest, increasingly supranational – and which cannot be eradicated simply 
by a well targeted policy.  
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8.3. Potential areas for future research 
This thesis shows the requirement to attend to the various dimensions of EU 
citizenship concurrently and recognise the role of EU mobility in activating EU 
citizenship. In order to settle the question of whether “the glass of EU 
citizenship … is half full or half empty” (Sanders et al., 2012: 222), quantitative 
analysis, more specifically, structural equation modelling could be used to test 
how the various dimensions of EU citizenship relate to one another. To this 
end, there is a need for EU-wide quantitative data with indicators that can 
account for the dimensions of EU citizenship and the effects of EU mobility. 
Using this data could help establish whether the different categories of EU 
citizens, as identified in this thesis, can be generalised across the EU’s 
member states. Alternatively, readily available data from the IntUne project, 
which includes a number of indicators for the dimensions of EU citizenship – 
albeit it makes little or no references to EU mobility – could be utilised. This 
data would provide a basis for further unpacking the relationship between the 
interlinked dimensions of EU citizenship, beyond the focus group evidence 
here, in order to create a more complete picture of processes of differentiation 
within the EU.   
 
Against the backdrop of intensified EU mobility flows, there is also a 
requirement to investigate emerging processes of differentiation and 
exclusions in the EU. Due to the rather sensitive nature of this issue, 
qualitative research, especially ethnographic study could be used to flesh out 
how the different categories of EU citizens – stayers/mobiles but also citizens 
who participate in different types of mobility (including economic and learning 
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mobility) – understand how they are affected by these processes. The 
resulting study might tell us something about the differences between 
processes of differentiation and exclusion occurring at the national and EU 
levels across a variety of national contexts.  
 
In their attempt to explore these processes, scholars may find Pierre 
Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of cultural capital and its recent application in the 
national and (more recently) cosmopolitan contexts a useful starting point (see 
for example Thompson and Tambyah, 1999; Urry, 2002; Calhoun, 2003; 
Weenink, 2008; Skey, 2011a, b, 2013). Cultural capital – understood as high-
class cultural signals, which underscore processes of differentiation and 
exclusion – was originally developed to shed light on how social class 
inequalities were generated and reproduced by the (French) educational 
system (especially in Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; 1979). In his later works, 
Bourdieu (1986: 46) highlighted that cultural capital is an inherent aspect of 
every community and is applicable to different fields (social domains). The 
concept has not only been adopted to shed light on various processes of 
differentiation and exclusion in the national and cosmopolitan contexts but in 
the global student migration context as well (Kim, 2011, 2012; Carlson, 2013; 
Igarashi and Saito, 2014). Hence, applying the concept of cultural capital to 
EU mobility and, especially EU learning mobility, could also shed light on the 
extent to which processes within the EU echo broader developments linked to 
global (student) migration flows and the cosmopolitan outlook of (chiefly) 
Western travellers (see for example Calhoun, 2003; Weenink, 2008; Skey, 
2013). 
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Finally, notwithstanding the richness of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to research, our understanding of EU citizenship would greatly 
benefit from mixed-method research. The thesis underlined that there is an 
urgent requirement to incorporate the findings of qualitative evidence about 
the ideals of policy-makers regarding EU citizenship with EU-wide data on EU 
citizens’ attitudes and behaviour. It is only by attending seriously to both the 
top-down and bottom-up aspects of citizenship and citizenship practice that 
we will further extend our understanding of what is at stake in the on-going 
process of forging a dynamic bond between the EU and its citizens. 
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Appendix 2. Focus group questionnaire and 
demographical information  
Focus group guide – EU Groups 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Welcoming and pre-session questionnaire completion  
2. Introduction  
a. Introduction of researcher and the purpose of the focus group; 
Welcome everyone, my name is Nora Siklodi and I am a PhD 
candidate at the Department of Politics and International Relations at 
Royal Holloway, University of London (and a Visiting Researcher at the                                                                         
Political Science Department at Stockholm University).  
This focus group is organised as part of an academic project on young, 
migrant citizens’ experiences and practices of citizenship in the 
European Union. To shed light on these issues a number of focus 
groups, 8 to 10, are carried out in two cities Stockholm and London. 
Each session is recorded and later transcribed by me and the analysis 
of the discussions will be included in my doctoral thesis. Ultimately the 
discussions in these sessions will assist in outlining a citizenship model 
based on your actual practices and concepts. 
3. Guidelines 
Before we start this session, I would like to ask you to bear in mind a few 
things; 
a. This session is recorded, which means, inevitably, that your name will 
be included in the recordings. However, your name and personal details will 
be kept confidential and only I will have access to these. In the analysis, 
thesis and publications your names will be altered to keep your details 
confidential.  
435 
 
b. To ensure clarity of recordings, could I ask you to let everyone express 
their views and motivate each other to participate, but for only one person to 
talk at a time.  
For the same reason, I would be grateful if you could switch off your 
phones or put them on silent.  
c. This session is expected to last approximately 90 minutes. Please let 
me know in advance if you need to leave earlier than that. 
d. At the end of the session you will be given 100SEK in Sweden/ sweets 
and pizza in the United Kingdom as a token of thanks. 
About our discussion: 
This is an informal session, just like the ones you have with your friends at 
home. I prepared a couple of questions for the beginning and I will drop in a 
couple of questions or ideas to guide the discussion, but the emphasis here is 
on how you can relate to this topic. It is your experiences, practices opinions 
and attitudes that I am interested and value. 
Do you have any question about what I have said so far? 
4. Participants introduction - Recorded 
Please introduce yourselves. (Name and country of origin) 
II. DISCUSSION 
PART I. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
1. Preliminary Questions  
To start off the discussion, preliminary questions and issues are raised by the 
moderator on citizenship, migration and the European Union in general and 
the experiences of respondents.  
To begin with, we are going to discuss some very broad concepts which 
served as the basis of this research. Please feel free to express your opinions 
on the questions and also on what you hear from others. 
Q1. What does citizenship mean to you?  
Q2. What does it mean to be a European citizen?  
Have you ever thought of yourself in these terms? 
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Q3. Why did you leave your home country and choose Sweden/the UK for 
you studies/residence? Would you have gone somewhere else if you could? 
Cut off discussion after 20 minutes 
PART II. STRUCTURED DISCUSSION 
Now we are going to consider dimensions that are closely linked with the ideal 
of modern citizenship and its practices in Europe. 
2. Identity 
Q4. Do you agree or disagree that democratic citizenship should be based on 
nationality and national sentiments only? Why? 
Q5. Do you consider yourself firstly as a British/Swedish (use as applicable) or 
European, country of origin? Can you think of any personal experience(s) that 
made you feel this way? 
Q6. Do you think you would feel ‘more European’ if you lived in another 
member state? If so, please tell us why. 
3. Rights 
Apparently, we are all supposed to be equals in the EU. 
Q7. Can you think of any advantage or disadvantage of not being a native 
resident of Sweden/ the United Kingdom (use as applicable)?  
Q7.1. Have you experienced either? 
Q7.2. If this was a negative experience, how do you think these issues could 
be resolved?  
Q8. Do you think you gain additional benefits and rights due to European 
citizenship compared to your national entitlements? Please mention a couple 
of ‘benefits’ you know of or have experienced 
4. Participation 
Q9. Considering the various types of political participation that is available, for 
example voting, volunteering, local community action, working for an NGO, 
etc., could you tell us what forms of political participation have you done in 
Sweden/ the UK?  
Q9.1.Was there a specific reason, maybe issue, that made you participate this 
way? 
Everyone seems to think that participation in politics is the most important 
feature of citizenship, because people feel that they have a say in political 
decisions. To what extent do you agree? 
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Q10. How important do you think it is to be politically engaged in 
a. your country of origin? 
b. country of residence? 
c. Europe? 
Q10.1.Have you participated in all of these levels? How?  
Cut off discussion after 1 hour.  
 
PART III. STRUCTURED DISCUSSION CONT. 
In the following, we would like to learn a little more about your experiences as 
migrant Europeans in the European Union. 
5. Mobility 
You have now travelled a lot.  
Q11. Has travelling within the EU made you feel more or less European?  
How about your experiences in the UK/Sweden?  
Q12. Has living in Sweden/ the UK (use as applicable) changed the way in 
which you perceive politics as a whole? How? 
Q13. Where do you see yourself in 5-10 years’ time? 
6. Socialising Practices 
Q14. How do you differentiate, if at all, between acceptable and offensive 
behaviour and practices? Please give an example. 
The EU is working hard to bring together people by crossing borders. 
Q15. Do you relate differently to people with diverse cultures and background 
due to your experiences in Sweden/the UK? How? 
Q15.1. What type of people are you likely to socialise with? Why? 
Cut off discussion after 1hour 20 mins 
PART IV. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
And finally to finish off the discussion… 
7. Closing Questions 
Q16. How would you advise someone who has never heard of European 
citizenship and just realised that he/she is a European citizen? 
Q17. Has this discussion made you feel more conscious of European 
citizenship and EU citizens?  
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Would you like to get more information on this issue, maybe even directly from 
the EU? 
Q18. Would you like to add anything to what has already been said?  
Do you have any questions? 
 
Thank you for your time and participation! 
End discussion at 1 hour 30 mins 
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Focus group guide – Stayer Groups  
I. SAME INTRODUCTION AS FOR MOBILES  
II. DISCUSSION 
PART I. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
1. Preliminary Questions  
To start off the discussion, preliminary questions and issues are raised by the 
moderator on citizenship, migration and the European Union in general and 
the experiences of respondents.  
To begin with, we are going to discuss some very broad concepts, which 
served as the basis of the research. Please feel free to express your opinions 
on the questions and also on what you hear from others. 
Q1. What does citizenship mean to you?  
Q2. What does it mean to be a European citizen? Have you ever thought of 
yourself in these terms? 
Q3. Have you considered studying/ residing somewhere other than 
UK/Sweden (use as applicable)? Would you have done this, if you could? 
Where?  
Q3.1. What were the main reasons why you did not go abroad? 
Cut off discussion after 20 minutes. 
PART II. STRUCTURED DISCUSSION 
Now we are going to consider dimensions that are closely linked with the ideal 
of modern citizenship and its practices in Europe. 
2. Identity 
Q4. Do you agree or disagree that democratic citizenship should be based on 
nationality and national sentiments only? Why? 
Q5. Do you firstly consider yourself as a European or British/Swedish (use as 
applicable)? Can you think of any personal experience(s) that made you feel 
this way? 
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Q6. Do you think you would feel ‘more European’ if you lived in another 
member state? If so, please tell us why. 
3. Rights 
Apparently, we are all supposed to be equals in the EU. 
Q7. Do you think this is the case?  
Q7.1. Have you personally experienced something relevant? 
Q7.2. If this was a negative experience, how do you think these issues could 
be resolved?  
Q8. Do you think you gain additional benefits and rights due to European 
citizenship compared to your national entitlements? Please mention a couple 
of ‘benefits’ you know of or have experienced 
4. Participation 
Q9. Considering the various types of political participation that is available, for 
example voting, volunteering, local community action, working for an NGO, 
etc., could you tell us what forms of political participation have you done?  
Q9.1.Was there a specific reason, maybe issue that made you participate this 
way? 
Everyone seems to think that participation in politics is the most important 
feature of citizenship, because people feel that they have a say in political 
decisions. To what extent do you agree? 
Q10. How important do you think it is to be politically engaged at the 
d. Local level? 
e. National level? 
f. European level? 
Q10.1.Have you participated in all of these levels? How?  
Cut off discussion after 1 hour.  
PART III. STRUCTURED DISCUSSION CONT. 
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In the following, I would like to learn a little more about your experiences as 
non-migrant European citizens. 
5. Mobility 
Q11. Have you ever made use of your freedom of movement rights within the 
EU, for what reasons and why?  
If not, how often do you travel outside Sweden/ UK and why? 
Q12. Where do you see yourself in 5-10 years time? 
6. Socialising Practices 
Q13. How do you differentiate, if at all, between acceptable and offensive 
behaviour and practices? Please give an example. 
The EU is working hard to bring together people by crossing borders. 
Q14. Do you relate differently to people with diverse cultures and background 
as a result? How? 
What type of people are you likely to socialise with? 
Cut off discussion after 1hour 20 mins 
PART IV. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
And finally to finish off the discussion… 
7. Closing Questions 
Q15. How would you advise someone who has never heard of European 
citizenship and just realised that he/she is a European citizen?  
Q16. Has this discussion made you feel more conscious of EU citizenship and 
citizens?  
Would you like to get more information on this issue, maybe even directly from 
the EU? 
Q17. Would you like to add anything to what has already been said? 
Do you have any questions? 
Thank you for your time and participation! 
End discussion around 1 hour 30 mins  
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A2.3. Demographic survey  
Nationality:          
  
Country of origin:         
  
Country of residence:        
   
Have you lived in other countries? If so, please tell us where and for how long: 
           
           
   
How long you have been living in Sweden?      
   
What are you studying?        
  
What is your age?         
  
Do you identify with any social or ethnic groups other than your national one? 
(Optional)          
    
In the following, please TICK the relevant box: 
Gender: 
1. Male 
2. Female 
Highest level of education (completed): 
1. A-levels / International Baccalaureate 
2. Bachelors/ First Degree 
3. Masters Degree 
4. PhD  
5. Other:           
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Focus group sample and coding 
EU Group 1, Sweden 
14 May 2012, Stockholm University 
 
EU Group 2, Sweden 
14 May 2012, Stockholm University 
  
Interview 
coding/ 
Demographical 
information
Italian Male Portuguese 
Male
German 
Female
French Male
Age 28 26 23 21
Gender M M F M
Country of 
origin Italy Portugal Germany France
Highest 
Education
BA BA BA A-levels
Length of time 
(months)
42 9 18 4
Subject
MA History 
and Political 
Science
MA Political 
Science
MA 
Peace 
and 
Conflict 
Studies
BA Political 
Science
Interview 
coding/ 
Demographical 
information
Age
Gender
French Male Bulgarian Female German 
Female
Italian Male Portuguese 
Male
British-
Hungarian 
Male
26 25 22 27 23 21
M F F M M M
Country of 
origin
Highest 
Education
Length of time 
(months)
Subject
France Bulgaria Germany Brazil Portugal Hungary
BA BA A-levels A-levels BA A-levels
1 9 42 10 10 9
Pre-Masters 
Language  
course 
MA Social 
Anthropology
BA Political 
Science and 
Economics
BA Political 
Science
MA Marketing BA Mechanical 
Engineering
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EU Group 3, Sweden 
16 May 2012, Stockholm University 
 
EU Group 4, Sweden 
28 May 2012, Stockholm University 
  
Interview 
coding/ 
Demographical 
information
Age
Gender
Hungarian 
Female
German 
Female
Lithuanian 
Male
French 
Male
25 22 25 23
F F M M
Country of 
origin
Highest 
Education
Length of time 
(months)
Subject
Hungary Germany Lithuania France
MA A-levels BA A-levels
24 10 36 10
Media and 
Communication
Mathematics
MA 
International 
Relations
BA Urban 
Planning
Interview 
coding/ 
Demographical 
information
Age
Gender
Italian 
Male (2)
Italian Male 
(1)
Polish Female 
(2)
Bulgarian 
Female 
Romanian 
Female (2)
French 
Male
Romanian 
Female (1)
Polish 
Female (1)
22 24 21 20 24 23 27 23
M M F F F M F F
Country of 
origin
Highest 
Education
Length of time 
(months)
Subject
Italian Italian Poland Bulgarian Romanian French Romanian Polish
A-levels A-levels A-levels A-levels BA BA BA BA
5 4 6 0.5 23 9 21 6
BA 
Physics
BA Politics, 
Erasmus
BA Culture 
and Literature 
of English 
speaking 
areas
BA Political 
Science
MA Media, 
communication 
and 
anthropology
MA 
Geography
MA Media 
and 
Communic
ation
MA 
European 
Studies
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Swedish Control Group, 
15 May 2012, Stockholm University 
 
EU Group 1, UK 
26 February 2013, Royal Holloway  
 
  
Interview 
coding/ 
Demographical 
information
Age
Gender
Swedish Female 
(4)
Swedish 
Female (3)
Swedish 
Female (5)
Swedish 
Female (7)
Swedish Female 
(1)
Swedish 
Female (2)
Swedish 
Female (6)
25 19 21 23 24 19 28
F F F F F F F
Country of 
origin
Highest 
Education
Length of time 
(months)
Subject
Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden
A -levels A-levels A-levels A-levels A-levels A-levels MA
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
BA Business and 
Political Science
BA Political 
Science
BA French
BA 
Sociology 
and Political 
Science
BA Political 
Science and 
Business 
Administration
BA Business 
and Political 
Science
PhD Politics - 
EU 
institutions
Interview coding/ 
Demographical 
Information
German 
Male Dutch Male Italian Male
German 
Female
Italian 
Female
Romanian 
Female
German-
Swiss 
Female
Age 28 25 20 22 24 22 23
Gender M M M F F F F
Nationality German Dutch Italian German Italian Romanian
German and 
Swiss
Country of origin Germany Netherlands Italy Germany Italy Romania/Mo
ldova
Highest 
Education
MA MA A-levels A-levels A-levels A-levels A-levels
Length of time 
(months)
48 4 48 30 36 48 30
Subject
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Economics 
with Political 
studies
Geography 
and Politics 
and 
International 
Relations
Geography 
and Politics 
and 
International 
Relations
European 
Studies
Politics and 
International 
Relations
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EU Group 2, UK 
27 February 2013, Royal Holloway  
 
EU Group 3, UK 
27 February 2013, Royal Holloway  
 
 
  
Interview coding/ 
Demographical 
Information
Age
Gender
Nationality
Country of origin
Highest 
Education
Length of time 
(months)
Subject
Finnish 
Female (1)
Finnish 
Female (2)
French-
British 
Female
German 
Male
21 21 20 20
F F F M
Finnish Finnish
French-
British German
Finland Finland UK Germany
FB IB A-levels IB
30 36 - 30
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Interview coding/ 
Demographical 
Information
Age
Gender
Nationality
Country of origin
Highest 
Education
Length of time 
(months)
Subject
Swedish 
Female
Swedish 
Male
Italian 
Female
German-
British 
Female
Dutch 
Female
23 20 21 20
F M F F F
American 
Swedish Swedish Italian German Dutch
Sweden Sweden Italy Germany Netherlands
IB IB IB IB IB
36 24 48 60 18
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Politics and 
International 
Relations
European 
Studies
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Economics, 
Politics and 
International 
Relations
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EU Group 4, UK 
1 March 2013, Royal Holloway  
 
UK Control Group 
27 February 2013, Royal Holloway  
 
Interview coding/ 
Demographical 
Information
Age
Gender
Nationality
Country of origin
Highest 
Education
Length of time 
(months)
Subject
Italian- 
Mexican 
Female
French Female 
(1) French Female (2)
German 
Female (2)
German 
Female (1)
Italian 
Female
French 
Female (3)
Austrian 
Female
21 20 19 20 19 20 19 20
F F F F F F F F
Italian- 
Mexican French French German German Italian French Austrian
Italy France France Germany Germany Russia France Austria
A-levels French 
Baccalaureate
French 
Baccalaureate
A-levels IB/ EB IB IB A-levels
24 23 24 24 24 24 24 24
European 
Studies
European 
Studies
European Studies 
with Spanish
European 
Studies with 
Spanish
European 
Studies with 
Spanish
European 
Studies
European 
Studies with 
Italian
European 
Studies with 
Spanish
Interview coding/ 
Demographical 
Information
Age
Gender
Nationality
Country of origin
Highest 
Education
Length of time 
(months)
Subject
British Male 
(2)
British 
Female (2)
British Male 
(3)
British Male 
(4)
British 
Female (1)
British-Swiss 
Male
British 
Female (3)
British 
Female (4)
British 
Female (5)
British 
Female (6)
British-
Canadian 
Male
British Male 
(1)
British Male 
(5)
21 21 21 20 21 21 20 21 23 21 27 23 23
M F M M F M F F F F M M M
British British English British English
British, 
Swiss, 
American
British British British British
British 
Canadian British British
UK 
(England)
UK England UK 
(England)
England England England India England England UK UK UK
A-levels A-levels A-levels A-levels A-levels A-levels A-levels A-levels A-levels A-levels MA MA MA
3 yrs. in 
London
21 yrs. 20 yrs. 1,5 yrs. in 
London
2.5 yrs. in 
London
20 yrs. 21 yrs. 5 yrs. in 
London
21 yrs. 1 yr. 20 yrs. 23 yrs.
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Politics
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Politics
Computer 
Science
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Politics and 
International 
Relations
European 
studies with 
Spanish
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Politics and 
International 
Relations
Politics and 
International 
Relations
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Appendix 3: EU citizenship rights today: an evaluation 
Current list of legislation on EU citizenship110 
Primary legislation 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 01 December 2009 
Treaty on the European Union111 01 December 2009 
Declaration on Nationality 01 November 1993 
Secondary legislation 
Citizenship Directive 
(Council Directive 2004/38/EC) 
 
29 April 2004 
Long-term Residence Directive  
(Council Directive 2003/109/EC)  
 
25 Nov 2003 
Municipal Elections Directive 
(Council Directive 94/80/EC) 
 
19 December 1994 
Direct Elections Act 
Amendment of Direct Elections Act 
European Parliament Elections Directive 
(Council Directive 93/109/EC) 
Amendment to European Parliament Elections 
Directive 
(Council Directive 2013/1/EU) 
10 August 1976 
25 June 2002 
 
06 December 1993 
 
 
27 January 2013 
European Citizens’ Initiative Regulation 
European Parliament and Council Regulation 
211/2011/EU  
16 February 2011 
 
  
                                            
110 For a more detailed list of current EU legislation which has implications for EU citizenship 
visit EUDO (2014). 
111 Originally introduced in 1993. It was then amended by the Treaty of Nice, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and finally by the TFEU in 2009. It is legally binding in its most recent, 2012 
version.  
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Overview of citizens’ EU rights: potentials and limitations 
Official 
Document 
EU Citizens' 
Rights 
Potentials Limitations 
Article 18, 
TFEU 
Non-
discrimination 
on the basis 
of nationality  
Observes human rights as 
citizenship rights. It thus, 
potentially, strengthens EU 
citizenship rights and opens 
an avenue for supra, post-
national and cosmopolitan 
citizenship models in the EU 
(Soysal 1994; Habermas, 
2001; Kostakopoulou, 2007).  
Provides additional rights to 
EU mobiles. 
It is too broad and applies to all 
residents in the EU, blurring the 
distinction between EU citizens and 
non-citizens. As such, it should not 
be included under the citizenship 
provisions of the TFEU. 
It is only relevant to intra-EU 
mobiles – has not been applied to 
the case of stayers to limit the 
prospect of reverse discrimination 
(Shuibhne, 2010). 
Article 19, 
TFEU 
Non-
discrimination 
on the basis 
of 
intersecting 
social factors  
Same as above. 
Besides, it provides rights to 
all EU residents and has 
served as the foundation for 
secondary legislation 
preventing discrimination 
(Kostakopoulou, 2014). 
Same as above.  
The recent reports by the 
Commission (2013j, k, l) highlight 
that the resulting directives have not 
actually been implemented by 
member states. 
Article 20(1), 
TFEU  
Also  
Article 9, 
TEU 
Introduction 
of EU 
citizenship 
and its bi-
level 
structure  
They introduce the first 
transnational citizenship 
model (Heater, 2004b). 
They give a clear indication of 
who EU citizens and non-
citizens are (Kochenov, 
2009). 
They afford a derogative character 
to EU citizenship (Hansen, 2009), 
making it dependent on member 
state citizenships (Delanty, 1997). 
Article 20(2), 
TFEU  
Preliminary 
summary of 
citizens' 
rights (and 
duties), and 
limitations 
applicable to 
these rights 
It provides substance to EU 
citizenship. This is the first 
time citizens’ rights are listed 
in the EU Treaty. 
It is too abstract.  
The duties of EU citizens are 
motioned but not defined here or 
elsewhere in the Treaty.  
It makes EU rights subjected to the 
limitations and conditions of the 
Treaty, most of which are in fact 
defined by secondary law. 
Article 21(1), 
TFEU 
Free 
movement 
and 
residence 
within EU 
It enlists and details mobility 
and residency rights as the 
first EU right. The 
Commission’s (2010a, b, 
2013a, b, c) reports have 
underscored that these rights 
are simultaneous with EU 
It is not universal because the 
secondary legislation makes 
distinction between EU mobiles, 
depending on the length of their 
residence (under and over 3 
months). The residency rights of 
mobiles who are staying for over 3 
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citizenship per se. As a 
result, any restriction on 
these rights has been 
narrowly interpreted 
(Kostakopoulou, 2014). 
months are linked to their sufficient 
economic resources.  
Also allows for limitations to be 
imposed by member states on the 
grounds of national security and 
public interests – these are decided 
by the member states (Aradau et al., 
2013). 
Article 22, 
TFEU  
EU mobiles 
rights to vote 
and stand as 
a candidate 
at the local 
(Art. 22(1)) 
and EP 
elections (Art. 
22(2)) 
It grants political rights to EU 
mobiles – one that is 
comparable to the rights of 
member state citizens (Shaw, 
2007). 
It introduced representative 
democracy at the EU level. 
 
It only mentions the voting rights of 
EU mobiles. There is no discussion 
of stayers’ political rights.  
EU mobiles do not receive any right 
to participate in the national 
elections in the host country. This 
may limit their ability to fully 
integrate there (European 
Commission, 2012b).  
It allows member states to introduce 
registration or residency 
requirements (Directive 94/80/EC, 
93/109/EC and 2013/1/EU). 
Article 23, 
TFEU  
Diplomatic 
protection 
outside the 
territory of the 
EU 
Applicable to a fair portion of 
EU citizens – those who stay 
in a TC, amounting to around 
30 million in 2012 (Eurostat, 
2014a). 
Since it is to be coordinated 
by the Commission (2010a), 
it might be the first 
supranational level right of 
EU citizens. 
After 20 years this right is still not 
fully introduced in national laws and 
embassy members are not informed 
about citizens’ entitlement 
(European Commission, 2011d). 
Originally, it was to be implemented 
and coordinated by member states 
(Council Decision 2002/772/EC, 
Euratom). Due to their lateness, the 
Commission (2010a) has recently 
adopted a more dynamic role. Even 
then, it is more of an inter-state than 
supranational right because in order 
for citizens to be able to use this 
right, their country of origin must 
guarantee and pay all costs 
(European Commission, 2011d). 
A secondary legislation to 
implement this right is still only in the 
making.  
Article 24, 
TFEU 
Right to 
petition to the 
It gives direct access to all 
EU residents to EU level 
It is not in the citizenship title of the 
TFEU and not only relevant for EU 
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EP and 
Ombudsman 
in any of the 
EU’s official 
languages  
institutions. 
Introduces deliberative 
democracy at the EU level 
(European Commission, 
2008). 
citizens. Hence, it blurs the 
distinction between citizens and 
non-citizens once again. 
Though an increasing number of 
residents make use of this right 
each year, their total is still less than 
1% of the EU’s population 
(European Commission, 2010a). 
Article 24, 
TFEU 
Citizens' 
Initiative  
It introduces direct 
democracy at the EU level 
and grants agenda-setting 
right to citizens.  
 
There are initial composition and 
qualification requirements for 
projects to be recognised formally 
by the Commission (European 
Commission, 2010e).  
Even if a CI has been recognised 
and necessary signatories collected, 
the Commission is not obliged to 
propose EU law (EU Regulation 
211/ 2011). For example, the 
Commission stalled the process in 
the case of the very first CI that 
passed these requirements, the 
right2water initiative. 
ECFR 
Title V: 
Citizens' 
Rights 
 
Summarises 
the rights of 
EU citizens 
and 
introduces 
additional 
rights, 
including 
citizens’ right 
to good 
administratio
n (Art. 41) 
and access to 
documents 
(Art. 42) 
It is on the same footing as 
EU treaties since 2009 
(European Commission, 
2013j). Thus, whenever a 
new EU legislation is drawn 
up, references to the ECFR 
must be made (Council 
Decision 2007/252/JHA, 
European Commission 
2013j). 
It enhances the ‘rights-based’ 
model of EU citizenship 
pointing to its supranational 
potentials (Kochenov, 2012). 
It is not included in the text of the 
TFEU, blurring its actual impact on 
policies. 
UK and Poland has opt-outs, thus it 
does not actually apply across the 
EU. 
It only adds administrative rights to 
the existing list of EU citizens’ rights. 
Social rights are introduced under 
separate titles and most apply to all 
EU residents (Title V and III 
respectively). 
Council 
Directive 
2004/38/EC, 
“Citizenship 
Directive” 
Regulates 
citizens’ intra-
EU mobility 
Implements the rules 
applicable in the context of 
EU citizens’ (and their 
families) mobility, and 
guarantees their non-
discrimination on the basis of 
Although called the “citizenship 
directive”, it only regulates intra-EU 
mobility.  
Introduces three categories of EU 
mobiles depending on the length of 
time they spend in the host state 
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nationality. 
It makes the host state 
responsible for the social 
welfare of EU mobiles.  
(short-term, long-term and 
permanent movers). Thus, it paves 
the way for differentiation among EU 
mobiles. 
Its structure fits workers' needs, but 
there is a need for other directives 
for different groups, especially 
visiting EU students.112  
Since it is implemented by member 
states, they can limit citizens’ 
mobility and have already done so. 
By including TCNs mobility rights, it 
blurs the distinction between EU 
citizens and ‘the other’ (For a recent 
evaluation see Guild, Peers and 
Tomkin, 2014).  
Council 
Directive 
94/80/EC  
Regulates EU 
mobiles’ right 
to vote and 
stand as 
candidates in 
the municipal 
elections (at 
the host 
state) 
It is a move towards 
implementing a state-like 
citizenship at the EU level 
(European Commission, 
1986) and making decisions 
close to citizens (European 
Commission, 2012a). 
It assists the integration of 
EU mobiles into the host 
country, which has been 
shown to matter most to 
mobiles (Favell, 2010).  
Limitations have been introduced by 
member states including registration 
or residency requirements 
(European Commission, 2012a). 
Thus, the actual experiences of EU 
mobiles differ across state borders. 
In fact, some stated were exempt 
until recently (European 
Commission, 2003, 2005, 2007b). 
Council 
Directive 
93/109/EC, 
Amended by  
Council 
Directive 
2013/1/EU 
Regulates EU 
mobiles’ right 
to vote and 
stand as a 
candidates in 
the EP 
elections (at 
the host 
state) 
It summarises the rights and 
limitations of EU mobiles in 
the host state and gives them 
a ‘direct’ say in EU level 
policy-making. 
Same as above (European 
Commission, 2003; 2005; 2007b 
2010f).  
Only refers to EU mobiles, no 
discussion about stayers’ rights. 
The 2013 amendment has not been 
fully applied yet and took years of 
negotiations to be ratified (European 
Commission, 2006b, 2010f; 2013f, 
g). 
EU 
Regulation 
211/2011 
 
Citizens’ 
Initiative 
It introduces participatory 
democracy at the EU level 
(Garcia and Greenwood, 
2014).  
There are initial composition and 
qualification requirements for 
projects to be recognised formally 
by the Commission (European 
                                            
112 Yet DG EMPL (2013e) has proposed another, more specific directive on workers’ mobility. 
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A supranational right. The 
relevant laws are 
implemented and drafted by 
the Commission.  
It is dynamic and allows for 
citizens to embrace 
alternative forms of 
engagement. Thus it raises 
new questions about the EU’s 
legitimacy problem. 
Commission, 2010f).  
Even if a CI overcomes these 
hurdles the Commission is not 
obliged to propose an EU law. Thus, 
it underlines the ‘elitist’ character of 
the EU’s policy-making process (Hix 
and Høyland, 2011). 
94/262/ 
ECSC, EC, 
Euratom: 
Decision of 
the EP 
Right to 
petition the 
Ombudsman 
It guarantees citizens’ direct 
access to an EU level political 
actor. 
Long-term residents can also make 
use of this right. Hence it blurs the 
distinction between EU citizens and 
‘the other’.  
 
 
